Blackwater’s Secret War in Pakistan

24 11 2009

Blackwater’s Secret War in Pakistan

By Jeremy Scahill

The source, who has worked on covert US military programs for years, including in Afghanistan and Pakistan, has direct knowledge of Blackwater’s involvement. He spoke to The Nation on condition of anonymity because the program is classified. The source said that the program is so “compartmentalized” that senior figures within the Obama administration and the US military chain of command may not be aware of its existence.

The White House did not return calls or email messages seeking comment for this story. Capt. John Kirby, the spokesperson for Adm. Michael Mullen, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told The Nation, “We do not discuss current operations one way or the other, regardless of their nature.” A defense official, on background, specifically denied that Blackwater performs work on drone strikes or intelligence for JSOC in Pakistan. “We don’t have any contracts to do that work for us. We don’t contract that kind of work out, period,” the official said. “There has not been, and is not now, contracts between JSOC and that organization for these types of services.” The previously unreported program, the military intelligence source said, is distinct from the CIA assassination program that the agency’s director, Leon Panetta, announced he had canceled in June 2009. “This is a parallel operation to the CIA,” said the source. “They are two separate beasts.” The program puts Blackwater at the epicenter of a US military operation within the borders of a nation against which the United States has not declared war–knowledge that could further strain the already tense relations between the United States and Pakistan. In 2006, the United States and Pakistan struck a deal that authorized JSOC to enter Pakistan to hunt Osama bin Laden with the understanding that Pakistan would deny it had given permission. Officially, the United States is not supposed to have any active military operations in the country. Blackwater, which recently changed its name to Xe Services and US Training Center, denies the company is operating in Pakistan. “Xe Services has only one employee in Pakistan performing construction oversight for the U.S. Government,” Blackwater spokesperson Mark Corallo said in a statement to The Nation, adding that the company has “no other operations of any kind in Pakistan.”

A former senior executive at Blackwater confirmed the military intelligence source’s claim that the company is working in Pakistan for the CIA and JSOC, the premier counterterrorism and covert operations force within the military. He said that Blackwater is also working for the Pakistani government on a subcontract with an Islamabad-based security firm that puts US Blackwater operatives on the ground with Pakistani forces in counter-terrorism operations, including house raids and border interdictions, in the North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan. This arrangement, the former executive said, allows the Pakistani government to utilize former US Special Operations forces who now work for Blackwater while denying an official US military presence in the country. He also confirmed that Blackwater has a facility in Karachi and has personnel deployed elsewhere in Pakistan. The former executive spoke on condition of anonymity.

His account and that of the military intelligence source were borne out by a US military source who has knowledge of Special Forces actions in Pakistan and Afghanistan. When asked about Blackwater’s covert work for JSOC in Pakistan, this source, who also asked for anonymity, told The Nation, “From my information that I have, that is absolutely correct,” adding, “There’s no question that’s occurring.”

“It wouldn’t surprise me because we’ve outsourced nearly everything,” said Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, who served as Secretary of State Colin Powell’s chief of staff from 2002 to 2005, when told of Blackwater’s role in Pakistan. Wilkerson said that during his time in the Bush administration, he saw the beginnings of Blackwater’s involvement with the sensitive operations of the military and CIA. “Part of this, of course, is an attempt to get around the constraints the Congress has placed on DoD. If you don’t have sufficient soldiers to do it, you hire civilians to do it. I mean, it’s that simple. It would not surprise me.”

The Counterterrorism Tag Team in Karachi

The covert JSOC program with Blackwater in Pakistan dates back to at least 2007, according to the military intelligence source. The current head of JSOC is Vice Adm. William McRaven, who took over the post from Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who headed JSOC from 2003 to 2008 before being named the top US commander in Afghanistan. Blackwater’s presence in Pakistan is “not really visible, and that’s why nobody has cracked down on it,” said the source. Blackwater’s operations in Pakistan, he said, are not done through State Department contracts or publicly identified Defense contracts. “It’s Blackwater via JSOC, and it’s a classified no-bid [contract] approved on a rolling basis.” The main JSOC/Blackwater facility in Karachi, according to the source, is nondescript: three trailers with various generators, satellite phones and computer systems are used as a makeshift operations center. “It’s a very rudimentary operation,” says the source. “I would compare it to [CIA] outposts in Kurdistan or any of the Special Forces outposts. It’s very bare bones, and that’s the point.”

Blackwater’s work for JSOC in Karachi is coordinated out of a Task Force based at Bagram Air Base in neighboring Afghanistan, according to the military intelligence source. While JSOC technically runs the operations in Karachi, he said, it is largely staffed by former US special operations soldiers working for a division of Blackwater, once known as Blackwater SELECT, and intelligence analysts working for a Blackwater affiliate, Total Intelligence Solutions (TIS), which is owned by Blackwater’s founder, Erik Prince. The military source said that the name Blackwater SELECT may have been changed recently. Total Intelligence, which is run out of an office on the ninth floor of a building in the Ballston area of Arlington, Virginia, is staffed by former analysts and operatives from the CIA, DIA, FBI and other agencies. It is modeled after the CIA’s counterterrorism center. In Karachi, TIS runs a “media-scouring/open-source network,” according to the source. Until recently, Total Intelligence was run by two former top CIA officials, Cofer Black and Robert Richer, both of whom have left the company. In Pakistan, Blackwater is not using either its original name or its new moniker, Xe Services, according to the former Blackwater executive. “They are running most of their work through TIS because the other two [names] have such a stain on them,” he said. Corallo, the Blackwater spokesperson, denied that TIS or any other division or affiliate of Blackwater has any personnel in Pakistan.

The US military intelligence source said that Blackwater’s classified contracts keep getting renewed at the request of JSOC. Blackwater, he said, is already so deeply entrenched that it has become a staple of the US military operations in Pakistan. According to the former Blackwater executive, “The politics that go with the brand of BW is somewhat set aside because what you’re doing is really one military guy to another.” Blackwater’s first known contract with the CIA for operations in Afghanistan was awarded in 2002 and was for work along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

One of the concerns raised by the military intelligence source is that some Blackwater personnel are being given rolling security clearances above their approved clearances. Using Alternative Compartmentalized Control Measures (ACCMs), he said, the Blackwater personnel are granted clearance to a Special Access Program, the bureaucratic term used to describe highly classified “black” operations. “With an ACCM, the security manager can grant access to you to be exposed to and operate within compartmentalized programs far above ‘secret’–even though you have no business doing so,” said the source. It allows Blackwater personnel that “do not have the requisite security clearance or do not hold a security clearance whatsoever to participate in classified operations by virtue of trust,” he added. “Think of it as an ultra-exclusive level above top secret. That’s exactly what it is: a circle of love.” Blackwater, therefore, has access to “all source” reports that are culled in part from JSOC units in the field. “That’s how a lot of things over the years have been conducted with contractors,” said the source. “We have contractors that regularly see things that top policy-makers don’t unless they ask.”

According to the source, Blackwater has effectively marketed itself as a company whose operatives have “conducted lethal direct action missions and now, for a price, you can have your own planning cell. JSOC just ate that up,” he said, adding, “They have a sizable force in Pakistan–not for any nefarious purpose if you really want to look at it that way–but to support a legitimate contract that’s classified for JSOC.” Blackwater’s Pakistan JSOC contracts are secret and are therefore shielded from public oversight, he said. The source is not sure when the arrangement with JSOC began, but he says that a spin-off of Blackwater SELECT “was issued a no-bid contract for support to shooters for a JSOC Task Force and they kept extending it.” Some of the Blackwater personnel, he said, work undercover as aid workers. “Nobody even gives them a second thought.”

The military intelligence source said that the Blackwater/JSOC Karachi operation is referred to as “Qatar cubed,” in reference to the US forward operating base in Qatar that served as the hub for the planning and implementation of the US invasion of Iraq. “This is supposed to be the brave new world,” he says. “This is the Jamestown of the new millennium and it’s meant to be a lily pad. You can jump off to Uzbekistan, you can jump back over the border, you can jump sideways, you can jump northwest. It’s strategically located so that they can get their people wherever they have to without having to wrangle with the military chain of command in Afghanistan, which is convoluted. They don’t have to deal with that because they’re operating under a classified mandate.”

In addition to planning drone strikes and operations against suspected Al Qaeda and Taliban forces in Pakistan for both JSOC and the CIA, the Blackwater team in Karachi also helps plan missions for JSOC inside Uzbekistan against the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, according to the military intelligence source. Blackwater does not actually carry out the operations, he said, which are executed on the ground by JSOC forces. “That piqued my curiosity and really worries me because I don’t know if you noticed but I was never told we are at war with Uzbekistan,” he said. “So, did I miss something, did Rumsfeld come back into power?”

Pakistan’s Military Contracting Maze

Blackwater, according to the military intelligence source, is not doing the actual killing as part of its work in Pakistan. “The SELECT personnel are not going into places with private aircraft and going after targets,” he said. “It’s not like Blackwater SELECT people are running around assassinating people.” Instead, US Special Forces teams carry out the plans developed in part by Blackwater. The military intelligence source drew a distinction between the Blackwater operatives who work for the State Department, which he calls “Blackwater Vanilla,” and the seasoned Special Forces veterans who work on the JSOC program. “Good or bad, there’s a small number of people who know how to pull off an operation like that. That’s probably a good thing,” said the source. “It’s the Blackwater SELECT people that have and continue to plan these types of operations because they’re the only people that know how and they went where the money was. It’s not trigger-happy fucks, like some of the PSD [Personal Security Detail] guys. These are not people that believe that Barack Obama is a socialist, these are not people that kill innocent civilians. They’re very good at what they do.”

The former Blackwater executive, when asked for confirmation that Blackwater forces were not actively killing people in Pakistan, said, “that’s not entirely accurate.” While he concurred with the military intelligence source’s description of the JSOC and CIA programs, he pointed to another role Blackwater is allegedly playing in Pakistan, not for the US government but for Islamabad. According to the executive, Blackwater works on a subcontract for Kestral Logistics, a powerful Pakistani firm, which specializes in military logistical support, private security and intelligence consulting. It is staffed with former high-ranking Pakistani army and government officials. While Kestral’s main offices are in Pakistan, it also has branches in several other countries.

A spokesperson for the US State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC), which is responsible for issuing licenses to US corporations to provide defense-related services to foreign governments or entities, would neither confirm nor deny for The Nation that Blackwater has a license to work in Pakistan or to work with Kestral. “We cannot help you,” said department spokesperson David McKeeby after checking with the relevant DDTC officials. “You’ll have to contact the companies directly.” Blackwater’s Corallo said the company has “no operations of any kind” in Pakistan other than the one employee working for the DoD. Kestral did not respond to inquiries from The Nation.

According to federal lobbying records, Kestral recently hired former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega, who served in that post from 2003 to 2005, to lobby the US government, including the State Department, USAID and Congress, on foreign affairs issues “regarding [Kestral's] capabilities to carry out activities of interest to the United States.” Noriega was hired through his firm, Vision Americas, which he runs with Christina Rocca, a former CIA operations official who served as assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs from 2001 to 2006 and was deeply involved in shaping US policy toward Pakistan. In October 2009, Kestral paid Vision Americas $15,000 and paid a Vision Americas-affiliated firm, Firecreek Ltd., an equal amount to lobby on defense and foreign policy issues.

For years, Kestral has done a robust business in defense logistics with the Pakistani government and other nations, as well as top US defense companies. Blackwater owner Erik Prince is close with Kestral CEO Liaquat Ali Baig, according to the former Blackwater executive. “Ali and Erik have a pretty close relationship,” he said. “They’ve met many times and struck a deal, and they [offer] mutual support for one another.” Working with Kestral, he said, Blackwater has provided convoy security for Defense Department shipments destined for Afghanistan that would arrive in the port at Karachi. Blackwater, according to the former executive, would guard the supplies as they were transported overland from Karachi to Peshawar and then west through the Torkham border crossing, the most important supply route for the US military in Afghanistan.

According to the former executive, Blackwater operatives also integrate with Kestral’s forces in sensitive counterterrorism operations in the North-West Frontier Province, where they work in conjunction with the Pakistani Interior Ministry’s paramilitary force, known as the Frontier Corps (alternately referred to as “frontier scouts”). The Blackwater personnel are technically advisers, but the former executive said that the line often gets blurred in the field. Blackwater “is providing the actual guidance on how to do [counterterrorism operations] and Kestral’s folks are carrying a lot of them out, but they’re having the guidance and the overwatch from some BW guys that will actually go out with the teams when they’re executing the job,” he said. “You can see how that can lead to other things in the border areas.” He said that when Blackwater personnel are out with the Pakistani teams, sometimes its men engage in operations against suspected terrorists. “You’ve got BW guys that are assisting… and they’re all going to want to go on the jobs–so they’re going to go with them,” he said. “So, the things that you’re seeing in the news about how this Pakistani military group came in and raided this house or did this or did that–in some of those cases, you’re going to have Western folks that are right there at the house, if not in the house.” Blackwater, he said, is paid by the Pakistani government through Kestral for consulting services. “That gives the Pakistani government the cover to say, ‘Hey, no, we don’t have any Westerners doing this. It’s all local and our people are doing it.’ But it gets them the expertise that Westerners provide for [counterterrorism]-related work.”

