Protesters in Tokyo demand end to nuclear power

A protester holds an anti-nuclear power plant sign at a rally in Tokyo on Saturday. AP Photo/Itsuo Inouye


Protesters in Tokyo demand end to nuclear power

japan today


Thousands of people rallied in a Tokyo park Saturday, demanding an end to atomic power and vowing never to give up the fight, despite two years of little change after the nuclear disaster in northeastern Japan.

Gathering two days ahead of the second anniversary of the March 11 earthquake and tsunami that sent the Fukushima Daiichi plant into multiple meltdowns, demonstrators said they would never forget the nuclear catastrophe, and expressed alarm over the government’s eagerness to restart reactors.

“I can’t see what lies ahead. It looks hopeless, but if I give up now, it’s over,” said Akihiro Nakata, a 47-year-old owner of a construction company, who had a drum slung around his shoulder. “I’d rather die moving forward.”

Only two of Japan’s 50 working nuclear reactors have been put back online since the disaster, partly because of continuous protests like Saturday’s, the first time such demonstrations have popped up in this nation since the 1960s movement against the Vietnam War.

People have thronged Tokyo parks on national holidays, and have gathered outside the parliament building every Friday evening. The demonstrations have drawn people previously unseen at political rallies, such as commuter “salarymen” and housewives. Organizers said Saturday’s demonstration drew 13,000 people.

Two years after the disaster, 160,000 people have left their homes around the plant, entire sections of nearby communities are still ghost towns, and fears grow about cancer and other sicknesses the spewing radiation might bring.

Fukushima waste

Fukushima Waste waiting disposal.

But the new prime minister elected late last year, Shinzo Abe, hailing from a conservative party that fostered the pro-nuclear policies of modernizing Japan, wants to restart the reactors, and maybe even build new ones.

The protesters said they were shocked by how the government was ignoring them.

“I am going to fight against those who act as though Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Fukushima never happened,” Nobel Prize-winning writer Kenzaburo Oe told the crowd, referring to the atomic bombings preceding the end of World War II. “I am going to fight to prevent any more reactors from being restarted.”

The demonstrators applauded, waving signs and lanterns that read, “Let’s save the children” and “No nukes.” Some were handing out leaflets, pleading to save animals abandoned in the no-go zone.

Kazuko Nihei, 36, was selling trinkets and soap that mothers, like her, who had fled Fukushima had made, hoping to raise funds for children’s health check-ups and their new lives in Tokyo.

“When the government talks about recovery, they are talking about infrastructure. When we talk about recovery, we are talking about the future of our children,” she said.

Another big Tokyo rally was planned for Sunday. A concert Saturday evening featured Oscar and Grammy-winning musician Ryuichi Sakamoto, one of the most vocal opponents of nuclear power. Commemorative services will be held Monday throughout the nation to remember the nearly 19,000 people who died in the disaster.

Less under the spotlight Monday will be a class-action lawsuit being filed against the government and Tokyo Electric Power Co, the utility that operates Fukushima Daiichi, demanding all land, the natural environment and homes be restored to their state before March 11, 2011.

The lawsuit in Fukushima District Court is unusual in drawing people from all walks of life, including farmers, fishermen and housewives, because of the wording of the damage demand.

It has drawn 800 plaintiffs so far, a remarkable number in a conformist culture that frowns upon any challenge to the status quo, especially lawsuits. That number may grow as people join the lawsuit in coming months. A verdict is not expected for more than a year.

“We can’t believe the government is thinking about restarting the reactors after the horrendous damage and human pain the accident has caused,” Izutaro Managi, one of the lawyers, said by telephone. “It is tantamount to victimizing the victims one more time.”

Kazuko Ishige, a 66-year-old apartment manager who was at the rally with a friend from Fukushima, said she was sick of the government’s lies about the safety of nuclear plants.

“I am really angry,” she said. “I am going to have to keep at it until I die.”

Copyright 2013 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed.

