Do International Islamists Have India In Their Sights?

[Using a “defunct” Revolutionary Internationalist Movement to make trouble in India is in keeping with current policies connected to the State Dept. and National Endowment for Democracy.  Pakistani sponsorship of an international Communist conference on the Maoist revolution in Naxal is also in keeping with the known M.O. of the Pakistani ISI (SEE:  Actively Participate in the Campaign and Conference in Support of the Peoples War in India!).]

Tapping into Proxy War

R S N Singh
E-Mail- aruna_rsn2000@yahoo.co.in

Antony Shimray, the nephew of NSCN-IM General Secretary T Muivah, who was apprehended by the security authorities in October 2010, revealed the extensive linkages between China and NSCN-IM and other insurgent and terrorist groups in India including the Maoists.

There are number of evidences regarding the coalescence of the proxy wars being waged by China and Pakistan respectively. As per the Asian Age dated 01 March 2012 (Intelligence reveals ISI-Naxal link ) the ISI was using Bangladesh based operatives to establish links with the Indian Maoists and ULFA leader leader Paresh Barua had played the key role in bringing them into direct contact.  For sophisticated arms, the Maoists, as per Intelligence agencies, are heavily dependent on the ULFA’s international procurement network .The report further states that the ISI has urged the Maoists to target infrastructure projects and industrial units in the Indian hinterland.  The Maoists on their part had pleaded for supply of sophisticated arms and explosives particularly RDX.

Two important leaders of the Manipur based People Liberation Army (PLA) N Dilip Singh and Arun Kumar Singh Salam were apprehended in October 2011. During their interrogation, they revealed that the plans to form a ‘Strategic United Front’, comprising the various militant outfits in J&K and the Northeast and the Maoists. Such a front is not possible without collaboration between the Chinese Intelligence and Pak ISI. The recent capture of arms in September this year, i.e. 98 pistols, 10 AK-47 and 2 assault rifles (all of Chinese make), by the Indian Army in Keran sector of J&K establishes China-Pakistan link in the ongoing proxy war against India.

There are also reports about emerging links between the Indian Maoists and Dawood gang at the behest of the ISI. Reportedly Dawood Ibrahim has solicited Maoist indulgence for making in-roads into the illegal mining industry in areas in India.

The arrows and dots of concern on the Indian map i.e. Maoist terror, Jihadi terror, insurgencies in Kashmir and the Northeast, and fundamentalist threat emanating from Bangladesh are rushing to ride on each other, thus generating an unprecedented destabilising churning force. It is evident that the threat from internal and external inimical forces is becoming seamless. The so far acceptable line between ‘law and order’ and ‘internal security’ and ‘external threat’ has almost disappeared.

Western Linkages

Maoist terror has regional and international linkages. The regional activities and support structure is coordinated by the organizations Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), which as the name suggests, comprises Maoist outfits in Asian countries, i.e. India, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The Revolutionary Internationalist Movement(RIM) whose Headquarter is based in Chicago, in the US is one of the major benefactors of ultra-leftist groups active in Asia which significantly includes Nepal , India, Afghanistan and Iran. Possibly the US authorities view this organization as a tool to influence regimes or carry out regime changes in target countries. This should partly explain the frequent visits of otherwise  rabid anti-US  Indian Maoist sympathizers to that country.

While the regional support frame work of the Maoists is well known, its European support structure has either been dismissed or ignored. The Maoists Communist Party, Manipur in a press release on 09 December 2011 revealed the support by various ultra-leftist outfits based in Philippines, Malaysia, European countries and Canada. The various ultra-leftist outfits aiding and abetting the Maoists in India are Association for Proletarian Solidarity, Italy (ASP), Communist Party of Philippines (CPP), Maoists Communist Party of France (MCPF), Partito Comunista maoista (PCm) Italia, Party of the Committees to Support Resistance for Communism (CARC), Revolutionary Communist Party, Canada (PCR-RCP), and Struggling Socialist Union, Italy (SLL). This explains the visit of a delegation from the European Commission to witness the trial of Binayak Sen. This also explains the kidnappings(allegedly staged) of two Italians  Paolo Bousco (58) and Claudio Colangelo (61) . Paolo has been trekking in Orissa for many years. Both the Italians had gone to Orissa jungles despite travel advisory by their government. Both were abducted from the Kandhmahal area where most Maoist terrorists are Panna cast Christians and the Maoist discourse in the region has strong Church and anti-Hindu elements.

In April 2012 nine French tourists were deported from Bihar as their activities in the interior of the State betrayed Maoist links.

These ultra-leftist groups have been conducting meets in Europe in support of Peoples War in India being waged by the Indian Maoists. These are attended by the Maoists leaders, sympathizers and benefactors of the Indian Maoists.

Feeding into Terror

Apart from aiding Indian Maoists directly and indirectly, China has been using the Maoists in Nepal for securing their geopolitical objectives vis-à-vis India. Following the ostensible split in the Maoist ranks recently, the leader of the break-away group (Nepal Communist Party, Maoist), Mohan Vaidya Kiran visited Beijing . On his return he spoke to the media about the Chinese position on the contentious issue of ‘fedearalism’ in Nepal. He said ‘’China is not against federalism but is opposed to foreign interference (read India) on issue of federalism.” Subsequently, Vaidya’s party issued a ban order on plying of vehicles with Indian registration numbers and screening of Hindi movies.

Fuelling and feeding on the ISI sponsored proxy war jihadi terror are fundamentalist groups in Bangladesh and Wahabi groups drawing sustenance from Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian footprints were quite conspicuous in the violence by Rohingyas in Myanmar. The Wahabi discourse emanating from Saudi Arabia and its concomitant jihadi factor owing allegiance to  groups based in Bangladesh and Pakistan  was quite pronounced in Kokrajhar and then in Mumbai, Pune, Hyderabad and Bengaluru. The jihadi frenzy witnessed in India travelled to Bangladesh and recently consumed nearly a dozen Buddhist temples in the Cox’s Bazar area.  It was allegedly an act of religious vendetta by Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. A large number of Indian Muslims going to the Gulf for work return indoctrinated and imbued in Jihad. Global jihad has indeed engulfed the entire Indian subcontinent.

Feeding on the Maoist terror are also elements pretending to be part of the electoral politics of India. In reality these are different routes to the same objective of capturing state power. The CPM is the parliamentary route, the CPI-ML is the semi-parliamentary route and the Maoists are the armed route. This explains   the deafening silence or ambivalence  of CPM AND CPM(ML)whenever there are terrorist attacks by the Maoists. Their common controller and benefactor China is not averse to the internecine struggle between the three because in its reckoning while all the routes complement, the route which circumstances favour, will assume the lead role and succeed. It is for this reason that there is never a hint of condemnation by the CPM, or CPI(ML) or the Maoists even in the face of most  blatant inimical posturing by China against India. For Capitalist China, communism only remains a strategic tool for proxy war.

There are also political outfits tapping into Jihadi terror as well as Maoist terror. At least leaders of two political parties campaigned with Osama bin Laden look –alike during elections in Bihar, thus fanning the Jihadi discourse. In Jharkhand one segment of the ruling segment owes half it seats to the Maoists. Proxy War therefore is subverting Indian democracy.

