international code of conduct for information security


international code of conduct for information security

Letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent
Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the
Recent years have witnessed the considerable progress achieved in developing
and applying the latest information and telecommunication technologies, which
could potentially be used for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of
maintaining international stability and security. It is of great significance that the
common challenges in the sphere of information security should be dealt with
through international cooperation and in the spirit of mutual respect. To that end,
China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have jointly elaborated in the form of a
potential General Assembly resolution on an international code of conduct for
information security and call for international deliberations within the United
Nations framework on such an international code, with the aim of achieving the
earliest possible consensus on international norms and rules guiding the behaviour
of States in the information space (see annex).

It would be highly appreciated if you could circulate the present letter and its
annex as a document of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly, under
item 93 of the provisional agenda.
(Signed) Li Baodong
Permanent Representative of the People’s Republic of China
to the United Nations
(Signed) Vitaly Churkin
Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation
to the United Nations
(Signed) Sirodjidin Aslov
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Tajikistan
to the United Nations
(Signed) Murad Askarov
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Uzbekistan
to the United Nations

Annex to the letter dated 12 September 2011 from the Permanent
Representatives of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan
and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the
[Original: Chinese, English and Russian]
International code of conduct for information security

The General Assembly,
Recalling its resolutions on the role of science and technology in the context of
international security, in which, inter alia, it recognized that scientific and
technological developments could have both civilian and military applications and
that progress in science and technology for civilian applications needed to be
maintained and encouraged,
Noting that considerable progress has been achieved in developing and
applying the latest information technologies and means of telecommunication,
Recognizing the need to prevent the potential use of information and
communication technologies for purposes that are inconsistent with the objectives of
maintaining international stability and security and may adversely affect the
integrity of the infrastructure within States, to the detriment of their security,
Underlining the need for enhanced coordination and cooperation among States
in combating the criminal misuse of information technologies and, in that context,
stressing the role that can be played by the United Nations and other international
and regional organizations,
Highlighting the importance of the security, continuity and stability of the
Internet and the need to protect the Internet and other information and
communications technology networks from threats and vulnerabilities, and
reaffirming the need for a common understanding of the issues of Internet security
and for further cooperation at the national and international levels,
Reaffirming that policy authority for Internet-related public issues is the
sovereign right of States, which have rights and responsibilities for international
Internet-related public policy issues,
Recognizing that confidence and security in the use of information and
communications technologies are among the main pillars of the information society
and that a robust global culture of cybersecurity needs to be encouraged, promoted,
developed and vigorously implemented, pursuant to General Assembly resolution
64/211 of 21 December 2009, entitled “Creation of a global culture of cybersecurity
and taking stock of national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures”,
Stressing the need for enhanced efforts to close the digital divide by
facilitating the transfer of information technology and capacity-building to
developing countries in the areas of cybersecurity best practices and training,
pursuant to resolution 64/211,


Adopts the international code of conduct for information security as follows:

Purpose and scope
The purpose of the present code is to identify the rights and responsibilities of

States in information space, promote their constructive and responsible behaviours
and enhance their cooperation in addressing the common threats and challenges in
information space, so as to ensure that information and communications
technologies, including networks, are to be solely used to benefit social and
economic development and people’s well-being, with the objective of maintaining
international stability and security.
Adherence to the code is voluntary and open to all States.
Code of conduct
Each State voluntarily subscribing to the code pledges:
(a) To comply with the Charter of the United Nations and universally
recognized norms governing international relations that enshrine, inter alia, respect
for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of all States,
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and respect for the diversity of
history, culture and social systems of all countries;
(b) Not to use information and communications technologies, including
networks, to carry out hostile activities or acts of aggression, pose threats to
international peace and security or proliferate information weapons or related
(c) To cooperate in combating criminal and terrorist activities that use
information and communications technologies, including networks, and in curbing
the dissemination of information that incites terrorism, secessionism or extremism
or that undermines other countries’ political, economic and social stability, as well
as their spiritual and cultural environment;
(d) To endeavour to ensure the supply chain security of information and
communications technology products and services, in order to prevent other States
from using their resources, critical infrastructures, core technologies and other
advantages to undermine the right of the countries that have accepted the code of
conduct, to gain independent control of information and communications
technologies or to threaten the political, economic and social security of other
(e) To reaffirm all the rights and responsibilities of States to protect, in
accordance with relevant laws and regulations, their information space and critical
information infrastructure from threats, disturbance, attack and sabotage;
(f) To fully respect rights and freedom in information space, including rights
and freedom to search for, acquire and disseminate information on the premise of
complying with relevant national laws and regulations;
(g) To promote the establishment of a multilateral, transparent and
democratic international Internet management system to ensure an equitable
distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure
functioning of the Internet;

(h) To lead all elements of society, including its information and
communication partnerships with the private sector, to understand their roles and
responsibilities with regard to information security, in order to facilitate the creation
of a culture of information security and the protection of critical information
(i) To assist developing countries in their efforts to enhance capacitybuilding
on information security and to close the digital divide;
(j) To bolster bilateral, regional and international cooperation, promote the
important role of the United Nations in formulating international norms, peaceful
settlements of international disputes and improvements in international cooperation
in the field of information security, and enhance coordination among relevant
international organizations;
(k) To settle any dispute resulting from the application of the code through
peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force.

