Threat of Islamic extremism in Central Asia is often exaggerated, says analyst

Threat of Islamic extremism in Central Asia is often exaggerated, says analyst

News analysis by Martin Sieff

Islamic extremism is rarely the root of trouble in Central Asia

WASHINGTON, DC – Tuesday, September 28, 2010 – The following is the third and final piece in our series examining religion in Central Asia.

The role of extreme or revolutionary Islamic movements in Central Asian affairs is usually exaggerated  by Western pundits.  In fact, the most serious internal threats to peace, stability and security in Central Asian nations have usually had other causes that are directly rooted in economic or clan conflicts.

Extreme Islamist movements have tried, so far with a remarkable lack of success, to take advantage of these other causes. And whenever conditions of economic hardship or conventional political conflict have been lacking, extreme Islamism has been able to make no progress at all.

Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have been rocked by serious internal violence in recent years. In each case, there have been widespread suspicions and accusations that extreme Islamist movements instigated the violence, but on closer investigation, their role was found to be peripheral.

There is no indication that extreme Islamist movements, most notably Hizb ut-Tahrir, were responsible for wave of anti-Uzbek rioting in the southern Kyrgyzstan cities of Osh and Jalalabad from June 11 to June 14 this year. At least 370 people were killed in the clashes and the full death toll may have been as high as 3,000. Some 400,0000 people, most of them ethnic Uzbeks, fled their homes, of whom 100,000 temporarily found refuge in neighboring Uzbekistan.

Kyrgyz President Roza Otunbayeva said shortly after the clashes that her government had evidence that the clan and supporters of ousted Kyrygz President Kurmanbek Bakiev instigated the riots on the night of June 10-11. While evidence is still patchy, this still seems to be the most likely explanation for how the violence there began. Bakiev and his supporters were certainly capable of courting more radical Islamist elements. But no evidence has emerged that hard-line Islamist groups planned the violence or supplied weapons before or during the riots.

In fact, the timing of the violence supports the assessment that President Otunbayeva made publicly at the time: She said her government had evidence that the Bakiev clan specifically wanted to stir up riots or inter-communal violence in early June to discredit the planned June 27 referendum that was to be held on a new and more democratic constitution for the landlocked and resource-poor nation.

In fact, the referendum went ahead and the new constitution was approved with a 90 percent approval rate and a 70 percent turnout of eligible voters.

Similarly, when the Uzbek city of Andijan was rocked by violent protests in 2005, there were widespread accusations and suspicions that Hizb ut-Tahrir was behind it. Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders fiercely rejected the claim and the pattern of evidence supports their contention.

Andijan in Uzbekistan in 2005, like Osh and Jalalabad in Kyrgyzstan in June this year, was an economically impoverished city  Osh and Jalalabad had been destabilized earlier this year by the popular revolution that overthrew President Bakiev in the Kyrgyz capital Bishkek on April 7. Similarly, Andijan was affected in 2005 by the overthrow of Bakiev’s predecessor, President Askar Akayev, in Kyrgyzstan.

The Uzbek government of tough, experienced old President Islam Karimov certainly acted at the time as if the protests in Andijan were motivated by democratic, U.S.-backed forces rather than by Islamist ones. Karimov lost no time in expelling the U.S, Air Force from its use of the Karshi-Khanabad, or “K-2,” air base which was being used to fly supplies to U.S. and NATO forces fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Again, the pattern of developments was that the protests were caused, not by pro-Islamist movements and sentiments, but by pro-Western, pro-democratic ones. At least 600 to 700 people were killed when the Uzbek security forces repressed the riots. An Uzbek security forces defector some years later claimed the real death toll was more than double that – around 1,500.

The violence currently shaking Tajikistan appears to be far more Islamist in nature than either of the previous two cases. But here too, the real picture is more complex.