Conclusion

The ‘secure’ space in India is shrinking at a frightening pace. Little economic development is possible in insecure environment. The leaders however fail to conflate security and overall development. Indian decision-makers must realize that today’s wars are not about territory. It is about influence, political manipulations, effecting regime changes, engineering social and economic instability by terror, insurgency, and ideological subversion, and eventually causing internal collapse of the target country and making it untenable in its existing form. This method of war called ‘proxy war’ or ‘asymmetrical war’ has the advantage of being calibrated by diplomacy, is cost effective, and does not invite international opprobrium and sanctions. It is not limited by frontiers and geography. Most vitally, it affords ‘deniability’.  The proxy soldiers are liberally funded, supplied with sophisticated arsenal and trained in a progressive military manner. The Internal Security Forces of the targeted country will always be outdone by the proxy soldiers in these aspects. Since the level of proxy war emanates from degree of conventional capability and perceived nuclear deterrence, it is the military of the targeted country which has to provide the leadership in the armed response of the State to the internal facet of the war as well. We must remember that Central Armed Police Forces and para-military forces are not structured, officered, organized, trained and motivated to take on the proxy soldiers. The failure to accept this ,truism  will continue to claim  lives of CAPF, police and para-military  personnel. In the ultimate analysis terror and instability will grow till it creates the situation of implosion of the State. The Military  was employed soon after Independence to crush the violent communist uprising in the Telengana region, to assimilate some recalcitrant princely states and to liberate Goa. If the Military was the chief instrument for building the Independent Indian nation-state why is there such heavy reluctance to use it for its preservation when the fissiparous forces are shrinking the secure space in the country at such a rapid pace, and the Internal Security forces are unable to arrest the momentum?

The author is a former R&AW Officer and author of book ‘Military Factor in Pakistan’

Views expressed are personal

THE INDIAN DOCTRINE ON SUB-CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS:

[SEE:  Pakistan’s Changed Doctrine: Perspectives and Perceptions]

THE INDIAN DOCTRINE ON SUB-CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS:

 

REFLECTIONS FROM A U.S. COUNTERINSURGENCY PERSPECTIVE

 

David P. Fidler

 

1 INTRODUCTION In December 2006, the Indian Army and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps respectively issued  new doctrines on conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations (Indian Army 2006; U.S.  Army and Marine Corps 2007). The near simultaneous release of the Indian and U.S. doctrines  revealed that both countries had engaged at the same time in developing doctrine applicable to  COIN. To the knowledge of the Indian and U.S. participants of this research project,  development of the Indian and U.S. doctrines occurred independently, with no attempts to share  lessons learned, best practices, and doctrinal principles. This fortuitous coincidence creates the  opportunity to engage in comparative analysis of the two doctrines. In keeping with the objective  of gleaning lessons from India’s experiences fighting counterinsurgencies, this paper focuses on  what the United States can learn from the Indian doctrine applicable to COIN. Comparative  analysis of the two doctrines provides, however, food for thought about larger issues, including  the importance of doctrine for COIN operations and the relationship between democracy and  COIN doctrine.  ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF THE NEW INDIAN AND U.S. DOCTRINES ON  COUNTERINSURGENCY  The simultaneous development of doctrines applicable to COIN by India and the United States  do not share proximate causes, but the origins and purposes of the two doctrines partake of a  1  This paper will appear as a chapter in India and Counterinsurgency: Lessons Learned (S.  Ganguly and D. P. Fidler, eds.) (London: Routledge, 2009), in press.

 

deeper, common concern facing both democracies. The direct motivations for development of

the U.S. doctrine flow from difficulties and challenges the United States confronted with

insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. The U. S. military was unprepared to fight COIN

campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq when the insurgencies threatened the U.S. interventions in

those countries (Nagl 2007: xiii). The U.S. Army and Marine Corps developed the

Counterinsurgency Field Manual (CFM) to address the most urgent threats faced by U.S.

political and military leaders.

By contrast, development of the Indian Doctrine on Sub-Conventional Operations 

(DSCO) does not appear motivated by any urgent crisis within or beyond India. Although India

was engaged in COIN activities while it developed its doctrine (e.g., efforts to end the

insurgency in Nagaland (Shekatkar 2009) and the challenge posed by the Naxalite insurgents

(Oetken 2009), the doctrine makes no reference to these on-going problems as stimulants for its

development. In fact, the Indian doctrine rarely mentions specific COIN campaigns India has

waged.

2

 Rather than a document triggered by specific crises, the Indian doctrine appears to

reflect an effort to capture, in the words of the Chief of the Indian Army Staff, ‘our collective

wisdom and philosophy that we have acquired over almost five decades in fighting such warfare’

(Indian Army 2006: i).

Behind this difference in the origins of the two doctrines stand other features that

illuminate the motivations for their respective development. Both India and the United States felt

compelled to develop COIN doctrine at the same time, but the two countries have radically

divergent histories with respect to engaging in COIN. The U.S. experience with countering

2

The Indian doctrine only mentions specific campaigns twice. See Indian Army 2006: 7

(referring to ‘multi-pronged national initiatives in J[ammu] & K[ashmir], North East, and the
Naxal violence affected states’) and 63 (mentioning the ‘ongoing insurgencies in J&K and North
East’).

 

insurgencies within its borders ended in the nineteenth century with the conclusion of the Civil

War and the destruction of native American opposition to Manifest Destiny. U.S. involvement in

COIN operations in the twentieth century was entirely overseas, and, although not infrequent,

these operations failed to make any lasting impression on how the U.S. military and civilian

government prepared for armed conflicts. Indeed, the tragedy of Vietnam stimulated efforts

within the U.S. military to forget the COIN lessons learned in that conflict and to avoid having to

fight similar wars in the future (Cassidy 2006). The shock of being unprepared for the

insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq sent the United States in search of COIN doctrine.

By contrast, India has been engaged in fighting insurgenciess within its territory for

virtually its entire existence (Chadha 2005). India’s only experience with waging COIN beyond

its shores was in Sri Lanka (Mehta 2009; Gill and Lamm 2009). The Indian Army’s near-

continuous involvement in COIN since India’s independence contributed to the evolution of

COIN strategies and tactics, contained in various operational and training documents (Banerjee

2009). However, prior to December 2006, the Indian Army had never synthesized its COIN

know-how in a single doctrinal document. India’s approach to COIN had developed largely in a

‘common law’ fashion, with strategies and tactics passed along over time without systematic

efforts to codify the guiding principles. As the case studies in this book highlight, this approach

did not serve India well because military officers, soldiers, and civilian officials had to re-learn

painfully the lessons of how to engage effectively in COIN with each new insurgency challenge.

Thus, for different reasons, the United States and India determined they needed to craft

formal doctrine on COIN. For India, the exercise was mainly one of codification—collecting in

one document guidance accumulated over the course of more than fifty years. The objective was

not to revolutionize how the Indian Army or government thought about how to fight

 

insurgencies. For the United States, the exercise of developing doctrine was revolutionary

because it challenged dominant military and political mindsets that abhorred irregular warfare

and sought to embed COIN capabilities in the nation’s arsenal of instruments of civilian and

military power. As Sewall (2007: xxi) argued, the CFM is radical because it ‘challenges much of

what is holy about the American way of war.’ This difference between India and the United

States perhaps helps explain why the Indian doctrine has not been subject to much public

scrutiny or discussion in India,

3

 while the CFM caused an avalanche of interest, commentary,

and debate in the United States (Heuser 2007; Kahl 2007a; Luttwak 2007; Peters 2007).

Despite these divergent origins and purposes, the motivations behind the doctrines are

united in one important consideration—both India and the United States believe that they will

face insurgent violence in the future for which they must prepare. The doctrines respectively

recognize that India’s and the United States’ superior power in conventional warfare creates

incentives for enemies to engage in asymmetrical conflicts, such as terrorism, insurgency, and

proxy wars. For example, the Indian doctrine asserts that ‘insurrectionist movements are likely to

continue on account of religious, cultural and socio-economic disparities. These will continue to

be exploited by state and non state actors to further their nefarious designs and also to offset the

asymmetry in combat power’ (Indian Army 2006: 5).  Similarly, the CFM acknowledges that

‘[m]ost enemies either do not try to defeat the United States with conventional operations or do

not limit themselves to purely military means. . . . Instead, they try to exhaust U.S. national will,

aiming to win by undermining and outlasting public support’ (U.S. Army and Marine Corps

2007: li). In addition, both doctrines express awareness of the changing nature of the insurgency

threat, particularly the manner in which insurgencies exploit technologies and grievances

3

An exception can be found in Navlakha 2007. For analysis of the development of India’s

approach to COIN prior to the issuance of the DSCO, see Rajagopalan 2000, 2007, and 2008:
134-68.