US Continues To Build “Democratic” Police State Partnerships In Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

[According to plan, the forces of Imperialism are dividing-up space they intend to rape and eventually conquer, while the collaborating governments of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan get richer and further entrenched (SEE:  New mini-Cold War Heating-Up In Southern Central Asia? ).  If the governments of the world refuse to see the truth that “democracy and democratization” are deceptions and weapons of Imperial conquest, then We the People MUST recognize the brutal, ugly truth about our own fascist government.  Just like the elusive Imperial creation known as “al-Qaeda,” pseudo-democracy is a tool with two edges, cutting in either direction.  Sometimes we support “al-Qaeda” and sometimes we support democratization, but never when either subterfuges get in the way of actual Imperial looting operations.]

US and Turkmenistan to continue combating illegal narcotics

Turkmenistan, Ashgabat, Sept. 21 / Trend , H.Hasanov /

The United States and Turkmenistan formalized an extension of their ongoing cooperation in the fields of combating illegal narcotics and law enforcement in a signing ceremony held today at Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The parties signed a fifth Amendment to the existing bilateral Letter of Agreement on Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Assistance. Rashid Meredov, Deputy Chairman of Turkmenistan’s Cabinet of Ministers and Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed the Amendment on behalf of the Turkmenistan Government. Ambassador Robert E. Patterson signed the Amendment on behalf of the United States Government.

The Amendment extends support for the “Counternarcotics” project, designed to increase the investigative skills of counternarcotics officers and improve the State Counter Narcotics Center (SCNS) training facility. The goal of this project is to improve the interdiction and investigation skills of the Turkmen counternarcotics police through curriculum development and the donation of equipment to the SCNS Training Center.

Saint Louis Radioactive Rainfall 133x Greater Than Background Radiation

Vodpod videos no longer available.

Breaking News: We are running out of time

Posted by Mochizuki

Within the 30km zone surrounding the Fukushima dai-ichi power plant, there is a certain amount of despair setting in regarding the question of whether or not residents will ever be able to return to their homes. Serious problems remain. “In reactor three, which suffered a meltdown, fuel rods containing plutonium perforated the bottom of the containment and embedded themselves in the basement of the building. Just where and how far the plutonium travelled, no one quite knows”. (political commentator Jirou Honzawa)

On the tenth of August, LDP party and Diet member Seiichi Murakami posed the question of the whereabouts of the plutonium to the budget steering committee of the lower house, but neither Minister of health, Labour and Welfare Ritsuo Hosokawa nor his fellow ministers were able to provide an answer.

The day after the question, Jirou Honzawa interviewed the member Murakami. “The plutonium is certainly buried deep within the basement, but where exactly is anyone’s guess, and no one is able to pin it down. Obviously, the ocean is right next to the facility, so there’s no question that underground water is flowing into the sea. TEPCO is absolutely avoiding checking this out, and the government and the mass media are keeping a tight lid on this whole stinking mess.

Immediately after the accident, when it was announced that low-level contaminated water was to be discharged into the ocean, Murakami raised the possibility than contaminants might be carried far past the Alutian archipelago and possibly reach as far as San Francisco. however the government was unable to provide a compelling rebuttal. “Contamination of the ocean is continuing steadily. The scary thing is that unlike cesium, plutonium has a half life of 24,000 years, longer than anyone can fully comprehend. That’s how long this pollution of the ocean will continue, and if we don’t come to grips with this one way or another, we are going to fall afoul of international law. Those countries affected by the oceanic contamination are going to demand damages, aren’t they? But of course the government is preoccupied with short-term concerns, and are failing to get a handle on the situation.” (Honzawa)

Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have signed an agreement to mark out undersea borders

State media: Turkey to mark out undersea borders


ANKARA, Turkey — State media say Turkey and Turkish Cypriots have signed an agreement to mark out undersea borders to facilitate oil and gas exploration in the Mediterranean.

Wednesday’s deal comes after Cyprus began a search for oil and gas near sizable gas finds inside Israeli waters earlier this week despite Turkish warnings that it undermines the rights of Turkish Cypriots.

