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Daily Archives: July 19, 2010
Russia and Ukraine Want To Build Reactors For the World
Russia, Ukraine To Consider Joint Atomic Project
MOSCOW, Russia — Russian and Ukrainian experts will discuss setting up a joint nuclear generation project on Tuesday, Ukraine’s major energy company said.
“A Russian-Ukraine meeting on equipment supplies to power stations in Russia and other countries will take place on July 20, 2010, at the Turboatom headquarters,” Turboatom said in statement.
“In addition, the meeting will discuss conditions for the creation of a joint Russian-Ukrainian standard generation unit project to be constructed in a number of countries,” the statement added.
The meeting will involve experts from leading Russian and Ukrainian atomic energy companies.
Economic and political ties between Russia and Ukraine have strengthened significantly since Viktor Yanukovych replaced pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko as president in late February.
Source: RIA Novosti
American Rosebuds Of Democratic-Revolution Left To Wither On Their Vines
Ukraine: What Opposition?
KIEV, Ukraine — Nearly five months into Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych’s term, the opposition is in disarray – just when it is needed the most.
Yulia Tymoshenko
After the opposition’s last high-profile appearance in April, when its top leaders staged a mass protest against Yanukovych’s renewal of the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s lease on its Crimea base, observers predicted an opposition revival.
But now, as Yanukovych gravitates toward Moscow and threatens the democratic gains made after the Orange Revolution, the opposition seems powerless.
The opposition is loosely bound in parliament by former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko’s faction, the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT), and the Our Ukraine-People’s Self Defense Bloc (OU-PSD).
Shortly after his inauguration, Yanukovych dealt the opposition a crippling blow by luring away some of its deputies and major funders into his own faction, the Party of Regions. The result was a consolidation of Yanukovych’s power through a parliamentary majority and a simmering sense of betrayal and discord within the opposition.
But the ultimate paradox is that while the opposition suffers, it is now needed more than ever.
Mass discontent without mass organization
Yanukovych’s recent turn toward semi-authoritarianism and his pursuit of divisive cultural policies – such as tapping the vehemently anti-Ukrainian Dmytro Tabachnyk to head the Ministry of Culture and Education and denying the Stalin-engineered famine of the 1930s was genocide against Ukrainians – create the potential for mass discontent.
Voicing mass discontent, however, requires mass organization – among the opposition’s biggest problems today.
The latest attempt to organize came in the form of the People’s Committee to Protect Ukraine, founded in early May. Ostensibly, it unites a handful of different parliamentary parties in opposition to the Yanukovych administration.
But the committee has so far failed to attract any serious media attention and lacks a specific, pro-active policy platform.
Besides Tymoshenko, the group is a hodge-podge of Ukraine’s elite, from intellectuals and activists to politicians. Some are recognizable, but most are uninteresting to the general public.
“The Ukrainian electorate is looking for a new face,” Serhiy Solodky, deputy director of the Institute for World Policy in Kiev, told ISN Security Watch. “But they simply haven’t been able to find it yet.”
Meanwhile, as the opposition struggles to get its act together, Yanukovych’s anti-democratic policies – media censorship, a crackdown on protests and his recent bid to tweak the constitution to grant himself more power – hang over Ukraine like a dark cloud.
Who will lead?
Ukraine’s natural opposition leader would seem to be Tymoshenko, the runner-up in this year’s presidential election who was ousted from the premiership after Yanukovych installed his own loyalist. Her political experience, fiery rhetoric and unabashed criticism of Yanukovych’s administration should make her a prime candidate.
But after an exhausting presidential campaign, during which Tymoshenko consistently attacked Yanukovych while the global financial crisis ravaged the Ukrainian economy, voters developed a ‘Tymoshenko fatigue’.
“One of the reasons Yanukovych won [the presidential election] was because people showed that they were tired of Tymoshenko,” Ivan Lozowy, a political insider and president of the Kiev-based Institute for Statehood and Democracy, told ISN Security Watch. “She hit her ceiling a long time ago in terms of support. In 2005, people used to say ‘I like her because she does things.’ Now it’s the exact opposite.”
Within the opposition itself, Tymoshenko does more harm than good. Rather than unite the opposition, Lozowy said, she serves as a power-hungry “boulder” that stands in the way of other potential leaders.
Her proclivity for the spotlight leaves little room for other aspirants to gather steam for the next parliamentary elections, scheduled for 2011 and considered a major test for Ukraine’s opposition forces.
“An opposition candidate has to start developing around now,” said Lozowy. “It’ll be much more difficult to pop up a year before the election, but there’s no one else besides Tymoshenko.”
And among the other possible contenders, pickings are slim.
Arseniy Yatseniuk, onetime minister of foreign affairs and former parliament chair, lost his momentum during this year’s presidential election after an awkward campaign engineered by Russian political technologists.
Boris Tarasiuk, also a former minister of foreign affairs and current parliamentarian, lacks the youthful allure and charismatic personality to rally voters.
Others, such as OU-PSD parliamentarian Viacheslav Kyrylenko and former interior minister Yuriy Lutsenko, are young and visible, but their ties to disgraced former president Viktor Yushchenko damage their credibility.
The rest either lack the charisma or organizational capacity – or both – to make any serious bid for leadership, according to Lozowy.
Fed up
Under Yushchenko, Ukrainians suffered five years of bitter political infighting, in which he and Tymoshenko traded accusations of corruption almost daily and left crucial reforms hanging unattended. The honeymoon after 2004’s Orange Revolution gave way within months to Yushchenko’s divisive nationalist rhetoric, on one hand, and Tymoshenko’s wild populism, on the other.
Now, the Yanukovych presidency – though decidedly less western-oriented and democratic – has brought relative order and political stability. The one-time villain of the Orange Revolution, it turns out, has become a long-awaited savior from the deadlocked politics of the Orange era.
And though Yanukovych’s policies may well be disconcerting, many Ukrainians have sacrificed political preferences for a break from the tumultuous past – which means a departure from the Orange elites, many of whom make up the current opposition.
“The previous government carries with it an extremely negative image,” said Solodky. “The electorate is tired of what has happened the past five years. Right now, it’s willing to look away in favor of calm and order.”
What’s more, opposition parliamentarians are too preoccupied with feeding their egos – and business interests – to effectively unite and counter Yanukovych’s increasingly worrying policies, according to Solodky.
“The opposition doesn’t sense a genuine risk, because everyone dreams of themselves winning the next [parliamentary] election, and they don’t want to give that up,” he said. “They understand the problem, but while it doesn’t affect their business support, and while there’s a potential to collect more votes for the next elections, they’ll remain divided.”
Dim future?
With Yanukovych consolidating his power at a steady pace, time is running out for the opposition.
It has already failed recently to push through parliament the dismissal of two highly controversial Yanukovych appointments: Valeriy Khoroshkovskyi, a media magnate dubiously tapped by Yanukovych to head the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU); and Fuel and Energy Minister Yuriy Boiko, a former head of Ukraine’s state-owned oil and gas company, Naftohaz of Ukraine, during the energy corruption-infested administration of former president Leonid Kuchma.
The opposition’s next major obstacle will be the regional elections scheduled for late October. But recent legislation passed by Yanukovych’s majority – and howled down by the opposition as unconstitutional – requires that candidates run according to their parties for half of all local council seats.
And in order for a party to get a seat, it needs to win a majority of votes. Because both the opposition is a mere collection of smaller political parties and cannot put up a single candidate, the legislation effectively tips the scale in favor of Yanukovych’s dominant Party of Regions, of the eponymous faction.
The law, which BYuT said in a recent statement it would challenge in Ukraine’s Constitutional Court, would play on the opposition’s divisions and pave the way for the Party of Regions to collect the majority in many areas, according to Serhiy Kudelia, a political scientist and former advisor in the Tymoshenko government.
“The Party of Regions played a very smart trick on the opposition, which basically puts [party leaders] at odds with each other,” Kudelia told ISN Security Watch. “It provides them with an incentive to pursue their own projects.”
The regional elections will be a telling indicator of the opposition’s strategy ahead of the parliamentary elections, the first of Yanukovych’s presidency. So far, however, the signs are ominous: While Yanukovych’s Party of Regions is a colossal and united political force in its own right, Tymoshenko’s Fatherland party, though the dominant party in BYuT, is riddled with disunity and competition.
According to Kudelia, the Yanukovych administration’s image as a unified force damages Tymoshenko’s – and the opposition’s – chance for success.
“The political fortunes of Tymoshenko will depend to a large extent on the ability of Yanukovych to preserve this united front of the government,” he said. “If she does poorly [in the elections], then this will be a precondition for further fleeing of major figures to other parties.”
Source: ISN
Pakistan Begins the Journey Back To Military Dictatorship
Musharraf plans return, looks to Army for security
By Rauf Klasra
LONDON: Former President General (retd) Pervez Musharraf finally kicked off his campaign to return to Pakistan as he launched an attack on Saturday from Dubai against his political rivals — Nawaz Sharif and Asif Zardari — and their poor governance and said the Army would provide him security on his return within coming months.
Musharraf said if the military was under any constraints not to provide him security, he would raise his own private security on his return to Pakistan in the coming months to face both Nawaz Sahrif and Asif Ali Zardari.
General Musharraf told his top aides in a six-hour-long marathon meeting in Dubai on Saturday that he was willing to face any legal proceedings against him and would even face jail if a fair trial was conducted. “I have many top legal minds assisting me and they will come to my aid if I need them,” he was quoted by sources as saying during the crucial meeting.
Top sources told The News in London that Gen Musharraf had convened a meeting at his flat in downtown Dubai, which was attended by former foreign minister Khurshid Kusuri, Hamid Nasir Chattha, Ishaq Khan Khakwani, Raza Hiraj, Ch Shahbaz, Barrister Saif, Ch Fawwad, Dr Amjad, Lt Gen (retd) Muzaffar, ex-QMG, and Maj Gen (retd) Rashid Quershi. The meeting lasted for over six hours. The deteriorating law and order situation and economic meltdown in Pakistan was discussed in detail.
Sources said General (retd) Musharraf vowed to return to Pakistan in the Dubai meeting aimed at chalking out his return strategy. This was first time he held a serious meeting with his aides to stage a comeback to Pakistan and face his main rival Nawaz Sharif.
During his discourse, Musharraf made it clear whatever he did in curtailing the activities of extremist elements, he did it in his capacity as the president and Army chief. “This is exactly in the same manner as the current set up: the chief executive, the army chief and the corp commanders of Peshawar and Rawalpindi were carrying out their duties,” he told his aides.
One source said that Gen Musharraf actually sent a message to present Pakistani leadership and his key opponents who wanted to put him on trial that even present military leadership was busy in the same activities as it was the call of duty.
Sources said that the timetable for the return of Gen Musharraf to Pakistan and launching of the political party also came under discussion. Many views were exchanged on all the subjects. Musharraf was said to be very confident about his return to Pakistan. During his meeting with his former colleagues he addressed the concerns and questions, which might have been in their minds. Musharraf emphasized that it was the duty of the government, the armed forces and the paramilitary forces to contain the extremists and protect the people.
He said he had served the country well (much and far better than the bad governance and misrule of the last two and a half years rule of the PPP and the PML-N). He said that the people were in far better position than they were in now. He stated that he got hundreds of messages everyday in praise of his years in office. He further deliberated that after serving for nine years and attaining the highest offices in the army and as head of the state, he was not really aspiring for any personal political gain, but wanted to help Pakistan from sliding further down. He said the present political leadership of the country was not capable to serve the people and their repeated coming to office, for the third and fourth time, in the past two decades had shown that they were void of any acumen to provide good governance or even learnt anything from their past mistakes.