Russian anti-drug police find radioactive drug lab

Russian anti-drug police find radioactive drug lab

Russian anti-drug police find radioactive drug lab

November 1, 2012 – 13:50 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Russian anti-drug police and the Federal Security Service (FSB) have raided a drug lab in Moscow that contained plutonium-contaminated soil, the Federal Drug Control Service (FSKN) said on Thursday, Nov 1.

“We have taken an underground amphetamine lab out of operation,” the FSKN said.

“During a search our special services found a small container which probably contains earth from Chernobyl, the radiation dosimeter readings were off the charts. Plutonium was also detected. Four sources of ionizing radiation were found in the car of one of those detained.” The criminals may have been part of a terrorist gang, the FSKN added.

The operation took place two weeks ago, but has only just been made public, the FSKN said, adding that staff from MosNPO Radon, a company that specializes in handling radioactive substances, were also involved, RIA Novosti reported.



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Russia to Resume Under-Critical Nuclear Testing

Russia to Resume Under-Critical Nuclear Tests on Novaya Zemlya

File:Ivan bomb.png wiki


Russia will resume non-nuclear explosion tests at the Matochkin Shar Range on the Novaya Zemlya islands, reports Jane’s referring to Russian state-led corporation Rosatom. Such tests are held to evaluate combat effectiveness of Russian nuclear weapons and maintain safety of its long-term storage. Tests of this kind do not transgress the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty signed by Russia in Sept 1996.

Non-nuclear explosion test also known as under-critical nuclear test is a special detonation of nuclear warheads with plutonium and uranium isotopes when nuclear energy does not release. During such experiments, a chemical explosive is detonated which blast wave envelopes samples of fissile materials having different storage period and nuclear charge fragments. Such tests make possible to study physical processes happening in nuclear charges at the instant of explosion.

Advantage of those tests is that there is neither environment contamination nor radioactive releases. Experts obtain an opportunity to determine remaining storage life of nuclear warheads and verify their reliability. The Matochkin Shar range is the most appropriate site for such tests as it is located in strait at the depth of 12 meters, has anchoring berths and abrupt coast around. In the US, analogous tests are held under the Pollux program at Nevada nuclear range.

Nuclear test range on the Novaya Zemlya islands also known as “Object 700″ was established in 1954. It comprises three assets for surface, subsurface, submarine, and air nuclear tests: Chyornaya Guba, Matochkin Shar, and D-P. The latest test with nuclear energy release took place at the range in 1990. In total, 130 nuclear explosions have been performed at the Novaya Zemlya test range.

Media Misses Horrific Nature of Consequences of Regional War In the Middle East

Op-Ed: Arab media views on war with Iran make WW3 sound very ordinary

Sydney- Middle Eastern perceptions of the threat of a war with Iran and those of the West are very different. Exactly how different can be seen in the speculation is appearing online in the region regarding the ramifications of a US/Iran war.

Al Jazeerabelieves that a war with Iran would escalate into a regional war with Iranian “proxies” striking at the US and predicts a war which would make the last decade look “tame by comparison”. This alludes to the Taliban style-asymmetrical warfare pattern and methods similar to the insurgency in Iraq.

None of this is to suggest that the United States would not “win” a war with Iran, but given the incredibly painful costs of Iraq and Afghanistan; wars fought against weak, poorly organised enemies lacking broad influence, politicians campaigning for war with Iran are leading the American people into a battle which will be guaranteed to make the past decade of fighting look tame in comparison.

A recent study has shown that an initial US aerial assault on Iran would require hundreds of planes, ships and missiles in order to be completed; a military undertaking itself unprecedented since the first Gulf War and representative of only the first phase of what would likely be a long drawn-out war of attrition.

For a country already nursing the wounds from the casualties of far less intense conflicts and still reeling from their economic costs, the sheer battle fatigue inherent in a large-scale war with Iran would stand to greatly exacerbate these issues.

Gulf feels that any attack on Iran would simply reinforce the hardline anti-Western policies of the Iranian regime:

The expectation is that the Iranian regime would retaliate — probably by seeking to block oil shipments through the Gulf, with rocket attacks on Israel by Hezbollah, and, quite possibly, with a wider campaign of terrorism. It would also throw its weight behind the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Such predictions, however, gloss over the likely impact within Iran. No one knows for sure, but diplomats privately suggest three probabilities. The first is that bombing would solidify the Iranian leadership, weaken moderate politicians and disarm dissidents. The mullahs would claim they had been right all along about the US.