 

associated with globalization (Indian Army 2006: 5-6; U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007: 7-8).

Heightening the importance of this awareness is the position of India and the United

States as ‘status quo’ powers in the international system with increasingly interlocking political

and economic interests. Chastened by its misadventure in Iraq, the United States finds itself

confronted with challenges from revisionist powers, such as China and Russia, and revolutionary

non-state actors, such as Al Qaeda. This context involves threats to U.S. security within its

borders and overseas. In this context, failed or failing states and their ungoverned spaces present

opportunities for threats to emerge to the stability and functioning of the U.S. and the

international political and economic systems. As the CFM puts it, ‘[p]ower vacuums breed

insurgencies’ (U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007: 7).

India’s rise as a great power is dependent on its acceptance and integration into the post-

Cold War international system. India has become more economically integrated by embracing

globalization, and its political and strategic interests align more with the United States than in the

past, as evidenced by increasing Indo-U.S. cooperation across many fields of endeavor. As a

status quo power, India too fears disruption of the current system, and, like the United States, its

fears include international concerns and worries about its internal security. Unlike the United

States, India faces serious socio-economic, ethnic, and religious problems at home that can

weaken its ability to govern effectively within its territory, producing possibilities for more

terrorism and insurgency violence (Indian Army 2006: 7).  In this regard, the continuing problem

of Naxalite violence underscores India’s domestic vulnerability to insurgency and terrorism

(Oetken 2009).

Despite different origins and purposes, the Indian and U.S. doctrines on COIN represent

acknowledgment by both countries that political action and violence by insurgencies plugged

 

into globalization, and perhaps supported by hostile countries, constitute strategic threats to their

interests at home and abroad. This acknowledgment is part of what makes these doctrines

significant not only for each country’s individual policies but also for their mutual interests in

preparing for and responding effectively to this common threat. This reality then heightens the

importance of comparing and contrasting the Indian and U.S. doctrines on COIN.

THE VALUE OF COMPARISON: SENSING SIMILARITIES, DISSECTING 

DIFFERENCES 

The experiences of India and the United States in waging COIN may, at first glance, suggest that

India’s predominantly domestic campaigns and the United States’ exclusively foreign operations

limit the value of comparative analysis. This impression is, however, mistaken. From the U.S.

perspective, India offers lessons in five areas:

• The importance of doctrine in preparing for and waging COIN effectively;

• Confirmation of U.S. doctrine by similar conclusions reached by India;

• Insights produced by analyzing where U.S. and Indian doctrines differ;

• Instruction for the United States in how to help other countries prepare for handling

potential insurgency violence within their own territories; and

• Challenges democracies face in conducting COIN campaigns.

Doctrine and counterinsurgency: complexity, counterintuitiveness, and capabilities

The simultaneous emergence of the Indian and U.S. doctrines on COIN does not represent a

revolution in terms of how the militaries of both countries view the importance of doctrine. The

U.S. military has long invested in developing doctrine. The big change for the United States was

not suddenly awakening to the importance of doctrine but was abandoning its traditional

antipathy for preparing to wage unconventional warfare. Once that policy decision occurred, the

 

U.S. Army’s and Marine Corps’ desire to develop comprehensive COIN doctrine connects

readily to the doctrine-centric approach of the U.S. military to its missions.

In terms of India, as noted earlier, the Indian Army was not bereft of thinking on COIN

prior to December 2006 (Rajagopalan 2000 and 2007). The guidance was not, however,

synthesized in one overarching document. In addition, on the civilian side, ‘there is little

evidence that Indian decision-makers ever systematically thought through the [COIN] issue’ and

‘the only conceptual Indian government template that exists for understanding and dealing with

internal rebellions remains Nehru’s thinking on these issues in the 1950s’ (Rajagopalan 2007:

91). The development of the DSCO indicates that the Indian Army concluded that the traditional

approach was no longer adequate. Like the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, the Indian Army

decided to provide more rational, centralized, and harmonized doctrinal guidance on COIN

operations.

Two other factors may also explain the Indian Army’s decision to issue a synthesized

doctrine. First, despite repeated experiences with COIN campaigns, the preparedness of Indian

civilian and military personnel for COIN operations tended to be poor at the start of each new

COIN effort. The ‘common law’ approach to COIN doctrine was not very effective. Second, as

discussed in the process of this research project, the India Army’s materials on COIN tended to

be of poor quality and lacking in standardization. In addition to the traditional, decentralized

approach to doctrine, continued marginalization of COIN capabilities within the Indian Army

may have contributed to this state of affairs (Rajagopalan 2000: 60).

The change of direction on COIN doctrine in India and the United States raises questions

about the importance of doctrine to waging effective COIN campaigns. In short, why is doctrine

particularly important to undertaking COIN operations at home or abroad? Doctrine is, of course,

 

important to many types of military tasks, but doctrine may play a heightened role for engaging

in COIN successfully. Explaining this enhanced role for doctrine requires pinpointing aspects of

COIN that increase the need to orient soldiers and politicians to the nature of the task they face.

Three features of COIN help illuminate the necessity for harmonized doctrinal guidance.

First, as literature on COIN makes clear, COIN operations are enormously complex

conceptually, strategically, and tactically. COIN campaigns require coordinated political,

economic, social, and military actions to gain the support of the people affected by an

insurgency’s propaganda, intimidation, and violence. This coordination must occur at the highest

policy levels and be executed from those political heights down to the most local levels on the

ground. The sheer complexity of COIN operations counsels strongly for creating and

implementing a common blueprint for actions required for waging COIN campaigns effectively.

Second, those engaging in COIN operations are often required to behave in

counterintuitive ways, which mandates explaining why such counterintuitive behavior makes

sense and constitutes the most effective ways to battle an insurgency. For civilian officials, the

requirement to coordinate political actions closely with military operations is an unusual task,

which produces disconcerting ambiguities and tensions in the civilian-military relationship. This

unsettling context arises even when all involved are committed to the primacy of civilian control

of military actions. For soldiers and military officers predominantly trained to engage in

conventional warfare, waging COIN confronts them with counterintuitive responsibilities. The

CFM captured this reality in identifying paradoxes of COIN operations (Table 1).

Table 1. Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations

Sometimes, the more you protect your force,
the less secure you may be

The host nation doing something tolerably is
normally better than us doing it well

Sometimes, the more force is used, the less
effective it is

If a tactic works this week, it might not work
next week; if it works in this province, it might
not work in the next

 

The more successful the counterinsurgency is,
the less force can be used and the more risk
must be accepted

Tactical success guarantees nothing

Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction

Many important decisions are not made by
generals

 

 

Some of the best weapons for
counterinsurgents do not shoot
Source: U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007: 48-51

These paradoxes may be more counterintuitive for the U.S. military than the Indian Army

because the Indian Army has constitutional and statutory responsibilities to provide support and

aid to civil authorities in times of domestic disturbances (Indian Army 2006: 15). However, as

revealed by the difficulties the Indian Army has experienced in COIN campaigns, these

constitutional and statutory duties have not translated easily into Army thinking and training,

even after more than fifty years of experience countering insurgencies. The Indian experience

should stand as a warning to the United States that the mere presence of doctrine does not

translate into sustainable capabilities.