The sources said Musharraf appreciated the efforts of the leaders of various factions of the Muslim League uniting against the PML-N and wished them well. He stated that he was not against the Chaudhrys of Gujrat and would be very happy to receive them. He further reiterated that his doors were open for all his former colleagues and called upon them to shun their differences.
Another Fascist Attack Against Freedom of the Press–This Time, It’s India’s Turn
[India is suffering from right-wing fundamentalism inciting anti-minority (Muslim) riots and terror attacks. Fundamentalism, in all its many forms and religions, is a sickness, a mental aberration which prevents believers from seeing their faith in action today, keeping them firmly stuck in the past. Those with this mental illness cannot see that faith is a living thing, a lens for using the past to help the believer see the reasons behind the mysteries of the present.
When we learn that God is not bound by our attempts to limit, or to explain His nature, then we will understand that He is there to broaden our understanding. With such understanding comes peace.]
Hooliganism pure and simple
To say that Friday’s mob attack on the offices of Headlines Today carries the signature of the Sangh Parivar is to state the obvious. Leave aside the openly pro-Sangh placards sported by the rampaging protesters, the vandalism follows a pattern of aggression only too familiar. From the destruction of the Feroz Shah Kotla cricket pitch in 1999 to countless attacks on film crews, art galleries, and, in particular, the works of M.F. Husain, intolerant elements in the Sangh have given vent to their anger far too often for anyone not to be able to recognise their brand of violence. (At a different level, who can forget the trauma of December 6, 1992, when trishul-waving saffron hordes set upon journalists covering the dying moments of the Babri Masjid?) In the latest instance, the news channel — which, paradoxically, has been anything but unsympathetic to the Sangh’s ideology and politics — was targeted because it telecast material that allegedly linked personages belonging to the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh and the Bharatiya Janata Party to acts of terror against the Muslim community. The channel also claimed to have uncovered a 2007 plot to assassinate Vice-President Hamid Ansari.
It can be nobody’s case that the findings of investigative journalism should be treated as conclusive evidence. But equally, there is no denying that the Hindutva terror trail is inching towards the heart of the Sangh. Police investigations over the past couple of years have zeroed in on a shocking story that not too long ago was dismissed as a figment of secular fundamentalist imagination. Today that possibility has become disturbingly real with evidence in a string of terror attacks — among them the Mecca Masjid and the Malegaon blast cases — pointing to the involvement of the Hindu Right. Maharashtra Anti-Terrorism Squad chief Hemant Karkare was closing in on this terror network when he was killed by the 26/11 terrorists from Pakistan. The pace has since picked up, and as much is evident from the RSS’s admission that one or two of its minor functionaries could have been involved in the cases. Clearly, the high priests of the Sangh do not wish to relive the aftermath of Mahatma Gandhi’s assassination when the RSS was banned and pushed to desperate straits. The BJP is in all manner of trouble, politically speaking. The Sangh has sleuths snooping around in its backyard. Hooliganism against the media — in the latest case, against a media organisation that cannot be labelled antagonistic — is the last thing the twosome needs right now.
Another Major Train derailment In West Bengal, Raising Suspicion Of Sabotage
Union Railway Minister Mamata Banerjee talks to the media at Kolkata airport on Monday morning. PTI
Mamata ‘suspicious’ about cause of Sainthia accident
PTIRailway Minister Mamata Banerjee raised suspicions about the cause of the second major train accident in West Bengal saying “We have some doubt in our mind. Whatever happened is not casual thing”.
Railway Minister Mamata Banerjee raised suspicions about the cause of the second major train accident in West Bengal in two months on Monday while one of her top officials did not rule out sabotage.
“I am suspicious about the cause of the accident,” Ms. Banerjee told reporters before proceeding to the site of the mishap after a speeding Sealdah-bound Uttarbanga Express rammed into the rear of the Ranchi-bound Vananchal Express at Sainthia station in Birbhum district, about 190 km from Kolkata.
“We have some doubt in our mind. Whatever happened is not casual thing. We will take all strong step against those who are behind this,” she said, adding an inquiry will reveal everything.
Ms. Mamata made these remarks in Kolkata when asked about the circumstances that could have led to the mishap which has left 60 persons dead.
She also said the Railways will investigate why the Uttarbanga Express was travelling 25 minutes before time.
“How did the train arrive 25 minutes before time is under the scanner,” she said, suggesting the train may be overspeeding.
The Railways also did not rule out the possibility of sabotage.
“Nothing can be ruled out. Ho sakta hai hamara equipment se chherchhar hui ho. Ye sab janch ke bad pata chalega (It may be possible that our equipment might have been tampered with. It will be known only after inquiry),” Eastern Railways General Manager V. N. Tripathy told PTI at the site of the accident in Sainthia.
To another question, he said the Uttarbanga Express was running at a much higher speed than it was supposed to while entering the Sainthia station.
“The train was overspeeding but there is no explanation why the train was overspeeding,” Mr. Tripathy said.
“What caused the accident is a mystery to us. The driver of the Uttarbanga Express was a very good driver. He had stopped the train properly at previous station. We are puzzled,” he said.
Railway Board Chairman Vivek Sahay said the driver had stopped just five kms before the accident site. “So how he could have speeded up in five kms. The driver cannot commit a mistake like this,” he said.
“We do not know whether the signal was given. Even if the signal was given, the train has to stop at Sainthia,” Mr. Sahay said.
Today’s accident comes within two months of the Jnaneshwari train disaster on May 28 near Jhargram in West Midnapore district that left 148 dead. The Railway Minister had alleged a ‘political conspiracy’ behind it. The Central Bureau of Investigation is currently probing the Jnaneswari mishap.
If Armenia Agrees To Withdraw From Azeri Territory, the Border will Open, the Gas Will Flow
Ankara Accusing Yerevan Of ‘Lack of Political Will’
Turkey has the political will necessary to continue the so-called peace process that has started in the region and it is willing to develop relations with all its neighbors based on mutual trust and friendship, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu said, reported by Turkish Anadolu agency.
“Recently there has been some progress with solving the existing problems with our neighbors. But Armenia continues to remain the weak circle of that process. The signing of the Protocols became the first step in the normalization process. And the continuity of that process will definitely be dependent on whether or not will Armenia have the will and adopt a constructive approach to solve the problems,” said Davutoglu.
Further Davutoglu said the process might move ahead should Armenia like Turkey have the same political will.
“And if Armenia shows the same political will, the process may move forward for the benefit of the whole region. By not shaking the hand of friendship that Turkey has landed, Armenia will first of all harm itself,” added Turkish FM.
Speaking about the Nagorno Karabakh conflict Davutoglu also said that Ankara has not proposed to deploy peacekeepers there after the conflict’s resolution.
Independence to Nagorno-Karabakh can not be subject of further negotiations
Azerbaijani FM: Independence to Nagorno-Karabakh can not be subject of further negotiations
19.07.2010 14:10
Azerbaijan, Baku, July 19 / Trend S. Agayeva /
Giving independence to Nagorno-Karabakh can not be the subject of further negotiations, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov told media at a joint press conference with Ukrainian counterpart.
“Armenians have an independent state of Armenia. Self-determination as the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh can only occur within the autonomy of Azerbaijan”, the minister said.
Azerbaijani Foreign Minister noted with regret that the Almaty meeting was fruitless. Armenia refused from making a statement in the format “3+2″. Baku welcomed its signing. “Today there is nothing secret in the negotiation process. A plan of the talks is known to everybody. It was approved in a statement of the presidents at G-8 summit in Toronto, ” Mammadyarov said.
The presidents of Russia, the United States and France, Dmitry Medvedev, Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy made a joint statement within the June summit of G-8 in Canada. They urged the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan to accelerate work on the main principles of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to proceed then to drafting of the Peace Agreement.
The statement adopted by three leaders in Canada on Saturday noted that a lasting settlement must be based on several principles, including the return of the occupied territories of Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, which provides guarantees of security and self-governing; corridor linking Armenia with Nagorno Karabakh. Determination of a final legal status of Nagorno Karabakh by the will of people having legal power, the right of all internal and displaced people and refugees to return to their homes, international guarantees of security, including peacekeeping operations are also included. These provisions are consistent with the basic items of the Madrid principles.
The minister said that details of the talks were announced to inform the public about the negotiations. “This is a very sensitive issue for Armenia and the Armenian community of Nagorno-Karabakh,” Mammadyarov said.
The minister said that the Azerbaijani side is still willing to continue negotiations, but their effectiveness will depend on the Armenian side.
The conflict between the two South Caucasus countries began in 1988 when Armenia made territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Armenian armed forces have occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan since 1992, including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and 7 surrounding districts. Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994.
The co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – Russia, France, and the U.S. – are currently holding the peace negotiations.
Armenia has not yet implemented the U.N. Security Council’s resolutions on the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and the occupied territories.
Kazakh President Calls Russia and America’s Bluff
[Kazakhistan's President Nazarbayev exposed the great international sham known as the "pipeline wars." Both Russian and American gas pipeline projects rely on the same sources of supply, both follow generally the same routes, though Nabucco is far more ambitious in scope than its competitor South Stream. The nature of the competition is to seduce suppliers, financiers and route right-of-ways , all at the same time, into joining either one of the visualized projects, which are in reality great international diplomatic balancing acts. Whoever manages to convince all the necessary players at one time to take the first steps forward together will win the competition, if it really is a competition and not a conspiracy. In this respect, whoever starts the building process for either the Caspian undersea supply lines or gas liquefaction plants, will convince the rest of the world that their production is not imaginary.
Competition to bring these needed sources of fuel to the rest of the demanding world is the wrong way to bring the project about, unless the intention has been to raise the prices of everything, all along.
There will be a merger of Nabucco and South Stream projects; there is probably a deal already on paper. For the cause of world peace and harmony, America and Russia should bring the idea of competition and confrontation to an end in Central Asia. A good way to announce this to the world would be to start a joint undersea pipeline project, or a gas liquefaction plant.]
Kazakhstan ready to join Nabucco gas project, seeks more from EU
18.07.2010 20:18
Kazakhstan‘s president said on Sunday his country is ready to be a part of theNabucco gas pipeline, but the European Union must do more to make its participation in the project possible, RIA Novosti reported.
“Kazakhstan has never been against Nabucco, the issue is that in Europe there is a lot of talk about Nabucco…but in practice little is being done,” Nursultan Nazarbayev said on Sunday at a news conference in Astana after talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel.
He said that for Kazakhstan to participate in the EU-backed pipeline project, seen as a rival to Russia’s South Stream, there would need to be either a pipeline under the Caspian Sea to connect with Nabucco or at least a gas liquefaction plant on the coast.
“Nothing is being done on either issue except talk,” Nazarbayev said.
The Kazakh president said that neighboring Turkmenistan, which has abundant gas reserves, has also said it could contribute to Nabucco, but it also needs these questions resolved.
“The European Union could work more actively on this,” Nazarbayev said.
The Nabucco project is intended to transport natural gas from the Caspian region to Europe via Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Austria, bypassing Russia. It is designed to annually transport 31 billion cubic meters of gas, which would meet as much as 5 percent of EU demand in 2020.
Gazprom’s South Stream project bypasses Ukraine, passing through Turkish waters and across Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia and Austria. Both Russia and the EU deny that the planned pipelines would be rivals, but the bulk of the gas for each project would come from the same Caspian region countries.
Kazakhstan’s Caspian shelf has an estimated 3.3 trillion cubic meters of gas reserves, and the country’s gas production is expected to grow to approximately 45 billion cubic meters in 2010.