The military intelligence source confirmed Blackwater works with the Frontier Corps, saying, “There’s no real oversight. It’s not really on people’s radar screen.”

In October, in response to Pakistani news reports that a Kestral warehouse in Islamabad was being used to store heavy weapons for Blackwater, the US Embassy in Pakistan released a statement denying the weapons were being used by “a private American security contractor.” The statement said, “Kestral Logistics is a private logistics company that handles the importation of equipment and supplies provided by the United States to the Government of Pakistan. All of the equipment and supplies were imported at the request of the Government of Pakistan, which also certified the shipments.”

Who is Behind the Drone Attacks?

Since President Barack Obama was inaugurated, the United States has expanded drone bombing raids in Pakistan. Obama first ordered a drone strike against targets in North and South Waziristan on January 23, and the strikes have been conducted consistently ever since. The Obama administration has now surpassed the number of Bush-era strikes in Pakistan and has faced fierce criticism from Pakistan and some US lawmakers over civilian deaths. A drone attack in June killed as many as sixty people attending a Taliban funeral.

In August, the New York Times reported that Blackwater works for the CIA at “hidden bases in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where the company’s contractors assemble and load Hellfire missiles and 500-pound laser-guided bombs on remotely piloted Predator aircraft.” In February, The Times of London obtained a satellite image of a secret CIA airbase in Shamsi, in Pakistan’s southwestern province of Baluchistan, showing three drone aircraft. The New York Times also reported that the agency uses a secret base in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to strike in Pakistan.

The military intelligence source says that the drone strike that reportedly killed Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, his wife and his bodyguards in Waziristan in August was a CIA strike, but that many others attributed in media reports to the CIA are actually JSOC strikes. “Some of these strikes are attributed to OGA [Other Government Agency, intelligence parlance for the CIA], but in reality it’s JSOC and their parallel program of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] because they also have access to UAVs. So when you see some of these hits, especially the ones with high civilian casualties, those are almost always JSOC strikes.” The Pentagon has stated bluntly, “There are no US military strike operations being conducted in Pakistan.”

The military intelligence source also confirmed that Blackwater continues to work for the CIA on its drone bombing program in Pakistan, as previously reported in the New York Times, but added that Blackwater is working on JSOC’s drone bombings as well. “It’s Blackwater running the program for both CIA and JSOC,” said the source. When civilians are killed, “people go, ‘Oh, it’s the CIA doing crazy shit again unchecked.’ Well, at least 50 percent of the time, that’s JSOC [hitting] somebody they’ve identified through HUMINT [human intelligence] or they’ve culled the intelligence themselves or it’s been shared with them and they take that person out and that’s how it works.”

The military intelligence source says that the CIA operations are subject to Congressional oversight, unlike the parallel JSOC bombings. “Targeted killings are not the most popular thing in town right now and the CIA knows that,” he says. “Contractors and especially JSOC personnel working under a classified mandate are not [overseen by Congress], so they just don’t care. If there’s one person they’re going after and there’s thirty-four people in the building, thirty-five people are going to die. That’s the mentality.” He added, “They’re not accountable to anybody and they know that. It’s an open secret, but what are you going to do, shut down JSOC?”

In addition to working on covert action planning and drone strikes, Blackwater SELECT also provides private guards to perform the sensitive task of security for secret US drone bases, JSOC camps and Defense Intelligence Agency camps inside Pakistan, according to the military intelligence source.

Mosharraf Zaidi, a well-known Pakistani journalist who has served as a consultant for the UN and European Union in Pakistan and Afghanistan, says that the Blackwater/JSOC program raises serious questions about the norms of international relations. “The immediate question is, How do you define the active pursuit of military objectives in a country with which not only have you not declared war but that is supposedly a front-line non-NATO ally in the US struggle to contain extremist violence coming out of Afghanistan and the border regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan?” asks Zaidi, who is currently a columnist for The News, the biggest English-language daily in Pakistan. “Let’s forget Blackwater for a second. What this is confirming is that there are US military operations in Pakistan that aren’t about logistics or getting food to Bagram; that are actually about the exercise of physical violence, physical force inside of Pakistani territory.”

JSOC: Rumsfeld and Cheney’s Extra Special Force

Colonel Wilkerson said that he is concerned that with General McChrystal’s elevation as the military commander of the Afghan war–which is increasingly seeping into Pakistan–there is a concomitant rise in JSOC’s power and influence within the military structure. “I don’t see how you can escape that; it’s just a matter of the way the authority flows and the power flows, and it’s inevitable, I think,” Wilkerson told The Nation. He added, “I’m alarmed when I see execute orders and combat orders that go out saying that the supporting force is Central Command and the supported force is Special Operations Command,” under which JSOC operates. “That’s backward. But that’s essentially what we have today.”

From 2003 to 2008 McChrystal headed JSOC, which is headquartered at Pope Air Force Base and Fort Bragg in North Carolina, where Blackwater’s 7,000-acre operating base is also situated. JSOC controls the Army’s Delta Force, the Navy’s SEAL Team 6, as well as the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment and 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the Air Force’s 24th Special Tactics Squadron. JSOC performs strike operations, reconnaissance in denied areas and special intelligence missions. Blackwater, which was founded by former Navy SEALs, employs scores of veteran Special Forces operators–which several former military officials pointed to as the basis for Blackwater’s alleged contracts with JSOC.

Since 9/11, many top-level Special Forces veterans have taken up employment with private firms, where they can make more money doing the highly specialized work they did in uniform. “The Blackwater individuals have the experience. A lot of these individuals are retired military, and they’ve been around twenty to thirty years and have experience that the younger Green Beret guys don’t,” said retired Army Lieut. Col. Jeffrey Addicott, a well-connected military lawyer who served as senior legal counsel for US Army Special Forces. “They’re known entities. Everybody knows who they are, what their capabilities are, and they’ve got the experience. They’re very valuable.”

“They make much more money being the smarts of these operations, planning hits in various countries and basing it off their experience in Chechnya, Bosnia, Somalia, Ethiopia,” said the military intelligence source. “They were there for all of these things, they know what the hell they’re talking about. And JSOC has unfortunately lost the institutional capability to plan within, so they hire back people that used to work for them and had already planned and executed these [types of] operations. They hired back people that jumped over to Blackwater SELECT and then pay them exorbitant amounts of money to plan future operations. It’s a ridiculous revolving door.”

While JSOC has long played a central role in US counterterrorism and covert operations, military and civilian officials who worked at the Defense and State Departments during the Bush administration described in interviews with The Nation an extremely cozy relationship that developed between the executive branch (primarily through Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) and JSOC. During the Bush era, Special Forces turned into a virtual stand-alone operation that acted outside the military chain of command and in direct coordination with the White House. Throughout the Bush years, it was largely General McChrystal who ran JSOC. “What I was seeing was the development of what I would later see in Iraq and Afghanistan, where Special Operations forces would operate in both theaters without the conventional commander even knowing what they were doing,” said Colonel Wilkerson. “That’s dangerous, that’s very dangerous. You have all kinds of mess when you don’t tell the theater commander what you’re doing.”

Wilkerson said that almost immediately after assuming his role at the State Department under Colin Powell, he saw JSOC being politicized and developing a close relationship with the executive branch. He saw this begin, he said, after his first Delta Force briefing at Fort Bragg. “I think Cheney and Rumsfeld went directly into JSOC. I think they went into JSOC at times, perhaps most frequently, without the SOCOM [Special Operations] commander at the time even knowing it. The receptivity in JSOC was quite good,” says Wilkerson. “I think Cheney was actually giving McChrystal instructions, and McChrystal was asking him for instructions.” He said the relationship between JSOC and Cheney and Rumsfeld “built up initially because Rumsfeld didn’t get the responsiveness. He didn’t get the can-do kind of attitude out of the SOCOM commander, and so as Rumsfeld was wont to do, he cut him out and went straight to the horse’s mouth. At that point you had JSOC operating as an extension of the [administration] doing things the executive branch–read: Cheney and Rumsfeld–wanted it to do. This would be more or less carte blanche. You need to do it, do it. It was very alarming for me as a conventional soldier.”

Wilkerson said the JSOC teams caused diplomatic problems for the United States across the globe. “When these teams started hitting capital cities and other places all around the world, [Rumsfeld] didn’t tell the State Department either. The only way we found out about it is our ambassadors started to call us and say, ‘Who the hell are these six-foot-four white males with eighteen-inch biceps walking around our capital cities?’ So we discovered this, we discovered one in South America, for example, because he actually murdered a taxi driver, and we had to get him out of there real quick. We rendered him–we rendered him home.”

As part of their strategy, Rumsfeld and Cheney also created the Strategic Support Branch (SSB), which pulled intelligence resources from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA for use in sensitive JSOC operations. The SSB was created using “reprogrammed” funds “without explicit congressional authority or appropriation,” according to the Washington Post. The SSB operated outside the military chain of command and circumvented the CIA’s authority on clandestine operations. Rumsfeld created it as part of his war to end “near total dependence on CIA.” Under US law, the Defense Department is required to report all deployment orders to Congress. But guidelines issued in January 2005 by former Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone stated that Special Operations forces may “conduct clandestine HUMINT operations…before publication” of a deployment order. This effectively gave Rumsfeld unilateral control over clandestine operations.

The military intelligence source said that when Rumsfeld was defense secretary, JSOC was deployed to commit some of the “darkest acts” in part to keep them concealed from Congress. “Everything can be justified as a military operation versus a clandestine intelligence performed by the CIA, which has to be informed to Congress,” said the source. “They were aware of that and they knew that, and they would exploit it at every turn and they took full advantage of it. They knew they could act extra-legally and nothing would happen because A, it was sanctioned by DoD at the highest levels, and B, who was going to stop them? They were preparing the battlefield, which was on all of the PowerPoints: ‘Preparing the Battlefield.’”

The significance of the flexibility of JSOC’s operations inside Pakistan versus the CIA’s is best summed up by Senator Dianne Feinstein, chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “Every single intelligence operation and covert action must be briefed to the Congress,” she said. “If they are not, that is a violation of the law.”

Blackwater: Company Non Grata in Pakistan

For months, the Pakistani media has been flooded with stories about Blackwater’s alleged growing presence in the country. For the most part, these stories have been ignored by the US press and denounced as lies or propaganda by US officials in Pakistan. But the reality is that, although many of the stories appear to be wildly exaggerated, Pakistanis have good reason to be concerned about Blackwater’s operations in their country. It is no secret in Washington or Islamabad that Blackwater has been a central part of the wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan and that the company has been involved–almost from the beginning of the “war on terror”–with clandestine US operations. Indeed, Blackwater is accepting applications for contractors fluent in Urdu and Punjabi. The US Ambassador to Pakistan, Anne Patterson, has denied Blackwater’s presence in the country, stating bluntly in September, “Blackwater is not operating in Pakistan.” In her trip to Pakistan in October, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton dodged questions from the Pakistani press about Blackwater’s rumored Pakistani operations. Pakistan’s interior minister, Rehman Malik, said on November 21 he will resign if Blackwater is found operating anywhere in Pakistan.

The Christian Science Monitor recently reported that Blackwater “provides security for a US-backed aid project” in Peshawar, suggesting the company may be based out of the Pearl Continental, a luxury hotel the United States reportedly is considering purchasing to use as a consulate in the city. “We have no contracts in Pakistan,” Blackwater spokesperson Stacey DeLuke said recently. “We’ve been blamed for all that has gone wrong in Peshawar, none of which is true, since we have absolutely no presence there.”

Reports of Blackwater’s alleged presence in Karachi and elsewhere in the country have been floating around the Pakistani press for months. Hamid Mir, a prominent Pakistani journalist who rose to fame after his 1997 interview with Osama bin Laden, claimed in a recent interview that Blackwater is in Karachi. “The US [intelligence] agencies think that a number of Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders are hiding in Karachi and Peshawar,” he said. “That is why [Blackwater] agents are operating in these two cities.” Ambassador Patterson has said that the claims of Mir and other Pakistani journalists are “wildly incorrect,” saying they had compromised the security of US personnel in Pakistan. On November 20 the Washington Times, citing three current and former US intelligence officials, reported that Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, has “found refuge from potential U.S. attacks” in Karachi “with the assistance of Pakistan’s intelligence service.”

In September, the Pakistani press covered a report on Blackwater allegedly submitted by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies to the federal interior ministry. In the report, the intelligence agencies reportedly allege that Blackwater was provided houses by a federal minister who is also helping them clear shipments of weapons and vehicles through Karachi’s Port Qasim on the coast of the Arabian Sea. The military intelligence source did not confirm this but did say, “The port jives because they have a lot of [former] SEALs and they would revert to what they know: the ocean, instead of flying stuff in.”