Third, the need for robust and diverse military and civilian capabilities in COIN

operations requires doctrine to help focus political attention on undertaking the necessary

transformations in policy, resource allocation, and training. Leaders and legislators will demand

to know why COIN capabilities deserve more political and economic support. Without question,

the CFM has heightened political and military awareness in the United States of the changes

needed in civilian and military agencies to mount more effective COIN efforts (Nagl 2007: xix).

The Indian DSCO has not generated similar levels of policy interest, but it has produced some

heightened awareness of the challenges facing the Indian government and military in this realm.

Producing doctrine does not, by itself, generate COIN capabilities, but creating and refining

those capabilities might be more difficult without doctrine to stimulate and inform political and

military processes.

 

An irony of the development of the Indian and U.S. doctrines is that the military has

taken the lead in what experts acknowledge is primarily a political endeavor the success of which

depends on the capabilities of civilian actors. The DSCO states that ‘all actions of the security

forces must have a civil face and be directed towards strengthening the hands of the civil

authorities’ (Indian Army 2006: 15). Similarly, the CFM asserts that ‘[r]esolving most

insurgencies requires a political solution; it is thus imperative that counterinsurgent actions do

not hinder achieving that political solution’(U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007: 40). If political

factors are primary, then civilian input into COIN doctrine should be significant, if not

controlling.

The development of the CFM involved diverse actors, including human rights

organizations, but the lack of preparedness and capacity on the part of the U.S civilian agencies,

especially the Department of State, to assist the military in COIN efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq

revealed limited civilian engagement in, and capabilities for, COIN. These civilian weaknesses

affected the development of doctrine. As Sewall (2007: xl) argued:

Because counterinsurgency is predominantly political, military doctrine should flow from

a broader strategic framework. But political leaders have failed to provide a compelling

one. Since the armed forces are carrying almost the entire burden in Afghanistan and

Iraq, it is unsurprising that they felt compelled to tack the problem anyway. But the

doctrine is a moon without a planet to orbit.

In terms of India, the development of India’s COIN doctrine has not involved the civilian

government agencies affected, such as state and central police forces. This lack of involvement

of civilian government in the development of doctrine for an endeavor that is fundamentally

political rather than military is striking in the cases of both the United States and India. The lack

 

of civilian involvement is perhaps more striking with respect to India given the internal threats

the country has faced from insurgencies and the fact that the ‘Indian state has always seen

counter-insurgency as a political rather than military problem, and . . . has insisted that the Indian

Army accept it as such’ (Rajagopalan 2007: 75). The dominant role of the military in the

formulation of COIN doctrines and the weak capabilities or participation of political and civilian

agencies connect to problems both countries have experienced with achieving unity of effort

between military and civilian entities in COIN contexts.

Doctrinal similarities: Sharing core principles and practices

Comparative analysis of the Indian and U.S. doctrines reveals many similarities, and these

similarities help confirm that the conclusions reached independently by both countries have

general validity in COIN campaigns. Given that India’s experiences have predominantly been

domestic and the United States’ COIN endeavors have exclusively been external, the frequency

of similarities in the two doctrines highlights core principles of COIN theory applicable no

matter the context. Table 2 contains a non-exhaustive list of similarities in the doctrines. More

specifically from the U.S. perspective, the similarities between the doctrines indicate that the

urgency with which the U.S. Army and Marine Corps produced the CFM between 2004 and

2006 did not lead the effort astray because its conclusions resonate so well with the codification

of India’s fifty-plus years of experience fighting insurgency movements.

More importantly for the United States, the similarities between the CFM and India’s

DSCO can be useful in U.S. efforts to convince host nations with which it works of the

importance of certain principles in COIN operations. In the future, the United States will be

involved in supporting countries facing insurgencies, but without the U.S. military footprint seen

in Afghanistan and Iraq. In those cases, the quality of the host nation’s COIN strategies, tactics,

 

and capabilities will be even more important. India’s doctrine stands as independent

confirmation that the COIN principles promulgated by the United States as an external actor are

also appropriate for the host nation to embrace as well. In fact, India’s experience may be more

persuasive given that it accrued over five decades of difficult COIN conflicts, as opposed to the

United States’ belated conversion to COIN’s importance in the wake of problems in Afghanistan

and Iraq. Further, the Indian Army’s decision to issue a doctrinal document helps underscore the

need for host-nation militaries and governments faced with possible insurgency violence to

prepare strategy, guidance, and capabilities to undertake the arduous task of COIN operations.

Doctrinal differences: External COIN v. Internal COIN

Despite similarities, the Indian and U.S. doctrines exhibit significant differences. Some of the

differences in the documents are stylistic, such as frequent use of historical and contemporary

examples in the CFM compared with the complete lack of such examples in the DSCO. The

CFM is also more detailed and lengthy than the comparatively sparse document produced by the

Indian Army. More important than these presentational matters are substantive differences in the

doctrines themselves. Most, if not all, of these differences flow from the external/internal

distinction that marks comparison of the U.S. and Indian experiences with COIN.

 

 

Table 2. Key Similarities between the Indian and U.S. Counterinsurgency Doctrines

Topic

Doctrine on Sub-Conventional Operations

Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Use of elements of
national power

Management and resolution ‘of such conflicts necessitates
a multi-pronged thrust by all elements of national power’
(p. 3)

‘Counterinsurgents . . . use all instruments of national
power’ (p. 2)

Population

The ‘[p]opulace invariably emerges as the ‘Centre of
Gravity’ in all sub[-] conventional operations’ (p. 16)

‘Focus on the population, its needs, and its security’ (p.
51)

Role of military forces

‘The role of the Armed Forces . . . is to act as facilitator to
bring down the level of violence so that a political process
can be initiated’ (p. 16); and to provide aid to civil
authorities (p. 15)

Military forces undertake offensive and defensive
operations to create a secure environment, and stability
operations to improve the legitimacy of the
counterinsurgent forces (pp. 5-6)

Dealing with external
support of insurgents

Stressing the need to prevent external support (p. 18) and
inclusion of this task as a line of military operation (p. 25)

Stressing that insurgents must be isolated from external
support (p. 42)

Use of force

Stressing ‘minimum use of kinetic force’ (p. 3)

Emphasizing the importance for counterinsurgents to
‘calculate carefully the type and amount of force to be
applied’ and the need to ‘use escalation of force/force
continuum procedures to minimize potential loss of life’
(p. 45)

Rules of engagement

‘The use of force should be judicious and governed by
explicit rules of engagement that must hinge on the
principle of ‘minimum force’’ (p. 33)

‘Training counterinsurgents in ROE [rules of engagement]
should be reinforced regularly’ (p. 350)

Information operations

‘The management of perceptions of all state and non state
players in the domestic, regional and international
environment is of paramount importance’ (p. 19)

Asserting that information operations may be the most
important logical line of operations for counterinsurgents
(p. 160)

Integration of efforts

Stressing the importance of an ‘‘Apex Body’ that . . .
coordinates and oversees the functioning of all the
agencies, including security forces, in the conflict zone’
(p. 19)

‘All organizations contributing to a COIN operation
should strive . . . for maximum unity of effort’ (p. 57)

Human rights

‘operations have to be undertaken with full respect to
Human Rights’ (p. 21, and Chapter 8: Human Rights, pp.
53-5)

‘Respect for the full panoply of human rights should be
the goal of the host nation’ (p. 361)

Rule of law

Doctrine ‘underscores the need for scrupulous upholding
of [the] laws of the land’ (p. 3)

‘Establishing the rule of law is a key goal and end state in
COIN’ (p. 360) and the rule of law ‘is a powerful
potential tool for counterinsurgents’ (p. 39)

 

Topic Doctrine on Sub-Conventional Operations Counterinsurgency Field Manual Use of lines of operation Describing ‘lines of military operations’ required in sub-

conventional conflict (p. 25) Utilizing ‘logical lines of operations’ to direct COIN

activities (pp. 154-88) Metrics Listing ‘indicators for gauging the success of military

operations in the conflict zone’ (p. 38) Stressing the importance of engaging in assessment of