The Web Blog That Cost Its Creator His Life
[The Web Blog That Cost Its Creator His Life. SEE: Greek journalist and blogger Sokratis Giolias killed]
The fifth estate: A rogue rodent
The Greek, and by extension, the European economies are facing difficult times. The Greek political situation has followed suit, with political parties facing the impossible task of sacrificing people’s hard earned finances for the good of the economy. This article is not about judging the politicians who have pocketed millions while in office, creating public service positions by the tens of thousands in order to secure votes in elections.
Mass media, typically regarded as the fourth estate, are in their majority not serving as watchdogs of the political bodies, but disappointingly all too often find themselves accomplices by non-coverage or over-coverage of specific issues. Indeed, the traditional gatekeepers of information have become fewer as mergers and acquisitions of mass media by media groups has become the norm. With fewer gatekeepers, and in some cases, a near dictatorial approach to deciding what receives extensive coverage and what gets buried, Media have allowed for a new estate: The fifth estate.
The fifth estate has manifested most obviously in Greece.
One blog, which is based on openness of information has become the most popular website in Greece, receiving millions of visitors each day. The blog, is only outvisited by Google, Facebook, Youtube, Yahoo, and Blogger.
In terms of information, this blog is simply destroying traditional media. The blog reposts from other blogs, contains original content, and posts users testimonials and commentaries. No censorship, no agenda, other than transparency and faith in democracy.
What’s more, the top site in Greece, runs on a blogspot platform, with no commercial advertisements.
The blog is heralded for disseminating information which led to the resignation of Minister Angela Gerekou last week, who quit after her husband was found owing over €5.5 million in taxes.
The age of information filtering is coming to an end. The risks and dangers obvious: unreliable information, lack of quality and depth in writing, and all the reasons given in a journalism class. But for a country like Greece, where the democratic deficit has been multiplied by influencable media, the value of real freedom and democracy is priceless.
Let’s hope the political “democratic” response is to impose stringent regulations on blogs.
Until then, the “rodents” will continue to gnaw away at politicians with deep pockets.
For those who don’t know what blog is being refered to in this article visit: troktiko.blogspot.com
Greek journalist and blogger Sokratis Giolias killed
Greek journalist and blogger Sokratis Giolias killed
Journalists, bloggers and news readers in Greece and around the world are in shock after this morning tragic events: Greek journalist and blogger Sokratis Giolias was killed today in his apartment located in a residential area of Athens. He was executed by three men, according to police and eye witness reports, after being lured out of his apartment by a phone call saying his car was being stolen. As he exited his house to check if indeed there was a theft going on, he was met by the three men who are said to have used two guns to commit the murder.
Sokratis Giolias was a highly recognized news journalist of the Greek media scene. He was a director of the national news radio station “Thema 9.89,” was known to collaborate closely with Makis Triandafylopoulos, a Greek journalist mostly famous for his investigative reporting and was and allegedly one of the founding members of the Troktiko blog which is the most-visited news source in Greece according to New Europe.
In a country with high corruption rates and heavy political involvement in the media, Giolias, father of a two year old child, and the Troktiko blog put in great efforts to make a difference and provide quality news and investigative reporting, which subsequently led to his and his blog’s massive success.
According to the preliminary police reports, the car used by the three gunmen was found abandoned after being burnt down extremely close to Giolias’ residence (1,5 kilometers). Rumors sent to New Europe claim the shooters were dressed as policemen.
We hope the murderers will be caught and brought to justice and that this cruel crime will not scare great reporters and keep them away from quality news and investigative pieces. The worldwide media and public’s condolences go to Sokratis Giolias’ family and friends.
In Osh, the rally was held against the OSCE mission in Kyrgyzstan
In the south of Kyrgyzstan in Osh was held to protest the presence of police officers from the countries of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).
The protesters also demanded to punish the officials responsible for inciting ethnic hatred.
Last Friday it became known the intention of the OSCE Presssend to southern Kyrgyzstan, 52 unarmed police officers who will advise staff of Kyrgyz law enforcement agencies.
The request for sending the police mission in Kyrgyzstan joined the OSCE president Rosa Otunbayeva.
Gul Bahadur–the Man In North Waziristan
The Survivalist of North Waziristan: Hafiz Gul Bahadur Biography and Analysis – by Charlie Szrom
Source: Critical Threats
Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters use Waziristan to prepare for and launch attacks against American forces in Afghanistan and Western targets abroad. Since early June, the Pakistani military has been conducting a campaign to kill Waziristan’s preeminent Taliban leader, Beitullah Mehsud. Standing in the military’s way is Hafiz Gul Bahadur, a key Taliban leader in North Waziristan and an enigmatic man of complex ideology, shifting alliances, and an overarching commitment to his own survival.
· I. IMPORTANCE OF HAFIZ GUL BAHADUR
· II. HISTORY
· III. OUTLOOK ON THE WORLD
· IV. RELATIONSHIP WITH FOREIGN MILITANTS, HAQQANI, AND MULLAH OMAR
· V. RELATIONSHIP WITH BEITULLAH MEHSUD AND THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT
· VI. CONCLUSION
IMPORTANCE OF HAFIZ GUL BAHADUR
The American-led coalition in Afghanistan faces insurgents directed, trained and supported by Taliban leaders in the North Waziristan Agency, a district within Pakistan that borders Afghanistan and sits roughly 130 miles to the southwest of Islamabad (see Waziristan map insert below). A September 2007 UN report estimated that 80 percent of all suicide bombers in Afghanistan pass through training facilities in North and South Waziristan.[1] Although American drone attacks have killed some foreign fighters operating in North Waziristan, these attacks cannot dismantle the area’s insurgent support network.
The Pakistani military has been conducting a significant military operation in Waziristan since early June. The stated goal of this operation is to kill or, at least, significantly diminish the power of Beitullah Mehsud, the leader of the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the most wanted man in Pakistan. Mehsud is widely held responsible for the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and his forces threaten the stability of the Pakistani government, which has blamed Mehsud for the deaths of 1200 people in the last two years.[2] He also threatens to expand, or at the very least continue, Waziristan’s significance as a staging ground for attacks abroad, whether by Taliban insurgents against coalition forces in Afghanistan or by al-Qaeda members against targets worldwide.
To attack or isolate Mehsud from the north the Pakistani military must cross through North Waziristan, an area controlled by Taliban leader Hafiz Gul Bahadur. Bahadur could hinder the Pakistani military’s campaign against Mehsud by preventing or seriously impeding the movement of Pakistani forces through his region. [3] Since late June, he has demonstrated –on a limited scale – his ability to disrupt Pakistani operations in the region, kidnapping at least ten Pakistani soldiers on July 31 (whom he released two days later) and claiming responsibility for a suicide bombing – the first time Bahadur has claimed responsibility for such an attack– on July 28. [4]
Bahadur has cooperated with both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud in the past, but he has never made permanent alliances with either. On June 29, Bahadur’s forces attacked Pakistani troops in North Waziristan, which began the recent violence between his forces and those of the government. This attack broke an on-again, off-again peace deal Bahadur had maintained with the Pakistani government since September 2006. [5] Bahadur said he attacked Pakistani forces because of continued American drone strikes and increasing Pakistani military operations in and near his territory, which he claimed violated the 2006 agreement’s terms.[6]Bahadur repeated this message through his spokesman after the July 28 suicide bombing.[7]
Bahadur has protected his powerbase by engaging in limited violence in response to American drone strikes, Pakistani military operations, or encroachment by certain groups of foreign fighters. Yet he has never launched an unrestricted war against the Pakistani government, Beitullah Mehsud, or other elements in North Waziristan, including foreign fighters who have occasionally crossed him. It appears that the maintenance of his sphere of influence motivates Bahadur more than any other factor. Unrestrained attacks on the Pakistani military or other power brokers in his area could entail risk above the level Bahadur seems willing to accept, effectively limiting his potential use of force. His current fight with the Pakistani military does not seem to be a life-or-death struggle, but is more like a series of negotiations through violence with attacks and threats of attacks as bargaining chips. Bahadur attacks to limit or direct Pakistani military operations, and the Pakistani military responds to ensure its continued freedom of movement through his area, but neither side seeks open conflict with the other. As a result, neither a true peace agreement nor a complete defeat of Bahadur seems likely any time soon, and Bahadur’s limited raids are likely to trouble Pakistani operations in Waziristan for their duration.
HISTORY
Little information is available on Bahadur’s early years. He comes from Madda Khel, North Waziristan, a town close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Estimates of his age vary widely, from early thirties to late forties. [8] He likely received his education at a Deobandi madrassa and probably participated in the Afghan civil war from 1992 to 1996, during which the Taliban, founded in 1994, began to seize control of most of Afghanistan.[9] His self-designation as a Hafiz, or one who has memorized the entire Qur’an, suggests that his religious education plays an important role in his thinking.
Bahadur first received media mention in 2000 when he was active as a North Waziristan leader of the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), a major Islamist Pakistani party. [10] He received still more attention in the month before the 9/11 attacks when he threatened to attack monitors the United Nations planned to deploy to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region to halt the flow of weapons to the Afghan Taliban.[11] Bahadur vehemently opposed the deployment of such monitors, which would have diminished the ability of Pakistani Pashtuns to support the Afghan Taliban fighting Afghanistan’s Northern Alliance. In conjunction with other JUI leaders and in his role as the head of the JUI’s student wing, the Jamiat-Tulaba-i Islam, Bahadur recruited a lashkar, or militia, of as many as 4,000 volunteers to oppose the monitors, who never deployed due, in part, to the disruption created by the 9/11 attacks.[12]
Bahadur’s ability to combine political acumen and charisma with local tribal ties gave him a strong foundation for acquiring power. Bahadur is one of the leaders of the Utmanzai Wazir tribe, who reside primarily in North Waziristan. Reports suggest that Utmanzai Wazirs have historically exhibited more unity than other tribes, perhaps providing Bahadur with a relatively stable base. [13]Within the Utmanzai Tribe, Bahadur probably belongs to the Madda Khel subgroup, part of the Ibrahim Khel branch. [14] Bahadur’s men, reported to be some of the fiercest fighters in North Waziristan, have been reported to number several thousand.[15]
Bahadur has used his ability to negotiate peace agreements in his area to expand the influence he had because of his tribal leadership. He has frequently served as chief negotiator, giving him significant control over post-ceasefire situations; negotiations have also served as tools whose short-term nature and exacting terms Bahadur uses to ensure that both the Pakistani military and Taliban leaders like Mehsud continue to woo him.
Bahadur achieved his greatest prominence with the September 2006 peace deal with the Pakistani government, which resulted in an end to hostilities and military operations in exchange for an expulsion of foreign fighters (which never occurred fully), among other terms. Between September 2006 and June 2009, Bahadur conducted occasional violence against the Pakistani government while scuffling from time to time with fellow Taliban and, particularly, foreign fighters whom he perceived to be encroaching on his area of control, such as Uzbeks.
OUTLOOK ON THE WORLD
Reports often mention Bahadur in the same breath as his fellow Taliban leader Maulvi Nazir Ahmad, who resides in South Waziristan. Nazir Ahmad, a leader of the Ahmedzai Wazir tribe and its Taliban branch, has likewise made alliances with both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud. Style, outlook on the world, and Bahadur’s political background separate the two leaders, but an opposition to foreign fighters in Waziristan, particularly Uzbeks, as well as loyalty to Mullah Omar and the Haqqani family, connect them.