The Nation cannot independently confirm these allegations and has not seen the Pakistani intelligence report. But according to Pakistani press coverage, the intelligence report also said Blackwater has acquired “bungalows” in the Defense Housing Authority in the city. According to the DHA website, it is a large gated community established “for the welfare of the serving and retired officers of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.” Its motto is: “Home for Defenders.” The report alleges Blackwater is receiving help from local government officials in Karachi and is using vehicles with license plates traditionally assigned to members of the national and provincial assemblies, meaning local law enforcement will not stop them.

The use of private companies like Blackwater for sensitive operations such as drone strikes or other covert work undoubtedly comes with the benefit of plausible deniability that places an additional barrier in an already deeply flawed system of accountability. When things go wrong, it’s the contractors’ fault, not the government’s. But the widespread use of contractors also raises serious legal questions, particularly when they are a part of lethal, covert actions. “We are using contractors for things that in the past might have been considered to be a violation of the Geneva Convention,” said Lt. Col. Addicott, who now runs the Center for Terrorism Law at St. Mary’s University School of Law in San Antonio, Texas. “In my opinion, we have pressed the envelope to the breaking limit, and it’s almost a fiction that these guys are not in offensive military operations.” Addicott added, “If we were subjected to the International Criminal Court, some of these guys could easily be picked up, charged with war crimes and put on trial. That’s one of the reasons we’re not members of the International Criminal Court.”

If there is one quality that has defined Blackwater over the past decade, it is the ability to survive against the odds while simultaneously reinventing and rebranding itself. That is most evident in Afghanistan, where the company continues to work for the US military, the CIA and the State Department despite intense criticism and almost weekly scandals. Blackwater’s alleged Pakistan operations, said the military intelligence source, are indicative of its new frontier. “Having learned its lessons after the private security contracting fiasco in Iraq, Blackwater has shifted its operational focus to two venues: protecting things that are in danger and anticipating other places we’re going to go as a nation that are dangerous,” he said. “It’s as simple as that.”





Leaked documents reveal No 10 cover-up over Iraq invasion

23 11 2009

Leaked documents reveal No 10 cover-up over Iraq invasion

• Inquiry to hear how Blair hid true intentions for war
• Military ‘ill-prepared’ for aftermath of invasion

British soldiers visit locals in a village south of Basra in 2003British soldiers visit locals in a village south of Basra in 2003, at the start of the US-led invasion. Photograph: Dan Chung

Military commanders are expected to tell the inquiry into the Iraq war, which opens on Tuesday, that the invasion was ill-conceived and that preparations were sabotaged by Tony Blair‘s government’s attempts to mislead the public.

They were so shocked by the lack of preparation for the aftermath of the invasion that they believe members of the British and US governments at the time could be prosecuted for war crimes by breaching the duty outlined in the Geneva convention to safeguard civilians in a conflict, the Guardian has been told.

The lengths the Blair government took to conceal the invasion plan and the extent of military commanders’ anger at what they call the government’s “appalling” failures emerged as Sir John Chilcot, the inquiry’s chairman, promised to produce a “full and insightful” account of how Britain was drawn into the conflict.

Fresh evidence has emerged about how Blair misled MPs by claiming in 2002 that the goal was “disarmament, not regime change”. Documents show the government wanted to hide its true intentions by informing only “very small numbers” of officials.

The documents, leaked to the Sunday Telegraph, are “post-operational reports” and “lessons learned” papers compiled by the army and its field commanders. They refer to a “rushed” operation that caused “significant risk” to troops and “critical failure” in the postwar period.

One commander said the government “missed a golden opportunity” to win support from Iraqis. Another commented: “It was not unlike 1750s colonialism where the military had to do everything ourselves”. One, describing the supply chain, added: “I know for a fact that there was one container full of skis in the desert”.

Some troops were deployed in civilian flights to countries neighbouring Iraq with their equipment “brought in by hand baggage”. Items considered dangerous, including penknives and nail scissors, were confiscated from them.

Interviewed for the postwar report drawn up by the MoD, Brigadier Bill Moore, commander of 19 Brigade, was asked: “Did you receive the correct level of advice for the nation-building you faced?” He replied: “We got absolutely no advice whatsoever. The lack of advice from the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth Office], the Home Office and DFID [the Department for International Development] was appalling.”

The “lessons learned” report stated: “Never again must we send ill-equipped soldiers into battle”. However, many of the failures recounted in leaked documents and given in evidence to Commons committees, notably relating to equipment, were repeated in Afghanistan as inquests have shown.

Significantly, the documents support what officials have earlier admitted – that the army was not allowed to prepare properly for the Iraq invasion in 2002 so as not to alert parliament and the UN that Blair was already determined to go to war.

The documents add: “In Whitehall, the internal operational security regime, in which only very small numbers of officers and officials were allowed to become involved [in Iraq invasion preparations] constrained broader planning for combat operations and subsequent phases effectively until Dec 23 2002.”

Blair had in effect promised George Bush that he would join the US-led invasion when, as late as July 2002, he was denying to MPs that preparations were being made for military action. The leaked documents reveal that “from March 2002 or May at the latest there was a significant possibility of a large-scale British operation”.

Documents leaked in 2005 show that, almost a year before the invasion, Blair was privately preparing to commit Britain to war and topple Saddam Hussein, despite warnings from his closest advisers that it was unjustified. They also show how Blair was planning to justify regime change as an objective, despite warnings from Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, that the “desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action.

Chilcot says he and his team would not shrink from making criticisms of individuals or organisations if they were justified. But he stressed the inquiry was not a court of law set up to determine issues of guilt and innocence.





US pours millions into anti-Taliban militias in Afghanistan

23 11 2009

[It's much easier to create enemy "strawmen" if you can just hand them the money, instead of having to give it to the  ISI and their friends first, so they get a cut of everything.]

US pours millions into anti-Taliban militias in Afghanistan

• Special forces funding fighters in Afghanistan
• Fears strategy could further destabilise country

A former Taliban fighter hands over his armsA former Taliban fighter hands over his arms to join government troops in Herat. Photograph: Reza Shirmohammadi/AFP/Getty Images

US special forces are supporting anti-Taliban militias in at least 14 areas of Afghanistan as part of a secretive programme that experts warn could fuel long-term instability in the country.

The Community Defence Initiative (CDI) is enthusiastically backed by Stanley McChrystal, the US general commanding Nato forces in Afghanistan, but details about the programme have been held back from non-US alliance members who are likely to strongly protest.

The attempt to create what one official described as “pockets of tribal resistance” to the Taliban involves US special forces embedding themselves with armed groups and even disgruntled insurgents who are then given training and support.

In return for stabilising their local area the militia helps to win development aid for their local communities, although they will not receive arms, a US official said.

Special forces will be able to access money from a US military fund to pay for the projects. The hope is that the militias supplement the Nato and Afghan forces fighting the Taliban. But the prospect of re-empowering militias after billions of international dollars were spent after the US-led invasion in 2001 to disarm illegally armed groups alarms many experts.

Senior generals in the Afghan ministries of interior and defence are also worried about what they see as a return to the failed strategies of the Soviet Union during its occupation of Afghanistan.

Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, said the US risked losing control over groups which have in the past turned to looting shops and setting up illegal road checkpoints when they lose foreign support.

“It is not enough to talk to a few tribal elders and decide that you trust them,” Ruttig said. “No matter how well-trained and culturally aware the special forces are they will never be able to get to know enough about a local area to trust the people they are dealing with.”

Another controversial aspect of the programme is the involvement of Arif Noorzai, an Afghan politician from Helmand who is widely distrusted by many members of the international community.

Although many western officials want to sideline Noorzai and give oversight to the Afghan army and police, some of the CDI militias will build upon the 12,500 militiamen in 22 provinces Noorzai helped to set up this summer in the run up to the presidential elections on 20 August, an official said.

Despite the lack of any announcement about the programme, which could radically affect conditions in unstable areas across Afghanistan, it has begun in 14 areas in the south, east and west, but is expected to extend far beyond that.

Another diplomat in the south-east of the country said in the last six weeks special forces have held several meetings with elders in restive districts in Paktia, close to the Pakistani border, seeking to embed themselves with the local people.

The diplomat said: “It is not clear anything has happened yet, but the elders in the area are all seeing dollar signs and very much want to qualify for this programme.”

According to some western officials, the US government will make a pot of $1.3bn (£790m) available for the programme, although the US embassy said it could not yet comment on CDI.

A US military spokesman also declined to comment saying the programme was still in its early phases and public discussion could jeopardise the lives of some of the Afghans involved.

The plan represents a significant change in tack from a scheme promoted just last year by General McChrystal’s predecessor, David McKiernan. The Afghan Public Protection Force (APPF) was piloted in Wardak province and involved the rigorous vetting of recruits who were then given basic training, a uniform and came under the authority of the Afghan police.

“McChrystal was always quite dismissive about APPF,” a senior Nato official in Kabul said. “It was too resource-intensive and so slow we would have lost long before it had been spread to the whole country.”

He added: “He wanted to move to a much more informal model, which is far less visible and unaccountable, using Noorzai to find people through his own networks and then simply paying out cash for them to defend their areas.”

The US has shared few details of its plans with its allies. The programme is controlled by a newly created special forces group that reports directly to McChrystal as head of US forces in the country, but which sits outside the authority of the International Security Assistance Force, the Nato mission in Afghanistan.





US builds up its bases in oil-rich South America

23 11 2009

US builds up its bases in oil-rich South America

From the Caribbean to Brazil, political opposition to US plans for ‘full-spectrum operations’ is escalating rapidly

By Hugh O’Shaughnessy

US air force officers and Congressmen tour the Palanquero base in Puerto Salgar, Colombia, in August. The base is expected to host US air force counter-narcotics missions under the new bilateral deal US air force officers and Congressmen tour the Palanquero base in Puerto Salgar, Colombia, in August. The base is expected to host US air force counter-narcotics missions under the new bilateral deal

The United States is massively building up its potential for nuclear and non-nuclear strikes in Latin America and the Caribbean by acquiring unprecedented freedom of action in seven new military, naval and air bases in Colombia. The development – and the reaction of Latin American leaders to it – is further exacerbating America’s already fractured relationship with much of the continent.

The new US push is part of an effort to counter the loss of influence it has suffered recently at the hands of a new generation of Latin American leaders no longer willing to accept Washington’s political and economic tutelage. President Rafael Correa, for instance, has refused to prolong the US armed presence in Ecuador, and US forces have to quit their base at the port of Manta by the end of next month.

So Washington turned to Colombia, which has not gone down well in the region. The country has received military aid worth $4.6bn (£2.8bn) from the US since 2000, despite its poor human rights record. Colombian forces regularly kill the country’s indigenous people and other civilians, and last year raided the territory of its southern neighbour, Ecuador, causing at least 17 deaths.

President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, who has not forgotten that US officers were present in government offices in Caracas in 2002 when he was briefly overthrown in a military putsch, warned this month that the bases agreement could mean the possibility of war with Colombia.

In August, President Evo Morales of Bolivia called for the outlawing of foreign military bases in the region. President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras, overthrown in a military coup d’état in June and initially exiled, has complained that US forces stationed at the Honduran base of Palmerola collaborated with Roberto Micheletti, the leader of the plotters and the man who claims to be president.

And, this being US foreign policy, a tell-tale trail of oil is evident. Brazil had already expressed its unhappiness at the presence of US naval vessels in its massive new offshore oilfields off Rio de Janeiro, destined soon to make Brazil a giant oil producer eligible for membership in Opec.

The fact that the US gets half its oil from Latin America was one of the reasons the US Fourth Fleet was re-established in the region’s waters in 2008. The fleet’s vessels can include Polaris nuclear-armed submarines – a deployment seen by some experts as a violation of the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty, which bans nuclear weapons from the continent.

Indications of US willingness to envisage the stationing of nuclear weapons in Colombia are seen as an additional threat to the spirit of nuclear disarmament. After the establishment of the Tlatelolco Treaty in 1967, four more nuclear-weapon-free zones were set up in Africa, the South Pacific, South-east Asia and Central Asia. Between them, the five treaties cover nearly two-thirds of the countries of the world and almost all the southern hemisphere.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world’s leading think-tank about disarmament issues, has now expressed its worries about the US-Colombian arrangements.

With or without nuclear weapons, the bilateral agreement on the seven Colombian bases, signed on 30 October in Bogota, risks a costly new arms race in a region. SIPRI, which is funded by the Swedish government, said it was concerned about rising arms expenditure in Latin America draining resources from social programmes that the poor of the region need.

Much of the new US strategy was clearly set out in May in an enthusiastic US Air Force (USAF) proposal for its military construction programme for the fiscal year 2010. One Colombian air base, Palanquero, was, the proposal said, unique “in a critical sub-region of our hemisphere where security and stability is under constant threat from… anti-US governments”.