There in a few paragraphs you have a condensed version of the views in circulation around the Middle East at the moment.

The overall view of the result of an attack on Iran, by Israel with or without or the US:

1. Iran could use its terror networks around the world to attack Israel, the US and its allies.

2. An Iraq-style invasion would be a massive burden for the US.

3. The US doesn’t want another war.

4. The US can’t win a war against Iran by those means.

5. There would be a massive regional conflict, uniting Moslems against the US and Israel.

6. Iran could block the Straits of Hormuz, sending oil prices skyrocketing.

7. Iran may have been passing on “dirty bomb” nuke technology to proxies.

8. Iran has previously threatened strikes on the US in the event of a conflict.

9. The US can’t win a guerrilla-style Vietnam or Afghanistan type of war.

Underselling World War 3

There you also have the seeds of World War 3. These theories work on the basis of a traditional regional limited war. You can almost hear the geniuses talking about atomic suicide bombers. They assume that the same tactics which have dragged out conflicts would be too much for the American public or politicians to stomach.

Unfortunately, this is a rather complacent viewpoint. It really does sound like “business as usual”. The world has changed since 2001. The probability is that these tactics would be more than they’d be prepared to tolerate. The mindset of the world has changed. The only real “success” of Al Qaeda in its September 11 attack was to make the rest of the world perceive radical Islam as a threat. Iran’s involvement in supporting various groups in the region and its record of supporting terrorist groups around the world makes it a credibly dangerous threat.

That credibility is likely to become an own goal. Iran, in short, has become the best possible excuse for anti-Islamist hardliners to make political capital. Any attack by Iranian or Islamic groups in support of Iran in the case of a conflict would be a cause for rabble-rousing.

Worse, it would be an excuse for much more drastic types of warfare. The lessons of Afghanistan don’t quite apply in the case of a war against a nation. An enemy nation is a legitimate target. The US could simply stand off and fire its weapons, without invading, and destroy Iran. There would be no need to invade.

(Arguably, that’s exactly what the US should have done in Iraq. Simply destroying the regime’s military support, destroying the nuclear facilities beyond recovery and letting the locals argue it out among themselves would suffice. It’s a lot cheaper, too. It’s more than likely that the US would look for a simpler and less expensive option in any future Middle East war.)

Then there’s the capacity of Iran to hit targets in the West and the US. Another potential own goal, and a big one. Escalation by attacks on the West could backfire, badly. The use of “dirty bombs” or small nukes (there are quite a few ex-Soviet small “suitcase bombs” in circulation) could be a legitimate reason for the use of heavy nukes against Iran. Terror strikes in general could cause civil reprisals, as 9/11 did in the US. A dirty bomb or small nuke strike on Israel would inevitably get instant, massive retaliation.

There are no guarantees of a mere war of attrition under these circumstances. Nor is there much to be gained for the people in the region. Food prices would go up enormously as foreign imports dried up. Trade would become impossible. The black market, already thriving in Iran, would do very nicely, but the rich nations in the Gulf and elsewhere would get an entirely negative effect.

The Middle East, without trade, would become a human desert. The huge populations in this region would be at risk from multiple shortages. Iran’s very large population, without infrastructure, would be in a terrible position.

Fighting people isn’t the same thing as fighting politicians and lawyers

There’s another factor- People. In the past, guerrillas have fought politicians trying to stay in power and armies playing by rules. In a real war, those niceties aren’t in play. In 1945, massive attacks on civilian targets like Dresden, Tokyo and Eastern Europe were commonplace. The “civilized” allies weren’t very civilized at all. The hatred generated by years of war was literally translated into firestorms and massive attacks on cities.

The Middle East has never seen a war with whole countries literally obliterated from the face of the Earth. From Berlin to Moscow was one big graveyard of wrecked cities and millions of dead. About 24 million people died. People were killed simply for being German or Russian or just being in the wrong place. There were no laws in force at the time of the actual fighting. In one attack, the US Air Force burned Tokyo to the ground and killed about 100,000 people in a fire bombing raid.