Unlike other major Taliban leaders in Waziristan, especially Maulvi Nazir, there is little public knowledge about Bahadur’s worldview. Nazir has made numerous public statements, including an April 2009 interview with as-Sahab, al-Qaeda’s media branch.[16] Bahadur by contrast maintains a private profile, avoiding any direct contact with journalists in recent years and putting out statements only through his spokesman, Ahmadullah Ahmadi. [17]
In August 2008, his forces banned journalists working for Western news agencies from operating in his territory based on claims that such reporters had ties to foreign intelligence agencies. Stating, “those who work for intelligence agencies will be punished,” Ahmadi called foreign media employees “harmful for Islam, Muslims and the country.” [18] The North Waziristan Taliban made good on their promise in November 2008, when they kidnapped a freelance Canadian journalist who sought to meet with North Waziristan Taliban leaders.[19] Gul Bahadur’s forces still have not released the journalist, Beverly Giesbrecht, although they have distributed videos of her pleading for her life.[20]
Bahadur’s worldview draws heavily from his religious beliefs, which originate from his reportedly Deobandi education.[21] Deobandism, a branch of Sunni Islam, arose in Deoband, India in 1866 as part of a wave of civic reform across India brought on by the Indian Rebellion of 1857. Deobandism’s students came from as far as Afghanistan and Arabia.[22] The teachings of Shah Wali Allah, a scholar who lived from 1703 to 1762, laid the foundation for Deobandism. Wali Allah promoted takhayyur, or the belief that, instead of following a single school of Islam throughout one’s life, one could employ any one of the four principal schools. Eventually, Wali Allah hoped for a “harmonization” of all of the four schools. Wali Allah also promoted the cautious use of ijtihad, or the independent interpretation of the Qur’an and Sunnah for the modern age, as opposed to a reliance entirely on ancient commentaries.[23]
Deobandis initially studied how to revive Islamic life while living under a colonial regime, eschewing politics and focusing on Islamic practices and personal belief, as opposed to the long-term political goals promoted by Islamist thinkers such as Hassan-al Banna. Deobandism eventually became the force behind the Jamiaat Ulema Islam (JUI), founded in 1947 first as a religious movement, which helped to set up popular mosques across Pakistan.[24]
The creed of today’s Pashtun Taliban probably stems from the combination of ideologies that resulted when hundreds of mosques sprung up in the Pashtun tribal belt during the Afghan-Soviet war. Pashtun local custom, known as Pashtunwali, and Wahabbism, brought to the region by mass Saudi funding for the mujahideen, created a new form of Deobandism specific to the Taliban, far more radical than the apolitical movement originally envisioned by Deobandism’s founders. Today’s Taliban may actually draw more from something closer to the Salafi-Jihadism ideology espoused by al-Qaeda and its followers than from that expressed by traditional Deobandi beliefs. [25]
While Nazir and Bahadur both believe in jihad as it applies to fighting coalition forces in Afghanistan, recently, Nazir has been a much stronger champion of the implementation of radical Islamism. In April 2009, Nazir said the goal of Islamic militants should be “to make supreme the Word of Allah and establish the system of shari‘a.”[26] Nazir even imposed a strict form of shari’a in his portion of South Waziristan (see here for more on Nazir’s ideology).[27]
Bahadur’s fellow Taliban leader Maulvi Saddiq Noor, who has sometimes worked alongside Bahadur, did lead an August 2006 campaign in Miranshah to force shopkeepers not to sell CDs and barbers not to shave men’s beards;[28] other North Waziristan Taliban also imposed taxes in line with shari’a practices in October 2006. [29] In 2000, Bahadur himself said that, “Opium and alcohol have destroyed the youth. Obscenity, video and satellite dishes are everywhere. The government is not taking the responsibility to eradicate these evils, therefore, we decided to put an end to it.” [30]Bahadur did work through political channels earlier in his life to pressure the government to adopt more Islamist-oriented values, but he has remained quiet on the issue in recent years and appears never to have directly implemented shari’a himself.
The most recent information on Bahadur’s views on international jihad comes from a public statement he issued jointly with Beitullah Mehsud and Nazir in February 2009, after their formation of the Council of United Mujahideen. The document, which quotes several Qur’anic verses citing the need for the unity among Muslims, states:
The objective of this alliance and shura is to fight as one force in the name of God to stop the trespasser from his trespass and the oppressor from his oppression. So that Islam, the religion of God, and Truth is glorified.…[It is] just as the enemies, that is, the Jews and Christians, have united against the Muslims, particularly the mujahideen, under the leadership of the United States whose leader is new President Obama. [31]This document, however, may better represent the overall Taliban’s views, rather than the specific views of the three men who signed it.
Views on the state of Pakistan reveal the greatest divergence between Bahadur and Nazir. Nazir and Bahadur both agree that attacks on Pakistan distract from anti-coalition efforts in Afghanistan.[32] Yet Nazir goes further: he also sees the conflict in Kashmir as a diversion.[33] Bahadur, while not explicitly commenting on the Kashmiri conflict, has proclaimed the importance of defending Pakistan. Just days after the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, in the midst of tension between India and Pakistan, Bahadur’s spokesman said:
We consider any attack on Pakistan an attack on Islam. We resolve to fight shoulder to shoulder with the Pakistan Army by joining Pakistan on the condition that the government should win the tribal people’s trust, and following our ancestors’ footsteps, we shall refresh the memories of their history.[34]While Nazir said nothing along such lines at the time, other Taliban leaders made similar statements during the post-Mumbai period: even Beitullah Mehsud said that, “Thousands of our well-armed militants are ready to fight alongside the army if any war is imposed on Pakistan.”[35]Bahadur is no Pakistani nationalist: his November 2008 statement goes on to say that the Pakistani government has made the slogan “Pakistan ka Matlab Kya: La Ilaha Illallah” (“What does Pakistan mean? There is no God but God”) a “shibboleth” through its actions, particularly the alliance with the US. [36] In 2000, Gul Bahadur stated most clearly his views on Pakistan and Islam: “We are not against the government. We are Pakistanis, but we want the rule of Allah.”[37] This ambivalence appears to define his position and actions in Waziristan.
RELATIONSHIP WITH MULLAH OMAR, HAQQANI, AND OTHER FOREIGN MILITANTS
Bahadur’s conflicting views on the Pakistani state, combined with his attacks on government forces, show his desire to preserve his autonomy and power through limited action. Most of Bahadur’s interactions, however, have occurred with fellow fighters in North Waziristan. These relationships best show Bahadur’s personality as a survivalist: he hopes to maintain power through fealty to Haqqani and Omar while fending off foreigners who encroach too much on his power or draw too much attention to Bahadur’s area of influence.
The first major Pakistani military offensive against foreign militants in Waziristan, beginning in March 2004, brought Western media coverage to militant leaders such as Gul Bahadur through reports of clashes and the eventual peace deal between Bahadur and the Pakistani government in September 2006.[38] Bahadur’s prominence rose significantly once the military began focusing on North Waziristan in early 2005 (parts of North Waziristan, particularly the Shawal Valley, had seen more limited fighting in early 2004), due to an increased focus on al-Qaeda and other foreign militants in that area.[39]
Bahadur played a key role in the conflict as a Taliban leader who, while opposed to the Pakistani military operation, remained skeptical of the presence of some foreign militants in North Waziristan. Some of these foreign fighters were Uzbeks, who began arriving in Waziristan en masse after the 9/11 attacks and subsequent fall of Kabul. [40]
Uzbek militants initially came as part of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a group founded by Tahir Yuldashev and Joma Namangani in 1998 to overthrow Islam Karimov’s regime in Uzbekistan.[41] A faction of the IMU broke away around 2002[42] to form a smaller group known as the Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) over an apparent disagreement with the larger organization’s leadership that the time was not ripe to resume operations in Uzbekistan. The group left IMU territory in South Waziristan to reside near Mir Ali in North Waziristan and, in 2005, changed its strategy to focus less on Uzbekistan and more on global jihad, reportedly following a directive from al-Qaeda. Soon the group changed its name to the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) and made Mir Ali, North Waziristan, a key operational and training base. The IJU’s fighters likely number between 100 and 200, according to estimates.[43]
These Uzbeks eventually began to bother Bahadur. His Madda Khel hometown and Miranshah base of operations lie in western North Waziristan, closer to the Afghan border and roughly fourteen miles by road to the west of the Uzbeks’ base of Mir Ali. However, areas of influence in North Waziristan overlap and shift quickly (both Bahadur and foreign fighters work in each other’s territory), meaning the Uzbeks – perhaps on their way to jihad in Afghanistan, or perhaps in the process of acquiring choice tracts of land (as they did in South Waziristan) could have easily aggravated Bahadur.[44]
In August 2006, perhaps caving to pressure from the Pakistani government, Bahadur decided to cease hosting foreign militants, a decision backed and perhaps precipitated by the drop in support for foreign militants by fellow Taliban leader Maulvi Saddiq Noor, with whom Bahadur has allied on occasion.[45] Direct statements from Bahadur on the eviction of foreign militants are not available, but the September 2006 peace agreement between Bahadur and the Pakistani government (see below for more information on the agreement) called for their eviction.[46] Other reports have surfaced on Bahadur’s displeasure with growing Uzbek influence in North Waziristan, and opposition to Uzbek influence was one of the reported aims of his formal alliance with Nazir (detailed below).[47]
Bahadur followed up on the 2006 peace deal by orchestrating a drive to force foreigners led by Iraqi national Abu Okash to remove tinted windows from their vehicles in March 2007, showing that non-Uzbek foreign fighters could also irritate Bahadur. [48] Okash had resided in North Waziristan since 2001, winning the respect of some locals, who also believed he had al-Qaeda ties. Tensions between him and tribesmen such as Bahadur, however, increased after the September 2006 peace deal.[49] Bahadur’s forces nearly exchanged fire with the foreigners after they attempted to expand the campaign to Mir Ali from Miranshah, but tempers cooled after Beitullah Mehsud reportedly intervened.[50]
As recently as December 2008, Bahadur’s organization turned against a local Taliban leader who had worked closely with foreign fighters, accusing the individual, Maulana Abdul Khaliq Haqqani (as a Pakistani, Abdul Khaliq is unrelated to the Haqqani network[51]) of embezzling funds collected on behalf of local Taliban.[52] Bahadur’s men seized the man from his office in Miranshah and drove him towards Mir Ali.[53] Khaliq, a firebrand radical whose mosque and madrassah – Gulshan-e Uloom in Miranshah – the Pakistani military destroyed in 2006, worked closely with Uzbek militants. [54] He even appeared with IMU leader Tahir Yuldashev in a propaganda video in January 2008.[55] In July 2007, Khaliq launched attacks against Pakistani military targets, promising to “avenge the martyred brothers, sisters and sons” who had died in the raid on the Red Mosque on July 10 that year.[56] Khaliq, also reportedly a proponent of suicide bombings, may have drawn unwanted attention to Bahadur’s home base of Miranshah through his pronouncements and Uzbek associates, who often treated local Pashtuns brutally. Khaliq also may have simply encroached on Bahadur’s control.[57]
Bahadur’s relationships with Mullah Omar (head of the Quetta Shura Taliban and former leader of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan) and the Haqqani network have likely tempered Bahadur’s opposition to the foreign fighters. Omar, who wants the Taliban in Afghanistan to have as much support as possible, attempts to avoid internal Taliban conflicts on the Pakistani side. [58] The Haqqanis use Uzbek and other foreigners to assist in operations against coalition forces in Afghanistan.[59] Bahadur trusts, and perhaps follows, both of them. Omar pressured Nazir, Mehsud, and Bahadur to form the Council of United Mujahideen, or Shura Ittehad ul-Mujahideen, in February 2009; the statement announcing the council’s formation cites bin Laden, with whom Haqqani has ties, and Mullah Omar as the leaders of the mujahideen.[60] Omar and Haqqani also reportedly pushed for the September 2006 Waziristan peace agreement between the Pakistani government and Bahadur. [61] Finally, Haqqani’s forces must pass through Bahadur’s strongholds to conduct attacks in Afghanistan. No reports of Bahadur preventing the work of such forces have surfaced. Indeed, Bahadur has dedicated himself to fighting American-led forces in Afghanistan and reportedly cooperates with and assists Haqqani.[62]
Probably thanks to the Haqqani network, foreign fighters remained in North Waziristan despite some opposition. A sampling of the list of foreigners killed by CIA drone strikes in or near Bahadur’s area of North Waziristan shows the that Bahadur either failed to remove some of the foreigners, chose to work with some foreign fighters, or harbored fighters at Haqqani’s behest. Drone strikes killed Al-Qaeda leader Abu Laith al-Libbi in January 2008 near Mir Ali, [63] former Egyptian Islamic Group Leader and reported chief al-Qaeda propagandist Abu Jihad al-Masri in October 2008,[64] senior al-Qaeda member Abdullah Azzam al-Saudi died on November 19, 2008,[65] and Rashid Rauf, the organizer of the plot to bring down trans-Atlantic flights, on November 22, 2008. [66] A May 16, 2009 strike that killed al-Qaeda member Asad al-Misri along with twenty-three militants loyal to Bahadur and a September 4, 2008 drone strike near Miranshah that killed two Arab fighters along with four Daur tribesmen show Bahadur may indeed have chosen to associate with some foreigners.[67]
Such strikes infuriated Bahadur as they occurred within his territory and sometimes killed individuals loyal to him. After the November 2008 Rauf killing, Bahadur spokesman Ahmadi said, “Americans have killed innocent people and none of them were foreigners.”[68] After Azzam’s death, Ahmadi said that, “We will start revenge attacks across other districts if the US drone attacks do not stop after November 20 [2008].” Such feelings may have caused Bahadur to waver in his peace dealings with the Pakistani government and potentially ally with Beitullah Mehsud.
