Shale gas for Europe–Is it safe?

Shale gas for Europe: Is it safe?

Author: Kostis Geropoulos

A faucet lighting up from the amount of natural gas in the water supply in a scene from 2010 US documentary Gasland shows that there are some impurities, to put it mildly, in the drinking water in areas where there is drilling for shale gas. The film, which premiered on HBO on 21 June, focuses on the impact of hydraulic fracturing. Shale drilling – the unconventional technique of fracturing rock to extract gas – has changed the energy landscape in the US. “It is a complete game changer. It is by far the most important development that the industry has seen in the last 20 years,” Fadel Gheit, a senior energy analyst at Oppenheimer & Co. in New York, told New Europe on 15 July.

Discussing the documentary, Gheit said scientifically it is difficult to prove that hydraulic fracturing is responsible for contamination of drinking water. He explained that shale gas is about 3,000 to 4,000 meters into the ground. The drinking water table is less than 50, 60 or 70 meters. “This is very solid rock that has very low permeability so it is very difficult scientifically to convince somebody that whatever liquid that the companies use in hydraulic fracturing can penetrate rocks of almost three kilometers in the ground to reach the drinking water,” Gheit said. Hydraulic fracturing is critical to the economics of shale gas drilling. “If we don’t employ hydraulic fracturing we cannot justify spending money drilling wells in the shale gas, period. If it is banned, we shut down all the shale gas wells in the United States,” Gheit said.

Across the Atlantic, energy companies are also looking for drilling rights. “There is a very strong belief that Eastern Europe is sitting on huge shale gas fields,” Gheit said, adding a lot of European companies want to cooperate with US companies with experience in drilling shale gas. “It is new technology that the Europeans are unfamiliar with and they want to learn it and perfect it so that they can apply that in their countries,” he said.

Shale gas has led to depressed natural gas prices because all of sudden the market went from a shortage to a glut. Russian gas monopoly Gazprom may not be pleased that new, abundant form of supply has been discovered in the US and Europe may follow suit. But Gheit said Gazprom can still be the lowest cost producer and offer very long, attractive supply terms for utilities in Europe and around the world. “Gazprom is going to develop huge potential shale gas resources that will allow it to dominate the landscape. Because Gazprom believes that in additional to conventional gas, which usually has very high decline rate, non-conventional gas – shale gas – has extremely long reserve life,” Gheit said, adding that the Russian company could remain a key supplier of both conventional gas and shale gas. At some point, the global energy market will transform itself away from oil because “oil has become politically an almost radioactive commodity,” Gheit said. “Gas can really change the landscape, can really change the world the way we see it right now.” Just don’t light a match near your water faucet.

KGeropoulos@NEurope.eu

Karachi on Fire

Karachi on Fire

KARACHI: A Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) leader and a member of the Sindh Assembly, Raza Haider, and his security guard were gunned down by unidentified motorcyclists inside a mosque in the Nazimabad area on Monday.

Life in the provincial capital was crippled following the incident, as at least 35 people were killed and more than 125 injured in incidents of violence that broke out in various areas in response to the killing.

Around three-dozen vehicles and several shops were set ablaze, while massive traffic jams were witnessed at almost all major thoroughfares of the city.

Two unidentified men shot dead 50-year-old Haider and his security guard Khalid Khan inside the Jamia Masjid Aqsa in Nazimabad Block No 2, when the lawmaker was getting ready to say his prayers at the mosque.

Bodies of the two victims were taken to the Abbasi Shaheed Hospital. MLO Dr Sheraz told Daily Times that the MPA sustained six bullet wounds – three from a sub-machine gun and three from a 9mm pistol – while his guard had sustained only one bullet injury.

The condition of a teenage boy Arsalan, who was also wounded in the attack, was stable, he added.

Liaquatabad Town SP Waqar Mallan told Daily Times that police found empty shells of a 9mm pistol and an SMG from the crime scene. The SP added that the culprits arrived at the mosque on two motorcycles and a white-coloured car.

“Two of the four men on the motorcycles entered the mosque and after shouting ‘Allah-o-Akbar’ opened fire on the MQM leader and his guard,” the officer said.

“The sketches that we are preparing with the help of eyewitnesses would be provided to the media after they are finalised, but our first priority is to control the law and order situation,” he added.

Meanwhile, violence and anarchy spread throughout the city following the MPA’s murder. Besides several vehicles and shops, a petrol pump, roadside stalls and pushcarts in various parts of the city were set ablaze by protesters.

Routine life was suspended and commercial activities came to a halt due to the violence, as several people stuck in traffic jams had parked their vehicles on the roads and walked to their destinations.

The MQM Rabita Committee announced three days of mourning. The committee said special prayers would also be organised for Haider.

Separately, MQM chief Altaf Hussain called for a high-level probe into Haider’s murder.

Condemning the killing, Altaf termed it a big tragedy, according to a statement by the MQM. President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani, PML-N chief Nawaz Sharif, and the four chief ministers strongly condemned the killing of the MQM leader.

The PM appealed to MQM party workers to avoid taking any extreme measures to express outrage against those who had committed this heinous crime.