COIN operations (pp. 188-91) Understanding the local

context Stressing the ‘imperative that the physical, human and

informational facets of the conflict zone are correctly

understood’ (p. 27) ‘Successful conduct of COIN operations depends on

thoroughly understanding the society and culture within

which they are being conducted’ (p. 40) Training Highlighting the importance of training (Chapter 6:

Training, pp. 48-52) ‘Train military forces to conduct counterinsurgency

operations’ (p. 51) Role of intelligence ‘Intelligence is the medium for the real time flow of

information leading to conduct of successful operations’

(p. 40, and Chapter 4: Intelligence, pp. 40-3) ‘Counterinsurgency . . . is an intelligence-driven

endeavor’ (p. 79, and Chapter 3: Intelligence in

Counterinsurgency) Small team tactics ‘In this environment, operations based on small teams

increase chances of contact and success’ (p. 34) ‘Aggressive saturation patrolling, ambushes, and listening

post operations must be conducted, risk shared with the

populace, and contact maintained’ (p. 48) Development actions Emphasizing that ‘efforts must be made to address

aspirations of the locals by undertaking civic action

programmes like resuscitation of schools, medical

facilities, communication network and projects that

generate self[-]employment opportunities’ (p. 36) Discussing the importance of economic development as a

logical line of operation (pp. 171-3) Junior leadership ‘Sub[-]conventional operations are invariably

decentralized at the unit and sub[-]unit level, thus placing

heavy demands on junior leadership’ (p. 52) Emphasizing that ‘young leaders–so-called ‘strategic

corporals’–often make decisions at the tactical level that

have strategic consequences’ (p. 50), which means

‘[j]unior leaders especially need . . . skills in a COIN

environment because of the decentralized nature of

operations’ (p. 239) Stress on troops Emphasizing the importance of managing stress among

troops in sub-conventional operations (pp. 36-7) ‘Leaders remain aware of the emotional toll that constant

combat takes on their subordinates and the potential for

injuries resulting from stress’ (p. 240) Sustaining the effort ‘Commanders at all levels must ensure that compatible

logistic support, to include replenishment of war like

material, supplies, medical and postal cover, are given due

attention’ (p. 37) Highlighting the critical important of logistics and

sustainment units in COIN operations (Chapter 8:

Sustainment, pp. 255-85)

 

The U.S. doctrine contains many features that respond to the challenges the United States

faces in conducting COIN operations in foreign countries. Understandably, the Indian doctrine

does not contain corresponding concerns because India’s main COIN challenges have been

within its territory. The situation of the two countries with respect to these COIN contexts is not

likely to change in the future. For example, given the difficulty of COIN, hovering over the

CFM is the question whether the United States should intervene in another nation through COIN

operations. As Sewall (2007: xliii) observed, the CFM ‘is neutral regarding the choice for war.

Ironically, though, the manual’s ultimate value may lie in better informing the nation’s jus ad 

bellum decisions.’

The same question does not hover over the DSCO because India does not have the luxury

of deciding whether to respond to insurgent violence in its territory. The equivalent political

question for India is how to prevent violence from occurring in the first place. As Navlakha

(2007: 1246) argued, ‘Because most conflicts, before they graduate to armed resistance/struggle,

begin with the articulation of popular concerns and aspirations[,] . . . the effort ought to be

directed at redressing them before the rot sets in.’ Prevention questions arise for the United

States, but, as an external actor, it has less ability to redress political, economic, and social

problems in other states than the Indian government has to address problems within its territory

that may become tinder for insurgent violence.

Another difference in the U.S. and Indian doctrines concerns the emphasis placed on the

legitimacy of COIN operations. The CFM is obsessed with legitimacy: ‘The primary objective of

any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate

government’ (U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007: 37). The U.S. concern with legitimacy in

 

COIN is two-fold. First, as an intervening power, the United States confronts legitimacy

challenges with respect to its intervention and subsequent behavior in the host nation. These

challenges connect to many issues, including the legality of the intervention, support from the

international community, and sensitivity of U.S. military forces and civilian personnel to local

traditions, cultures, and religions. Second, the United States faces the objective of helping create

and/or maintain a legitimate government in the host nation. Accomplishing this task requires the

United States to become involved in, among other things, supporting political institutions,

developing host-nation security forces, providing essential services, and creating economic

development opportunities.

India’s DSCO contains different legitimacy concerns, which reflect the internal focus of

this document and most of India’s COIN experiences. Whether India has a legitimate basis to

respond to an insurgency within its territory is simply not an issue for the DSCO. Although it

recognizes that political and socio-economic grievances stimulate insurgency and terrorism, the

DSCO tends to cast dispersions on the legitimacy of such violence: ‘The modus operandi of the

weaker side [in sub-conventional warfare] is generally characterised by irrationality,

indiscrimination, unpredictability and ruthlessly destructive behavior’ (Indian Army 2006: 1).

4

 In

addition, the DSCO contains nothing to suggest that the Indian Army developed it to inform

COIN operations outside India, as occurred in Sri Lanka. Thus, the DSCO never addresses the

question of the legitimacy of Indian intervention in another country.

The legitimacy concerns in the DSCO revolve around India’s responses to insurgency and

terrorist violence in its territory. India has an unquestioned right to respond to such violence, and

4

The CFM contains similar sentiments: ‘insurgents are constrained by neither the law of war nor

the bounds of human decency as Western nations understand them. . . . These amoral and often
barbaric enemies survive by their wits, constantly adapting to the situation’ (U.S. Army and
Marine Corps 2007: 52).

 

to take an uncompromising stance when the violence aims for secession from India. The DSCO’s

emphasis on respect for human rights and the rule of law shows the Indian Army is aware that

the legitimacy of actions taken by the Army (and the civilian government) is subject to scrutiny

and criticism. Controversies about the activities of the Indian Army in waging COIN (e.g.,

allegations of disproportionate use of force or human rights violations of detained persons) do

not, however, undermine the legitimacy of India’s right to combat internal violence or to oppose

absolutely secessionist demands. The domestic context of India’s COIN operations, as presented

in the DSCO, allows India to avoid the fragile linkages the United States confronts in foreign

campaigns between the legitimacy of U.S. involvement in the conflict, performance in COIN

operations, and support for the host nation’s government.

These different legitimacy perspectives inform other differences in the two doctrines. For

example, the CFM draws frequently on international law as an important component in U.S.

engagement in COIN operations (Fidler 2007), particularly with respect to complying with the

laws of war and fostering the rule of law in the host nation (U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007:

351-3, 360-1). By contrast, the DSCO never mentions international law of any kind and draws

only on the Indian Constitution and statutes for legal guidance for Indian Army actions. The

DSCO’s approach does not mean the Indian Army is hostile towards international law, any more

than the CFM’s use of international law represents an American love affair with the law of

nations. The substantive content of Indian law may reflect or incorporate relevant international

legal norms. Although Navlakha (2007: 1245) criticized the DSCO for not specifically including

Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which sets minimum standards for non-

international armed conflict, Indian law and the guidance provided in the DSCO (e.g., List of

Do’s and Don’ts) appear consonant with Common Article 3’s substance. The difference in the

 

utilization of international law signals different contexts for the doctrines in terms of how the

legality of actions influences perceptions of legitimacy in COIN.

Other doctrinal differences also reflect the external/internal environments addressed by

the U.S. and Indian doctrines respectively. For example, the CFM pays far more attention to

developing host-nation security forces

5

 than the DSCO gives to Indian Army support for training

state police forces. As the case study on the Punjab explained, Indian Army training of the

Punjab police allowed the police to play the major role in defeating the Sikh insurgency

(Marwah 2009; Fair 2009). The DSCO does not, however, mention, let alone highlight, this

important role the Indian Army plays in combating insurgencies inside India. Why the DSCO 

fails to highlight this aspect of Indian Army support to civil authorities is not clear, but it may

reflect sensitivities in Indian politics concerning civil-military relations.