The proposal sets out a scheme to develop Palanquero which, the USAF says, offers an opportunity for conducting “full-spectrum operations throughout South America…. It also supports mobility missions by providing access to the entire continent, except the Cape Horn region, if fuel is available, and over half the continent if un-refuelled”. (“Full-spectrum operations” is the Pentagon’s jargon for its long-established goal of securing crushing military superiority with atomic and conventional weapons across the globe and in space.)

Palanquero could also be useful in ferrying arms and personnel to Africa via the British mid-Atlantic island of Ascension, French Guiana and Aruba, the Dutch island off Venezuela. The US has access to them all.

The USAF proposal contradicted the assurances constantly issued by US diplomats that the bases would not be used against third countries. These were repeated by the Colombian military to the Colombian congress on 29 July. That USAF proposal was hastily reissued this month after the signature of the agreement – but without the reference to “anti-US governments”. This has led to suggestions of either US government incompetence, or of a battle between a gung-ho USAF and a State Department conscious of the damage done to US relations with Latin America by its leaders’ strong objections to the proposal.

The Colombian forces, for many years notorious for atrocities inflicted on civilians, have cheekily suggested that with US help they could get into the lucrative business of “instructing” other armies about human rights. Civil strife in Colombia meant some 380,000 Colombians were forced from their homes last year, bringing the number of displaced since 1985 to 4.6 million, one in ten of the population. This little-known statistic indicates a much worse situation than the much-publicised one in Islamist-ruled Sudan where 2.7 million have fled from their homes.

Amnesty International said: “The Colombian government must urgently bring human rights violators to justice, to break the links between the armed forces and illegal paramilitary groups, and dismantle paramilitary organisations in line with repeated UN recommendations.”

Palanquero, which adjoins the town of Puerto Salgar on the broad Magdalena river north-west of the capital, Bogota, is one of the seven bases that the government of President Alvaro Uribe gave to Washington last month despite howls from many Colombians. Its hangars can take 100 aircraft and there is accommodation for 2,000 personnel. Its main runway was constructed in the 1980s after Colombia bought a force of Israeli Kfir warplanes. At 3,500 metres, it is 500 metres longer than the longest in Britain, the former US base outside Campbeltown, Scotland. The USAF is awaiting Barack Obama’s signature on a bill, already passed by the US Congress, to devote $46m to works at the base.

Many Colombians are upset at the agreement between the US and Colombia that governs – or, perhaps more accurately, fails to govern – US use of Palanquero and the other six bases. The Colombian Council of State, a non-partisan constitutional body with the duty to comment on legislation, has said that the agreements are unfair to Colombia since they put the US and not the host country in the driving seat, and that they should be redrafted in accordance with the Colombian constitution.

The immunities being granted to US soldiers are, the council adds, against the 1961 Vienna Convention; the agreement can be changed by future regulations which can totally transform it; and the permission given to the US to install satellite receivers for radio and television without the usual licences and fees is “without any valid reason”.

President Uribe, whose studies at St Antony’s College, Oxford, were subsidised by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, has chosen to disregard the Council of State.





Pakistan to US: Don’t surge in Afghanistan, talk to Taliban

23 11 2009

Pakistan to US: Don’t surge in Afghanistan, talk to Taliban

Pakistan contradicts US Gen. McChrystal’s strategy of pulling back from Afghanistan borders, and disagrees with the strategy of a surge to defeat the Taliban.

By Saeed Shah | McClatchy Newspapers

Islamabad, Pakistan – The Pakistani government has some advice the Obama administration may not want to hear as it contemplates sending additional US troops to neighboring Afghanistan: Negotiate with Taliban leaders and restrain India.

Pakistan embraces US efforts to stabilize the region and worries that a hasty US withdrawal would create chaos. But Pakistani officials worry that thousands of additional American soldiers and Marines would send Taliban forces retreating into Pakistan, where they’re not welcome.

Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani’s office said Friday that he told visiting CIA Director Leon Panetta of “Pakistan’s concerns relating to the possible surge of the US and ISAF forces in Afghanistan which may entail negative implications for the situation in Baluchistan,” the Pakistani province that borders Afghanistan to the south.

The Pakistanis’ advice is almost diametrically opposed to the strategy outlined by Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the US military commander in Afghanistan: Don’t send additional forces to protect Afghan cities, but send them to outposts along the Pakistani border — where McChrystal has withdrawn troops.

It’s just one example of how Pakistan, a critical US ally in the struggle against Islamist extremists and a major recipient of American military aid, continues to deal differently with the violence that threatens not only the US-backed government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai, but also impoverished, nuclear-armed Pakistan.

The two countries’ divergent views of the threat posed by Islamist extremists, and the Obama administration’s efforts to press Pakistan to move against groups that menace Afghanistan have produced strains between the two countries and between Pakistan’s civilian government and its powerful military and Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI) — and a growing drumbeat of Pakistani allegations about alleged nefarious CIA activities in Pakistan.

“The Pakistanis say some things in public — often for reasons related to internal politics, it seems — that they don’t focus on in private,” said a senior US intelligence official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because intelligence matters are classified. “That’s not to say that we see eye-to-eye on everything behind closed doors, but both sides realize that — whatever the disagreements of the moment might be — the long-term partnership is essential. After all, Pakistani contributions to counterterrorism since 9/11 have been decisive, and our government recognizes that.”

Don’t escalate, negotiate

Instead of escalating the war in Afghanistan, however, top Pakistani officials are pressing the administration to try to negotiate a political settlement with top Taliban commanders that would allow the US to exit Afghanistan.

Pakistani officials argue that such a negotiating strategy can’t work unless the rebel leadership is involved, right up to Jalaluddin Haqqani, the head of the most dangerous insurgent faction, and Mullah Mohammed Omar, the one-eyed founder of the Afghan Taliban and Osama bin Laden’s ally and host.

Because Pakistan is a longtime patron of the Taliban and of the Haqqani network, Pakistani officials think they could broker a deal to reduce Afghan President Hamid Karzai to a figurehead leader and divide power between the Pashtun Taliban and Afghanistan’s Tajik, Uzbek, and Hazara minorities.

US and some Pakistani officials, however, are skeptical, arguing that the Taliban have little incentive to negotiate when their strength and sway in Afghanistan is growing and public and international support for the US-led war in Afghanistan is waning.

Najmuddin Shaikh, formerly the top bureaucrat in the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, said the Taliban could be brought to the negotiating table if they saw a greater American military commitment and more investments in the Afghan countryside.

“It’s a little premature for talks [with the Taliban],” Shaikh said. “There has to be a change in the ground situation, things happening in the next six to eight months that shows the ‘ink spots’ strategy – [McChrystal's idea of protecting Afghan population centers] – is taking hold, that some foot soldiers are being weaned away, then talks become possible.”

Nevertheless, behind the scenes talks with mid-level Taliban officials already have begun, and Pakistani officials think they could rapidly accelerate now that Karzai has begun his second term.

“We’ve already been talking to them [the Taliban],” said a senior Pakistani official in Islamabad, who couldn’t be named because of the sensitivity of the issue. “If the US helps the process, some arrangements can be worked out for political reconciliation. I’m not for a moment suggesting that it’s an easy task, but otherwise you will be fighting these people for the next hundred years.”

Money talks

The United States and other NATO forces also favor talking to some Taliban, but they focus on “non-ideological” insurgents who can be peeled away, partly through bribery. Retired British general Graeme Lamb was appointed for this task in August, but so far the effort has produced little success.

“The Americans have wasted a lot of time over this ‘moderate Taliban’ idea. It is never going to pan out. It misunderstands the Taliban phenomenon,” said Simbal Khan, an analyst at Institute of Strategic Studies, a policy institute funded by the Pakistani government. “If you try to break off elements with cash, they’ll take your money and still fight you.”

Pakistan worries about India, not Al Qaeda

The Pakistani military and ISI still consider arch rival India, not militant Islam, the main threat, and unlike US officials, Pakistani officials distinguish between the Taliban and other militant groups whose target is Afghanistan and groups that are seeking to impose their extreme brand of Islam on Pakistan.

Pakistan has for eight years declined to mount any serious pursuit of bin Laden and the other top Al Qaeda leaders who sought shelter in Pakistan after the 2001 US invasion drove them out of Afghanistan.

Pakistan also has quietly tolerated the presence of Mullah Omar, who US officials said is based near the Baluchistan city of Quetta and shuttling between there and Karachi, Pakistan’s largest city and a key financial and logistics center for Islamic militants. The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because intelligence on terrorist groups is classified. Officially, Pakistan denies that bin Laden and Omar are in the country.

Pakistan’s laissez-faire attitude toward Al Qaeda, Omar and Afghan militants such as Haqqani doesn’t appear likely to change in the face of stepped-up American pressure.

US national security adviser James Jones last week delivered a message to Gilani and other Pakistani officials from President Barack Obama, who urged Pakistan to take action against Afghan militant groups operating from Pakistani soil.

The Pakistanis politely told Jones that Pakistan is doing all it can, and that it must concentrate on groups that are attacking Pakistan, rather than those that are a threat in Afghanistan. Gilani’s office said he told Jones that Pakistan’s “forces were over-stretched because of continuous tension on the eastern border” with India.

Gilani’s office said Friday that, “The new Afghan policy of the US government should not disturb the regional balance in South Asia.”

Pakistani officials say that relations with India remain dangerously strained, requiring military resources on Pakistan’s eastern border. Pakistan is also concerned about India’s growing influence in Afghanistan, which Islamabad fears is part of a move to encircle Pakistan.

With Pakistani forces already fighting the Pakistani Taliban in South Waziristan, the country fears opening too many battlefronts and furiously rejects Washington’s constant mantra of “do more.”

US officials say the Pakistani military is obsessed with the Indian border, where they say there’s no active threat, and reluctant to address the threats that are a product of Pakistan’s refusal to quash the insurgency on Pakistan’s western border with Afghanistan.

“When we get into the position of stabilizing, then we can help the other side (the US),” said a senior Pakistani military officer, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he wasn’t authorized to discuss the issue publicly. “There are limits of our power. You cannot be expected to use your force against all [militant] groups because then your power will be diluted. That’s exactly what’s happening on the other side [to the US in Afghanistan], they’re all over the place and virtually in control of nothing.”

(Shah is a McClatchy special correspondent.)





Political minefield awaits health bill

23 11 2009

[If we are lucky, none of it will make it to the other side.]

Political minefield awaits health bill

Following the Thanksgiving recess, the U.S. Senate is braced for a difficult debate on the $848 billion healthcare reform bill.

//

BY DAVID LIGHTMAN

McClatchy Newspapers

WASHINGTON — The Senate is ready to begin a volatile, high-stakes healthcare debate that’s sure to be punctuated by tense and unpredictable battles over some of the most incendiary issues in American politics today.

Debate on the $848 billion bill to overhaul the nation’s healthcare system is expected to start next week, after the Senate returns from its Thanksgiving recess, and many lawmakers already consider it a golden opportunity to win long-sought projects and local aid for their constituents.

The flashpoints will be familiar — abortion, federal deficits, government involvement in healthcare decisions and other hot topics — and many Democrats already have said they want to see, and are well-positioned to seek, changes in the bill.

In fact, the legislation is moving ahead only because it got 60 votes Saturday night to proceed — the minimum needed — two weeks after the House of Representatives’ version squeaked through by five votes.

“I, along with others, expect to have legitimate opportunities to influence the healthcare reform legislation that is voted on by the Senate later this year or early next year,” said Sen. Blanche Lincoln, D-Ark., who was Saturday’s 60th vote to break a Republican filibuster and start debating the bill.

Sen. Mary Landrieu, D-La., was the 59th vote, and the bill could provide her state with an estimated $300 million in help for healthcare for the poor.

Sen. Ron Wyden, D-Ore., got the bill altered Friday so more people would have access to its health exchanges, marketplaces where consumers could shop for coverage and rates. Sen. Ben Nelson, D-Neb., was said to be pleased that the bill lacked changes in federal antitrust law protection for the insurance industry.

They all voted yes Saturday, saying they were motivated by a desire to let debate proceed, but many Democrats still had qualms.

“There is a great deal more work that needs to be done,” Landrieu said, particularly to help small businesses.

Moderates like Nelson, Landrieu, Lincoln and Joe Lieberman, I-Conn., have warned that they might not support the final bill.

Lieberman said on NBC’s “Meet the Press” that he voted to end debate only because he wants a chance to amend it.

Specifically, he said, he wants to remove the so-called public option provision, under which some consumers would be offered an optional government insurance plan that would compete with private insurers.

“I don’t want to fix our healthcare system in a way that creates more of an economic crisis,” he said, predicting that a public plan would drive up coverage costs, not lower them.

 

Democrats can expect little help from Republicans, who stuck together Saturday to oppose proceeding and vowed that Democrats would pay a political price if the bill remained largely intact.

“This 20-pound bill is the size of most people’s turkeys next week,” said Sen. Richard Burr, R-N.C., “and that’s what most people in North Carolina think of this bill.”

The measure would require most people to obtain insurance coverage.