Post Published: 03 August 2010

Five killed in Lebanese-Israeli border clash

Five killed in Lebanese-Israeli border clash

Main Image

An U.N peacekeeper waves a United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) flag at Israeli soldiers on the Lebanese-Israeli border near Adaisseh village, southern Lebanon, August 3, 2010

By Karamallah Daher

ADAISSEH | Tue Aug 3, 2010 9:13am EDT

Lebanon (Reuters) – Israeli and Lebanese troops fought a rare cross-border skirmish on Tuesday that killed four Lebanese and an Israeli officer in the most serious violence along the frontier since a 2006 war.

The Iranian- and Syrian-backed Hezbollah group, which battled Israel in the war four years ago, took no part in the exchange of fire. There was no sign of any extensive Israeli preparations for a large-scale operation — an early indication the clash might not trigger a wider conflict.

“It started when the Israelis wanted to cut a tree down inside Lebanon. The Lebanese army fired warning shots at them and they responded by shelling,” said a security source in Lebanon.

United Nations peacekeepers appealed to both sides to exercise “maximum restraint” after the incident.

A new Lebanon war could be even more devastating than the last. Hezbollah has an arsenal of 40,000 rockets, according to Israeli estimates. Israel has threatened to attack Lebanese infrastructure in any new conflict with the Shi’ite guerrillas.

Lebanese Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri “denounced the Israeli violations of Lebanese sovereignty.” His office said he also contacted Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to discuss “ways to confront the Israeli aggression against the Lebanese army.”

ISRAELI COMPLAINT

Israel’s Foreign Ministry said it would file a complaint at the United Nations over the clash, accusing Beirut of violating the 2006 Security Council resolution that ended the war.

“Israel views the Lebanese government as responsible for this serious incident and is warning of the ramifications if the violations continue,” the ministry said in a statement.

The Israeli military said its troops were fired upon while engaged in “routine activity” inside Israeli territory, between an Israeli security fence and a U.N.-drawn border line.

An Israeli helicopter fired two missiles at a Lebanese army post near Adaisseh village, destroying an armoured personnel carrier. A security source said three Lebanese soldiers and a Lebanese journalist were killed and five people wounded.

Witnesses said Israeli artillery also fired at the village.

Hezbollah’s Al Manar television said a high-ranking Israeli soldier was killed on the border. The Israeli military had no immediate comment.

The fatalities were the first suffered by either side since the 2006 war in which 1,200 people, mostly civilians, were killed in Lebanon, along with 158 Israelis, mostly soldiers.

That conflict began after Hezbollah attacked an Israeli border patrol, killing eight soldiers and abducting two others, whose bodies were later returned in a prisoner swap.

A 13,000-strong U.N. peacekeeping force known as UNIFIL patrols southern Lebanon under a U.N. resolution that expanded its mandate and ended the war on August 14, 2006. UNIFIL said it was examining the circumstances of the bloodshed.

The incident occurred a day after rockets that Israel suspects were fired from Egypt by Islamist militants struck Jordan’s Red Sea port of Aqaba, killing a man.

“(There is) a necessity to repel any Israeli attempt of aggression no matter what the circumstances,” Lebanese President Michel Suleiman was quoted as saying. He urged the use of diplomacy to deal with the border incident.

(Reporting by Mariam Karouny and Yara Bayoumy in Beirut; and Jeffrey Heller in Jerusalem bureau)

When Limited Warfare Strategy Seems Like Treason

When Limited Warfare Strategy Seems Like Treason

By:  Peter Chamberlin

“The masters have realized that if they can deal directly with the organ-grinder, then why waste time dealing with the monkey?”

Yours Sincerely,

Ameer Bhutto

The Afghan war is a controlled experiment in conflict management.  The one-sided nature of the war, what the generals call “asymmetrical conflict,” means that one side has the latent military power to utilize enough force to decisively win the battle, but chooses to not escalate the violence to adequate levels.

There are two alternatives to this total pacification solution–status quo, where the major force accepts a stand-off situation; or various limited warfare strategies.  In Afghanistan, the US and NATO have chosen the limited warfare option, in order to limit damage to our image, or reputation in world opinion, while pursuing pipeline plans to their completion in Central Asia and Pakistan.

Completing “the mission” before economic collapse overtakes us will eventually force our leaders to embrace the total war solution.  They understand this; it has always been the plan.  The cost of this solution will be paid in massive collateral death.  It will be unavoidable in the end.  Such a move will do serious damage to America’s image in the court of world opinion, seriously undermining any agreements or understandings based on trust.

This ugly truth reinforces the idea of fighting a controlled conflict in Afghanistan; relying on political indicators to determine acceptable levels of violence.  This has allowed the creation of a public perception that the limited war, in itself, can accomplish the goals of the mission.  Nothing can be further from the truth.  We are on a path to total war, unless unforeseen developments derail the secret plans.

The methods used to wage counter-insurgency operations are limited by political indicators, as well.  The “hearts and minds” component to these operations is of greater strategic importance than the actual fighting.  Battles are waged in a manner that seeks to win support from the population which is enduring the actual fighting.  A successful political seduction helps to keep the conflict limited and manageable.