Similarly, the CFM spends more time on other key aspects of military support to civil

governance, including providing essential services and engaging in economic development

activities, than does the DSCO. The DSCO mentions these tasks, but it does not elaborate on

them much, perhaps because the Indian Army’s engagement in civil support functions is

understood and less controversial and difficult than the challenges the U.S. military faces inside

foreign countries undertaking non-military tasks.

The Indian doctrine also does not focus as extensively as the U.S. doctrine on the

importance of cultural and language skills in COIN operations. Commentators have noted how

radical the CFM’s emphasis on cultural and language skills is for the U.S. military (Heuser

2007), and the U.S. military’s growing interest in developing and exploiting these skills has

generated controversy, especially with respect to the military’s deployment of anthropologists in

5

See, e.g., U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007: 199-235 (Chapter 6: Developing Host-Nation

Security Forces)

 

so-called ‘Human Terrain Teams’ (Rohde 2007). The DSCO asserts the importance of military

units acquiring ‘detailed knowledge of the area of operations, its people, their customs,

traditions, language and religious beliefs’ (Indian Army 2006: 49), but it does not elaborate on

this need or reflect on cultural and language problems Indian Army troops have faced in COIN

operations in different regions (e.g., in the northeast and Punjab). Again, the absence of detailed

discussion may signal that India, as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-lingual nation, faces

language and culture issues in every policy context, and the importance of dealing with these

issues in sub-conventional operations goes without saying.

The DSCO also spends little to no time addressing funding and logistical issues that arise

during COIN operations, while the CFM shows more concern about these matters. Again, the

explanation relates to the external/internal difference in COIN contexts. U.S. law on foreign and

military assistance forces the U.S. government to fund COIN operations in a highly complex

fashion, which forces doctrine to confront the issue up front (U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007:

347-9, 357-60). The emphasis on logistical support for sustainable COIN operations is easy to

understand from the perspective of the United States intervening thousands of miles from its

shores (U.S. Army and Marine Corps 2007: 255-85).

The DSCO never addresses funding issues, which might be odd given the federal

structure of India’s governance and the need to coordinate central and state government

resources. As for logistical matters, the DSCO devotes one sentence to it as a ‘miscellaneous’

issue under operational facets of COIN efforts (Indian Army 2006: 37). The DSCO provides no

information on ‘best practices’ on logistics, even though the Indian Army has faced logistical

problems in COIN operations in difficult terrain (e.g., the northeast). However, compared to the

logistical tasks faced by the United States in its external COIN campaigns, the Indian Army faces

 

an easier logistics context that perhaps requires less doctrinal attention.

In the end, the differences between the Indian and U.S. doctrines do not reflect

fundamental divergence in COIN concepts or strategies. The main differences are either stylistic

or reflect emphases particular to the contexts in which India (internal) and the United States

(external) mainly wage COIN. These differences are important for the United States, particularly

with respect to efforts it might make with other countries in improving their approaches to COIN

doctrine, strategies, and capabilities. As India’s doctrine reflects, a country will approach internal

COIN challenges differently from how the U.S. tackles its foreign COIN campaigns. A different

approach does not necessarily mean that the United States and the foreign government will be at

odds on core principles for COIN, as the similarities between the Indian and U.S. doctrines

illustrate. Thus, in keeping with U.S. doctrine on COIN, a host nation developing COIN doctrine

tolerably is normally better than the United States doing it well.

DEMOCRACY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY DOCTRINE 

Comparative analysis of the Indian and U.S. doctrines should not lose sight that both are

democratic polities that share values and interests, including the ironclad necessity of civilian

control over military forces. In many ways, democracy and its associated tenets, such as the rule

of law and respect for human rights, pre-determines what COIN doctrine for a democracy

contains. As democracies, the United States and India face philosophical and jurisprudential

determinants of their COIN doctrines that they cannot adjust or avoid. This reality represents an

opportunity and a burden for democratic countries.

The opportunity appears in how the ‘best practices’ of COIN, such as the strategy of

making the people the center of gravity in the struggle, resonate with democracy’s principles,

such as its emphasis on the sovereignty of the people. Democracy has no exclusive or inherent

 

claim to the hearts and minds of a population, but, at least doctrinally, what governments must

strategically achieve in COIN fits well with democratic aspirations. Doctrinal emphasis on the

rule of law, respect for human rights, strengthening civilian authorities, catalyzing economic

opportunity, and empowering communities finds ready acceptance in democratic sensibilities.

Despite serious mistakes and failures, India’s fifty years of experience fighting insurgencies

reveal the resiliency of the Indian democracy when confronted by multiple variations of this

threat. The democratic determinants of COIN doctrine lessen somewhat the doctrine’s

importance because the framework of democratic ideals, principles, and rules applies whether

formal doctrine for military and civilian agencies exists. In other words, strict implementation of

COIN doctrine within a democracy carries less significance because of the ‘safety net’

democratic politics provides. Perhaps this reasoning helps explain the late development of formal

COIN doctrine by India, despite its extensive experience in this realm.

The burden for democratic countries of these philosophical determinants of COIN

doctrine is two-fold. First, as the United States discovered in its COIN operations in Vietnam,

Afghanistan, and Iraq, a democracy undertaking COIN efforts in foreign, non-democratic nations

proves difficult and dangerous. The legitimacy linkages the United States confronts in external

COIN operations have a gossamer quality easily damaged by events on the ground, particularly

failures by the host nation to live up to the benchmarks of democracy building. This reality

heightens the importance of high levels of compliance with COIN doctrine. Without high

compliance, the United States faces the burden of carrying more of the military and civilian

sacrifice of COIN operations with dwindling legitimacy at home, in the host nation, and in the

international community. The external COIN context always means there is an exit strategy, no

matter how disastrous withdrawal of U.S. support may be for the government and people of the

 

host nation. In short, the United States has no democratic ‘safety net’ to cushion failure to

implement effectively COIN doctrine in foreign countries with no traditions of democracy.

Second, the burden imposed by the philosophical determinants of COIN doctrine appears

in the difficulties these determinants create for military and civilian actors involved in COIN.

The mandate to respect the rule of law provides good illustrations of this burden. Continuing

controversies in India about the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) reveal deep

tensions in this democratic society created by the necessity to use high levels of force within the

rule of law (Government of India 2005). The Indian Army believes that its troops need the

authority and the protection provided by the AFSPA in order to accomplish their assigned COIN

missions (Government of India 2005: 8), but critics complain that the authority given is

excessive and the immunity rendered frees soldiers from worrying about the rule of law

(Navlakha 2007). Similar concerns arise in external COIN operations by the United States, as

revealed by accusations that the U.S. military personnel have violated the laws of war in Iraq and

Afghanistan with impunity (Kahl 2007b) and that U.S. private contractors operating in the

conflict zone, such as Blackwater, are subject to no laws whatsoever (Dickinson 2007).

For India and the United States as democracies, COIN doctrine is predominantly an

exercise in applied ideology that has to occur simultaneously across civilian and military sectors.

The doctrines are not utilitarian tools that can be wielded without a substantive vision of the

political end state. This reality colors everything about COIN operations undertaken by

democracies. Not surprisingly, the tensions that arise in this context resemble the controversies

about what the ‘rule of law’ means in COIN operations and nation-building efforts (Stigall 2006;

Stromseth, Wippman, and Brooks 2006: 56-84; Center for Law and Military Operations 2007).

Should the ‘rule of law’ be minimal and linked simply to creating functioning rules and

 

institutions, or should it have a substantive edge by requiring certain kinds of institutions and

rules?