Turkey’s state-run broadcaster, TRT, says Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Dervis Eroglu, the president of the breakaway Turkish Cypriot, state signed the deal in New York.

Erdogan has lashed out at Cyprus and Israel for what he described as their “madness for an oil search” in the Mediterranean, adding that Turkey has sent warships to the area before the deployment of its research ship.

Center-2011 exercises echo Arab Spring

Center-2011 exercises echo Arab Spring

Center-2011 exercises

Center-2011 exercises

© RIA Novosti

RIA Novosti military commentator Konstantin Bogdanov
Center-2011 exercises kicked off Monday in Russia and Central Asia. Center-2011 is a contingency plan for Russia and its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) counterparts to practice the use of armed force “to stabilize the situation” in Central Asia. This outspoken position taken by some officials indicates that the drills will practice armed support for Russia-friendly regimes.

Big exercise in Central Asia

This year’s largest strategic military exercise called Center-2011 will be held in Russia and in Central Asian states from September 19 through 26. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will command the maneuvers.

Russia’s Chief of the General Staff Nikolai Makarov said no large army units will be involved. “Brigades at most, not armies” will be set in motion. Nevertheless, about 12,000 troops and some 1,000 pieces of combat equipment, including 70 aircraft, will take part in the exercise. The Caspian Military Flotilla will also be involved at almost full strength.

The purpose of the joint drills is stated rather bluntly: training and using mixed forces to stabilize a situation and conduct military operations in a Central Asian strategic sector. So the areas set aside for combat training are all mostly in Central Asia and southern Russia.

In Tajikistan, operations will be limited to command and staff exercises by the Collective Rapid Reaction Force (KSOR) at Russian military base No. 201. In Kyrgyzstan, Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik troops, supported by Russian aircraft from Kant Air Base, will conduct full-scale tactical drills. Over a thousand Russian troops and two hundred pieces of combat equipment are heading for the Oimasha proving grounds in Kazakhstan.

Updated Russian combat manuals and corresponding changes in army control chain will be a new feature of the drills. Lower level commanders will be given a greater degree of freedom in decision-making.

“Previously, senior commanders would describe every step to be taken by their subordinates two levels down. A battalion commander would issue instructions not only to the company, but also to platoon commanders. Now nobody will impede anyone’s initiative, and officers will have to think through their tactical moves themselves,” Makarov said, commenting on the new manuals.

Other means

Top officials – both in Russia and outside – have already expressed concerns over the possible echoes of the Arab Spring in the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). Last month, for example, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko spoke openly that the Rapid Reaction Force could be used not only against an external aggression, but also against the threat of a “constitutional coup.”

Sergei Prikhodko, Russian presidential aide, supported Lukashenko’s stand. CSTO Secretary Nikolai Bordyuzha noted soon after the Belarusian leader’s fairly loud statement: “The events in North Africa have opened our eyes to many things. What is happening there calls for analysis, and for appropriate methods to protect each state.”

Later, Bordyuzha explained that his words, as well as Lukashenko’s wish, did not mean using the KSOR for interference in the domestic political affairs of the organization’s member-states. “We are categorically against the CSTO taking up policing functions or participating in a political struggle on the side of any political force,” Bordyuzha said.

It should be noted, however, that a number of amendments made to CSTO documents in December 2010 that are aimed at “improving the response mechanism to crisis situations and strengthening the CSTO’s potential to counter threats and challenges to security” make use of the KSOR in such cases unlikely, but – given a broader interpretation – possible. The former approach specifically ruled out any legitimate interference by the organization’s armed forces in the internal affairs of CSTO member-countries.

Literally last week Chief of General Staff Nikolai Makarov also spoke in the same vein. “The processes taking place in North Africa and the Middle East were difficult to forecast. What will happen next? What leadership will come to power? This has to be a warning to all states. We have similar questions for the Central Asian countries. We must be prepared for anything. This is why we are practicing with these drills,” Makarov said, commenting on the objectives of Center-2011. He added that “Russia’s military organization must be ready for a worst-case scenario.”

These similarities in statement and allusion made openly by high-ranking officials can mean only one thing: the CSTO has acknowledged that the KSOR (read Russian armed forces, which make up the bulk of the CSTO united army), can be used to support the stability of political regimes in the organization’s member-states. “By other means, means of extreme violence,” as Clausewitz said in his day, describing the relationship between war and politics.