It would set up health insurance exchanges and offer them the alternative of a government-run program, or public option. In most cases, people would pay fines if they didn’t get coverage.

At least four areas are likely to be major flashpoints:

• Abortion. At least four Democratic senators are considered staunch abortion foes, and they’re likely to be uncomfortable with the Senate bill’s provisions that allow abortion coverage in federally subsidized plans, as long as only private funds are used to pay for such coverage. The House legislation is more restrictive.

• Public option. The plan in the Senate bill, which would allow states to opt out, makes a lot of Democrats nervous; at the moment, it lacks the 60 votes needed to overcome procedural hurdles.

“Who pays if it fails to live up to expectations?” asked Lincoln.

• Budget deficits. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office estimates that the bill would cut $130 billion from the deficit over 10 years, but many experts and legislators are skeptical that it can achieve that without cuts in Medicare and other programs that politicians are unlikely to make.

• Affordability. “Many Americans will be required to purchase health insurance that is more expensive . . . than the coverage they currently have,” said Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, a GOP moderate.

The CBO did find that people enrolling in the public option “would typically have premiums that were somewhat higher than the average premiums for the private plans” people could buy through the new exchanges.

Despite all these controversies, Democratic leaders said that near-universal coverage legislation, a goal of party leaders since the 1940s, has now proceeded farther than ever before.





British Disinformation on the Saudi Aggression in Yemen

23 11 2009

[The writer does her best to convince us that the Saudis must defend themselves in Yemen because of the threat from "al Qaida" if they don't.  People are not believing this kind of crap anymore; many of us know that the Saudis are "al Qaida," or at least its creators.]

Saudi Arabia goes to war

Mai Yamani

guardian.co.uk

A crucially important conflict, woefully under-reported in the west, has now come to a head in the Middle East. In response to an ongoing fight that could spill out beyond the Arabian peninsula, Saudi Arabia has entered into direct war with the Houthi rebels in northern Yemen.

Saudi military intervention marks the first time in the kingdom’s history that its army has crossed its borders without an ally. Previously, the kingdom engaged only in proxy wars. The Saudis used royalist Yemenis to fight Nasser’s Egypt in the 1960s, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein to fight Iran in the 1980s, and the US to fight Iraq in the 1990s.

Indeed, Saudi Arabia has fought every “ism” that has sought to dominate the Middle East, including Nasser’s pan-Arabism, communism, and today’s Islamism of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas, the terrorism of al-Qaida and the Shi’ism of Iran. The tools it relied upon were oil money and Wahhabi Islam. During the 1980s, Saudi Arabia spent more than $75bn on the propagation of Wahhabi doctrine, funding schools, mosques, and charities across the Islamic world in an effort to bolster its influence.

A large share of these resources was reserved for its back garden, Yemen. Thousands of schools were established, covering every city and village in Yemen. Saudi Arabia created in Yemen a strong Wahhabi current that was politically and ideologically loyal to the ruling al-Saud. Indeed, Yemen’s president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, used imported Wahhabism to defeat his domestic opponents – first the communists, then the Houthis – despite being a Zaidi Shi’a.

But now this policy has backfired, with the Houthis openly rebelling against Wahhabi encroachment on their religious ideology, while themselves encroaching on neighbouring Saudi territory as they fight the government.

After four months of fighting, Saleh’s domestic forces had failed to contain the revolt. So, unable to prosecute the war on his own, Saleh turned a domestic rebellion into a sectarian and security threat to the entire Arabian peninsula, thereby manoeuvring the Saudis – eager from the outset to help Saleh, whom they view as their proxy – into providing military backing.

The Saudis’ justification for intervening is that their national territory is under threat. But that argument is weak, and there is no national support for this war in either country. Rather, Saudi military intervention reflects the kingdom’s wariness toward a hostile Shia region on its southern border, especially given that the same tribes and sects that populate northern Yemen dominate the southern Saudi regions of Jizan and Najran. The Saudi state doubts the loyalty of its own Ismaili and Zaidi populations, whose natural sympathies are suspected to lie with the Houthis.

Southern Saudi Arabia and northern Yemen have thus become a microcosm of the broader civil war playing out in the Muslim world. But Saudi Arabia’s intervention in the conflict has also turned what had been a cold war – a war of position and influence within the region – into a hot war with international repercussions.

The principal conflict is between the Saudis and Iran, which has established powerful political bridgeheads in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Gaza. Saleh played a key role in reinforcing Saudi perceptions of a dangerous Iranian security threat, thereby helping to turn the Houthi rebellion into a geopolitical conflict.

Both the Saudi and Yemeni governments have also claimed that there are strong links between the Houthis and al-Qaida, thereby gaining American support. But the Houthis are not terrorists. Abdul Malik al-Houthi, a leader of the insurgency in Yemen’s Sa’dah region, said this month that the Houthis, who are Zaidi Shia, are ideologically and strategically antithetical to Wahhabi Sunni al-Qaida.

At the same time, al-Qaida has benefited from the conflict, as the chaos on the rugged and mountainous 1,500km border allows it to smuggle arms and fighters into Saudi Arabia in an attempt to destabilise the kingdom. Sunni areas of Yemen – a weak state, if not a failed one – have become a safe haven for al-Qaida.

But the Saudis are unlikely to succeed militarily in Yemen. Yemen’s army of 700,000 could not suppress the Houthi rebellion, despite five attempts since 2004. Now they are leaving Saudi Arabia’s untested army of 200,000 men to do the job for them. And, while the Saudis are currently relying on their air force, a full-scale land battle will have to follow – on the same harsh terrain that helped defeated Nasser’s battle-hardened troops in the 1960s.

The Houthis, for their part, lack aircraft and armoured vehicles, but have tactical advantages owing to their numbers, experience of the terrain, and skilful use of land mines. They also benefit from disciplined training, reminiscent of Hezbollah’s activities in Lebanon.

Saleh has declared that there is no end to this war, but a peaceful solution at this stage would put the Houthis in a stronger position to win their demands, which primarily concern the preservation of culture and identity. For example, the Houthis want a Zaidi university.

Is there a way out? Qatar acted as a mediator last year, and persuaded the Yemeni government to accept a ceasefire. Syria, which enjoys good relations with Yemen, has also offered to mediate. Each of these offers was unacceptable to the Saudi rulers, who fear that submitting the conflict to outside mediation would diminish the kingdom’s regional power. For this reason, Iran’s offer to mediate was seen as the ultimate provocation.

So the war continues, with no immediate possibility of a peaceful solution – and with the policy failure of Saudi Arabia’s military intervention eroding its position in the Arab world. The dilemma for the Saudis is that now the damage will be much greater if they do not crush the Houthis, as this would embolden al-Qaida. This is the biggest threat facing Saudi Arabia, but its rulers’ ill-considered war strategy has only brought that threat closer.





MK ULTRA, PROJECT TALENT

23 11 2009

Duncan O’Finioan and David Corso, both survivors of the first generation of the US Military’s highly classified super-soldier program, take the platform to talk about MK-ULTRA and PROJECT TALENT, a…

more about "MK ULTRA, PROJECT TALENT", posted with vodpod





FIRST EARTH BATTALION The Real Story Pt.2 By Jim Channon

22 11 2009

Gorgeous George Stares At GoatsClooney becomes a psychic soldierSource: VarietyGorgeous George Stares At Goats We suspect that usually George Clooney’s stare only makes him a ladykiller, but…





THE STORY OF THE FIRST EARTH BN …PART 1 | Home of the 1st Earth Battalion

22 11 2009





Climategate: the final nail in the coffin of ‘Anthropogenic Global Warming’?

22 11 2009

Climategate: the final nail in the coffin of ‘Anthropogenic Global Warming’?


Source: UK Telegraph

If you own any shares in alternative energy companies I should start dumping them NOW. The conspiracy behind the Anthropogenic Global Warming myth (aka AGW; aka ManBearPig) has been suddenly, brutally and quite deliciously exposed after a hacker broke into the computers at the University of East Anglia’s Climate Research Unit (aka Hadley CRU) and released 61 megabites of confidential files onto the internet. (Hat tip: Watts Up With That)

When you read some of those files – including 1079 emails and 72 documents – you realise just why the boffins at Hadley CRU might have preferred to keep them confidential. As Andrew Bolt puts it, this scandal could well be “the greatest in modern science”. These alleged emails – supposedly exchanged by some of the most prominent scientists pushing AGW theory – suggest:

Conspiracy, collusion in exaggerating warming data, possibly illegal destruction of embarrassing information, organised resistance to disclosure, manipulation of data, private admissions of flaws in their public claims and much more.

One of the alleged emails has a gentle gloat over the death in 2004 of John L Daly (one of the first climate change sceptics, founder of the Still Waiting For Greenhouse site), commenting:

“In an odd way this is cheering news.”

But perhaps the most damaging revelations – the scientific equivalent of the Telegraph’s MPs’ expenses scandal – are those concerning the way Warmist scientists may variously have manipulated or suppressed evidence in order to support their cause.

Here are a few tasters. (So far, we can only refer to them as alleged emails because – though Hadley CRU’s director Phil Jones has confirmed the break-in to Ian Wishart at the Briefing Room – he has yet to fess up to any specific contents.) But if genuine, they suggest dubious practices such as:

Manipulation of evidence:

I’ve just completed Mike’s Nature trick of adding in the real temps to each series for the last 20 years (ie from 1981 onwards) amd from 1961 for Keith’s to hide the decline.

Private doubts about whether the world really is heating up:

The fact is that we can’t account for the lack of warming at the moment and it is a travesty that we can’t. The CERES data published in the August BAMS 09 supplement on 2008 shows there should be even more warming: but the data are surely wrong. Our observing system is inadequate.

Suppression of evidence:

Can you delete any emails you may have had with Keith re AR4?

Keith will do likewise. He’s not in at the moment – minor family crisis.

Can you also email Gene and get him to do the same? I don’t have his new email address.

We will be getting Caspar to do likewise.

Fantasies of violence against prominent Climate Sceptic scientists:

Next
time I see Pat Michaels at a scientific meeting, I’ll be tempted to beat
the crap out of him. Very tempted.

Attempts to disguise the inconvenient truth of the Medieval Warm Period (MWP):

……Phil and I have recently submitted a paper using about a dozen NH records that fit this category, and many of which are available nearly 2K back–I think that trying to adopt a timeframe of 2K, rather than the usual 1K, addresses a good earlier point that Peck made w/ regard to the memo, that it would be nice to try to “contain” the putative “MWP”, even if we don’t yet have a hemispheric mean reconstruction available that far back….

And, perhaps most reprehensibly, a long series of communications discussing how best to squeeze dissenting scientists out of the peer review process. How, in other words, to create a scientific climate in which anyone who disagrees with AGW can be written off as a crank, whose views do not have a scrap of authority.

“This was the danger of always criticising the skeptics for not publishing in the “peer-reviewed literature”. Obviously, they found a solution to that–take over a journal! So what do we do about this? I think we have to stop considering “Climate Research” as a legitimate peer-reviewed journal. Perhaps we should encourage our colleagues in the climate research community to no longer submit to, or cite papers in, this journal. We would also need to consider what we tell or request of our more reasonable colleagues who currently sit on the editorial board…What do others think?”

“I will be emailing the journal to tell them I’m having nothing more to do with it until they rid themselves of this troublesome editor.”“It results from this journal having a number of editors. The responsible one for this is a well-known skeptic in NZ. He has let a few papers through by Michaels and Gray in the past. I’ve had words with Hans von Storch about this, but got nowhere. Another thing to discuss in Nice !”

Hadley CRU has form in this regard. In September – I wrote the story up here as “How the global warming industry is based on a massive lie” – Hadley CRU’s researchers were exposed as having “cherry-picked” data in order to support their untrue claim that global temperatures had risen higher at the end of the 20th century than at any time in the last millenium. Hadley CRU was also the organisation which – in contravention of all acceptable behaviour in the international scientific community – spent years withholding data from researchers it deemed unhelpful to its cause. This matters because Hadley CRU, established in 1990 by the Met Office, is a government-funded body which is supposed to be a model of rectitude. Its HadCrut record is one of the four official sources of global temperature data used by the IPCC.

I asked in my title whether this will be the final nail in the coffin of Anthropenic Global Warming. This was wishful thinking, of course. In the run up to Copenhagen, we will see more and more hysterical (and grotesquely exaggerated) stories such as this in the Mainstream Media. And we will see ever-more-virulent campaigns conducted by eco-fascist activists, such as this risible new advertising campaign by Plane Stupid showing CGI polar bears falling from the sky and exploding because kind of, like, man, that’s sort of what happens whenever you take another trip on an aeroplane.

The world is currently cooling; electorates are increasingly reluctant to support eco-policies leading to more oppressive regulation, higher taxes and higher utility bills; the tide is turning against Al Gore’s Anthropogenic Global Warming theory. The so-called “sceptical” view is now also the majority view.

Unfortunately, we’ve a long, long way to go before the public mood (and scientific truth) is reflected by our policy makers. There are too many vested interests in AGW, with far too much to lose either in terms of reputation or money, for this to end without a bitter fight.