As the CFM argues, the traditional American way of war, which aligned civilian and

military actions in a linear relationship (e.g., reconstruction as a post-combat Phase IV activity),

cannot accommodate these COIN challenges. The United States must adjust to a much more

difficult way to apply its ideology, or abandon involvement in COIN conflicts. The democratic

determinants of COIN doctrine render impossible the option of turning COIN into a purely

military contest, with the brutality and suffering that approach would entail. The last time the

United States faced this choice after Vietnam, its military and civilian leaders jettisoned the idea

of preparing to fight COIN conflicts more effectively, and the direct and indirect costs to the

United States as a democracy have been severe in the Afghan and Iraqi conflicts.

As the case studies in this book illuminate, Indian democracy has struggled with

remaining true to democratic principles while waging COIN campaigns. This struggle includes

India’s tendency to have to re-learn the lessons of COIN with each new COIN operation, which

is not an effective way to engage in the COIN exercise of applied ideology. Although India has

not yet lost a COIN conflict within its territory,  ‘a thin line divides success and failure in such

operations’ (Indian Army 2006: iv). Whether the promulgation of the DSCO thickens that line

for India remains to be seen.

Thinking of COIN doctrine as an exercise in applied ideology for India and the United

States means that these two countries’ doctrines are not easily exportable to other nations in need

of better COIN capabilities that do not have democratic legacies. The United States can see in

India’s doctrine a potential model for other countries to consider in developing their own

national COIN strategies and doctrines, particularly because the Indian doctrine has so much in

 

common with the new U.S. approach. But that commonality limits the utility of the Indian

doctrine as a national template for other countries making the difficult transition to democracy in

the midst of insurgent violence. The extent of the limits is inversely proportional to the scope of

the nation’s governance capabilities because engaging in COIN as applied ideology is a

capability-intensive exercise that simultaneously taxes legislative, judicial, executive, military,

and non-governmental capacities.

CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF THE INDIAN AND U.S. DOCTRINES 

The Indian and the U.S. doctrines maintain that these countries will confront increased threats

from insurgency movements and other forms of irregular, asymmetrical warfare in the future.

These predictions make the DSCO and the CFM priority documents for military and civilian

agencies in India and the United States. Whether the doctrines will receive such priority is not, as

of this writing, clear. The CFM could become a relic of the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq if

the United States decreases its presence and commitment to those countries. Negative outcomes

for the United States in one or both of these theaters could stimulate another retreat from the

development of more serious COIN capabilities.

In terms of India, retreat from insurgency threats, such as the on-going problems in the

northeast and the Naxalite problem, is not an option, but the need to respond to sub-conventional

threats does not ensure the successful implementation of the DSCO. After all, the DSCO 

ostensibly is a codification of learning already part of Indian Army expertise, but this learning

had trouble gaining serious traction within the Indian Army and beyond over the course of fifty

years of experience countering insurgencies. Further, critics of the Indian experiences with COIN

operations might emphasize the need to prevent asymmetrical conflicts within India by focusing

more political attention on socio-economic injustices, ethnic tensions, religious disputes, and

 

governance failings. The DSCO does not provide a blueprint for such preventive politics and

thus, in the eyes of critics, does not deserve priority within civilian government agencies.

Leaving aside the possibilities for marginalization, metrics for the future health of the

Indian and U.S. doctrines arise in four areas:

• The extent to which the doctrines become embedded in the training and education of

military officers and soldiers in the Indian Army and the U.S. military;

• The impact of the doctrines on the formulation of civilian strategies, the creation and

maintenance of improved civilian capabilities to engage in the political dimensions of

COIN operations, and the quality of the integration of these civilian strategies and

capabilities with the U.S. military;

• How well India and the United States refine the application of the doctrines to mitigate

tensions and reduce controversies in their application, such as those involving how the

rule of law applies to COIN security forces; and

• The level of cooperation and shared learning India and the United States develop on the

basis of their common understanding of the nature of the asymmetrical threat and the

political likemindedness reflected in the similar features of their COIN doctrines.

This paper’s comparative analysis of the Indian and U.S. doctrines on COIN reveals a

host of lessons that the United States can learn from the Indian experience. The lessons are not

revolutionary, in the sense that they should alter the way the United States thinks about COIN

operations. Rather, the lessons confirm the radical moves the U.S. Army and Marine Corps made

with the CFM and illuminate ways in which the Indian experience has more relevance to the U.S.

interests in COIN than previously realized or acknowledged. As the United States looks beyond

Afghanistan and Iraq in terms of future COIN challenges, India’s experiences and doctrine may

 

become increasingly interesting, especially if the two countries can engage each other more

productively as democracies facing violent, asymmetrical threats that may become the dominant

type of warfare in the next phase of the twenty-first century.

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Cassidy, R. M. (2006) Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terror: Military Culture and 

Irregular War, Westport, CT: Praeger Security International.

Center for Law and Military Operations. (2007) Rule of Law Handbook: A Practitioner’s Guide 

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Chadha, V. (2005) Low Intensity Conflicts in India—An Analysis, Sage: New Delhi.
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Dickinson, L. A. (2007) ‘Accountability of Private Security Contractors under International and

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Kahl, C. H. (2007a) ‘COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency?’ Foreign 

Affairs, 86(6): 169-76.

—— (2007b) ‘In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct

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Stromseth, J., Wippman, D. and Brooks, R. (2006)  Can Might Make Right? Building the Rule of 

Law After Military Interventions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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It Is High Time for the Elimination of Hafiz Saeed

[It doesn”t matter whether Hafiz Saeed actually visited the Line of Control or not, since he had already met face-to-face with militant leaders from the Kashmiri Hurriyat delegation, along with his militant counterpart, Syed Salahuddin (SEE:  Lashkar e-Taiba Leader Hopes To Revive Jihad In Kashmir After US Leaves Afghanistan).  Whatever plans he made with them went back to Jammu and Kashmir with them.  He had just completed his trip to Lahore to share his militant wisdom with Talal Bugti, where deadly anti-Shia blasts exploded in his wake.  Hafiz Saeed is a terrorist and if he is allowed to pull Pakistan into another war with India, then the whole world will surely blame Pakistan for all of the grief that will follow.]

Saeed denies visiting areas near LoC

The Hindu

PTI

A file photo of Jamaat-ud-Dawah chief Hafiz Saeed
APA file photo of Jamaat-ud-Dawah chief Hafiz Saeed

 

Lashkar-e-Taiba founder Hafiz Mohammad Saeed on claimed he had not visited areas along the Line of Control shortly before a recent spurt in violations of a ceasefire put in place in 2003.

“I did not visit the LoC where the Indian soldiers were killed,” Mr. Saeed, who now heads the Jamaat-ud-Dawah, said in a statement.

Expressing “surprise” at Indian Home Minister Sushilkumar Shinde’s remarks that he had visited the LoC, Saeed claimed: “India has no proof about my presence there. The Indian claim is totally baseless.

“If India proves my presence at the LoC, then I am ready to accept its other allegations (against) me,” he said.

Saeed, blamed by New Delhi for masterminding the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks that killed 166 people, said those in favour of granting Most Favoured Nation-status to India should “see the real face of India”.

Anti-Crime and Corruption Chief Murdered In Osh

Kyrgyzstan: Osh shot Head of combating organized crime and corruption

 

Kyrgyzstan: Osh is searching for a killer colonel of militia, drawn sketch

As Friday night became known “Fergana” in Kyrgyz city of Osh, southern killed Head of the Office for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption (UBOPiK) for the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry colonel Tolkunbek Shonoev. He left five children.

This information is a correspondent of “Fergana” confirmed a senior inspector of the press service of the Internal Affairs of Osh Zamir Sydykov. “Yes, indeed, around 20:00 at his home was shot Tolkunbek Shonoev, which refers to the nomenclature of the Ministry of Interior.”