RELATIONSHIP WITH BEITULLAH MEHSUD AND PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT
Bahadur has maintained on-again, off-again relationships with both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud over the last several years. Bahadur’s Wazir tribesmen are traditional rivals of Beitullah’s Mehsud tribe, although both tribes share a common lineage.[69] Bahadur opposes any perceived infringement upon his territory and power, and he has thus constructed short-term arrangements, rather than full-fledged peace treaties, to force both sides to seek his support. [70]
The first of these occurred in September 2006, when the Pakistani government, worn out after its two –and-half-year offensive against foreign militants and Taliban fighters in Waziristan, signed a deal with Hafiz Gul Bahadur and Maulvi Saddiq Noor, among other tribal leaders, many of whom had aided and abetted foreign fighters. Many analysts saw the deal as a victory for North Waziristan Taliban leaders, as the region had seen well over a year of fierce fighting.[71] The deal called for the Pakistani military to cease operations in the region, release detained militants, remove checkpoints, and reimburse local Taliban for damages during the operation. In return, the militants agreed to halt attacks on the government, refrain from setting up a parallel government, stop cross-border movement into Afghanistan, and expel foreigners, although the agreement made an exception for foreigners who remained and chose to “live peacefully in line with tribal customs and traditions.”[72] The deal, however, remained virtually unenforceable and, immediately after its conclusion, NATO reportedly recorded a 300 percent increase in attacks in Afghanistan.[73]
While both Jalaluddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar reportedly supported the peace deal, Bahadur reportedly could not extend the peace deal provisions concerning foreign fighters to Mir Ali, a primary location for foreign fighters in North Waziristan.[74] Haqqani, who reportedly controls seven thousand fighters,[75] relies on a large number of foreign militants, particularly the aforementioned Islamic Jihad Union, to conduct attacks in Afghanistan. These tensions almost resulted in conflict between Bahadur and foreign forces in March 2007. [76]
Bahadur called off the peace accord with the government on July 15, 2007, reportedly accusing the government of violating its terms by reestablishing checkpoints along North Waziristan roads.[77]Anti-government attacks by fellow North Waziristan Taliban leader Maulvi Abdul Khaliq Haqqani and anti-government sentiment generated by the July 10, 2007 raid on the Red Mosque in Islamabad may also have pressured Bahadur to call off the peace deal.[78] The Pakistani government responded to the deal’s breakdown by attempting to encourage tribal leaders to engage in talks with Bahadur. [79]
After months of conflict, Bahadur joined the newly formed Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) (Taliban Movement of Pakistan) – an umbrella group of several Pakistani Taliban factions – as the first deputy to Beitullah Mehsud in December 2007. [80] The TTP has since become the primary Taliban group operating inside Pakistan. Despite joining the new group, Bahadur’s forces refused to coordinate attacks against the Pakistani government, signing a short-term peace deal with the government on December 18, 2007 that would last until the beginning of 2008, restoring the September 2006 agreement.[81]
Rumors have emerged that Bahadur left the TTP, and, although he has made no formal announcement to that effect, he certainly has not coordinated operations with the umbrella group.[82] Further clashes between Bahadur and the government occurred in January, followed by another agreement on February 17, 2008, reportedly the sixth extension of the ceasefire between Bahadur and Islamabad.[83]
In June 2008, Bahadur’s name did not appear on a Pakistani government list of most-wanted individuals. [84]Also absent from the list was the name of Maulvi Nazir, the leader of the Ahmedzai Wazirs in South Waziristan and Bahadur’s counterpart. Nazir and Bahadur formalized their cooperation on July 7, 2008, creating the Local Taliban Movement, or Muqami Tehrik-e Taliban, with Bahadur as the chief and Nazir as the deputy.[85]
Just a few days before the Local Taliban Movement’s formation, Beitullah Mehsud distributed pamphlets in North Waziristan that stated he would never fight Bahadur, demanding proof from those who said he would.[86] Two weeks later in Bannu, just to the east of North Waziristan, “unidentified” individuals distributed anti-Mehsud pamphlets attributed to Bahadur and Nazir. [87]Bahadur denied a role in pamphlet distribution while Beitullah Mehsud, on July 3, 2008, blamed the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s intelligence agency, for attempting to create divisions among the militants. [88] Mehsud also called Bahadur “a true mujahid,” or fighter for jihad, at the time. [89]
Nazir and Bahadur would continue their cooperation throughout 2008 and 2009, forming the Council of United Mujahideen in February 2009 with Beitullah Mehsud and declaring their joint peace deal with the Pakistani government ineffective in June 2009.[90]
Having attempted to prove their allegiance, Bahadur and Mehsud, along with Nazir, took their most formal step towards alliance with the formation of the Council of United Mujahideen on February 20, 2009. [91] As mentioned above, Mullah Omar reportedly pushed for the unity agreement. [92]Bahadur may have been responding to the existing perception of disunity between him and Mehsud, as well as pressure from Taliban colleagues represented by statements made by Taliban leaders in Bajaur and Swat in early February 2009 that declared Bahadur their enemy because he refused to fight Pakistani forces.[93] Bahadur’s loyalty to Mullah Omar also likely influenced his decision.
The compacts between Bahadur and Mehsud and Bahadur and Islamabad came under the greatest stress in late spring and early summer 2009 as reports emerged that the Pakistani military would conduct a campaign in Waziristan targeting Mehsud. On June 1, 2009, Bahadur’s forces escorted a group of Pakistani military cadets from the military college in Razmak, in the southern portion of North Waziristan, to the border with the Bannu district of the NWFP. Two hours after Bahadur’s forces left the convoy, forces reported to be loyal to Beitullah Mehsud seized the more than 500 cadets.[94] In reported retaliation, the Pakistani military began conducting operations near North Waziristan in Bannu and Makeen.[95]
With such operations serving as the final straw – Bahadur saw them as intruding on his area of influence – on top of the primary irritation of drone strikes, Bahadur’s forces attacked Pakistani forces, just weeks after the Pakistani military had worked with Bahadur to evacuate the students through his area of control. On June 29, 2009, a reported 150 Taliban fighters attacked a convoy of Pakistani soldiers, killing anywhere from thirty to sixty Pakistani soldiers; the fighting left at least ten Taliban fighters dead. [96] In taking responsibility for the attack, Bahadur’s spokesman Ahmadullah Ahmadi said at the time that, “This accord is being scrapped because of Pakistan’s failure to stop the American drone attacks in North and South Waziristan…Since the army is attacking us in North and South Waziristan, we will also attack them.”[97]
The Pakistani military responded in force, targeting Bahadur’s hometown of Madda Khel with airstrikes on June 30 and helicopter attacks on July 1, causing local tribesmen to flee to Peshawar, Bannu, and across the border into Afghanistan. [98] Yet the Pakistani military took pains to assure the local populace that it did not intend to launch operations in North Waziristan, dropping leaflets in Pashto and Urdu on July 1 and asking for tips on terrorist locations.[99]Despite the leaflet statements, “stray missiles” from Pakistani Air Force jets hit a village near Miranshah on July 5, followed by the movement of “hundreds” of troops and dozens of tanks and other vehicles to Miranshah from Mir Ali on July 15 and the shelling of Miranshah and Mir Ali on July 16.[100]
The Pakistani forces likely moved forces from Mir Ali to prepare for a stranglehold operation against Beitullah Mehsud, but commanders likely realized their secondary value in threatening Bahadur as well. Responding to the threat, Bahadur organized the aforementioned July 28 suicide bombing against Pakistani forces and July 31 kidnapping of soldiers.[101]
Bahadur had repeatedly indicated his displeasure with the peace agreement in the weeks before he broke it. On June 14, 2009, Bahadur threatened to scrap the deal with the government if operations, conducted reportedly as vengeance for the kidnapping of the Razmak cadets, continued in the Bakakhel and Janikhel areas of Bannu, claiming the February peace deal did not allow the government to conduct operations in those areas.[102] Reports have also emerged indicating that Bahadur has said that Pakistani military operations against Beitullah Mehsud must cease before Bahadur will negotiate with the government, indicating that he may view any operations in North Waziristan as threatening to his existence, regardless of their stated target.[103]
Yet, according to reports and statements from Bahadur’s spokesman, American drone strikes have irritated Bahadur even more than Pakistani military operations. On June 26, Bahadur, along with Nazir, reportedly said that the peace agreement with the Pakistani government had become invalid due to US drone strikes.[104] Bahadur spokesman Abdullah Ahmadi also claimed that 50 drone strikes had killed hundreds of people since the signing of the February 2008 peace agreement with the government and repeated the demand to stop drone attacks after the July 28 suicide bombing. [105]
Ahmadi’s statements against drone strikes in November 2008 showed that such actions irritated Bahadur even before drone strikes in North Waziristan this year, which included a March strike that apparently hit a house in Sara Rogha, South Waziristan, where Bahadur met with Beitullah Mehsud and Nazir and the aforementioned May attack that killed twenty-three militants loyal to Gul Bahadur. [106] Drone strikes threaten Bahadur the most as his inability to defend against, take revenge for, or predict their location decreases his control over North Waziristan.
These series of demands and Bahadur’s willingness to abandon or throw his support behind both the Pakistani government and Beitullah Mehsud show his desire to survive, remain independent and maintain his control over North Waziristan.[107]
CONCLUSION
Bahadur remains a jihadi committed first to his own survival, second to the conflict in Afghanistan, third to Beitullah Mehsud, and last to his vision of an Islamist Pakistani state. His background of accruing political power, fluid ideology and alliances, and loyalty to Mullah Omar and Haqqani has given him the tools to continue supporting the fight against the American-led coalition in Afghanistan while compromising on almost everything else.
What does this mean for the current Pakistani military offensive in Waziristan? Bahadur will likely continue to direct some level of violence, including perhaps an increasing use of suicide bomb attacks, in an attempt to bully the Pakistani government into lessening operations in North Waziristan and reducing cooperation with the US on drone strikes. Likewise, the Pakistani government will likely continue limited actions against Bahadur to push him towards negotiations. However, Bahadur and the Pakistani government will probably avoid unchecked hostilities, which both seem to believe would be harmful to their interests.