Whoever is doing the actual fighting must be made to look as though they fit in.  Their attacks upon the insurgents and the propaganda campaigns directed at them, must alienate the militants from the local tribals.  The tribes which are being hit must be made to want see the militants separated from them, taken away and killed, even if they are relatives.  This justifies the creation and support of militant counter-forces, tribal militias and paramilitary assassin units.  It also requires national and international disinformation operations, coordinating government and media messages of denial, to refute news which escapes the battlefield black-outs.  The psychological dissonance caused by these operations disrupts public reactions which might upset control of the conflict.

On the battlefield, the practice of limited warfare operations requires a constant juggling of combat and information operations, in order to prevent losing tactical control of the warfare, allowing the scales to tip towards the total war solution.  Such a loss of control of the psywar would be seen as a battlefield defeat by strategists seeking to manage the conflict.

These strategies of limited warfare and conflict management prevail on both sides of the Durand Line, meaning that they are practiced by both the American, as well as the Pakistani generals.  This accounts for Pakistani support for the Taliban, on both sides of the border.  There is only one “Taliban,” whichever side of the border they are on.  If Gen. Kayani and his subordinates support the Afghan Taliban, then they support the “Pakistani Taliban (TTP),” as well.  If Pakistan is helping the Taliban attack NATO forces, then it is also helping the TTP attack Pakistanis, even if the support is indirect.

In Pakistan, the Taliban militants are a tool, used by the Army to maintain control over the Pakistani people and their troubling moves towards actual democracy.  Gen. Kayani has made it clear to President Karzani that he has the power to end or escalate the conflict there (SEE:  The huge scale of Pakistan’s complicity).  He has the same power and influence inside Pakistan.  The militants/insurgents who wage war against Western troops inside Afghanistan, are the same people (or they are connected to the same people) who attack civilians and mostly Frontier Corp. personnel inside Pakistan’s tribal regions.

Army policies of promoting limited war have spawned an epidemic of lawlessness, which has given rise to militant groups outside of Pakistan’s control, including those who wage war against the Army itself.  Most of the terror attacks upon actual government targets are revenge attacks by current and former client groups who are used to carry-out official policy on the covert level in Kashmere, Afghanistan and elsewhere.

But the Hegelian policy of fighting war by promoting war is rapidly reaching a point of reversal, where terrorist promotion must be countered by means of actual terrorist suppression.  When the terrorism fostered and promoted by both Pakistan and the United States increases to such levels of intensity that they threaten to upset the balance of the managed conflict, then it will become necessary to use severe suppression tactics upon the insurgency.

We are rapidly approaching the point of no return, where the managing powers lose control of the greater conflict and insurgencies escalate out of control, leading inevitably to a global conflagration.  Before the US loses its economic advantage in an uncontrolled global economic collapse, it must act militarily to achieve the war’s true mission—that of securing the gas and oil and the pipeline routes from Central Asia to the port at Gwadar.

Gen. Kayani understands the true timeline and its implications for him, as well as the rest of Pakistan.  This is the motivation that has driven him to undertake the operations in Swat and S. Waziristan.  It is the force behind the Army’s PR offensive in Balochistan.

Neither the Pakistani nor the American limited warfare operations now unfolding in Balochistan will succeed in pacifying local resistance to development plans, or in reducing attacks to a manageable level.  For good reason, it has been said that the Balochs are the Palestinians of the Pakistani struggle.  There is about as much chance of Pakistan bombing the will to resist out of the Baloch psyche as Israel has of pacifying the Palestinian resistance using the “Iron Wall” tactics of Ariel Sharon.

Direct action missions are keyed to escalate the conflict.  The escalation desired to warrant a large-scale military pacification operation, is already in the works.  Gen. Kayani cannot resist these plans without losing his position.  It is in his best interests (and in his mind it is in Pakistan’s best interest) to facilitate Pakistan’s transition into American plans.  Instead of opposing the escalation on Pakistani soil which he knows is coming, he is doing everything in his considerable power to make it possible.

To this end, Kayani plays his role as “organ-grinder” and the civilian leadership dances to the master’s tune which he keeps cranking-out.

peterchamberlin@naharnet.com

Gates hints at operation inside Pakistan

Gates hints at operation inside Pakistan

WASHINGTON: The US has said that it is undertaking a major build-up of forces in eastern Afghanistan — a stronghold of Haqqani faction — for a decisive push against terrorists’ safe havens close to the borders of Pakistan.

Disclosing this, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, hinted that the operation could be one “on both sides of the border”.

His comments came as he voiced concern over leaks by whistleblower website Wikileaks that Pakistan’s military Intelligence was maintaining links with Taliban and al-Qaeda.“We are increasing cooperation with Pakistanis in terms of working on both sides of the border, in terms of trying to prevent people from crossing that border. We are increasing our forces in eastern Afghanistan that will help us do this,” Gates told ABC’s programme “This Week”.