According to him, the murder took place in the Osh region Ak Tilek. Shonoeva shot right in the car when he drove up to his house on the official car of the brand Daewoo Nexia. Shot several times.

“Details of the incident will be in the morning. Now the crime scene investigative activities are conducted efficiently, “- said Sydykov.

International news agency “Fergana”

 

Identikit of the killer [NOT SPOCK]

Identikit of the killer. Photos from the website MVD.kg

fergana news

Press service of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kyrgyzstan issued a sketch of the alleged perpetrator, the suspect in the murder of the head of the Anti-Gang, assassinations and extortion of the Office for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption in the Osh and Jalal-Abad, Batken and Osh police colonel Tolkunbek Shonoeva.

Are currently being interviewed witnesses, witnesses and investigate all the circumstances of an armed attack. One of the suspects – a young man of Asian appearance at the age of 20-25 years, an oval face, dark, an increase of about 165-170 cm The second, a man about 30 years old, stocky build, wearing a camouflage jacket supposedly.

Law enforcement officers to carry out emergency search operations to identify and arrest those involved in this serious crime.

International news agency “Fergana”

France Makes First Move On Africa’s Resources, Sends Bombers and Troops To Mali Under Cover of “Humanitarian Intervention”

independent

French troops have already been joined by forces from Nigeria and Senegal as an international intervention force planned for later this year

 

French forces have arrived in Mali to stem the recent advances made by al-Qa’ida-backed Islamists who control the northern half of the country.

The French President, François Hollande, made a brief appearance on television last night to inform the French people that their army was fighting alongside government forces. He said that the intervention had started yesterday afternoon with UN support. “Our action will last however long is necessary,” he said. “France will always be ready to defend the rights of a people which wishes to live in freedom and democracy.”

French troops have already been joined by forces from Nigeria and Senegal as an international intervention force planned for later this year was hastily brought forward to meet a recent Islamist offensive. Colonel Abdrahmane Baby, from the West African nation’s foreign affairs ministry, confirmed that forces from France were in the country but refused to say how many or where.

An uneasy ceasefire along a 300 mile frontline between the army and the militants was broken this week for the first time since Islamists and Tuareg rebels conquered the north of Mali last spring. The loss of the desert north cut the country in two and plunged the Malian army into disarray. The political crisis was made worse when a military junta in March seized power from the democratically elected president, Amadou Toumani Toure.

The Islamists were this week able to capture Konna, a town about 350 miles from the capital Bamako that was the forward base of the Malian army. Government forces have now retreated to Sevare in the central Mali area of Mopti where they were being supported by French special forces. Residents of Mopti said that troops from the former colonial power had arrived at an airstrip nearby. Military analysts said the Mopti airstrip was the likely target of the rebel advance as its capture or destruction would complicate the use air power against them.

For months France has been trying to coax the UN and Mali’s neighbours into a military campaign to reconquer the north. The UN Security Council passed a resolution late last year approving a foreign intervention but its deployment was not expected before September. The plan has been attacked as unrealistic by US military officials as it called for 3,000 troops to hold an area the size of Texas and to be led by Malian forces who have consistently lost out to the well-armed and motivated rebels. However, the sudden loss of further territory may now bring that operation forward.

Aid agencies who have been dealing with hundreds of thousands of refugees have now been forced to evacuate the central band of the country. Some 412,000 people have been uprooted by the fighting, according the UN. This has exacerbated a food crisis already affecting countries throughout the Sahel region.

The medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières warned yesterday that the 55,000 Malian refugees in neighbouring Mauritania face serious malnutrition and high mortality rates.

France: Kurds furious. “Erdogan is a killer”

France: Kurds furious. “Erdogan is a killer”

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Chaos outside building where the 3 women were killed

Hundreds of Kurds protest outside the building where three Kurdish women were murdered last night in ParisHundreds of Kurds protest outside the building where three Kurdish women were murdered last night in Paris

(ANSAmed) – PARIS – “Erdogan is a killer.” “We’re all in the PKK.” “Free Ocalan”. Hundreds of Kurds are chanting these and other slogans outside the building where three Kurdish women, including the co-founder of the PKK were murdered Thursday morning. Chaos and screams of anger erupted as the bodies of the women were carried out. Protestors have formed a procession that is moving toward Strasbourg Saint-Denis in central Paris.

The chief of the Federation of Kurdish Associations in France has pointed the finger at Turkey for the murder of three Kurdish women in Paris Thursday. “It’s a crime of state, or in any case a political crime”, Edhart Leon told ANSA outside the Kurdish Information Centre where the women were killed. “If you were going to point the finger at anyone it would be Turkey”.

Leon, who was in Rome 15 years ago at a large rally for the the Kurdish leader, Ocalan, described the brutal murders of PKK co-founder Sakine Cansiz, 50, Dogan Fidan, 32 and Leyla Söylemez, 20 as “a message.” “Right now the Kurdish community is in deep shock”. “I’m waiting on information. Investigators are in place and are doing their job, but it’s a very difficult test for us”, he added.(ANSAmed).

Sit-in continues in Quetta; HDP says provincial govt has failed

Sit-in continues in Quetta; HDP says provincial govt has failed

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People chant slogans next to the bodies of their relatives awaiting burial, who were killed in Thursday’s deadly bombings in Quetta. — Photo by AP

QUETTA: The sit-in at Quetta’s Alamdar Road staged by hundreds of people from theHazara Shia community was ongoing on Saturday after the passing of nearly 24 hourssince it started, DawnNews reported.

The participants of the sit-in have refused to bury the dead until the army takes control of the provincial capital.

Police in Quetta had earlier said that the protest had ended, but Shia leader Ibrahim Hazara said Saturday that it would continue until the city was handed over to the army and the provincial government dismissed.

Some 50 coffins remain on the provincial capital’s Alamdar Road, the Associated Press reported.

Moreover, the Qaumi Yakjehti Council has announced that it would expand the perimeter of its protest to the cantonment check post.

Also on Saturday, the Hazara Democratic Party (HDP) took out a protest rally in Quetta against terrorist attacks in the city.

Participants of the rally held banners and placards condemning the recent unrest in Balochistan, including incidents of targeted killings, bomb blasts and other unrest.

The rally took various roads and routes and concluded near the office of Inspector General Balochistan Police.

The protesters said the provincial government had failed in establishing peace and law and order in the city and demanded that Quetta be handed over to the army.

The sit-in and protest comes in the wake of multiple bomb blasts in Quetta which claimed at least 104 lives. Eighty-six of those killed in the attacks were from the Hazara Shia community.

Policing powers delegated to FC

Prime Minister Raja Pervez Ashraf on Saturday issued directives to delegate policing powers to the Frontier Corps in Quetta.

The premier issued the directives after a meeting with Interior Minister Rehman Malik.

The FC has been directed to assist the Balochistan government in maintaining peace and controlling the law and order situation in the province in the wake of the multiple bombings that have claimed the lives of over 100 people.

PM phones Governor Magsi

Prime Minister Ashraf telephoned Governor Balochistan Zulfikar Magsi and the two discussed the situation in Quetta in the wake of the multiple blasts.

The premier, in his call, directed the provincial governor to take all steps necessary to ensure the protection of the citizens’ lives and properties.

He added that the federal government was ready to assist the provincial government to ensure the citizen’s security.

Prime Minister Ashraf moreover said that those wounded in the wake of the attacks should be treated with maximum care.

PM directs CM Balochistan to return to Quetta

Prime Minister Ashraf on Saturday directed Chief Minister Balochistan Aslam Raisani, who is reportedly abroad, to return to Pakistan immediately.

The prime minister also directed Federal Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira to travel to Quetta without delay.