While striking a non-aggression pact with Bahadur might allow the Pakistani military to achieve greater short-term success in Waziristan, US interests may suffer in the long term. As long as Bahadur maintains his sphere of influence, Taliban leaders such as the Haqqani family have a safe haven from which they can launch attacks against American forces in Afghanistan. And, while Uzbeks and some other foreign fighters have annoyed Bahadur, the Taliban leader continues to work with, or at least allows to reside in or near his territory, some foreign fighters, creating another ungoverned area where terrorists can – and have – plotted attacks against targets in the West. Peace between Bahadur and the Pakistani government may boost Islamabad’s interests in the short term while hurting Western interests in the medium and long term.
[1] “Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan (2001-2007),” United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, September 9, 2007, available: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2007.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EKOI-76W52H-Full_Report.pdf/$File/Full_Report.pdf. 68.
[2] Declan Walsh, “Pakistan orders manhunt for Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud,” The Guardian, June 15, 2009, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/15/pakistan-taliban-leader-mehsud-manhunt.
[3] “The Afghanistan-Pakistan militant nexus,” BBC News, June 22, 2009, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7601748.stm#nwaziristan (accessed July 21, 2009).
[4]Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Militants kidnap 10 FC men in NWA,” The News, July 31, 2009, http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23601; Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 29, 2009, available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/suicide-attack-on-checkpost-leaves-soldier-dead-979; Mushtaq Yusufzai, “ Taliban kill militant commander, deputy10 kidnapped FC men freed,” The News, August 1, 2009, available at http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23617
[5]Mushtaq Yusufzai, Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Warplanes pound militant positions in NWA,” July 1, 2009, accessed via World News Connection Database; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available at Nexis.com; Jan Zalewski, “Pakistani Taliban Terminate Peace Agreement in North Waziristan,” World Markets Research Center, June 30, 2009, available at Nexis.com; Salman Masood, “An Accord In Pakistan Is Scrapped By Militants,” The New York Times, July 1, 2009, available at Nexis.com; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[6] Rasool Dawar, “Taliban scrap peace deal in Pakistan tribal area,” Associated Press, June 30, 2009, available at Nexis.com.
[7] Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 29, 2009, available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/suicide-attack-on-checkpost-leaves-soldier-dead-979.
[8] Mohsin Abbas, “Captors suspect Canadian ‘a spy’; Taliban militants believed to be behind abduction of journalist in northern Pakistan,” The Toronto Star, November 21, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[9] Very little information is available on Bahadur’s early years and therefore reports of his education and pre-2000 activities are unverified. Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110; “The Afghanistan-Pakistan militant nexus,” BBC News, June 22, 2009, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7601748.stm#nwaziristan.
[10] Nadeem Yaqub, “Islamists cut cable TV,”Asia Times Online, June 27, 2000, available:
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BF27Df02.html
[11] Edith Lederer, “Security Council approves deployment of U.N. experts to help enforce anti-Taliban sanctions,” Associated Press, July 30, 2001, available: Nexis.com.
[12] Khabrain, “Jamiat-i-Talaba-i-Islam Appoints Workers to Shoot UN Monitors on Sight,”
Islamabad Khabrain (Urdu), August 17, 2001. pp 12, accessed via World News Connection Database.; “Religious group said to have set up tribal army to resist UN monitors,” The Nation, August 21, 2001, accessed via World News Connection database.
[13] Unpublished Draft: “Tribe: Wazir – Utmanzai” Naval Postgraduate School: Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, available: http://www.nps.edu.
[14] Bahadur’s hometown is in a Madda Khel clan region, in the western portion of North Waziristan. Some reports say he and his followers are part of the Tori Khel tribe, yet the Tori Khel reside in eastern North Waziristan according to one map. Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban”,Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, February 11, 2008, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4712&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=02f39cd67e; “Wazirs – Ahmadzai,” Naval Postgraduate School: Program for Conflict and Cultural Studies, February 10, 2009, available: http://www.nps.edu/Programs/CCS/Docs/Pakistan/Tribes/Ahmadzai_Wazir.pdf.; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110; Noor ul Haq, Rashid Ahmed Khan, and Maqsudul Hasan Nuri “Federally Administered Tribal
Areas of Pakistan,” Islamabad Policy Research Institute, available: http://ipripak.org/papers/federally.shtml; Unpublished Draft: “Tribe: Wazir – Utmanzai” Naval Postgraduate School: Program for Culture and Conflict Studies. http://www.nps.edu.
[15] “The Afghanistan-Pakistan militant nexus,” BBC News, June 22, 2009, available: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7601748.stm#nwaziristan
[16] Interview with Nazir conducted by As-Sahab and posted on many jihadi web forums. The interview was translated by SITE Intelligence Group, April 7, 2009; Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/question-mark-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-maulvi-nazir-ahmad .
[17] Ismail Khan and Jane Perlez, “Airstrike Kills Militant Tied To Al Qaeda In Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[18] “Taliban ban foreign journalists in North Waziristan,”Daily Times, August 27, 2008, available at Nexis.com.
[19] Mohsin Abbas, “Captors suspect Canadian ‘a spy’; Taliban militants believed to be behind abduction of journalist in northern Pakistan,” The Toronto Star, November 21, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Janullah Hashimzada, “Canadian female journalist kidnapped by TTP,” Pajhwok Afghan News, November 16, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[20] Saeed Shah, “Taliban abduct hundreds of schoolboys,” Globe and Mail, June 2, 2009. Available via Nexis.
[21] Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[22] Hunt Janin, The pursuit of learning in the Islamic world, 610-2003 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2006). 137.
[23] Patrick Bannerman, Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law (London: Routledge Kegan & Paul, 1989), 110.
[24] See Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 88-94.
[25] See Ahmad Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.),88-94.
[26] Interview with Nazir conducted by As-Sahab and posted on many jihadi web forums. The interview was translated by Site Intel Group, April 7, 2009; Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/question-mark-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-maulvi-nazir-ahmad .
[27] Hassan Abbas, “South Waziristan’s Maulvi Nazir: The New Face of the Taliban,” The Jamestown Foundation, May 14, 2007. Available: http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4147&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=182&no_cache=1; Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/question-mark-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-maulvi-nazir-ahmad.
[28] Bahadur abided by Noor’s declaration of a ceasefire in June 2006 (“Suicide killer ‘takes out’ 5 Pak soldiers,” The Times of India, June 27, 2006, available: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/1686230.cms); other sources have reported previous joint efforts, specifically in January 2007, between the two leaders: Haji Pazir Gul and Zulfiqar Ali, “Suicide bomber kills five in N. Waziristan,” DAWN, January 22, 2007, available: http://www.dawn.com/2007/01/23/top1.htm.
[29] Behroz Khan, “Pakistan: Tension Mounting Between Local Taliban; Foreigners in Waziristan,” The News, August 1, 2006. Available: The World News Connection; “Taliban slap taxes in Miramshah”, Dawn, October 22, 2006, available: http://www.dawn.com/2006/10/23/top7.htm.
[30] Nadeem Yaqub, “Islamists cut cable TV,”Asia Times Online, June 27, 2000, available:
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BF27Df02.html
[31] “Pakistan Taleban groups form allied council,” Geo TV News, February 25, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[32] “Top Taliban commander splits from Mehsud,”ANI , October 19, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[33] Interview with Nazir conducted by As-Sahab and posted on many jihadi web forums. The interview was translated by Site Intel Group, April 7, 2009. Chris Harnisch, “Question Mark of South Waziristan: Biography and Analysis of Maulvi Nazir Ahmad,” IranTracker.org, July 17, 2009, available: http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/question-mark-south-waziristan-biography-and-analysis-maulvi-nazir-ahmad..
[34] “We shall fight along with Pakistan army for country’s defence: Taliban,”Ausaf (Pakistan), December 10, 2008, available at Nexis.com
[35] Mushtaq Yusufzai. “Taleban chief says will support Pakistan army if India attacks,” The News, December 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[36] Abdur Rehman, “Dynamism of Pakistan’s Civil Society:Religious-Secular Rivalry and its Resources,” Journal of International Development and Cooperation, Vol.12, No.2, 2006, pp. 47–70. (45); “We shall fight along with Pakistan army for country’s defence: Taliban,”Ausaf (Pakistan), December 10, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[37] Nadeem Yaqub, “Islamists cut cable TV,”Asia Times Online, June 27, 2000, available:
http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BF27Df02.html
[38] K J M Varma, “Pak launches new operation against ultras, casualties increase.” Press Trust of India, March 18, 2004, available: Nexis.com.
[39] Afzal Khan, “Pakistan’s Hunt For Al-qaeda In South Waziristan,” Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, April 22, 2004; “Pakistan conducts operation in tribal region to arrest foreign suspect,” Xinhua, January 15, 2004, available: http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-01/15/content_2465468.htm; Carlotta Gall, “Pakistanis Pursue Qaeda Forces In Offensive on Afghan Border,” The New York Times, March 7, 2005, available: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E03E3DA1E3DF934A35750C0A9639C8B63
[40] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00122/00687_122609a.pdf. 18; Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking Penguin, 2008), 347.
[41] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00122/00687_122609a.pdf. 10.
[42] Sources differ regarding the date of the split, however most estimates agree that it occurred in 2002.
[43] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00122/00687_122609a.pdf. 11-20.
[44] “Foreign fighters moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan,” Indo-Asian News Service, available: Nexis.com
[45] “Foreign fighters moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan,” Indo-Asian News Service. August 1, 2006,,available: Nexis.com
[46] The Iraqi fighter Abu Obkash and the Egyptian militant Abu Nasr allegedly irritated Bahadur and his allies the most. See: Foreign fighters moving from Pakistan to Afghanistan,”Indo-Asian News Service. August 1, 2006, available: Nexis.com; Behroz Khan, “Pakistan: Tension Mounting Between Local Taliban; Foreigners in Waziristan,” The News, August 1, 2006. Available: The World News Connection; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110; “Behroz Khan, “Jerga hopeful of evicting foreigners from Waziristan.” The News. September 4, 2006, available: Nexis.com
[47] “Pakistan TV show discusses US media’s concerns about “leaderless drift,” Geo TV News, July 10, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[48] “Clash between Taleban, foreign militants averted,” Dawn News, March 10, 2007, available: http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/11/top12.htm; Ghulam Hasnain, “Musharraf risks civil war as he invades the Al-Qaeda badlands,” The Times Online, available: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2159249.ece.
[49] Behroz Khan, “Pakistan: Report Terms Arab National Present in Waziristan ‘Mystery Man’”, The News, October 13, 2006, accessed via World News Connection Database.
[50] “Clash between Taleban, foreign militants averted,” Dawn News, March 10, 2007, available: http://www.dawn.com/2007/03/11/top12.htm; Ghulam Hasnain, “Musharraf risks civil war as he invades the Al-Qaeda badlands,” The Times Online, July 27, 2009, available: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article2159249.ece.
[51] Syed Saleem Shahzad, “US strike hits Pakistan’s raw nerve,” Asia Times, June 13, 2008, available: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF13Df01.html
[52] Mushtaq Yusufzai,“Taleban detain colleague over funds embezzlement,” The News, December 25, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[53] Mustaq Yusufzai, “Taliban detain colleague over funds embezzlement,” The News, October 25, 2008, available: http://www.thenews.com.pk/print1.asp?id=143043
[54] “Pakistan Weekly Roundup on Jihad, Terrorism 29 Aug – 4 Sep,” The News, October 17, 2007, accessed via World News Connection Database.
