There are car bombs and other cars that are about to bomb, there are cars that have blown up and others that are about to blow up, there are suspicious cars and there are other wanted ones, there are mobile and variable lists that are being circulated electronically and via the “WhatsApp”, there are careless security devices on the one hand and other devices working on the other hand on their own expenses and do consider that resolving the issue of abducting the Turkish pilots is a priority and that its importance outweighs the priority of saving the lives of tens or even hundreds of Lebanese, and they also believe that this is the only concern.
Bandar’s plan and the three fronts’ war This is the best of all (as they say in Lebanon), and this means that its spitefulness and meanness is still better than what is inside, and this is no longer a secret. The politicians’ salons are full of tales about what is being plotted against Lebanon, and the security services know the reality of the “largest project” plotted by a cell or a group that decided all at once to trap the country.
The project aims at “bombing Lebanon”, and the issue is neither a theory of conspiracy nor a political accusation against those who plotted that project. Ever since Bandar bin Sultan’s threat and the messages conveyed by the Minister, Walid Jumblat- the rest of the messages are to be received respectively- the entire security intersections link between the “bombing” groups vertically with the absence of any horizontal line between them.
Whether those groups consider themselves as battalions and/or brigades with the diversity of their religious and historical characters, or give their selves the names of their “Heads”, the “operator” is still one. He is neither Muhammad Ahmad, nor Ahmad Taha and not even “Ahmad Al-Asir” and certainly he is not “Abu Ajeena”, and even if the ownership of the “operating phone” is moving between the states and capitals, the financer currently is considered the exclusive operator. Bandar bin Sultan has kept in his hand all the checkbooks, and has opened a new account and is using it without being “accountable” and his only concern is the head of the resistance.
The intervention of Hezbollah in Syria had disastrous impacts on the Saudi Project therein, and Hezbollah in its intervention has caused the failure of the effort to overthrow the regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and this is at least what Bandar believes in. He told this to the Lebanese politician who visited him in Riyadh, adding that he will spare no effort to make Hezbollah regret “If it did not come out of Syria”. What “the honorable” Bandar can do (and Iraq is a model) is represented in what he had already equipped, arranged, and prepared for in issues relating to the requirements of the assumed process of punishment as he claims. Thus, he has entered into Lebanon all the necessary elements from the outside, and hired all the cells and groups that belong to “ally” operators loading them with all the finance and sabotage needs.
Bandar within a short period of time has been able to restore all the keys of “jihadist cells” from other regional parties (Qatar and Jordan), and has used a lot of them in a way that makes them look like separated unrelated movements and operations that have nothing in common neither goals nor motives. However, they were in true fact just a series of deceptive operations with tactical objectives, which aim primarily at stumbling the field of resistance militarily by occupying it on a wide geographical scope from the south (Abra) to Bekaa (Anjar and Hermel), and then in Beirut and the suburbs (the rockets and the explosives of Bir al-Abed and Ruwais).
The second goal against the field of resistance was its human tanks mainly, integrating with the element of geography. It was clear that the operation aims at damaging the resistance in issues relating to the area of its geographic presence, including the popular embraces, which are considered the more painful points that could be targeted in the solid body of resistance.
Yet, the Israeli consequent support was not absent at all, and perhaps one of the most important achievements of Al-Labbouna operation was the exposure of this synchronization and coherence in the Saudi-Israeli targeting of the resistance’s square. Al-Labbouna operation took place in between the two said bombings in terms of timing; the first bombing was in Bir al-Abed and the second was in Ruwais.
This project is not limited at all to the geographical limits of resistance, but it covers all the bombing possibilities in the north, in Bekaa, and in Beirut, including the probability of waging a “civil war”, and this has been echoed by more than one Lebanese political leaders to an extent that made some talk about “civil” and “military” divisions that will follow igniting the spark of the putative civil war. In recent times, conditions for some of the “retired” characters have been created to enable them to bear the responsibilities of tasks similar to the task of the “military governor” within emirates and cantons that do currently exist and do not need but only to raise the flag and to perform the anthem.
All these projects and plans are being monitored and noticed, and concern is not limited to the local devices and parties, but the return of regional and international intelligence activity has been noticed as well largely in Beirut. Active movements by security officials and operators have been monitored in Gulf and Arab States regarding the axis of the Syrian camps and refugees, but their results have been enclosed quickly, as a result of the widespread Palestinian rejection of any process of involvement. Yet, they failed again to collect the Syrians within a specific framework on the Lebanese soil herewith their deep-rooted Lebanese differences on the Syrian territories.
It seems that the resistance has prepared itself well and intensively for the possibility of engaging in a wide-range war on three fronts simultaneously and interdependently in terms of the ferocity and timing; in the south with the Israeli enemy, where it should be in Syria, and certainly internally in case some tried to implement bombing projects against it. In fact, this readiness, which has been “qualitatively” verified in Al-Labbouna and the operation of the famous ambush, has been confirmed as well through the hard work and the valiant effort that led to discovering quickly the networks of bombings and blasting, and was proven at the security level through the rapid spread and through covering large geographical areas that are complex in terms of demography and intersection without compromising the readiness of the “resistance work” and/or the required quality to support Syria when needed.
The recent indications of its readiness was represented in what has been said by someone regarding that the resistance, in addition to continuing the accumulation of specific and advanced training of the Mujahedeen in large numbers, is still taking care of manufacturing and developing its devices what means that none of its organs would be feeble because of its emerging unavailable status. It has been able in the recent period to develop a “typical” and “qualitative” missile in terms of the manufacturing method and in terms of using it against the target and after trying it the efficacy of the “idea” has been proven. Additionally, “technical experts” have been able after experiments to re-develop the explosive and destructive capacities what makes the use of this missile soon after be a big surprise that demonstrate high qualifications and skills that could hardly be found in a local military organization and even can barely be found in regional countries that have weight, aptitude and history in this field.