But if the Hadley CRU scandal is true,it’s a blow to the AGW lobby’s credibility which is never likely to recover.





Saudi envoy walks out after Jethmalani remarks on Wahabis

22 11 2009

Saudi envoy walks out after Jethmalani remarks on Wahabis

New Delhi: Saudi Arabian Ambassador to India Faisal-al-Trad on Saturday staged a walk at an international conference of jurists here after former former Union Minister Ram Jethmalani accused the Wahabi sect of being responsible for terrorism.
Trad left the conference hall after Jethmalani made some remarks at the inaugural function when he said "unfortunately in the 17th century, they produced an evil man in Saudi Arabia by the name of Wahab, who was concerned about the decline of Muslim world but he hit upon a wrong remedy".

The Ambassador returned to the conference after Union Law Minister Veerappa Moily made it clear that Jethmalani’s remarks were personal and not that of the government.
Jethmalani alleged that "Wahabi terrorism" indoctrinated "rubbish" in the minds of young people to carry out terrorist attacks. He lamented that India had friendly relations with a country that supported Wahabi terrorism.
Moily, in his address, said that terrorism cannot be attributed to any particular religion.
Jethmalani said there have been Hindu terrorists and Buddhist terrorists and it was unfortunate that the terrorist that the world was talking about was mainly Muslim.
"But let me make it clear that I am a student of all religions including Islam. I have the highest respect for the prophet of Islam, he was a man of peace."
Terming Non-Aligned Movement and Panchsheel as evil, the former union minister said India should align with forces of good to combat the forces of evil. "India and its foreign ministers must learn to reassess the doctrines of past."
He said India’s foreign policy establishment should be courageous to shun country’s relationships with its "enemies".
Referring to Jethmalani’s comments, Justice Awn S Al-Khasawneh, a judge of the International Court of Justice, asked him not "to make sweeping statements."
- PTI





Wahabism linked with terrorism; Saudi envoy stages walkout

22 11 2009

Wahabism linked with terrorism; Saudi envoy stages walkout

NEW DELHI: Saudi Ambassador to India Faisal Al-Trad walked out of an international conference of jurists in protest after noted Indian jurist Ram Jethmlani’s accusation that the Wahabi sect of Islam was responsible for terrorism. The conference was attended by Indian President Pratibha Patil, Chief Justice KG Balakrishnan and Law Minister Veerapa Moily. Jethmalani said “Wahabi terrorism” indoctrinated “rubbish” in the minds of young people to carry out terrorist attacks. He lamented that India was friends with a country that supported Wahabi terrorism. The event’s organiser, Adesh Aggarwala, said the ambassador had walked out but returned after Moily’s statement that Jethmalani’s views were not supported by the government or the organisers. Moily said terrorism could not be attributed to any particular religion. iftikhar gilani





ECUADOR: Closing US bases

22 11 2009

ECUADOR: Closing bases

Wilbert van der…

The closure of the US military base in Manta is a huge victory for both the Ecuadorian activists who have been campaigning for a decade against the US military presence in their country, and for the international No-Bases campaign.

Manta is a lively city with 200,000 residents, on the Pacific Coast of Ecuador. Because of its harbour, it is a major hub of Ecuadorian tuna fishing industry. The city is home to an airport used only for domestic and regional flights.

In 1999, it was this airfield that made Manta the perfect location for a base for the United States military, as the US was looking for new hosts for its Forward Operations Locations (FOL) – military facilities for monitoring, tracking and intercepting drug trafficking from Colombia. Soon, those locations were found in El Salvador, The Netherlands-Antilles and in Ecuador.

This July, US military planes lifted off from the Eloy Alfaro Airbase, for the last time. After ten years of maintaining a base in Manta, the US was asked to end its military presence on Ecuadorian soil.

This was a huge victory for the Ecuadorian activists who have been campaigning for a decade, against the US military presence in their country that jeopardised Ecuador’s sovereignty and security. It was a big victory, too, for the international No-Bases campaign that started in 2003, during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq. As the US military was kicked out of Ecuador, the joy was shared by around 450 No-Bases campaign chapters worldwide.

As it happens often, the Ecuadorian population originally welcomed the US military, having been told by the government that the US base would bring international recognition for Manta along with new investments, new jobs and increased tourism. To top it off, the US promised that it would improve the local infrastructure and the harbour. Back then, few people worried about the unclear mandate and mission of the military base, or, the effects of such military presence – what it would do to the city.

In reality, new jobs were minimal – mostly low-paid work or temporary construction work. The fate of the people did not change as much as they were promised. The US promise to spend big on infrastructure in the region turned out to be one road, leading from the base to the city. In addition, many Mantanese were shocked to see the American presence result in a steep rise of night clubs, sex trade, drug dealing and crime.

Public opinion shifted dramatically throughout Ecuador, when the US base was allowed to expand encroaching the lands of local farmers without proper compensation, and, when the US military sunk several fishing boats because they sailed too close to the safety perimeter around the base.

Protests grew further, when it was exposed that the Manta base was involved in the chemical spraying of coca-fields in Colombia. Many Ecuadorian farmers, living close to the Columbian border, saw their fields and crops ruined.

The disappointments and problems experienced by the people of Manta are shared by many around the globe who face the everyday realities of a foreign military presence in their city or region.

The US alone maintains a global network of over a thousand such installations, in over a hundred countries. With this network of military bases and accompanying bilateral treaties with host nations in every continent, the US has built a permanent global military presence that, in the words of the Pentagon, enables it “to strike at a moments notice in any dark corner of the world.” And, that is excluding the temporary military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Philippines.

Meanwhile, former European colonial powers – current members of Nato – operate another 200 foreign military bases around the globe. The British can be found in the Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. The French presence is strong in Africa, the South Pacific and the Caribbean. To complete the picture, Russia maintains about half a dozen bases in former Soviet republics while India has a airbase in Tajikistan.

The most common problems experienced by the people living close to these military installations are pollution, noise-related stress and high crime rates. Also, the legal immunity awarded to military and civilian personnel operating from these bases ensures that any crimes committed by them go unpunished.

Manta and other FOL sites in El Salvador and the Netherlands Antilles are leased from the host governments. The Status of Forces Agreement in all these cases includes not only provisions for legal immunity for the servicemen, but also, provisions that strictly limit the use of the facilities. The Manta base, for example, was only to be used for monitoring drug transports from Colombia to the North American market. Therefore, Plan Colombia – missions connected to the civil war in Colombia – was specifically excluded from its mandate.

Although in the Netherlands and El Salvador, the government’s attitude is that the US deserves to be trusted on these matters, in Ecuador it soon became clear that this was a rather naïve position. For ten years, the US military used the Manta base for counterinsurgency missions in Colombia, helping the Colombian government in its war against the Farc and other guerilla groups. Worse, in 2008, the US military coordinated the extrajudicial killing of Farc leader Reyes from Manta, guiding Colombian troops into Ecuadorian territory to do the killing. In other words, the US used its base in Ecuador to help the Colombian army to violate Ecuadorian territorial integrity.

Such breach of agreement is repeated over and over on a global level. Lacking proper control mechanisms, the host countries are usually unable to keep the country operating the base stick to the original deal. That is why joint intelligence bases are often used to spy on host countries (like in Europe); drug interception operations develop into reconnaissance and counterinsurgency missions; and, bases originally set up to provide security to a host nation develop into jumping boards for military interventions and invasions – for example, in Europe, the US military bases originally set up to provide common defence against the Soviet threat are now crucial infrastructure for invasions in the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus.

Once a foreign base is established in a country, it is not easy to send back the guests home. In Manta, it took ten years of growing public pressure and a victorious election to convince Washington to close its base. The traditional political parties in Ecuador ignored the rising protests against the base among their own constituencies since they prioritised on remaining a loyal ally to the US. This led to the remarkable victory for Rafael Correa – the only candidate who promised to shut down the Manta base in his campaign – in the 2006 presidential elections.

In March 2007, just three months after the inauguration of the new government, the International Network for the Abolition of Foreign Military Bases organised its first global conference, in Quito and Manta. The pressure from Washington on the new Ecuadorian government was tangible. The US tried to bully and bribe the government into extending the lease of the Manta base. To repudiate the No-Bases campaigners in town at the time of the conference, the US embassy was busy organising press trips to the Manta base, to show the press that Manta was “not really a base.” However, that only emphasised the importance of Manta.

The No-Bases conference helped solidify a wide consensus among the Ecuadorian population that it was time for the US military to leave. Also, the conference helped to keep the pressure on the new government to not give in under the tremendous pressure from Washington to keep the base open.

The closure of the Manta base was a victory for all Ecuadorians, a victory shared by hundreds of similar campaigns around the globe that have been working together since 2003. Through international solidarity, campaigners found out that they are not alone in their long struggles for justice and security. By sharing information they learned from each other’s tactics, and, through joint actions, the International Network for the Abolition of Foreign Military bases has been successful in putting the bases issue on the agenda of many international movements for peace and socio-economic justice. The campaign is slowly creating more space for political debate on the issue, both in the host nations and on an international level.

The next step for the network is to campaign for an international treaty regulating – and strictly limiting – the opportunities for countries to export their military might through foreign bases. At the same time, the No-Bases network will continue unabatedly to fight for citizens around the world whose rights to livelihood, safety and justice are jeopardised by a foreign military presence.♦





Old Soviet Electrical Grid and Water Distribution Nightmares

21 11 2009

Power Struggle Threatens Central Asian Electricity Grid

Defections from regiona distribution network may destroy Soviet-era effort to ensure equitable sharing of electricity.

By Gulnura Toralieva in London (RCA No. 596, 20-Nov-09)

Kazakstan’s decision to withdraw from the Central Asia-wide electricity grid and strong hints by Uzbekistan that it will follow suit have highlighted the fragility of energy arrangements in the region. Analysts are warning that political leaders urgently need an action plan to avoid a potential crisis.

The Soviet Union created a common power system for Uzbekistan, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan which worked as long as they were part of the same state. But the system began fraying at the edges after 1991, as the newly independent countries began asserting competing interests.

Electricity generating capacity is distributed unevenly in Central Asia. Mountainous Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have close to 80 per cent of the region’s water resources, allowing them to build and benefit from hydroelectric power stations, whereas Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan have substantial oil and gas deposits but depend on their smaller neighbours for water.

Disputes arise whenever Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan store up water for the winter, the time they need it most for electricity production. The three lowland states want the water to flow downstream in spring and summer to provide irrigation during the growing season.

The Uzbeks export their natural gas to Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. They also supply electricity to Tajikistan, as well as providing a transit route for Kyrgyz and Turkmen electricity going to that country. But Tashkent periodically stops supplying gas in autumn and winter because of non-payment of bills, and earlier this year suspended the transit of Turkmen electricity to Tajikistan.

Following a meeting of the council which coordinates regional power supplies in mid-October, Kanat Bozumbayev, head of the Kazak electricity distributor KEGOC, said he had been told that Uzbekistan was leaving the network.

This was denied in a statement from the Uzbek state company Uzbekenergo. A spokesman said they merely wanted to alter the terms of transit arrangements.

“We would like to charge fees for electricity transits to Kyrgyzstan, which were previously regarded as transfers and were free of charge,” he said.

Although the problem was resolved – the Kyrgyz and Uzbeks reached a compromise on compensation – Uzbekenergo subsequently sent out further signals about withdrawing from the entire regional set-up.

In an article published in a state newspaper on November 5, Esso Sadulloev, who heads Uzbekenergo’s distribution office, said Uzbekistan planned to leave the Central Asia-wide grid, which he said was become increasingly unsustainable as certain member states were siphoning off electricity

“The unified electricity system is beginning to be obsolete, and is becoming the source of confrontation between participating states,” said Sadulloev.

His remarks appeared in the press two days after Kazakstan – Central Asia’s strongest economy and major oil producer – made the shock announcement that it too was withdrawing from the grid.

Deputy energy minister Duysenbay Turganov said KEGOC had taken the decision because the system was being disrupted by Tajikistan, which was taking more electricity than it was entitled to and failing to respond to instructions issued by the regional agency which manages the network. In February, Kazakstan temporarily withdrew from the Central Asian energy network because supplies to its southern regions were being disrupted by Tajikistan, which had begun taking electricity from the common grid in order to see its population through the winter months. The Tajiks began tapping the system, without consultation, after Uzbekistan halted transit supplies from Turkmenistan.

Kazakstan’s decision had serious consequences for Kyrgyzstan, which was forced to impose strict limits on power use for consumers as the supply faltered.

Energy experts say the current disagreements arise from longer-running shortcomings in the way the network has functioned. Some say it is just a matter of time before the entire system disintegrates.

The Central Asian network links and regulates supplies from 80-plus power stations across the region, and the departure of even one member could prevent it functioning as a whole.

The resulting energy shortages could provoke instability and unrest which no government would want to see. Bazarbay Mambetov, an economist in Kyrgyzstan, says no one can afford to let this happen.

