Does Presence of Colombian Police and Army Suspects Confirm New Gangs Are Continuation of Paramilitaries?

“Neoparamilitares?”

El crecimiento de las bacrim obligó al gobierno a crear un centro de inteligencia  especializado, llamado CI2. Y el pasado agosto arrancó la Unidad Nacional contra las Bandas Emergentes de la Fiscalía, que logró, la semana pasada, capturar   11 integrantes de los organismos de seguridad en Chocó que ayudaban a 
Los Rastrojos.

 

BACRIM growth forced the government to create a specialized intelligence center, called CI2. And last August kicked off the National Unity against emerging bands of the Prosecutor, who won last week, capturing 11 members of security agencies that helped Chocó Rastrojos.
DRUG TRAFFIC in Choco capture of 11 members of the security agencies of complicity with the Rastrojos raises the question of how far the so-called criminal gangs are the continuity of the paramilitaries.

In Bahia Solano and Nuquí, Chocó, 24 people were arrested on May 31, through links with the group of the stubble, among whom were 11 members of the security agencies, a councilman and a secretary of court, which puts on the fore the issue of whether this is an isolated case of corruption again, typical of the modus operandi of drug traffickers, or is another example of a link of continuity between the old paramilitary groups such as Los Rastrojos, replaced in many regions.

Among those captured in Bahia Solano are seven police officers, two noncommissioned officers of the Navy, the coordinator and a researcher at the CTI, the secretary of the municipal criminal court and a council of Nuqui. According to partial data collected by week, some 700 members of the security forces are being investigated for alleged complicity with those groups, according to police, filled in 152 municipalities in the spaces left by the AUC. The military says nearly 350 of its members are under scrutiny. Police have dismissed about 300 and the DAS, 30. The Navy has captured nine. And a dozen prosecutors were investigated for this reason.

In some cases, there officers involved. Late last year, the CTI captured an army colonel and a lawyer for the prosecution that, for two years, stealing night vision goggles and other weapons from 11 battalions to sell to new groups, and increasing the Police Intelligence was fired for cooperating with countries. Some senior officers have been removed on suspicion of links with these organizations.

Even with the name they gave-BACRIM, “the authorities of the previous government and have tried to disentangle the new groups of former paramilitaries. Gen. Oscar Naranjo said that paramilitary status would give them “reward” for drug traffickers. However, several signs, in addition to the cases of links between members of the security forces and seven criminal gangs recognized by the authorities indicates that they are important elements of continuity with the old paramilitaries.

It is estimated that only between 7 and 10 percent of the BACRIM file members are exparamilitares, but of the 63 heads of these groups caught up earlier this year, 53 percent come from the AUC. Some experts say that these gangs recruit retired soldiers, as did the paramilitaries. In Cordoba, Bajo Cauca, Valle and Nariño operate with territorial control methods, with uniforms and rifles. Massacres and threats have revived popular leaders and victims’ movement and, as Social Action, were responsible for the displacement of 133,000 people between 2007 and 2010. And as the AUC, ally or battle with the guerrillas, depending on the needs.

Catches in the Chocó put on the table that BACRIM are a complex phenomenon, an expression of the new conditions of armed conflict in the country. Although no doubt his main occupation is the drug (it was also for ‘Macaco’ and ‘Cuco Vanoy’ of the AUC) to the civilian population are a threat as real as the paramilitaries. Also show a capacity for territorial control and penetration of the state as having the stop-and remains to be seen what will they do in local elections in October.

The mere label of organized crime groups does not explain these realities. Without understanding the links of continuity between the paramilitaries and the ‘BACRIM’ on their territorial control methods, forms of penetration of the state and its relations with members of the security forces are not able to design effective strategies to control and protect civilians from the violence generated.