As many as 100,000 people were killed and 1.2 million made homeless in a terrible civil war in Tajikistan from 1992 to 1997, in which Russian military forces of insignificant numbers supported the established government of President Emomali Rahmon, who remains in power to this day. Tajikistan has a population of only 7.3 million.

But the same local, economic and tribal forces that operated in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan also have been operating in Tajikistan.  Both the 1992 civil war and the new outbreak of violence that has erupted there over the past month took place in the same mountainous areas around the Rasht Valley area. Tajikistan was torn apart by feuds and vendettas between rival clans. Islamist movements and teachings certainly played a role, but only because the political and tribal fault lines were there in the first place.

Kazakhstan too has a large degree of clan or tribal identity shaping its domestic politics. But the general standard of living and longer-term economic prospects under President Nursultan Nazarbayev remain high. And the Kazakh clans, unlike the Tajik ones in particular, have a long and successful tradition of mediating their rivalries and interests peacefully and through negotiation and compromise.

Extreme Islamist violence should therefore be seen not as a major driving force or independent threat to the stability and survival of the governments of Central Asia. Instead, it seems to be a symptom that appears when economic policy fails and when the local political processes fail to produce peaceful means to mediate and resolve conflicts and grievances.

This relatively optimistic picture could certainly change in the future, particularly in Tajikistan. But it has held true for almost 20 years since the nations of the region became independent, and in general they have prospered and survived far better than most Western pundits thought they would.

14 Islamist Militants Killed In Russia’s Dagestan

14 Islamist Militants Killed In Russia’s Dagestan

(RTTNews) – Police have killed 14 Islamist militants in Russia’s troubled North Caucasus region of Dagestan, local media reported quoting the National Anti-terrorist Committee.

Russia’s anti-terrorist special forces launched separate special operations on Wednesday morning on the outskirts of the cities of Makhachkala and Kaspiysk.

Tipped by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), its forces surrounded the militants in their hideouts, and killed 14 of them in hours long firefight. Regional and federal police forces also supported the FSB troops in the operation.

The national anti-terrorist agency vowed to intensify its operations targeting the insurgents in the restive North Caucasus region.

A sharp upswing in lawlessness and separatist violence in Muslim-dominated autonomous Republics in the North Caucasus – Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia – is undermining Kremlin’s control of its southern flank.

Several people, including ministers and top government officials, were killed in attacks by armed militants in recent years.

by RTT Staff Writer

For comments and feedback: contact

Chechen/Dagestan Operations Follow Snatch and Kill Policies Used In Balochistan

Seven persons were kidnapped in a special operation in Chechnya, rights defenders say

Sep 28 2010, 22:00

The statement of the HRC “Memorial” says that on September 24, 2010, agents of local law enforcement bodies kidnapped seven residents of Davydenko village, Achkhoi-Martan District of Chechnya.

According to eyewitnesses, on September 24, at about 5:00 a.m. over 100 employees of law enforcement bodies in 20 cars drove into Davydenko and split into several groups. Almost simultaneously they kidnapped five persons: Rasul Khalimovich Madaev, born in 1985, Isa Saidtselimovich Khabaev, born in 1986, his brother Moussa Saidtselimovich Khabaev, born in 1992, Rakhman Imranovich Maltsagov, born in 1985, and Mahmoud Rashidovich Salikhov, born in 1980 (invalid from childhood).

According to the “Memorial“, everywhere power agents acted under the same scenario – they broke into the house, and without presenting themselves took the man away. Relatives were not informed about where the detained person would be delivered, but they were promised that he would be released after checking documents or asked a few questions.

On September 24, at 6:00 p.m. power agents released Madaev, Moussa Khabaev, Salikhov and Rakhman Maltsagov. At 9:00 p.m. they released Aslan Khabaev and Abdullah Maltsagov. Adam Yusupov and Isa Khabaev were also kept at the Achkhoi-Martan ROVD, but they were not released. Isa Khbaev’s sister could see him; according to her story, he was in terrible condition: with signs of torture on his body.