“The energy grid was created as a single mechanism and has been ensuring a reliable, uninterrupted power supply across the region,” he said. “Whether its participants like it or not, we are all now linked together by this system.”

But it is a network whose infrastructure has not been maintained since the Central Asian republics went their separate ways.

“It is old and it hasn’t been properly maintained, and was designed for a different environment,” said Cleo Paskal, a researcher on energy and environmental matters at the London-based think-tank Chatham House.

The system was set up based on calculations of rainfall and river volumes over previous decades, whereas environmental conditions in the region may now have changed to the extent that the design is redundant, she said.

NO ONE COMES OUT AS WINNER

Ularbek Mateyev, an energy expert in Kyrgyzstan, says, “The Soviet Union designed and built the most viable energy grid, so no country will benefit from leaving it.”

One of the consequences would be to increase the number of outages due to accidents, as there would be no central mechanism for mitigating the effects of power surges by switching supplies from one country to another.

If Uzbekistan, centrally located with the four other states around it, were to leave, everyone else’s national grid would be placed under severe strain.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan would be worst hit, despite existing hydroelectric schemes and plans to build more, analysts say.

“Tajikistan, the northern part in particular, will suffer most,” said Anvar Kamolidinov, a water management expert in Tajikistan. “Soghd province depends on Uzbek electricity coming from the common energy grid. Soghd’s power plant at Kairakkum power plant provides only 20 per cent of the energy consumed there. If Uzbekistan leaves, two million people in [Soghd] region will be left without power.”

Meanwhile, Kamolidinov said, central and southern Tajikistan will also lose out as they will no longer get power generated in Turkmenistan and transferred through Uzbekistan.

Kyrgyzstan, too, will suffer from the loss of electricity coming from or via Uzbekistan.

Kazakstan’s energy minister Sauat Mynbayev says his country would probably struggle through, by keeping a power station in the southern Jambyl region running continuously.

“It would be a huge load, but in terms of power supplies, it would help us – and also northern Kyrgyzstan – survive this period,” he said at a government meeting in late September.

Experts warn, however, that the larger states will face significant problems just as smaller Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will. Neither Uzbekistan nor Kazakstan is currently in a position to assure a constant, uninterrupted flow of power.

Kamolidinov believes Kazakstan and Uzbekistan would have left the parallel system already if they were not dependent on their neighbours to fill in the gaps at certain time.

“Kazakstan might leave, but it will mean additional costs, including spending to build the infrastructure that will be required,” he said. “If Uzbekistan goes, it will have supply problems at peak periods in the morning and evening. Without the Nurek power plant… in Tajikistan, it will be technically problematic and costly for Uzbekistan to meet this peak consumption.

Mambetov say the Uzbeks also need to be able to draw on Kyrgyz electricity.

“Leaving the common grid will have negative consequences for Uzbekistan itself, first and foremost,” he said. “The Uzbek energy grid needs Kyrgyz power in order to regulate a constant current.”

POWER CLOSELY CONNECTED WITH REGIONAL POLITICS

Aside from periodic electricity shortages, the breakdown of regional energy arrangements will have wider implications, analysts say.

For one thing, neither the Tajiks nor the Kyrgyz will have much of an incentive to honour the already loose arrangements for opening up the dam sluices in spring to let water down the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, so that their neighbours have enough irrigation for their crops. Their natural tendency will be to hold as much back until late autumn, when they need to begin generating more power.

Within the Soviet Union, water and fuel were exchanged between republics as free, shared commodities. But in the post-1991 world, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have become increasingly annoyed that their neighbours charge them for gas, oil and coal, yet their own natural resource – water – still has no monetary value placed on it.

Kamolidinov expressed the sense of dissatisfaction common in Tajikistan that “virtually for nothing”, the country stores up the waters of the Syr Darya river in its Kairakkum reservoir for release to Uzbekistan and southern Kazakstan when they need it.

“It’s going to be difficult to reach a [water] agreement on previous terms after the [Uzbek] power supply to Soghd region is interrupted in winter,” he added.

Many analysts see disputes over water and energy as inextricably linked with the political differences between the Central Asian states.

“The system inherited from the Soviet Union is in the process of being dismantled because Central Asian leaders are unable to reach agreement,” said Shairbek Juraev, an assistant professor of international and comparative politics at the American University in Central Asia, based in Kyrgyzstan.

Disagreements over water and energy have been festering for a long time, but Juraev says political confrontation has picked up pace recently.

“There is a risk that the situation may worsen, and that it will affect ordinary people most of all, with shortages of power and water and limits on freedom of movement,” he said. “It may lead to deteriorating conditions along borders, interethnic tensions, and a general worsening of the political situation in the region.”

Uzbekistan’s unhappiness with the current electricity arrangements form part of a wider pattern of disagreements with Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, over their plans to complete major new hydropower schemes.

The Roghun and Kambarata power plants would bring Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, respectively, a lot closer to self-sufficiency in energy. But Uzbekistan worries that the new dams would block off water from the Amu Darya and Syr Darya, and is insisting on an international study on the possible effects of the projects before they are completed. (For more on this, see Uzbek Overtures to Kazakstan on Water Dispute.)

Russia’s role in the region is an added complicating factor. There is talk of Moscow investing in both the Roghun and Kambarata schemes, and the Uzbeks are also concerned about plans for a new Russian military base in southern Kyrgyzstan, not far from their border. (See Kyrgyzstan: Russian Base Plan Alarms Tashkent on this issue.)

These interconnected issues make it difficult to attribute blame to any one state when disputes arise.

“All the countries in this region do not take one another’s interests into account, and are thus responsible for the current situation,” said Farhod Tolipov, a political analyst in Tashkent. “Since they gained independence, these countries have had many reciprocal grievances and disagreements.

“You cannot criticise Uzbekistan alone, for announcing its decision to leave the common grid even though it was aware this would have certain consequences for its neighbours. Its actions were prompted by the behaviour of Kyrgyzstan, which is planning to build the Kambarata plant and open a Russian military base in the south, although it knows the reaction this would bring from Uzbekistan.”

According to Paskal, worsening inter-state relationships are ultimately the legacy of Soviet-era arrangements for “enforced cooperation” which are no longer working.

In addition, she said, the once-united Central Asian states are starting to undergo “real cultural polarisation and social fragmentation, which make cooperation difficult. If social cohesion starts to break apart, all relations become difficult.”

BUILDING SEPARATE NETWORKS

When it comes to electricity, however, the Central Asian states are not standing still, but are already taking steps to forge new one-to-one arrangements with one another while strengthening their own national grids.

The Kazaks, Kyrgyz, Tajiks and Uzbeks are currently working towards bilateral and trilateral deals on infrastructure and supply, bypassing the regional level at which agreement seems so difficult.

As Nargiz Kassenova, professor of political science at the Kazakstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research, noted, “The countries in the region are making great efforts to ensure energy security by making their own grids more autonomous and developing new capacity.”

Mateev agrees that a movement towards fully independent power networks is under way, while pointing out that it goes against the international trend towards greater cooperation and efficiency through economies of scale.

“In the next three to four years, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan will find solutions and free themselves from energy dependence on Uzbekistan,” he predicted.

Kamolidinov agreed that the Tajiks and Kyrgyz were heading away from reliance on other Central Asian states.

“Energy independence has long been on the agenda of these two countries,” he said. “Uzbekistan leaving the grid and the problems this will create for them will only strengthen their desire for energy independence.”

Gulnura Toralieva is a freelance journalist from Kyrgyzstan.





Naxalism: A Short Introduction to India’s Scariest Security Challenge

21 11 2009

Prime Minister Mahoman Singh has called them “the single biggest security challenge ever faced by our country”. Fourteen Indian states are struggling to battle the insurgency waged by their 20,000 fighters. Over the last three years some 2,600 people have died by their hands.

These are the Naxalites, the source of India’s scariest security challenge.

Naxalism. It is a topic few in the West are aware of. The international media lends little attention to India’s Maoist insurgents, choosing instead to focus its attention on the more dramatic attacks of groups like Lashkar-e-Toiba. It is hard to blame them: writing about Islamic terrorism has become too easy. There is no need to perform substantive reporting or analysis on the cause of events; pundits simply need to boil down Muslim gunmen and bombers to the level of caricature and the news has been written. Naxalism, in contrast, does not lend itself to such easy stereotypes. Not surprisingly, most media outlets have been conspicuously quiet about the movement.

This silence is not sustainable. Indeed, last month an attack staged by the Naxalites was so spectacular that even the New York Times could not ignore it. On the eighth of October 200 Naxalites ambushed a large contingent of Maharashtri police commandos, killing 17 of them in a gunfight staged in broad daylight. As the Indian government begins a major nation-wide paramilitary offensive against the Naxalites, the ambush on the eighth shall surely be but the first of many battles. I suspect that as this conflict enlarges in scope and drags through time the word “Naxalite” shall lose its alien sound. The day will come when Beltway analysts will pronounce the fate of Chhattisgarh in the same steady voice as they prophesize of Xinjiang; soon the pundit class will talk as freely of the Naxalites as they do the P.K.K.

However, this is all in the future — the post below is for those of you who want a head start.

·

The term “Naxalite” is derived from Naxalbari, the name of the West-Bengal town where India’s Maoist movement began. During the late 1960s the Communist Party of India was sharply divided on how to bring about India’s communist revolution. The party broke into two camps: those in favor of a attaining power by election, whereby the party would have the influence to provide momentum for a great urban uprising, and those in favor of utilizing the country’s vast peasant class to bring about a government-toppling armed insurrection. In 1967 Charu Mazumdar, a member of this second camp, grew tired with the Communist Party’s dithering and debates and set out to begin the revolution himself. The Naxalbari revolts were the result of his efforts.

Mazumdar called his new movement the “All India Coordination Committee of Communist Revolutionaries”, but most Indians  knew the group by their place of origin, and began to call all Maoist-style guerrillas “Naxalites.”  The movement was supported by two very different groups: leftist college students (mostly from Kolkotta), and poor delits and peasants who had just barely survived India’s worst famine in a century. A steady flow of aid from China further strengthened the movement, allowing it to spread beyond the Naxalbari region itself, taking root in Andrah Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand.

From this point on events turned against the Naxalites. Chinese aid was cut off in the early 70s when the Chinese Comunist Party ended their long standing policy of funding Asian Maoist groups. A brutal counterterror campaign was began by Bengal’s police, and it decimated the ranks of the Naxilite faithful. To top things off, Mazumdar himself was captured by state police, and he stayed in their custody until his death in 1972.

Absent a study source of funding, a base of operations, and a leader, the Naxalite movement fell apart. What had been one organization splintered into 30; divided and prone to factional infighting, Mazumdar’s mass movement was forced to the precipice of Indian society. Only in rural areas far removed from government power did Naxalism retain a vestige of popular support.

This state of affairs was the status quo well into the 1990s. By this time Naxalism had been reduced to irrelevancy, prompting national and state governments to focus on more pressing problems. Given breathing space the Naxalites were able to to rebound and then expand. By 2004 the two largest Naxalite factions joined together to form a new organization, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist). The creation of CPI-Maoist was a watershed event, ending the era of interfactional  violence among the Naxalbari and paving the way for a Naxalite resurgence.

·

Naxalism thrives in the regions of India devoid of state control and subject to endemic poverty. Naxalites are often welcomed with open arms in such circumstances;  those leading lives of toil in India’s isolated jungle villages eagerly grasp opportunities to escape the system of oppression and impoverishment that dominates rural India. Once welcomed in, CPI-Maoists construct a shadow-state, complete with taxes, regulations, and courts, all ostensibly for the betterment of disenfranchised delit peasants and tribal groups.

Yet for these oppressed groups seeking recourse by way of Naxalite is an inevitable Faustian bargain. As it becomes clear that a Naxal shadow state has supplanted the authority of state government, police forces are sent to drive the Naxalites out. In the violence that follows it is the delits and tribals who suffer most.

That Naxalite groups find continued support in rural areas despite the ills that accompany their presence marks another aspect of the regions Naxalites favor: the absence of an educated citizenry. The states with a significant Naxal presence all have literacy rates below the national average; the gap in literacy found between Bihar (54%) and Kerala (91% ) mirrors the extant of Naxalite control in the two states.

The area of India where support for the Naxalism runs highest has been called “the red corridor”, a long stretch of territory reaching from southern tip of Andhra Pradesh to the eastern regions of West Bengal. The intensity of Naxalite insurgency varies across this stretch; in most places Naxalites rule unopposed only in remote pockets and patches of the region’s countryside.

In the past opposition from the rural population of Eastern India has kept Naxalism from growing past these remote pockets. The response to CPI-Maoists’s expansion was violent; many rural landowners would not tolerate a Naxalite shadow state and founded anti-Maoist militias in an attempt at armed resistance. The pattern was set by the Salwa Judum, a grass roots resistance movement in Chhattisgarh that was co-opted by the state government soon after its founding. Eager to find a quick fix to the Naxalite problem, the government of Chhattisgarh paid members of the Salwa Judum as “Special Police Officers” and ordered them to clear the jungle of Naxalite influence. The battles that followed this command resulted in thousands of internal refugees across the state. The heavy handed tactics of the Salwa Judum and their government patrons alienated many of the state’s rural poor, and early this year the last vestiges of the movement disappeared.