US and Nato forces which would swell to almost 150,000 by September this year have so far only concentrated on flushing out Taliban from their southern Afghanistan strongholds of Helmand and Kandahar. The American forces are yet to launch a major foray into eastern Afghan provinces of Paktia, Khost, Paktika, Gardez, Logar and Ghazni which are a bastion of Jalaluddin Haqqani.

According to US intelligence estimates the Haqqani network, now run by Jalaluddin’s eldest son Sirajuddin, has between 3,000 to 5,000 heavily armed cadres. Despite mounting casualties and growing public doubts in the US, the defence secretary said that the July 2011 drawdown of troops would be “limited”.

Gates said that considerable number of US troops would remain in the country as he claimed that a major headway in the war against Taliban and al-Qaeda was underway. He said that the Taliban insurgency would not be able to wait out American forces as any major pullout was not on the horizon. “My personal opinion is that drawdowns early on will be fairly of limited numbers,” he said. Asked if Taliban have simply to “run out the clock until mid 2011,” Gates said he would “welcome that because we will be there in the 19th month, and we will be there with lot of troops.”

General Kayani’s quiet coup

General Kayani’s quiet coup

PRAVEEN SWAMI

In this July 19, 2010 photo made available by the Inter Services Public Relations Department U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talks to Pakistan's Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in Rawalpindi. Photo: AP
In this July 19, 2010 photo made available by the Inter Services Public Relations Department U. S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton talks to Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani in Rawalpindi. Photo: AP

Late in April, Ashfaq Pervez Kayani stood before a solemn audience that had gathered to mark Martyrs Day.

“There is no greater honour than martyrdom”, Pakistan’s army chief said, “nor any aspiration greater than it. When people are determined to achieve great objectives, they develop the faith needed to trust their lives to the care of Allah. We are well aware of the historical reality that nations must be willing to make great sacrifices for their freedom”. “I am proud”, he went on, “that the nation has never forgotten the sacrifices of its martyrs and holy warriors”.

If it hadn’t been for General Kayani’s impeccably-ironed military uniform, his audience might have been forgiven for believing that the speech was being made by the Islamist clerics who have exhorted insurgents to claim the lives of over 2,700 Pakistani troops in combat.

Pakistan’s Prime Minister went on national television in July to give his country’s army chief an unprecedented three year extension of service. The decision has won applause in some western capitals, as well as from some liberal and conservative commentators in Pakistan. In the midst of a bitter war against Islamists many believe poses the greatest existential threat Pakistan has ever faced, Kayani’s supporters believe its army needs continuity of leadership.

Those propositions might be true — but casts little light on the strategic considerations which have given Kayani three more years in office. Pakistan’s army hopes, in essence, that Kayani will be able to craft a way out of the crisis without compromising the power and influence of its generals.

Islamabad elites had long been discussing Kayani’s plans to secure an extension; this newspaper carried an extensive discussion of the issue in March. Key politicians, though, were evidently clueless. On May 17, Pakistani Defence Minister Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar said the government “was neither granting extension to Chief of Army Staff; nor had the general sought it.” But just a week later, media reported that a conference of corps commanders had called for an extension.

Some accounts hold that President Asif Ali Zardari, who is distrusted by the army, had little choice but to accept this fait accompli. Other commentary suggests both President Zardari and Prime Minister Gilani went along with decision, hoping to stave off any confrontation with the armed forces until 2013 — the year their terms in office end. Either way, as Pakistani lawyer and political commentator Asma Jehangir has noted, the extension suggests “that democracy has not taken root. The decision was taken on the basis of obvious pressure from the military”.

But just what was it that drove this pressure? Pakistan’s army isn’t, after all, short of competent commanders. “My advice to Kayani”, wrote the commentator Kamran Shafi days before the extension, “would be to issue his last Order of the Day on the appointed date of his retirement, receive his successor in General Head-Quarters, and after a cup of tea get into his private car and fade away.” There are good reasons, though, why that advice wasn’t heeded.

THE PAKISTAN ARMY’S AGENDA

Kayani is at the centre of three projects critical to the long-term power of the Pakistan army. The first is this: extricating the Pakistan army from a counter-insurgency campaign that appears unwinnable. During Kayani’s visit to troops in Orakzai on June 1, the Pakistan army announced “the successful conclusion of operations in the Agency”. But, as analyst Tushar Rajan Mohanty recently pointed out, it has admitted to over a dozen engagements there since, involving the use of combat jets and helicopter gunships. Refugees displaced last year are yet to return.

Hoping to manoeuvre an exit, Kayani has escalated support to the jihadist networks of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani. Last week, Canadian diplomat Chris Alexander — who spent seven years serving his country and the United Nations in Afghanistan — charged Kayani with “sponsoring a large-scale, covert guerrilla war through Afghan proxies.” “Without Pakistani military support,” Alexander asserted “all signs are the Islamic Emirate’s combat units would collapse”. Earlier, Harvard University’s Matt Waldman quoted Islamic Emirate commanders admitting that the ISI’s role was “as clear as the sun in the sky.”