On September 25, at about 9:00 p.m., power agents again took away Rasul Madaev and Abdullah Maltsagov.

In the morning on September 26, 2010, relatives of the kidnapped persons gathered about the Achkhoi-Martan ROVD. They stood there for the whole day, but nobody from the ROVD bosses went out to talk to them. Their lawyer was not let in.

On the same day, relatives of the detainees addressed, with the help of the employee of the HRC “Memorial“, the Investigatory Department (ID) for Chechnya of the Investigatory Committee at the Prosecutors Office (ICPO) of the Russian Federation, the Achkhoi-Martan Inter-District Investigatory Division of the ID for Chechnya of the ICPO, the prosecutor’s office of the Achkhoi-Martan District and the Prosecutor’s Office of the Chechen Republic. They filed applications on illegal actions of the Achkhoi-Martan ROVD to all these instances.

They were told at the Inter-District Investigatory Division that the cases of Yusupov and Khabaev had arrived to them. The men were charged under Article 208 (organization of an illegal armed formation or participation in it) and Article 317 (encroachment on the life of a law enforcer) of the Criminal Code. Parents of all the detainees have hired advocates. As of September 27, the advocate was admitted only to Adam Yusupov. On that very day relatives were admitted to see Maltsagov and Madaev.

The Taliban is NOT an expression of Pushtun Nationalism

The Taliban is NOT an expression of Pushtun Nationalism

– By Qudsia Siddiqee

One of the biggest lies that have been spun by our establishment, which is the arbiter of our national narrative, is that the Taliban are an expression of “Pushtun Nationalism”.  This lie has been repeated ad infinitum by reactionary politicians and Taliban apologists like Imran Khan and  biased academics like Tariq Ali and Rasul Baksh Rais.

The rich and diverse culture of the Pushtuns extends back to several millennia.  The cultural and anthropological influence of the Pushtuns extends from Iran to Bangladesh and even a cultural metropolis like Calcutta can boast of hosting Pushtuns and their way of life.  From Rehman Baba to Khushal Khan Khattak, poetry and moderate religious views have been a cornerstone of Pushtunwali.  The land of the Pushtuns is the land of Lord Gautum Buddha.  Even in Bollywood, Dilip Kumar and Raj Kapoor are the sons of Peshawar and Shahrukh Khan is atleast a nephew of the same city.

In the socio-political domain, Pushtuns have proven their valour on the battle field and have also shown the rest of South Asia that when it comes to non-violent resistance, the Pushtuns are second to none.  Today, nothing comes closer to describing the political beliefs of Pushtuns than the political ideology of literacy and non-violence of the Frontier Gandhi, the late Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, also known as Bacha Khan. Electorally, the Pushtuns on both sides of the Durand Line have always voted for secular, nationalist, center-left parties like the ANP in Pakistan.  Even the Pushtun vote for JUI is not predicated on Islamism but on a secular nationalism.  In this regard, in the seventies, the JUI was ostrasiced by Islamofascist parties like Jamaat Islami and the leadership of JUI under Mufti Mahmood was tagged as socialist deviants!

Then why is it that today, the establishment in Pakistan always views the Pushtuns and Taliban as two interchangeable entities?  This is because for the establishment, the Pushtun, like the rest of the country, simply serves as a laboratory for experimenting with violent Salafism in order to perpetuate an Oligarchic hold on power.  Since the time of Zia, the establishment has used State machinery to infuse the body politic with a virulent ideology that deculturalizes them and erodes an individual’s multiples identities of faith, ethnicity and regional influences.  In this regard, the establishment wants to squash the prospects of a pluralistic society and violently enforce a harsh, monolithic and artificial narrative whose genesis is based on the warped neurosis of Partition. It is the reaction of the dominant groups in Pakistan, the Punjabis and migrants, to the horrors of partition that shapes the national ideology of Pakistan: a “binery” vision that sees Pakistan as the “Un-India” and as a catidal of Islam where the country exists to serve the Jihadi adventures of assorted military dictators!