OVL–Cyprus-Based Indian Oil and Gas Co. and Gazprom

[Through a series of acquisitions and renaming of operations, connections between national oil and gas corporations are hidden.  Only through a thorough researching of the names involved can we hope to know who is drilling where and who is offering cover for big corporations devouring little fish and stirring-up international tensions in the process.  We see from the following that the international monster corporation Gazprom is tied to the new Indian/Vietnamese/Chinese tensions developing in Vietnam’s Block 128.  Gazprom is also tied to Israel/Cyprus/Turkey tensions over drilling in the Mediterranean.  Gazprom and Vietnam are partners on much of the offshore drilling, except, reportedly, on block 128.  Now we find that Vietnam’s partner in the coming intrigue, OVL of India, has a base of operations in Cyprus, which has purchased Russian assets in Siberia and Sakhalin.  Through a complicated of arrangements, Gazprom’s hand is hidden in the challenge to China and India’s possible involvement in the tensions brewing in the Eastern Med are hidden, as well.  Behind all of this, the US hand is nearly invisible, as is the British Petroleum connection.]

OVL, ONGC Videsh Ltd., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Cyprus-based, ONGC–

Ongc Nile Ganga (Cyprus) Limited
Themistokli Dervi, Nicosia 1066, Cyprus

Blocks of Vietnam's continental shelf in Gulf of Bac Bo

Blocks of Vietnam’s continental shelf in Gulf of Bac Bo

Gazprom and Vietnamese oil and gas corporation Petrovietnam signed a cooperation agreement on November 20, 2006. The agreement provides for cooperation of the companies in the following areas:

Blocks Nos. 112 and 129–132

–[excludes Block 127 and 128, India/Vietnam block.  Even though Gazprom is not an obvious partner in India/China/Vietnam spat, OVL and Gazprom partner in Siberia, making Gazprom indirect participant in China S. China Sea challenge.–editor]

Gazprom and Petrovietnam signed a strategic partnership agreement on December 15, 2009. The document provides for cooperation of the companies in the following areas:  (AREA 3)

  • active cooperation in oil and gas projects in Russia, Vietnam, and third countries within the established Gazpromviet company (in particular, the parties are considering potential participation in development of the Naguman oil, gas and condensate field as well as in projects for exploration and development of subsurface areas in the Republic of Sakha, Eastern Siberia, and the Far East);
OVL Logo



Sakhalin-I :

Participating Companies and their Shares :OVL – 20%,Exxon–30% ,Sodeco – 30% ,SMNG – 11.5% ,RN Astra – 8.5% (Operator – Exxon Mobil)

Sakhalin-1 is a large oil and gas field in far east offshore in Russia. OVL acquired 20% PI in the project in 2001. The exports of Sakhalin -1 crude oil started from September, 2006. The project is operated by Exxon Mobil. OVL’s share of production from the project was 1.474 MMT of oil and 0.415 BCM of gas during 2010-11 as compared to 1.532 MMT of oil and 0.390 BCM of gas during 2009-10.

Sakhalin Map


Specifics on OVL’s Vietnamese South China Sea Acquisitions


Block 06.1 :

Participating Companies and their Shares :OVL-45%,BP-35% ,PV-20% ,(Operator – British Petroleum (BP))

OVL, British Petroleum (Operator) and PetroVietnam have developed the Lan Tay field in Block 06.1 offshore Vietnam. The field started commercial production of Gas in January, 2003. The project is operated by British Petroleum. OVL’s share of production from the project was 2.249 BCM of gas and 0.038 MMT of condensate during 2010-11 as compared to 1.967 BCM of gas and 0.042 MMT of condensate during 2009-10. OVL’s share of the development expenditure was about USD 244 Million till 31st March, 2011.


Vietnam Asset
Block 127 :

Block 127 is an offshore deepwater Block, located at water depth of more than 400 meters with 9,246 sq km area in Vietnam. The PSC for the Block was signed on 24th May, 2006. OVL holds 100% PI in the Block with Operatorship. OVL has acquired 1,150 sq km 3D seismic data in the Block and the interpretation of the seismic data has been completed. Location for drilling of exploration well was identified and the well was drilled in July 2009 to a depth of 1265 mts. As there was no hydrocarbon presence, the Company has decided to relinquish the block to Petrovietnam. The Company has invested approx USD 68 million till 31st March, 2010.

Block 128 :

Participating Companies and their Shares :OVL- 100%

OVL signed a contract for 100% stake in the project in May, 2006. The project is operated by OVL. OVL had deployed the Rig Hakuryu-V on well B 128-RV-1X on 2nd September 2009 for drilling. However rig could not be anchored despite adding Piggy Back to the existing anchors. The drilling activity was terminated and it is planned that the location would be drilled in 2012 subject to successful field testing of anchors. OVL has invested about USD 46 million till 31st March, 2011