The same cannot be said for the Naxalites. Every bit of lost legitimacy for the Indian government was a gain for the Naxalite’s shadow state; by the end of this summer the Naxalites had enough popular authority to  set up road blocks on national highways and frisk employees of the Chhattisgarh government.

The surge in Naxalite power is not limited to Chhattisgarh. Multiple states, some outside the red corridor, have seen a troubling growth in Naxalite related violence. Part of the reason the October 8th ambush made headlines is because it did not occur in Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand, or Orissa, the four states traditionally subject to Naxal violence.

The scope this violence has ensured action on the part of India’s central government. Last month the Central Reserve Police Force reported that it had lost six times the number of men to Naxalites this year than it has to all other groups in all other combat zones, including Kashmir.  This month the CRPF announced that it was launching a nation-wide operation to counter the Naxal threat. Titled “Operation Green Hunt”, the campaign is expected to last two years.

We will see. As this blog has noted in the past, counterinsurgency campaigns  do not operate on a small time scale. This is but the beginning of another long war.

OTHER RESOURCES

Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
South Asian Terrorism Portal. 2008.

An invaluable resource for those concerned with Indian security issues, the South Asian Terrorism Portalt has in depth intelligence reports on most of India’s terrorist organizations. This particular report provides a summary of CPI-Maoist’s history, ideology, structure, and current activities. This is easily the best summary of CPI-Maoist that I have seen online.

Communist Party of India (Maoist): Documents, Statements, and Interviews of Leaders
Banned Thought. Last updated November 13 2009.

A collection of CPI-Moist documents and propaganda materials. As the title of the site indicates, all of these materials have been censored in India.

Charu Mazumdar: Reference Archive.
Marxists.org. 2003.

A collection of Charu Mazumdar’s manifestos.

India’s Forgotten War

An exhaustive aggregator and analyzer on all news items related to Naxalism.

Revolution in South Asia

A comprehensive blog that covers Maoist movements across South and Southeastern Asia… from the perspective of the Maoists.

Naxalite Rage

Shlok Vaidya’s blog on India’s security environment, guerrilla warfare, and “the far-flung implications” of a globally connected Naxalite insurgency.

ARTICLES OF INTEREST

Pragati.
Volume 31. October 2009.

Pragati released a special edition devoted to Naxalism and how the Indian government how to best over come it.

While the entire volume is top-notch, I recommend Raj Cherubal’s “Hope is the Antidote to Naxalism“, Ankur Kumar’s “Money and Friends“, and Sushant K Singh & Nitin Pai’s “Winning the Counterinsurgency Endgame” for those pressed for time.


A Spectre Haunting India

The Economist. 17 August 2006.

A good introduction to the conditions in which Naxalism arises.

Naxal Movement in India: A Profile.
Kujur, Rajat. Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. 2008.

An in depth history of the Naxal movement, with an emphasis on the movement post-Mazumdar.

On War Footing.
Datta, Sakait. Outlook India. 13 October 2009.

A short but detailed overview of what Operation Green Hunt will look like.

Operation Green Hunt launched. But where are the Naxals?
The Times of India. 7 November 2009.

The Times points out the prime difficulty in waging war against the Naxalites.

India: Draconian Response to Naxalite Violence.
Human Rights Watch. 6 April 2006.

Being Neutral is our Biggest Crime: Government, Vigilante, and Naxalite Abuses in India’s Chhattisgarh State
Human Rights Watch. 14 June 2008.

Dangerous Duty: Children and the Chhattisgarh Conflict
Human Rights Watch. 5 September 2008.

Human Rights Watch has recorded a plethora of human rights violations surrounding this conflict. I do not expect things to get better any time soon.





Sararogha Fort S. Waziristan

21 11 2009

A News Aggregator That Covers The World’s Major Wars And Conflicts. Military, Political, And Intelligence News Are Covered Also. Occasionally We Will Have Our Own Opinions Or Observations To Make.

more about "Sararogha Fort S. Waziristan", posted with vodpod





Lebanese Army Chief: Prepare for Possible Israeli Attack

21 11 2009

Lebanese Army Chief: Prepare for Possible Israeli Attack

Mohamad Shmaysani Readers Number : 191

21/11/2009 Israel media continued to circulate news about a possible new war with Lebanon. On Wednesday, Haaretz pointed Thursday that Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu was devising a scheme to wage war on Lebanon, Iran and Syria in the coming spring. And on Friday, Amos Harel, Haaretz’s military correspondent related the coming Israeli war on Lebanon to a broader regional war that reaches Tehran. Harel said that the situation on the border with Lebanon was complicated; on the one hand there is Hezbollah’s missile arsenal but on the other hand there is no Hezbollah activity against Israel on the border.

Meanwhile Lebanon’s army chief, Jean Qahwaji, called on soldiers to be on high alert and to prepare defenses along the border for a possible Israeli attack.
In a statement published in honor of Lebanon’s Independence Day, Qahwaji said soldiers should prepare “to handle what the Israeli enemy is scheming against the homeland, and to continue the battle against its violations – in the air, water, and land – with all the tools at our disposal”.

Israeli occupation forces Chief of Staff Gabi Ashkenazi recently warned the Knesset that Hezbollah is currently armed with thousands of missiles, some of which could reach Dimona, south of the occupied territories.
“Some of them have a range of 300 km and some of them have a range of up to 325 km,” Ashkenazi said, adding that the missiles were ready for use.
“There is a paradox – one hand there is calm, but when you peek over the fence you can see armament and empowerment. If Hezbollah carries out a retaliatory attack for (Imad) Mugniyah it will force Israel to respond and this will lead to deterioration,” he said.

“Lebanon will continue to work to free the land that is still under Israeli occupation including the Shaba Farms and part of the village of Rajar,” Qahwaji said.

The Army Chief urged the military to “make the utmost possible to reassure the citizens to their lives and livelihoods and continue in pursuit of terrorists, criminals and all those who undermine the country’s security.”
“You are also called to prohibit the spies from tampering with the country’s stability from time to time,” he said.

A Lebanese military court last week sentenced to death a man charged with spying for Israel and arrested another individual suspected of the same charge.
Last spring, Lebanon arrested close to 20 members of six espionage cells suspected of transmitting intelligence information to Israel.

Lebanese sources attributed last weeks arrests to improved cooperation between Lebanon’s many security agencies, saying that with the help of better-trained personnel and access to more sophisticated equipment, the Internal Security Forces have been intensifying their efforts to uncover espionage networks as part of an attempt to develop a pan-Lebanese image.
“You are also called to strengthen your efforts in order to track terrorists, criminals and perpetrators regardless of their affiliations. In this regard, you have achieved stunning exploits in this field during the last couple of months through efforts which were certified by local and international sides.”

“All the eyes are looking up to you, and the people is hailing you, therefore, do not hesitate to respond to the country’s call and spare no efforts for the sake of our land and thus you shall be preserving the precious legacy of your martyrs and drawing bright pages in the book of independence.” Qahwaji concluded his order of the day on the Independence Day.





Italian police arrest 2 linked to Mumbai attacks

21 11 2009

Italian police arrest 2 linked to Mumbai attacks

Mumbai's Taj hotel picks up pieces AFP/File – This photo taken on November 27, 2008, shows flames and smoke gushing from The Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai, …

By ARIEL DAVID, Associated Press Writer Ariel David, Associated Press Writer

ROME – Italian police on Saturday arrested a Pakistani father and son accused of helping fund and providing logistical support for last year’s terrorist attacks in Mumbai, India, authorities said.

The two were arrested in an early morning raid in Brescia, where they managed a money transfer agency, police in the northern Italian city said.

The day before the attacks began on Nov. 26 they allegedly sent money using a stolen identity to a U.S. company to activate Internet phone accounts used by the attackers and their handlers, said Stefano Fonsi, the head of anti-terror police in Brescia.

The transfer was just $229 but gave the attackers five lines over the Internet, which are difficult to trace and allowed militants to keep in touch even during the rampage, Fonsi said.

Italian police began the probe in December after being alerted by the FBI and Indian police about the transfer, Fonsi told The Associated Press.

Ten militants, allegedly from Pakistan, killed 166 people in a three-day assault on luxury hotels, a Jewish center and other sites in India’s financial capital. One Italian was among the 19 foreigners killed.

The funds were transferred under the identity of another Pakistani man who had never been to Italy and was not involved in the attacks, Fonsi said.

He lives in Spain and his identity was probably stolen when he used another money transfer agency somewhere in the world, Fonsi later told a news conference.

The order to open the accounts with the Callphonex company came from two men in Pakistan, he said. Fonsi added that Italian authorities had shared details of their identities with Pakistani officials.

The two suspects in Brescia, identified in a police statement as 60-year-old Mohammad Yaqub Janjua and 31-year-old Aamer Yaqub Janjua, are accused of aiding and abetting international terrorism as well as illegal financial activity. Their agency, which operated on the Western Union money transfer network, was seized by police.

Transferring funds using the identity of other people was a common practice at the Madina Trading agency in Brescia, and the Italian probe broke up a ring of people who used the system, Fonsi said.

Two more Pakistanis were arrested in Saturday’s raids for allegedly committing fraud, money laundering and other crimes through the masked transfers, but they were not linked to the Mumbai attacks. A fifth Pakistani man escaped arrest and was still being sought.

An additional 12 people were flagged to prosecutors for possible investigation but were not arrested, Fonsi said.

Just by using the stolen identity, the suspects had transferred some euro400,000 ($590,000) between 2006 and 2008 to various countries. The network also used its contacts in Pakistan to help illegal immigrants enter Italy, Fonsi said.

__

Associated Press Writer Andrea De Benedetti contributed to this report.





US to drop shooting case against Blackwater guard

21 11 2009

FILE - In a Monday, July 21, 2008 file photo, Blackwater Worldwide's AP – FILE – In a Monday, July 21, 2008 file photo, Blackwater Worldwide’s headquarters is seen in Moyock, …

By MATT APUZZO, Associated Press Writer Matt Apuzzo, Associated Press Writer

WASHINGTON – The Justice Department intends to drop manslaughter and weapons charges against one of the Blackwater Worldwide security guards involved in a deadly 2007 Baghdad shooting, prosecutors said in court documents Friday.

The shooting in busy Nisoor Square left 17 Iraqis dead and inflamed anti-American sentiment abroad. It touched off a string of investigations that ultimately led the State Department to cancel the company’s lucrative contract to guard diplomats in Iraq.

Iraqis have said they’re watching closely to see how the U.S. judicial system handles the five men accused of unleashing an unprovoked attack on civilians with machine guns and grenades.

A one-paragraph notice filed Friday says only that prosecutors have asked that the case against Nicholas Slatten of Sparta, Tenn., be dropped. The government’s detailed request to the court was filed with the judge and with the defendant, but was not made public.

Prosecutors filed the request in a way that allows them to file new charges against Slatten later. There is no indication in the documents whether they intend to. Justice Department spokesman Dean Boyd said Friday he could not say whether new charges would be filed.

Slatten’s attorney, Thomas Connolly, said he could not comment on the court documents but said Slatten has maintained his innocence all along. Slatten was an Army sniper who served two tours in Iraq before joining Blackwater.

The request could be a bad sign for the government. After the shootings, some guards spoke to investigators under the promise of immunity. Prosecutors have been arguing behind closed doors that the immunity deal did not taint the case. The judge is considering that issue now. Jury selection in the trial is scheduled to begin Jan. 25.

Five guards, all military veterans, face charges. Prosecutors say the shooting was unprovoked but Blackwater says its convoy was ambushed. A sixth pleaded guilty, turned on his former colleagues, and pleaded guilty to killing one Iraqi and wounding another.

The case against the remaining four guards is set for trial in February. Prosecutors were aggressive in their charges, using an anti-machine gun law to attach 30-year mandatory prison sentences to the case. And though authorities can’t say for sure exactly which guards shot which victims, all five guards are charged with 14 counts of manslaughter.

So far, most of the case has played out behind closed doors. Defense attorneys have argued the FBI improperly built their case using information gathered under the promise of immunity. Investigators say they were careful to build their case only on material gathered independent of the immunity deals.

The trial likely will hinge on whether the Blackwater guards were provoked. Iraqi witnesses say Blackwater fired the only shots. Some members of the Blackwater convoy said they saw gunfire. Others said they didn’t. Radio logs of the shooting indicate the guards were fired on.

Prosecutors say the guards was itching for a fight and unleashed a gruesome attack on unarmed Iraqis, including women, children and people trying to escape. The convoy allegedly launched a grenade into a nearby girls’ school.

Since the shooting, Blackwater, headquartered in Moyock, N.C., has renamed itself Xe Corp. and has undergone a management upheaval.








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