Kayani, the Pakistan army hopes, will be able to secure it allies power in a future regime in Kabul — and then use their influence to scale back its conflict with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan at home. Pakistan has, notably, offered to broker a rapprochement between its jihadist allies and Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s regime.

Linked to this objective, Kayani is working to heal President Musharraf’s rupture with domestic jihadists — a constituency who were once drawn to state-backed organisations like the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, but have been increasingly supporting the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Pakistan’s India policy is being reinvented by Kayani to this end: the second project he needs time to see to fruition.

In a thoughtful 2002 paper for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, George Perkovich cast light on Musharraf’s reappraisal of Pakistani military strategy on India. Lieutenant-General Moinuddin Haider, who served as interior minister under President Musharraf, told Perkovich he argued that the long-term costs of continuing to back jihadists would be higher than the potential losses from taking them on. President Musharraf feared that confrontation would provoke a civil war. “I was the sole voice initially”, Haider said, “saying, ‘Mr. President, your economic plan will not work, people will not invest, if you don’t get rid of extremists.’”

Haider gathered allies — among them Pakistan’s former intelligence chief, Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi. “We must not be afraid,” General Qazi said in the wake of the 2001-2002 India-Pakistan military crisis “of admitting that the Jaish was involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, bombing the Indian Parliament, [the journalist] Daniel Pearl’s murder and even attempts on President Musharraf’s life.”

But Musharraf did little to develop an institutional consensus around these ideas — and, as his legitimacy eroded, proved unable to make a decisive break with the past. Many in the Pakistan army blamed him for precipitating the internal crisis which developed during his term in office. Like so often in the past, the Pakistan army moved to force out a commander-turned-liability.

Ever since Kayani replaced Musharraf, there has been mounting evidence that the Pakistan army is seeking to renew hostility with India. In 2008, the United States was reported to have confronted Pakistan’s army with evidence that the ISI was involved in a murderous attack on the Indian diplomatic mission in Kabul. Later that year, it is now known from the testimony of Pakistani-American jihadist David Headley, the ISI facilitated the carnage in Mumbai. Pakistan has denied its intelligence services were linked to the Mumbai attacks, but has neither questioned the officials Headley named, nor sought to interrogate him on the issue.

In February, Kayani told journalists the Pakistan army was an ‘India-centric institution’, adding that this “reality will not change in any significant way until the Kashmir issue and water disputes are resolved”.

Language like this fits well with the intellectual climate of Pakistan’s armed forces. Lieutenant-General Javed Hassan — who played a key role commanding Pakistan forces during the Kargil war — was commissioned by the army’s Faculty of Research and Doctrinal Studies to produce a guide to India for serving officers. In India: A Study in Profile, published by the military-owned Services Book Club in 1990, Hassan argues that is driven by “the incorrigible militarism of the Hindus.” “For those that are weak,” he goes on, “the Hindu is exploitative and domineering.”

Faced with a flailing war against jihadists at home, Kayani’s anti-India platform offers the army the strategic equivalent of an escape button: precipitating a crisis with a historic adversary, secure in the knowledge that Pakistan’s nuclear umbrella guarantees is protection from a large-scale war. Pakistan’s military, many Indian foreign policy analysts believe, precipitated the bruising showdown between Foreign Ministers SM Krishna and Shah Mehmood Qureshi in Islamabad last month, undermining the fragile dialogue between the two countries.

India and Afghanistan are just parts, though, of the third, and most important project: guaranteeing the political primacy of the Pakistan army. In the wake of President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq’s assassination in 1988, Pakistan developed what the scholar Hussain Haqqani — now his country’s ambassador to the United States — described as “military rule by other means.” Hasan-Askari Rizvi noted that the army chief became the “pivot” for political system. The army chief, in turn, derived his authority from the corps commanders who addressed “not only security, professional and organisational matters, but also deliberate on domestic issues”.

In January 2008 General Kayani passed a directive which ordered military officers not to maintain contacts with politicians, and followed up with orders withdrawing serving personnel from civilian institutions. The move was interpreted as evidence of Kayani’s commitment to genuine civilian-led democracy. But Kayani repulsed President Zardari’s early efforts to bring the ISI under civilian control, and defeated his efforts to seek a grand rapprochement with India. Pakistan’s army proved willing to cede influence over the administration of the state, but not over the structure and thrust of national strategy.

“The army is the nation,” General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani said in his Martyrs Day speech, “and the nation is with the army.” Ensuring that this pithy proposition survives the crisis Pakistan is faced with is the purpose of the silent coup that has given Kayani three more years in office.

The huge scale of Pakistan’s complicity

The huge scale of Pakistan’s complicity

Pakistan's chief of army staff, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, continues to resist U.S. pressure to launch military operations where the Islamic Emirate is based.

Thanks to WikiLeaks, the involvement of Inter-Services Intelligence in the Afghan conflict is now obvious, argues Chris Alexander, Canada’s former ambassador to Afghanistan

Chris Alexander

From Saturday’s Globe and MailPublished on Friday, Jul. 30, 2010 5:37PM EDTLast updated on Saturday, Jul. 31, 2010 12:17PM EDT

When 91,000 classified military documents are leaked about a continuing war, there is bound to be controversy. But as one who spent six years in Afghanistan – first as Canada’s ambassador, then as deputy head of the United Nations mission there – my first reaction was how true to life it all was. Here is the hall-of-mirrors, see-saw world of counterinsurgency – in all its complexity.

