Beirut bombings are ‘a clear message by Saudi Arabia’

Beirut bombings are ‘a clear message by Saudi Arabia’

Russia-Today
Lebanese Army soldiers inspect the site of explosions near the Iranian embassy complex (R) in Beirut November 19, 2013.(Reuters / Mohamed Azakir)

Lebanese Army soldiers inspect the site of explosions near the Iranian embassy complex (R) in Beirut November 19, 2013.(Reuters / Mohamed Azakir)

The blasts near the Iranian embassy in Beirut are a clear message by Saudi Arabia to Iran, as by targeting Iran it wants to spread chaos and war also inside Lebanon, political analyst Kevork Elmassian told RT.

RT: We know that a Lebanese group linked to Al-Qaeda has reportedly claimed responsibility for the attack. From your point of view, what would be their motive there?

Kevork Elmassian: The group is called Abdullah Azzam and it is affiliated to Al-Qaeda. This is a clear message by Saudi Arabia or it’s an act of war by Saudi Arabia against Iran, this is for the first time the Saudis are crossing the red line by targeting the Iranian Embassy in Beirut. I don’t agree with the Iranian Ambassador who pointed his finger to the Israelis. It’s true that the Israelis are beneficiaries of these explosions but who perpetrated these attacks? They are Al-Qaeda linked groups; their emir is Bandar “bin-Satan” [bin-Sultan] in Saudi Arabia.

We have to know that these explosions happened with two suicide bombers. The Israelis never do such operations, they can use their airplanes and other car bombs. But there were two people, one of them was on motorcycle, he came close to the embassy and tried to explode himself in order to open a route for the other car entering to the embassy, but the security was awake and they shot him. He was forced to explode himself outside the embassy. But in politics we have to understand that this message from Saudi Arabia has come after the war of the Al-Qalamoun mountains. We have to know that Hezbollah and the Syrian army are fighting side by side against Al-Qaeda groups in Syria and recently in Al-Qara area, this area links with Arsal area in Lebanon, where the thousands of militants from Al-Qaeda  under the patronage of the Future Movement of Lebanon are having trainings and also smuggling arms into Syria. Also, this area links Homs to Damascus, it is in the center of Homs and Damascus, and most of the terrorists who are coming to the eastern Ghouta area in Damascus, the place where the chemical attack happened, are coming from this area.

RT: Why do you link Saudi Arabia to this case?

KE: Because the militants of the proxies of Saudi Arabia exist in the center between Damascus and Homs and they are spreading all this chaos and terrorism around the cities of Homs and Damascus. Most of the car bombs are coming from this area. When Hezbollah and Syrian army decided to crush the rebellion in this area, the Saudis wanted to send a very historical message to Iran. We have to remember the actions of Saudi Arabia in past few weeks: they refused the membership of the UN Security Council and then they said they were going to work to foil the peaceful negotiations in Geneva for peace in Syria. They are also trying to block any deal between the West and Iran. And the recent reports are saying that Saudi Arabia is going to buy a nuclear bomb from Pakistan, if a deal is reached between P5+1 and Iran. So these historical policies by Saudi Arabia are reflecting the desperation of Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, and by targeting now the embassy of Iran it wants to spread chaos and war also inside Lebanon.

Political terrorism in Wisconsin—The American Police state begins

The crime of being conservative is being prosecuted with vengance.

Political terrorism in Wisconsin: The American Police state begins

washington times

Conservative groups served with one of those subpoenas should refuse to comply, instead take Francis Schmitz to court.

WASHINGTON, November 19, 2013 – Cops are bursting into homes, seizing computers and other “evidence” while groups are being hit with subpoenas that require them to turn over voluminous and sensitive information – including the names of political donors.

The crime of being conservative is being prosecuted with vengance.

In Wisconsin, special prosecutor Francis Schmitz is going after conservative groups that were involved in the fight over the recall of Governor Scott Walker and Walker’s union reforms. Subpoenas are requesting “all records of income received, including fundraising information and the identity of persons contributing to the corporation.”  They are seeking lists of conservative donors.

These “John Doe” subpoenas are alarming as, under Wisconsin law, when someone receives one of these subpoenas, the only person they are allowed to discuss the subpoena with is their attorney. Not only does this inhibit First Amendment rights, it stops groups from being able to create a unified defense to allegations.

Among the groups that have been targeted are Americans for Prosperity-Wisconsin, The Republican Governors’ Association, The friends of Scott Walker, American Crossroads and the Republican Party of Wisconsin.

The subpoenas, which have been leaked to the media, demand all kinds of internal records, including donation information and the identity of individual donors.

This is political terrorism at work and the special prosecutor in this case is a political terrorist.

Obtaining donor lists for conservative organizations is a long time goal of left wing groups. The IRS, when it went after the Tea Party, wanted donor information, which they are legally precluded from having.