It is this false narrative which is the dominant discourse.  Therefore, the aspirations of ethnic nationalist minorities like the Sindhis, Balochis, Seriakis and Pushtuns and religious and sectarian minorities like the Brehlvis, Shias and Hindus are an anathema to this supremacist narrative that subsequently views these minorities as lesser Pakistanis!

Today, the establishment prefers to falsely project the Taliban as Pushtun militancy.  The fact that the secular and moderate Pushtun leadership and intelligentsia have taken a brave stance AGAINST the Taliban exposes this false narrative.  This exposure is dangerous on different levels.  The fact that the Pushtuns are a pacifist group that seeks to claim a genuine, proportional and fair stake in the country via a democratic setup is a big blow to those who wish to choke democracy and maintain an autocratic hold on power.

Similarly, the Taliban is a multi-ethnic force which is supported by extremist elements from not just Pakistan but violent Salafist mercenaries from all over the globe. From the East, the Uighirs are a substantial part of this force. It includes Tajiks and Uzbeks from Central Asia and Arabs from all over the Gulf. It even includes the odd Northern European and Bangladeshi.  In Pakistan, volunteers from violent Wahabi sectarian organizations are an equal, if not a greater part of the Taliban.  These sectarian organizations have their main headquarters in Punjab and their regional headquarters in Karachi, primarily in areas that are dominated by the ethno-mafiasos, the MQM.  Much of the financing for these Jihadi sectarian affiliates of the Taliban comes from the prosperous and recently radicalized Memon and Dehliwalla business communities.

These facts again puncture the dominant narrative that posits the Pushtuns as synonymous with the Taliban. It also dents the image of the MQM which wants to portray itself as a secular force for achieving its own dubious aims.  Internationally, because its leader chooses to reside in another country, and locally, so that it can continue to target the Pushtuns and not give them any stake in Karachi, where the latter are nearly a third of the population today.

In Pakistan, the political forces like the PPP and ANP that threaten the establishment are simply not tolerated. The PPP has been hounded by the press and by an Islamist judiciary.  Both parties have had their leaders and activists attacked and killed by the Taliban.  Today, it is not ANP which is taking out a rally for the Taliban heroine Aafia Siddiqui; that honour ironically rests with the MQM which claims to be anti-Taliban but dances to the whims of a Pro-Taliban military establishment.

The establishment cannot tolerate anything that exposes a carefully crafted narrative that aims to continuously fool people, both locally and internationally.  The Pushtuns have bravely opposed, not supported, the Taliban and have lost several of their elected leaders and representatives.  Their tribal leaders have been massacred by the Taliban after they were promised support by the establishment and then abandoned to the Taliban militias.  The Pushtuns, many of whom are under virtual siege by the Taliban/Al Qaeeda, welcome the drone attacks that have killed important Jihadi establishment assets.  Today, the worst enemy of the Taliban is the Pushtun who exposes them and the worse enemy of the Pushtuns is the Taliban who cannot bear to see them live and prosper.

Source: Pakteahouse

A Decision on Pakistan’s Future Has Been Made In Washington

[Woodward’s book highlights the urgency of the problem which Pakistan now faces. Like it or not, Pakistan’s place in America’s plans has changed because of perceived support to the Taliban and intransigence in solving the problem. Obama has obviously made a decision about the matter and the recent cross-border attack is an early indication of this. The Pakistani people understand the nature of the problem and helping them correct what they see should be the American motivation–but it’s not. This is still all about the pipeline wars.

I have been warning of an impending “Special Forces war” coming to Pakistan in the near future, for a long time. I don’t want to say, “I told you so,” but to motivate Pakistanis to become a vocal voice in their government’s affairs. This is the only chance you have to alter the course of events by opposing the violence that is in your immediate future. Stand together to change Pakistan’s place in the terror war. You might look to the antiwar policies being promoted by Turkmenistan to see a possible change of direction.]