That’s what a real war is like. Fighting politicians and lawyers isn’t the same thing as fighting people. The guerrilla methods of the past will be truly obsolete weapons if the sleeping but very ugly and merciless monster of vengeful human hatred is aroused. World War 3, in fact, won’t be fought so much with weapons, but with mindsets.

All involved are advised not to push those buttons. You can’t un-push them afterwards.

This opinion article was written by an independent writer. The opinions and views expressed herein are those of the author and are not necessarily intended to reflect those of

At the End of Syrian Road


A dark, gruesome, but wholly true depiction of the threat of thermonuclear war, the consequences, and Obama’s deployment of a major portion of the U.S. thermonuclear capabilities in multiple theaters threatening both Russia and China.

Bibliography: UNSURVIVABLE
September 2, 2012 • 2:41PM

1. Aldridge, Robert C., First strike!: The Penatagon’s strategy for nuclear war, South End Press: 1983.

2. Chinworth, William C., and J.M. Crochet: “The Future of the Ohio Class Submarine.” Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College: March 15, 2006.

3. Claremont Institute,; “The Stages of a Ballistic Missile’s Flight.” Claremont Institute, Claremont, California: Copyright: 2012.

4. Executive Intelligence Review Editors and Staff, Global Showdown Special Report, EIR Publications: June 2012.

5. Hersey, John, “Hiroshima.” The New Yorker: August 31, 1946

6. LaRouche, Lyndon H., “Edward Teller was right at Erice: The Threat Against Mankind,” Executive Intelligence Review, Vol. 39, No.34, August 31, 2012.

7. Manyin, Mark E.; Daggett, Stephen; Dolven, Ben; Lawrence, Susan V.; Martin, Michael F.; O’Rourke, Ronald, “Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ Toward Asia,” Congressional Research Service: March 28, 2012.

8. Newman, W.S., and Stipcich, S., International Seminar on Nuclear War, 3rd Session: The Technical Basis for Peace, Erice, Italy August 19-24, 1983. World Scientific Publishing Co: 1992.

9. Robock, A.; Oman, L.; Stenchikov, G.L.; Toon, O.B.; Bardeen, C.; and Turco, R.P., “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts”, Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics: April 19, 2007.

10. Robock, A.; Oman, L.; and Stenchikov, G.L., “Nuclear Winter Revisited with a Modern Climate Model and Current Nuclear Arsenals: Still Catastrophic Consequences” Journal of Geophysical Research, Vol. 112: 2007.

11. Rose, Frank A., “Missile Defense and European Security.” Speech at the 8th International Conference on Missile Defense. Paris, France: July 3, 2012.

State Dept. Formulates Guidelines for Avoiding Accidental Nuclear War In Central Asian Contest with Russia

[Many thanks to the folks at Larouche-PAC for pointing-out the following publication from our beloved State Dept.  The assembled American experts have assessed our current path and sought to define rules of engagement that would prevent a miscalculation by the Imperial planners, which would accidentally unleash thermonuclear war with Russia.  This topic is urgently relevant to the currently unfolding American co-opting of the Uzbek and Tajik governments, as well as the further division of Kyrgyzstan between East and West.

The solution proposed by these “genius” planners is to hopelessly intertwine the US and Russia, through cooperation on issues of economic trade and drug control in Central Asia ( Beneficial interdependence ), so that neither side would contemplate finding answers in a nuclear exchange.]

“Along these lines, Gen (ret.) James Cartwright has suggested the concept of ‘entanglement’ as having beneficial aspects.” 


Report on

Mutual Assured Stability: Essential Components and Near Term Actions


A definition for the desired end state was developed:

A relationship among nations and international organizations (such as the European Union) in which nuclear weapons are no longer a central feature for their security, deterrence based on nuclear destruction is no longer necessary, and the likelihood of nuclear war is treated as remote because their relationship is free of major, core security issues such as ideological, territorial, or natural resource competition issues, and the benefits from peaceful integration in economic, political, and diplomatic spheres provide a counterbalance to the perceived advantages of nuclear conflict.