But alarm bells soon started ringing for me. Intelligence sources have been named – a windfall for the Taliban that they are likely toasting. The cost of this betrayal will be measured in lives, undercutting efforts to build trust village-by-village in Kandahar, Helmand and elsewhere.

Look at the sheer scale of the WikiLeaks’ material – and its lack of context. In the Afghanistan I knew, civilians were struggling to rebuild an economy and institutions. In the documents, the country is depicted as a howling, naked battlefield. It is a caricature, which will feed prevailing prejudices.

There is, however, at least one genuine insight: dozens of reports tagging the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) – the branch of Pakistan’s military charged with most aspects of its Afghan policy – as the main driver of the conflict. So long as cross-border interference goes unchecked, prospects for peace remain dim.

By any measure, the conflict is escalating. According to the UN, the number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from January to April was twice the 2009 figure. In June alone, 104 foreign soldiers were killed, including four Canadians – the highest monthly toll to date.

In Pakistan, Taliban-led suicide attacks since 2007 have killed an estimated 3,400 – mostly civilians. Thousands more have been killed in operations to root militants out of Swat, Bajaur, Kurram, South Waziristan and elsewhere.

Both Afghanistan and Pakistan are now in the grip of a single escalating conflict, punching eastward from Khyber Pakhtunwa (the former Northwest Frontier Province) into Punjab’s heartland, as well as westward toward Kabul, Kandahar and Kunduz.

As a direct consequence, reconciliation has failed to get off the ground: the Pakistan-based Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan – the official name for the Taliban and its allies – clearly prefer to fight.

GENERAL ASHFAQ KAYANI V. THE REST OF THE WORLD

As the War Logs make clear, the principal drivers of violence are no longer, if they ever were, inside Afghanistan.

Consider the following:

First, in February, Pakistan’s security forces began arresting a dozen or so Taliban leaders – whose presence on their soil they had always noisily denied – presumably because these insurgent commanders had shown genuine, independent interest in reconciliation.

Second, the chief of Pakistan’s army staff, General Ashfaq Kayani, this year once again successfully resisted U.S. pressure to launch military operations in Baluchistan and North Waziristan, where the Islamic Emirate is based.

Third, Gen. Kayani told Mr. Karzai this spring that the condition for peace in Afghanistan would be the closing of several Indian consulates, while offering to broker deals with Islamic Emirate leaders, whom he considers a “strategic asset.”

Fourth, Gen. Kayani blithely told a Washington audience that he remained wedded to “strategic depth” – that is, to making Afghanistan the kind of proprietary hinterland for Pakistan, free of Indian or other outside influence, which it was from 1992 to 2001.

This is not empty rhetoric. Gen. Kayani is saying he wants to call the shots in Kabul. To do so, he is prepared to support the principal outfit launching suicide attacks in Afghanistan’s cities. He is backing the Islamic Emirate’s effort to wreck an Afghan-led nation-building process.

The Pakistan army under Gen. Kayani is sponsoring a large-scale, covert guerrilla war through Afghan proxies – whose strongholds in Baluchistan and Waziristan are flourishing. Their mission in Afghanistan is to keep Pashtun nationalism down, India out and Mr. Karzai weak.

It has nothing to do with Islam, whose principles they trample; indeed, the flower of Afghanistan’s ulema (religious leaders) have been among their victims.

Gen. Kayani and others will deny complicity. But as the WikiLeaks material demonstrates, their heavy-handed involvement is now obvious at all levels.

To understand the context of this fraught relationship, read a report called The Sun In the Sky: The Relationship of Pakistan’s ISI to Afghan Insurgents, by Matt Waldman, a former Oxfam policy adviser now at Harvard. It is a chilling tale. When the scale of this complicity is fully exposed, it will rank high on the list of modern scandals.

FULL CIRCLE

By any measure, Afghan society has recovered smartly since 2001. The latest annual growth in gross domestic product was 22 per cent – despite the global crisis. Government revenue increased by 60 per cent in 18 months. Annual inflation has been minus 12 per cent, as domestic agriculture substituted for pricey imports.

A renaissance has continued in media and culture. Schools, clinics and new rural infrastructure have opened the door to better lives.

Despite thickets of corruption, several Afghan ministries have combined integrity with delivery.

On July 20, 60 donor nations and 12 international organizations met at Kabul to assess progress. The highlight was Hamid Karzai’s speech – his best as Afghan President to date.

Leaving aside last year’s controversies, he articulated priorities rooted in national consensus.

He returned to the theme of his country as a crossroads and roundabout for Asia, arguing that trade, mineral wealth and sound public finances, wisely pursued, can make Afghanistan’s new institutions affordable.

The country has now come full circle – reclaiming the sense of purpose it embraced in 2002-04.