‘We need to make clear . . . the cancer is in Pakistan’ -By Bob Woodward

President Obama dispatched his national security adviser, retired Marine Gen. James L. Jones, and CIA Director Leon Panetta to Pakistan for a series of urgent, secret meetings on May 19, 2010.

Less than three weeks earlier, a 30-year-old U.S. citizen born in Pakistan had tried to blow up an SUV in New York City’s Times Square. The crude bomb – which a Pakistan-based terrorist group had taught him to make – smoked but did not explode. Only luck had prevented a catastrophe.

“We’re living on borrowed time,” Jones told Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari at the first meeting in Islamabad. “We consider the Times Square attempt a successful plot because neither the American nor the Pakistani intelligence agencies could intercept or stop it.”

Jones thought that Pakistan – a U.S. ally with an a la carte approach of going after some terrorist groups and supporting others – was playing Russian roulette. The chamber had turned out to be empty the past several times, but Jones thought it was only a matter of time before there was a round in it.

Fears about Pakistan had been driving President Obama’s national security team for more than a year. Obama had said toward the start of his fall 2009 Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review that the more pressing U.S. interests were really in Pakistan, a nuclear power with a fragile civilian government, a dominant military and an intelligence service that sponsored terrorist groups.

Not only did al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban operate from safe havens within Pakistan, but – as U.S. intelligence officials had repeatedly warned Obama – terrorist groups were recruiting Westerners whose passports would allow them to move freely in Europe and North America.

Safe havens would no longer be tolerated, Obama had decided. “We need to make clear to people that the cancer is in Pakistan,” he declared during an Oval Office meeting on Nov. 25, 2009, near the end of the strategy review. The reason to create a secure, self-governing Afghanistan, he said, was “so the cancer doesn’t spread there.”

Jones and Panetta had gone to Pakistan to tell Zardari that Obama wanted four things to help prevent a terrorist attack on U.S. soil: full intelligence sharing, more reliable cooperation on counterterrorism, faster approval of visas for U.S. personnel traveling to Pakistan and, despite past refusals, access to airline passenger data.

If, God forbid, the SUV had blown up in Times Square, Jones told Zardari, we wouldn’t be having this conversation. Should a future attempt be successful, Obama would be forced to do things that Pakistan would not like. “No one will be able to stop the response and consequences,” the security adviser said. “This is not a threat, just a statement of political fact.”

Jones did not give specifics about what he meant. The Obama administration had a “retribution” plan, one of the most sensitive and secretive of all military contingencies. The plan called for bombing about 150 identified terrorist camps in a brutal, punishing attack inside Pakistan.

Wait a second, Zardari responded. If we have a strategic partnership, why in the face of a crisis like the one you’re describing would we not draw closer together rather than have this divide us?

Zardari believed that he had already done a great deal to accommodate his strategic partner, at some political risk. He had allowed CIA drones to strike al-Qaeda and other terrorist camps in parts of Pakistan, prompting a public outcry about violations of Pakistani sovereignty. He had told CIA officials privately in late 2008 that any innocent deaths from the strikes were the cost of doing business against senior al-Qaeda leaders. “Kill the seniors,” Zardari had said. “Collateral damage worries you Americans. It does not worry me.”

“You can do something that costs you no money,” Jones said. “It may be politically difficult, but it’s the right thing to do if you really have the future of your country in mind. And that is to reject all forms of terrorism as a viable instrument of national policy inside your borders.”

“We rejected it,” Zardari responded.

Jones and Panetta had heard such declarations before. But whatever Pakistan was doing with the many terrorist groups operating inside its borders, it wasn’t good or effective enough. For the past year, that country’s main priority was taking on its homegrown branch of the Taliban, a network known as Tehrik-e-Taliban, or TTP.

Panetta pulled out a “link chart,” developed from FBI interviews and other intelligence, that showed how TTP had assisted the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad.