[55] “Militant leaders call on followers to take over Islamabad,” The Press Trust of India, January 28, 2008, available: Nexis.com.
[56] “Militants own up to attacks,” Dawn News, July 22, 2007, available: http://www.dawn.com/2007/07/22/top3.htm; Carlotta Gall and Salmon Massod, “At Least 40 Militants Dead as Pakistani Military Storms Mosque After Talks Fail,” New York Times, July 10, 2007, available: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/10/world/asia/10pakistan.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=red%20mosque&st=cse
[57] Khaliq also appears to have worked alongside Maulvi Saddiq Noor, a North Waziristan leader occasionally allied with Bahadur, see: Syed Saleem Shahzad, “US strike hits Pakistan’s raw nerve,” Asia Times, June 13, 2008, available: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JF13Df01.html; for information on his suicide bombing views: “13 militants killed in Miranshah,” The News, July 22, 2007, available: http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=9154
[58] “Pak-Afghan Taliban join hands to counter US’s Afghan surge,” Hindustan Times, March 27, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[59] Einar Wigen, “Islamic Jihad Union: al-Qaeda’s Key to the Turkic World?” Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, February 23, 2009, available: http://www.mil.no/multimedia/archive/00122/00687_122609a.pdf. 17.
[60] Nadeem Sarwar, “”Good” and “bad” Taliban unite in Pakistan’s tribal region,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; “Pakistan Taleban groups form allied council,” Geo TV News, February 25, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[61] “Pak-Afghan Taliban join hands to counter US’s Afghan surge,” Hindustan Times, March 27, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[62] Pazir Gul, “New group erodes Baitullah’s hold over militants,” Dawn, July 3, 2008, available: Nexis.com; Sadia Sulaiman “Empowering “Soft” Taliban Over “Hard” Taliban: Pakistan’s Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” Jamestown Terrorism, July 25, 2008, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=5080&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=ad0cf1fb6d; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[63] Afzal Khan, “Reviving the North Waziristan Peace Accord May Stabilize Tribal Pakistan.” Jamestown Terrorism Focus. March 4, 2008, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4748&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=5906189b0b
[64] “Al-Qaeda propaganda chief killed in Pakistan strike,” AFP, November 1, 2008. Available: http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i-kilo-XOudi-VkBdvQ6Y097hhUQ; Bill Roggio, “US strikes Haqqani Network in North Waziristan,” The Long War Journal, April 4, 2009, available: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/04/us_strikes_haqqani_n.php
[65] “Taliban warns of reprisals as Pakistan protests US drone attacks,” Agence France Presse November 20, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[66] Ismail Khan and Jane Perlez, “Airstrike Kills Militant Tied To Al Qaeda In Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[67] Pir Zubair Shah, “25 Militants Are Killed In Attack In Pakistan,” The New York Times, May 17, 2009; Malik Mumtaz and Mushtaq Yusufzai, “US air strike kills six in NWA,”The News, September 5, 2008,.available: Nexis.com
[68] Ismail Khan and Jane Perlez, “Airstrike Kills Militant Tied To Al Qaeda In Pakistan,” The New York Times, November 23, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[69] Afzal Khan, “Pakistan’s Second Miltary Foray Into Waziristan Repeats Past Mistakes,” Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 1 No. 32, June 15, 2004. Available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=waziristan&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=11&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=29966&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=4e92a364a7 ; Ahmed, Akbar S.. Resistance and Control in Pakistan. New York: Routledge, 2004. 17.
[70] Afzal Khan, “Pakistan’s Second Miltary Foray Into Waziristan Repeats Past Mistakes,” Jamestown Eurasia Daily Monitor, June 15, 2004, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=waziristan&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=11&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=29966&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=4e92a364a7
[71] Tarique Niazi, “The Taliban’s Turf War in South Waziristan,” Jamestown Terrorism Focus, April 10, 2007. Available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bany_of_the_words%5D=waziristan&tx_ttnews%5Bpointer%5D=5&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4074&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=664dd9dda2
[72] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “Pakistan: Report Reveals Names of Signatories of Waziristan Peace Accord,” The News, October 10, 2006, accessed via the World News Connection.
[73] “Waziristan peace effectively Talibanising area: UK paper,” The Daily Times, October 28, 2006, available: http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2006\10\28\story_28-10-2006_pg7_30
[74] Tom Hussain, “Taliban factional clash looms on horizon,” The National (UAE), June 15, 2009, available: http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090615/FOREIGN/706149861/1135; Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110; Ismail Khan, “Time to revisit Waziristan deal?” Dawn, December 23, 2006, available:
http://www.dawn.com/2006/12/23/top10.htm
[75] Tom Hussain, “Taliban factional clash looms on horizon,” The National (UAE), June 15, 2009. Available: http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090615/FOREIGN/706149861/1135
[76] “Clash between Taleban, foreign militants averted.” Dawn News, March 11, 2007, available: Nexis.com.
[77] “Efforts to revive Pakistani government’s peace accord with militants stall,” Xinhua, July 25, 2007, available: Nexis.com; Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A formidable enemy,” Newsline, July 2009, available: http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJul2009/newsbeatjuly2009.htm
[78] “Militants own up to attacks,” Dawn News, July 22, 2007, available: http://www.dawn.com/2007/07/22/top3.htm
[79]Bill Roggio, “Pakistan: Negotiating with the Taliban, again,” Long War Journal, July 20, 2007, available:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2007/07/pakistan_negotiating.php
[80] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “The Impact of Pashtun Tribal Differences on the Pakistani Taliban”,Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, February 11, 2008, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=4712&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=02f39cd67e;
[81] Militants announce unilateral ceasefire during Eid, Pajhwok Afghan News, available: Nexis.com
[82] Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[83] “Pro-govt militants, tribal elders join hands against Mehsud,” The Press Trust of India, July 8, 2008,available: Nexis.com
[84] Bill Roggio, “Pakistan places bounties on Baitullah and other senior Taliban leaders,” The Long War Journal, June 28, 2008, available:
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/06/pakistan_places_boun.php
[85] Sadia Sulaiman, “Hafiz Gul Bahadur: A Profile of the Leader of the North Waziristan Taliban,” Jamestown Terrorism, April 10, 2009, available: http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Bswords%5D=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews%5Bexact_search%5D=Gul%20Bahadur&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34839&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=7&cHash=b173cbe110
[86] “Mehsud challenged by new militant bloc.” Daily Times. July 1, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[87] “Taleban concerned over anti-Mehsud pamphlets,” Daily Times, July 15 2008, available: Nexis.com
[88] Pazir Gul, “New group erodes Baitullah’s hold over militants,” July 3, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[89] Pazir Gul, “New group erodes Baitullah’s hold over militants,” July 3, 2008, available: Nexis.com
[90] “Three security men die in roadside bomb blast in Pakistan’s tribal region,” Xinhua, June 26, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[91] Mushtaq Yusufzai, “Top militant commanders resolve rift,”The News, February 21, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[92] Nadeem Sarwar, “”Good” and “bad” Taliban unite in Pakistan’s tribal region,” Deutsche Presse-Agentur, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[93] Hamid Mir,“Taliban threaten attack on Islamabad,”The News, February 11, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[94] “Pak students freed from Taliban captivity,” Pajhwok Afghan News, June 2, 2009, available: Nexis.com.
[95] “65 Taliban killed in Bannu and South Waziristan,” Daily Times, June 14, 2009.
[96] Mushtaq Yusufzai, Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Warplanes pound militant positions in NWA,” The News, July 1, 2009, accessed via the World News Connection; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Jan Zalewski, “Pakistani Taliban Terminate Peace Agreement in North Waziristan,” World Markets Research Center, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Salman Masood, “An Accord In Pakistan Is Scrapped By Militants,” The New York Times, July 1, 2009, available: Nexis.com; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[97] Rasool Dawar, “Taliban scrap peace deal in Pakistan tribal area,” Associated Press, June 30, 2009.,available: Nexis.com
[98] Mushtaq Yusufzai, Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Warplanes pound militant positions in NWA,” available: the World News Connection, July 1, 2009; “36 including 14 soldiers dead in Waziristan attacks,” Pajhwok Afghan News English, June 30, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Army rules out operation in NWA,” The News, July 2, 2009, available: http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23044.
[99] Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Army rules out operation in NWA,” The News, July 2, 2009, available: http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23044.
[100] “Stray missiles kill seven civilians in NWA,” The News, July 6, 2009, available: http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23120; Alamgir Bhittani, “Air strike, rocket attacks in Waziristan,” DAWN, July 16, 2009, available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/air-strike,-rocket-attacks-in-waziristan-679;“Three tribesmen die in Waziristan mine blast,” DAWN, July 17, 2009, available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/three-tribesmen-die-in-waziristan-mine-blast-779.
[101] Mushtaq Yusufzai and Malik Mumtaz Khan, “Militants kidnap 10 FC men in NWA,” The News, July 31, 2009, http://thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23601; Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 29, 2009 available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/suicide-attack-on-checkpost-leaves-soldier-dead-979; Mushtaq Yusufzai, “ Taliban kill militant commander, deputy10 kidnapped FC men freed,” The News, August 1, 2009, available: http://www.thenews.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=23617
[102] Mushtaq Yusufzai and Irfan Burki, “Jets pound Baitullah’s stronghold, 12 killed,” The News, June 14, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[103] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A formidable enemy,” Newsline, July 2009, available: http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJul2009/newsbeatjuly2009.htm
[104] “Three security men die in roadside bomb blast in Pakistan’s tribal region,” Xinhua, June 26, 2009, available: Nexis.com
[105] Rahimullah Yusufzai, “A formidable enemy,” Newsline, July 2009, available: http://www.newsline.com.pk/NewsJul2009/newsbeatjuly2009.html; Pazir Gul, “Suicide attack on checkpost leaves soldier dead,” DAWN, July 28, 2009, available: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/suicide-attack-on-checkpost-leaves-soldier-dead-979.
[106] Pashtun Shinwari, “US missile attack kills 12 in Waziristan,” Pajhwok Afghan News, March 3, 2009, available: Nexis.com; Pir Zubair Shah, “25 Militants Are Killed In Attack In Pakistan,” The New York Times, May 17, 2009.
[107] Hamid Mir, “Pakistan: Article Cautions Govt Against US Interference in Internal Affairs,” Jang, June 9, 2009. Available on the World News Connection
Ergenekon Plot Confirms “Al Qaida” Is Mostly Disgruntled Military Men
Coup general accused of devising al-Qaeda attack |
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| Prosecutors in the investigation into the Sledgehammer coup plot have accused one of the key suspects, retired Gen. Süha Tanyeri, of devising al-Qaeda’s İstanbul bombings in 2003 and have asked for a separate investigation into his alleged links to the terrorist group. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Tanyeri, former head of the General Staff’s Strategic Research and Study Center (SAREM), will be tried along with other al-Qaeda attack suspects at the İstanbul 10th High Criminal Court if the investigation demanded by Sledgehammer prosecutors starts. In separate attacks on the HSBC headquarters, two synagogues and the British Consulate in İstanbul, 57 people, including the then-British Consul-General Roger Short, were killed while 700 others were injured by the impact of the explosions. When police detained Tanyeri last year as part of the Sledgehammer investigation, they also found a notebook in his possession that contained a note about a Gökkuşağı detergent store where the prosecutors of the al-Qaeda case suspect the bombs used by the terrorist group in the İstanbul attacks were developed. Tanyeri denied that the note belonged to him. He also denied dozens of pages of documents contained in the indictment into the Sledgehammer coup plot. İstanbul Today’s Zaman |
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Assassination plans of ‘Sledgehammer’
Istanbul: Daily News with wires
 Taha Akyol, a columnist for daily Milliyet, is reportedly in the target list of an alleged assassination plan.