The symbol of this restored strategic impulse is Mr. Karzai’s revived collaboration with his outstanding former finance minister (and 2009 presidential rival), Ashraf Ghani. Such political vision has the potential to deliver results.

But larger-scale institution-building will take years.

Afghanistan’s army and police were effectively dissolved in 1992; serious efforts to restore them were launched only in 2003 and 2005 respectively.

BOTH COUNTRIES’ CITIZENS CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE

Few Pakistanis rejoice in the ISI’s duplicity.

Most see the ISI’s strategy for the outrage it is. It has brought their military into disrepute, sullied Pakistan’s good name and unleashed unprecedented strife in its streets. Pakistani influence at Kabul is at its lowest ebb since 1947.

The vast majority of Pakistanis do not equate their national interest with the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Indeed, The Dawn, Pakistan’s largest daily, warned in an editorial after the Kabul conference against any precipitate U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan.

Pakistan’s army’s interference in Afghanistan’s recovery violates a key provision of the UN Charter, on non-interference – and at its new scale, it represents a threat to international peace and security. It deserves serious discussion in multilateral forums, including the UN.

Most citizens of both countries want to see the Taliban defeated, and legitimate governments strengthened. The trade deal signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan on July 20 – the first since partition – is a good start.

A similar deal on the border would be historic.

Without Pakistani military support, all signs are the Islamic Emirate’s combat units would collapse like a house of cards. Peace and reconciliation would prosper.

So long as this unholy alliance continues, Afghans will continue to succumb to the mistaken view that the U.S. and its allies are deliberately turning a blind eye to Taliban resurgence, despite our sacrifices to date.

Turning the corner on this issue will require a concerted show of will – and much tougher action in the eyes of the new storm of violence in North Waziristan and Baluchistan.

The shrine bombed in Lahore on July 1 holds Ali Bin Usman Hujwiri Ghaznavi, a saint who travelled to the Indus basin from what is now Afghanistan in the 11th century, becoming one of the anchors of Islam in South Asia.

As we begin a second decade of the second millennium, his legacy – one rooted in a rich, tolerant concept of religion; as well as strong relations then between Lahore and Ghazni (Islamabad and Kabul today) – remains worth defending.

For all the damage the WikiLeaks data dump could cause, at least they have brought our attention back to where it should be – to the real obstacles to peace.

Chris Alexander was ambassador of Canada to Afghanistan from 2003 to 2005 and Deputy Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan from 2005 until 2009. The views expressed in this article are entirely his own. The Long Way Back – his book on Afghanistan’s story since 2001 – will be published by HarperCollins in 2011.

Kayani wants India out of Afghanistan: Ex-Canadian envoy

Kayani wants India out of Afghanistan: Ex-Canadian envoy

NDTV Correspondent, IST

New Delhi: After the Wikileaks disclosures on the ISI-terror links, now a top Canadian diplomat has revealed that Pakistan’s Army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani, wants Indian consulates in the war-torn country to be closed and is even prepared to support suicide attacks.

Chris Alexander, who was Canada’s ambassador in Kabul from 2003 to 2005 and later the deputy of the United Nations (UN) mission until 2009, has written in “the Globe and Mail” saying, “Gen. Kayani told Mr. Karzai this spring that the condition for peace in Afghanistan would be the closing of several Indian consulates. This is not empty rhetoric. Gen. Kayani is saying he wants to call the shots in Kabul. To do so, he is prepared to support the principal outfit launching suicide attacks in Afghanistan’s cities. The Pakistan army under Gen. Kayani is sponsoring a large-scale, covert guerrilla war through Afghan proxies.”

Recently, in an exclusive interview with NDTV, Pakistan’s ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, had said India will not be allowed to use Afghanistan as a staging ground to militarily threaten Pakistan. (Read & Watch: Wikileaks episode won’t affect Pak’s ties with US, says Haqqani)

When asked what role he thinks think India can legitimately play in Afghanistan without causing Pakistan to feel buffeted in, Haqqani replied, “I think that the best course for India in Afghanistan is to make sure that whatever they do there does not create misgivings in Pakistan, a little more transparency, a little more open discussion as neighbours that this is what we are about to do. It’s a part of the confidence building that we need to do to overcome the misgivings of the past.

“Look, we all know that there are always issues that each side can raise with one another, complaints that one can have towards one another, but if the intention is to have a stable Afghanistan, a stable Pakistan, and a stable India, playing their respective roles, working together, then I think we can find a way of reassuring each other.

“In Afghanistan, as long as there is no significant military intelligence activity that Pakistan finds threatening, India of course will remain a country with which the Afghans will do business, and similarly, at some point in future, Pakistan itself looks forward to a normal trade relationship with India, but until we get there, we have to have a more reassuring posture towards one another. There are things Pakistan has to take India into confidence over just to be reassuring, and similarly India has to understand that it had to do that.”

When NDTV asked Haqqani if it is fair to say that Pakistan wants and demands primacy in Afghanistan once the US engagement begins to scale down, he said, “Pakistan does not seek control over or primacy in Afghanistan. We want to be a friend to Afghanistan and a neighbour. We recognize Afghan sovereignty and we want Afghanistan’s internal politics to remain Afghanistan’s internal matter.