“Look, this is it,” Panetta told Zardari. “This is the network. Leads back here.” He traced it out with his finger. “And we’re continuing to pick up intelligence streams that indicate TTP is going to conduct other attacks in the United States.”

This was a matter of solid intelligence, Panetta said, not speculation.

Jones and Panetta then turned to the disturbing intelligence about Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the group behind the horrific 2008 Mumbai attacks that had killed 175, including six Americans.

Pakistani authorities are holding the commander of the Mumbai attacks, Jones said, but he is not being adequately interrogated and “he continues to direct LeT operations from his detention center.” Intelligence shows that Lashkar-e-Taiba is threatening attacks in the United States and that the possibility “is rising each day.”

Zardari didn’t seem to get it.

“Mr. President,” said Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi, who was also at the meeting, “This is what they are saying. . . . They’re saying that if, in fact, there is a successful attack in the United States, they will take steps to deal with that here, and that we have a responsibility to now cooperate with the United States.”

“If something like that happens,” Zardari said defensively, “it doesn’t mean that somehow we’re suddenly bad people or something. We’re still partners.”

Afterward, the Americans met privately with Gen. Ashfaq Kayani, chief of the Pakistani army and the most powerful figure in the country.

Although Kayani had graduated from the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., he was a product of the Pakistani military system – nearly 40 years of staring east to the threat posed by India, its adversary in several wars since both countries were established in 1947.

This was part of a Pakistani officer’s DNA. It was hard, perhaps impossible, for a Pakistani general to put down his binoculars, turn his head over his shoulder and look west to Afghanistan.

Jones told Kayani that the clock was starting now on Obama’s four requests. Obama wanted a progress report in 30 days, Jones said.

Kayani would not budge much. He had other concerns. “I’ll be the first to admit, I’m India-centric,” he said.

Panetta laid out a series of additional requests for CIA operations. Obama had approved these operations during an October 2009 session of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review.

The CIA director had come to believe that the Predator and other unmanned aerial vehicles were the most precise weapons in the history of warfare. He wanted to use them more often.

Pakistan allowed Predator drone flights in specified geographic areas called “boxes.” Because the Pakistanis had massive numbers of ground troops in the south, they would not allow a box in that area.

“We need to have that box,” Panetta said. “We need to be able to conduct our operations.”

Kayani said he would see that they had some access.

The United States needed some kind of ground forces to eliminate the safe havens, Panetta concluded. The CIA had its own forces, a 3,000-man secret army of Afghans known as Counterterrorism Pursuit Teams. Some of these pursuit teams were now conducting cross-border operations in Pakistan.

“We can’t do this without some boots on the ground,” Panetta said. “They could be Pakistani boots or they can be our boots, but we got to have some boots on the ground.”

Army Lt. Gen. Douglas E. Lute, the National Security Council coordinator for Afghanistan and Pakistan, also traveled with Jones and Panetta to Pakistan. He supervised the writing of a three-page trip report to the president that Jones signed.

It contained a pessimistic summary, noting first the gap between the civilian and military authority in Pakistan. The United States was getting nowhere fast with these guys. They were talking with Zardari, who could deliver nothing. Kayani had the power to deliver, but he refused to do much. Nobody could tell him otherwise. The bottom line was depressing: This had been a charade.

Jones said he was once again alarmed that success in Afghanistan was tied to what the Pakistanis would or would not do. As he saw it, the United States could not “win” in Afghanistan as long as the Pakistani safe havens remained. It was a “cancer” on the plan the president had announced at the end of 2009.

Second, the report said the Pakistanis did not have the same sense of urgency as the Americans. There were regular terrorist strikes in Pakistan, so they could not understand the traumatic impact of a single, small attack on the U.S. homeland.

The Pakistanis were making another mistake by applying that same logic to India, in Jones’s view. If Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group behind the Mumbai attacks, struck there again, India would not be able to show the kind of restraint that it had then. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, who had barely survived Mumbai politically, would have to respond.