Beneficial interdependence: Interdependence in humanitarian and economic, as well as national security realms contributes to the benefits of mutual assured stability. Along these lines, Gen (ret.) James Cartwright has suggested the concept of “entanglement” as having beneficial aspects. Candidate actions are:

o Increase economic interdependence and investment. Russia agrees to measures of transparency on trade and investment from abroad (reciprocal action); specific actions include:
–Ending Jackson-Vanik restrictions;
–Finalizing WTO membership;
o Extend collaboration with Russia to stop drug trafficking from and through Afghanistan; develop collaboration on promotion of healthy lifestyles;
o Develop further collaborations with Russia on infectious disease (e.g. TB) preventive health promotion;
o Establish cooperation in science & technology (S&T) for safe, secure oil and gas transport, oil and gas exploration, and recovery; and
o Establish science and technology (S&T) cooperation in nanotechnology, pharmaceutical research, and other areas of common interest.


Appendix A – Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation 1. Conduct strategic stability talks with Russia to address matters of force structure, posture, and doctrine to avoid strategic surprise or misunderstanding.
Recommendation 2. Conduct talks with Russia to develop a common understanding of the essential components necessary for mutual assured stability, and a plan for building these components and achieving this new relationship.
Recommendation 3. Conduct a joint U.S.-Russia review of the requirements for national and multinational missile defense in the coming years as missile technology continues to spread, with the goal of achieving a shared understanding of each nation’s requirements for effective missile defense.
Recommendation 4. Change U.S. doctrine and posture away from defining our nuclear posture based on perception of Russia as the primary threat, toward a doctrine of general deterrence, a posture in which attacks from any direction are discouraged without singling out a particular adversary or enemy (reciprocal action required).
Recommendation 5. Continue the Nuclear Security Summit process, with its focus on securing nuclear materials and preventing nuclear smuggling.
Recommendation 6. Conduct talks with Russia for developing a mutual understanding of each other’s motivation for the possession of nuclear weapons, including tactical and hedge/reserve weapons; engage Russia via the NATO-Russia Council, particularly in dialogue on the motivations for tactical nuclear forces.
Recommendation 7. Work together with Russia on standardization of classification guidelines for nuclear-related information (to avoid conflict regarding sharing of data because of differences between U.S. and Russian classification guidelines).
A-2. Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation 8. Work jointly on the definition of a “gold standard” in technologies and best practices for nuclear materiel security, based on CTR work; the creation of a process for continuous evolution of the standard based on changes in threat, technology improvement, and changes in other circumstances; and the development of associated transparency measures for mutual assurance.
Recommendation 9. Conduct talks to define appropriate and acceptable measures useful to influence other nations toward responsible nuclear materiel security, using an appropriately tailored standard.
Recommendation 10. Develop agreements on sharing early warning data with Russia and using satellites to jointly monitor ballistic missile launches (reciprocal action required).
Recommendation 11. Develop agreement with Russia to give five-year advance notice on deployment of new nuclear systems (reciprocal action required).
Recommendation 12. Declare fissile material stocks to each other.
Recommendation 13. Develop a U.S.-Russia understanding on how each would act or not act if a nuclear weapon was used anywhere else in the world.
Recommendation 14. Increase U.S.-Russia economic interdependence and investment, including ending Jackson-Vanik restrictions; develop agreement with Russia for greater transparency on trade and investment from abroad (reciprocal action required).
Recommendation 15. Extend collaboration with Russia to stop drug trafficking from and through Afghanistan; develop collaboration on promotion of healthy lifestyles.
Recommendation 16. Develop further collaborations with Russia on infectious disease (e.g. TB) preventive health promotion.
A-3. Summary of Recommendations
Recommendation 17. Establish cooperation with Russia in science & technology (S&T) for safe, secure oil and gas transport, oil and gas exploration, and recovery.
Recommendation 18. Establish S&T cooperation with Russia in nanotechnology, pharmaceutical research, and other areas of common interest.