“At the same time, we are concerned like any other country would be about not letting Afghanistan be used as a military or intelligence staging ground, that would interrupt our own security, and very frankly even that in the very long term future, and I’m not talking about tomorrow, in the very long term future, if we have greater confidence on each other and India and Pakistan have reached a point where we start trusting each other, then even those issues would slowly start disappearing, but our concerns are not very dissimilar to what would have been American concerns. If for example the Soviet union had started creating a military or intelligence base in Mexico or in Canada during the cold war, so I think that the onus of creating trust lies on both sides, and in the case of Afghanistan, our Indian neighbours can find a way of reassuring Pakistan so that this does not become another sort of sore point between our two countries.”

Story first published:
August 03, 2010 07:37 IST

Iraq combat end a huge gamble

Iraq combat end a huge gamble

By STEVEN R. HURST (AP) – 1 hour ago

WASHINGTON — President Barack Obama hailed the coming end of the U.S. combat mission in Iraq, but the gamble is huge — a wager that the country won’t fall back into murderous anarchy.

And as he spoke of the need to be “humbled by the profound sacrifice” of American men and women who fought the war, Obama left out or glossed over some politically uncomfortable key facts.

That may reflect Obama’s sinking poll numbers — driven by a stubborn 9.5 percent unemployment rate, an anemic economic recovery and broad anti-incumbent sentiment — with just three months remaining to congressional elections.

There is a good chance Obama’s Democrats could surrender their big majority in the House and several seats in the Senate. They could even lose control of both chambers.

The president was walking a difficult line in his speech Monday to the Disabled American Veterans. His ambiguous record on the war before taking office and the fact that an end-of-2011 total withdrawal deadline was already in place were sure to have diluted his message.

As an opponent to what he, in 2002, called “a dumb war, a rash war,” Obama also strenuously challenged the Bush administration’s so-called troop surge in 2007, which is broadly credited with pulling Iraq back from the brink of civil war.

Obama said the combat mission will end by Aug. 31 “as promised and on schedule,” but the pullout was, in fact, preordained by the U.S.-Iraqi “Status of Forces Agreement” that took effect before his inauguration in January 2009.

And as Obama spoke glowingly of the end of combat, the president wisely issued a caveat — Iraqi reality.

The 50,000 U.S. troops who remain 16 more months as trainers, security forces and counterterrorism squads still face a grave mission.

“These are dangerous tasks,” Obama said. “And there are still those with bombs and bullets who will try to stop Iraq’s progress. The hard truth is we have not seen the end of American sacrifice in Iraq.”

Nor is there an end to tragedy for Iraqi citizens, who still are dying in terrorist shootings and bombings at a rate that belies any claim to even near normalcy seven years after former President George W. Bush ordered the invasion.

Iraq’s political system remains wobbly. Nearly five months after inconclusive March 7 elections, politicians still are struggling to form a new government. The bitter political tug-of-war and ensuing power struggle have heightened worries about concerted insurgent attacks.

Al-Qaida in Iraq shows signs of returning to a strength that threatens the advances made during the American troop buildup in 2007.

Oil production — the basis of the Iraqi economy — still has not returned to prewar levels, and those were down significantly as a result of U.N. sanctions imposed after the first Gulf War.

About 1.8 million Iraqis remain abroad, a majority having fled to Syria and Jordan to avoid the ravages of war. Before the U.S. invasion, only an estimated half-million Iraqis lived abroad.

Billions of dollars have been spent to fix Iraq’s antiquated electricity grid since the 2003 invasion, but many Iraqis still get power less than six hours a day — about the same or sometimes even less than they received under Saddam Hussein.

At least 4,413 members of the U.S. military have died since the invasion and nearly 32,000 have been wounded.

Given those difficult numbers, Obama sought a patriotic space for his opposition to the war, fully aware of the heavy price paid by the veterans in his audience.

“There are patriots who supported going to war, and patriots who opposed it,” the president said. “But there has never been any daylight between us when it comes to supporting the more than 1 million Americans in uniform who have served in Iraq — far more than any conflict since Vietnam.”

Hanging over the Aug. 31 milestone in Iraq, of course, remains the difficult — some say losing — war in Afghanistan, where, Obama reminded his listeners, “al-Qaida plotted and trained to murder 3,000 innocent people on 9/11.”

Glad to be rid, or nearly so, of the resource- and life-draining fight in Iraq, the president sought plenty of attention for what he hopes will mark the real beginning of the end of a fight he believes should never have been fought — a war that produced searing divisions among Americans.

His job now, if Iraq doesn’t fall apart again, will be to hold together faltering Democratic support for the increasingly bloody Afghanistan conflict.

In one of the more partisan periods in recent U.S. political history, Democrat Obama finds himself relying overwhelmingly on Republicans for support in Afghanistan.

EDITOR’S NOTE _ Steven R. Hurst, an international political writer for The Associated Press, was Baghdad bureau chief from 2005-08.