The options for Obama would be significantly narrowed in the aftermath of an attack originating out of Pakistan. Before such an attack, however, he had more options, especially if Pakistan made good on his four requests.

After the Jones-Panetta trip, Pakistan’s cooperation on visa requests did improve. When I interviewed Obama two months after the failed Times Square bombing, he highlighted Pakistan’s recent counterterrorism efforts. “They also ramped up their cooperation in a way that over the last 18 months has hunkered down al-Qaeda in a way that is significant,” he said.

“But still not enough,” I interjected.

“Well, exactly,” Obama said.

Joshua Boak and Evelyn Duffy contributed to this report.

“We must always obey the law, and not only when you have the balls”.

“The state module …” or officials – are people too!
“We must always obey the law, and not only when you have the balls”. Vladimir Putin

Then hot, then cold, then laughter, then tears – a reaction to the vocabulary of officials at everyone. Someone expression politicians outraged to the depths of the soul, and someone dedicates a vivid phrase of the book … For example, not so long ago, the most vivid expression of all of us loved Putin were immortalized in the book – a book bright witty, so to speak.

Always a serious and balanced prime minister is sometimes not averse to disturb the public the next utterance. What to say: “It is time to cease from one year to just chew snot” or “must always obey the law, and not only when caught in one place.” His remarks Putin has created a brand – a such a card, a corporate collection of words and intonations, making policy, of course, recognizable.

However, not always the Prime Minister can “calm” verbal flow and stop in time, not saying too much … His most famous gaffe concerned about the statements of President Victor Yushchenko. Putin, commenting on the victory of Yushchenko’s election, spoke thus: “… The only thing we expect that surrounded Mr Yushchenko will not people who build their political ambitions on anti-Russian, Zionist slogans on and so on ….” Of anti-Russian slogans understandable, but where Putin saw the Zionists surrounded by Yushchenko? Press office of President of the Russian Federation has worked pretty quickly, and on his official website was posted a correction. “Zionist” were replaced by “anti-Semitic.”

No less striking character in political circles is Vladimir Zhirinovsky … Speaking in the literal sense, the same language with the people, he easily convinces others that they were right. His thoughts about the Russian situation is understandable political scientists and journalists. Language Zhirinovsky copes with the principal – who communicates the information necessary. A concomitant to this process “error” can be attributed to the “worker-peasant” origins, or simply on the sincerity of people’s servants.

In the category of the most striking include the following statements of Vladimir Zhirinovsky:

– Naked women – these are the places of rest, where rest the Europeans. ”

– “You will all have to shake ass.”

– “He will say today, but tomorrow it will be hanged. He is pure, young, full of strength and energy. We have chosen a virgin! (About Kiriyenko).

– “The parliament are many prominent women: Hakamada, Panfilov, Starovoitova … They are strong, are in good age, and, if pregnant until March, it would be the best present Duma. And then sit around …”

– “I love such journalists as John Reed: make a report – he died – was buried.”

– “We need to make sure that was a lot of housing that was a lot of cars, yacht clubs, and youth to learn, to get married – a lot of times married. Though every year! Each new year to meet with his new wife, a new apartment, in a new suit and a new car! ”

Not uncommon in his speech, in addition to words with strong emotional coloring, officials use a “consonant” words … In other words, are stipulated.

In 2007, Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, quite the reservation that is called by Freud. Live at the “First Channel”, said: “This United Russia majority allows us to create a State modulo … er … the Duma.”

Boris Gryzlov, answering the question of ensuring equality of parties in the press, including in private, so caveat: “Unfortunately (!), We can not introduce censorship of private media sector.”

In general reservations which do not harm the state’s policy, are worthy of existence.Without them, would be a policy was too boring! But if such statements are repeated regularly and become the property of satirists, you should think over his speech: read more books – develop logic, crossword puzzles – to build thinking, well, with the diction does not interfere with work, so reservations with dulyami “not happen again .. .