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The indictment of the alleged coup plot known as Operation: Sledgehammer (Balyoz) has revealed eight assassination plans with specific targets.
The plans were allegedly prepared by the Istanbul Region Command of the Gendarmerie. The indictment has not been accepted yet and was leaked to the press by an unknown source. Dailies Star, Taraf and Zaman published details of the plans with pictures.
Sledgehammer is an alleged military coup plot against the leading Justice and Development Party, or AKP, drafted in 2003. According to the allegations, the military planned drastic measures to foment unrest in the country in order to remove the AKP from power. Those measures included bombing two major mosques in Istanbul, an assault on a military museum by people disguised as religious extremists and the raising of tension with Greece through an attack on a Turkish plane and blaming the incident on the Aegean neighbor.
The indictment features 196 suspects – 54 or them generals, of which 25 are on active duty.
The charges brought against retired Gen. Süha tanyeri have been separated from the Sledgehammer case to be looked into via another case on the al-Qaida attacks in Istanbul in 2003.
Details of the eight operation plans
“Operation: Molding” has three non-commissioned officers assigned to it and a major in charge. Leaders of the İsmailağa Community and Alaaddin Kaya, former owner of the dailies Zaman and Star, were listed as targets with the definition of “religious group leader.”
“Operation: Beard” targeted “non-Muslim group leaders and businessmen.” Three non-commissioned officers were assigned to the team with a lieutenant in command to target Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew and two other people mentioned by their surnames: Marovic and Mutafyan.
“Operation: Scythe” targeted “an anti-coup academic cadre,” but the target list was empty. Three non-commissioned officers were assigned to the team with a lieutenant in command. One of the officers noted having training in arming and disarming of explosive material.
“Operation: Sickle” targeted the “anti-coup Armenian press.” Etyen Mahçupyan, chief editor of the weekly Agos, and Hrant Dink, assassinated chief editor of Agos, and Sevan Nişanyan, author and linguistic expert were the targets. A lieutenant commands the team that consists of three non-commissioned officers, all trained in explosives.
“Operation: Fist” was against “Anti-coup extreme right circles” and target columnists Nazlı Ilıcak, Ahmet Taşgetiren, Ali Bulaç, Abdurrahman Dilipak and Fehmi Koru. The team is led by a captain and four non-commissioned officers, one trained in explosives.
“Operation: Shovel” targeted “anti-coup extreme left circles, including columnists Toktamış Ateş, Hasan Cemal and Cüneyt Ülsever. There was a lieutenant assigned to it with a team of three non-commissioned officers, one trained in unconventional warfare and special operations and another in psychological operations.
“Operation: Saw” targeted “anti-coup liberals,” including columnists Mehmet Altan, Ali Bayramoğlu, Mehmet Barlas and Taha Akyol. The team featured one lieutenant and three non commissioned officers.
“Operation: Rope” targeted “anti-coup NGOs and platforms” and was the only plan to target an organization – a liberal think tank called the Arı Movement. A lieutenant and four non-commissioned officers were assigned to operate against it.
Poppy for Medicine Program
ICOS poll finds Most Afghans Don’t Believe in Int’l Forces
ICOS poll finds
Most Afghans Don’t Believe in Int’l Forces
They Believe Al Qaeda Will Return under Taliban Control
KABUL – Field research of the International Council on Security and Development (ICOS) shows that the international community is experiencing severe difficulties in the crucial battle to win over the hearts and minds of the local population in southern Afghanistan.The ICOS report assessed local perception through extensive interviews of over 500 Afghan men in Kandahar and Helmand provinces in southern Afghanistan, the scene of some of the war’s most intense fighting.
The International Council on Security and Development is an international policy think tank working to combine grassroots research and policy innovation at the intersections of security, development, counter-narcotics and public health issues, online at:
http://www.icosgroup.net
The Bad News
“There is a serious “relationship gap” between the international community and the Afghan communities we intend to assist and protect,” said Norine MacDonald QC, President and Lead Field Researcher of ICOS. “The international community is failing to effectively meet the needs of the local population or understand their world view. We are also failing to explain ourselves or our objectives to the Afghan people. This provides clear opportunities for Taliban and Al Qaeda propaganda against the West and has resulted in high levels of negative attitudes towards our troops on the ground.”
“70% of the Afghan men we interviewed felt that the military operations in their area were bad for the Afghan people. 55% believe that NATO-ISAF are in Afghanistan only for their own benefit, to destroy or occupy the country, or to destroy Islam,” said MacDonald. “Further demonstrating this negative viewpoint, 75% of interviewees stated that they believe foreigners disrespect their religion and traditions, 68% believe that NATO forces do not protect the local population”.
MacDonald continued: “70% of the Afghans we interviewed stated that recent military actions in their area were wrong, and 59% oppose a new military offensive being built up by NATO forces in Kandahar. Military operations by their very nature have a negative impact on the community. The military operations have to be supported by aid, development and political efforts that balance out the negative impact with positive impacts.”
Mr Jorrit Kamminga, Director of Policy Research of ICOS adds: “61% of the interviewed Afghans believe that more Afghans are joining the Taliban compared to the year before. 74% believe that working with the international forces is wrong.” Kamminga noted issues also arise with local government. “70% of respondents mentioned they believe government officials in their area made money from drug trafficking. Disturbingly, 64% also thought that government administrators were linked to the Taliban.”
A majority of those interviewed believe more than one third of Afghans support the Taliban and Al Qaeda. 65% of interviewees said that Mullah Omar and the Taliban should again join the government.
However, according to the Afghans interviewed, the return of the Taliban may have an important negative side effect: 80% believe Al Qaeda will return if the Taliban regain control over Afghanistan.
The Good News
The research also revealed some successes – a slim majority (55%) of Afghans interviewed believe that NATO and the Afghan government are winning the war, demonstrating that the battle for perceptions is still open. 40% of Afghan respondents stated that democracy was important to them, and 72% would prefer their children to grow up under an elected government rather than the Taliban. There is also progress in the interviewees’ opinion on women’s rights, with 57% of interviewees supporting girls’ education.
Alignment of Local Population with International Security Interests Necessary
Ms. MacDonald outlined the larger problem, “The West needs to leave behind an Afghanistan which shares and is aligned with the international community’s security concerns. It is well-understood that building up the capacity of the Afghan state and security forces is the only realistic way to permit a NATO/ISAF withdrawal, but a stable Kabul government and a well equipped Afghan army are not sufficient. The West needs a relationship of fidelity: by both the Afghan government – and the Afghan people – that they will not tolerate Al Qaeda or others hostile to the west to operate in or from Afghanistan. Our best security lies in an enduring relationship based on common interests with the Afghan people themselves.”
The Relationship Gap
Mr Kamminga noted the field research clearly demonstrates a relationship gap between international forces and the civilians. “This research illustrates that nearly nine years after entering Afghanistan, many Afghans have almost no real knowledge or understanding of the motivations of the international community. The research overall indicates a lack of communication between the international community and the Afghan people; a failure to communicate facts and values, and respond to the emotional content and urgent needs of the local population”.
The reports states that the Taliban has inserted itself into the local society and created an effective political narrative: much more than an armed guerrilla insurgency, the Taliban today is a political force and a political player. The movement is waging a war of attrition on foreign forces, aiming to force NATO into a withdrawal from Afghanistan, which is aided by a domestic political backlash against the war in the West fuelled by the perceived lack of progress.
Making the case for a better future aligned the international community
At present, there is little understanding amongst ordinary Afghans of the tangible benefits provided by the West. Although the international community still has a great deal of work to do, it has indeed brought many real improvements in critical fields – in health, in education, in infrastructure, and in economic development. Some Afghans do recognise this, with 48% viewing recent reconstruction efforts in their area positively. The international community must make a clear case that there is a better future for Afghans and their families if Afghanistan is aligned to the West and its security concerns (in other words, no Al Qaeda bases on Afghan soil) rather than to the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Building a new partner of NextGenAfg
Preventing this scenario in the long run will require focusing positively interacting with “NextGenAfg”, the youth of Afghanistan who must be empowered to become a new generation of responsible and peaceful citizens. Young, untainted political leaders must be nurtured. “Relying on the existing elites will only prolong the current cycle of grievances, revenge, and jockeying for power,” says Kamminga.
Renovate Counter Narcotics Policies
The report outlined a series of recommendations related to closing the relationship gap and supporting the development of NextGenAfg. In addition the report recommended the establishment of Poppy for Medicine pilot in southern Afghanistan before the upcoming growing season (starting in October- November 2010). Villages would be allocated licences to grow opium poppies which would be processed into morphine in local facilities under a tightly controlled system, and utilised to meet the global shortage of pain killing medicines.
MacDonald concluded: “The current view of local dynamics in Southern Afghanistan needs a dramatic adjustment. This is not a question of more troops or more money. It is a question of building an effective strategic collaboration with the local population that properly supports our military operation, and will reinvent the security landscape.”
The International Council on Security and Development is an international policy think tank working to combine grassroots research and policy innovation at the intersections of security, development, counter-narcotics and public health issues, online at:
http://www.icosgroup.net
US fears Gulf seabed oil seepage near stricken BP well
US fears Gulf seabed oil seepage near stricken BP well
Boats on the surface are ready to resume collecting the oil
The US fears oil may be seeping from the ocean floor near the stricken Gulf of Mexico oil well.
The official in charge of the clean-up, Thad Allen, said if a substance leaking from the seabed was found to be methane this may mean oil was also leaking.
In the event the seepage was confirmed, he ordered BP to submit a plan to reopen the capped well to allow oil to be funnelled to the surface.
But BP says it would take three days to start this process.
During this time, the daily leakage of tens of thousands of barrels of oil, which had been capped last Thursday, could resume.
The well began leaking oil into the Gulf after BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded on 20 April, killing 11 workers, and capsized two days later.
BP had hoped the cap could stay in place until relief wells stopped the leak for good.
“Start Quote
I direct you to provide me a written procedure for opening the choke valve as quickly as possible ”
Thad AllenLetter to BP
But with pressure readings from within the well lower than expected, scientists had raised concerns that oil could leaking into the surrounding undersea bedrock.
And in a letter to BP chief managing director Bob Dudley, Adm Allen said: “Given the current observations… including the detected seep a distance from the well and undetermined anomalies at the well head, monitoring of the seabed is of paramount importance…
“I direct you to provide me a written procedure for opening the choke valve as quickly as possible without damaging the well should hydrocarbon seepage near the wellhead be confirmed.”
The flow of oil from the well was shut off by the cap at 1425 local time (1925 GMT) on Thursday and testing has continued since then.
Work on both of the relief wells designed to close off the well permanently is currently suspended because of the testing.
‘Worst disaster’
The Gulf of Mexico spill has been described as the worst environmental disaster the US has seen.
US fears Gulf seabed oil seepage near stricken …, posted with vodpod
The BBC’s Laura Trevelyan explains why BP is being ordered to provide the plan
The subsequent spill has affected hundreds of miles of Gulf coastline since April, with serious economic damage to the region as tourists have avoided Gulf Coast beaches and fishing grounds have remained closed.
BP has put the costs of dealing with the disaster at over $3.95bn (£2.6bn).
It has already paid out more than $200m to 32,000 claimants. The company is evaluating a further 17,000 for payment and is seeking more information on 61,000 other claims.
British Prime Minister David Cameron is to meet Mr Obama in Washington on Tuesday, and BP – formerly British Petroleum – is expected to be a key topic of discussion.
- NEW CAP FOR LEAKING OIL WELL
- In June, BP placed a cap, known as an LMRP cap, over the top of the Deepwater Horizon well so oil could be collected at the surface. However, this continued to leak oil and has now been replaced with a better fitting device.