Does anyone believe that if these donor lists were turned over to a special prosecutor they would remain secret?

A great example of what the left is doing is California in 2008 and 2009. California passed Proposition 8, which defined marriage as a union between one man and one woman. The left went nuts.

Liberals obtained copies of the donor list for a number of groups that supported Proposition 8 and then went on a rampage. Donors where harassed. Several either lost their jobs or resigned because of the harassment.

Irate liberals harassed businesses.

There is a legal description of what they did. It is called intimidation; at one time the balliwick of thugs and mobs.

The goal of the left in Wisconsin has been to find out the names of donors who helped Scott Walker. Walker’s reforms crippled the left by drying up a cash cow from forced union dues.

The left never forgives nor forgets.  They want payback and they are not beyond using the law, the government or terror to intimidate those who stand against them.

Conservatives need to stand up against this kind of tyranny.  Every conservative group that is served with one of those subpoenas should publicly say they have, refuse to comply and take the Wisconsin special prosecutor to Court.

A special prosecutor is just another lawyer who holds a job.  He or she is subject to the same disciplinary rules as every other lawyer.  This case, certain on its face, looks like the Attorney is using the law to abuse people just for their political beliefs.

That is unethical and that can and should result in that lawyer losing his law license.

The Wall Street Journal, Wisconsin Political Speech Raid Subpoenas hit allies of Scott Walker as his re-election campaign looms, contributed to this report

US Treasury List of Abu Musab Zarqawi’s Passports Ends In Chechnya

In those operations, the Vice Military Commander, Hakeem Al-Madani, was martyred as well as Sheikh Abu Musab (Arabian Peninsula).” 

Abu Musab, from Zarqa, Jordan, killed in Botlikh, Dagestan, Aug. 1999, according to testimony given by legendary Chechen Islamist leader, Ibn-ul-Khattab in an interview with Islamist website 

Recent OFAC Actions
Specially Designated Nationals List Update

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN list:

AL-BADRI, Dr. Ibrahim ‘Awwad Ibrahim ‘Ali (a.k.a. AL-BAGHDADI, Abu Bakr al-Husayni; a.k.a. AL-QURAISHI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husayni; a.k.a. AL-QURASHI, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al-Husseini; a.k.a. AL-SAMARRA’I, Dr. Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim; a.k.a. AL-SAMARRA’I, Ibrahim ‘Awad Ibrahim al-Badri; a.k.a. AL-SAMARRA’I, Ibrahim Awwad Ibrahim; a.k.a. “ABU BAKR AL-BAGHDADI”; a.k.a. “ABU DU’A”; a.k.a. “DR. IBRAHIM”), Iraq; DOB 1971; POB Samarra’i, Iraq (individual) [SDGT]
The following deletions have been made to OFAC’s SDN list:
AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal (a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“‘ABD AL-KARIM” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“ABU AL-MU’TAZ” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“AL-HABIB” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“AL-MUHAJIR” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“GHARIB” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“MOUHANAD” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“MOUHANNAD” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“MUHANNAD” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “RASHID”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
“RASHID” (a.k.a. AL-KHALAYLAH, Ahmad Fadil Nazzal; a.k.a. AL-ZARQAWI, Abu Mus’Ab; a.k.a. KHALAILAH, Ahmed Fadeel; a.k.a. KHALAYLEH, Fedel Nazzel; a.k.a. “‘ABD AL-KARIM”; a.k.a. “ABU AL-MU’TAZ”; a.k.a. “AL-HABIB”; a.k.a. “AL-MUHAJIR”; a.k.a. “GHARIB”; a.k.a. “MOUHANAD”; a.k.a. “MOUHANNAD”; a.k.a. “MUHANNAD”); DOB 20 Oct 1966; POB Zarqa, Jordan; citizen Jordan; National ID No. 9661031030 (Jordan); Passport Z264968 (Jordan) (individual) [SDGT]
MOUMOU, Mohamed (a.k.a. MUMU, Mohamed; a.k.a. “‘ABDALLAH, Abu”; a.k.a. “ABDERRAHMAN, Abou”; a.k.a. “AMINA, Abu”; a.k.a. “SHRAYDA, Abu”), Storvretsvagen 92, 7 TR. C/O Drioua, 142 31 Skogas, Sweden; Dobelnsgatan 97, 7TR C/O Lamrabet, 113 52 Stockholm, Sweden; Jungfruns Gata 413; Postal Address Box: 3027, 13603 Haninge, Sweden; London, United Kingdom; Trodheimsgatan 6, 164 32 Kista, Sweden; DOB 30 Jul 1965; alt. DOB 30 Sep 1965; POB Fez, Morocco; citizen Morocco; alt. citizen Sweden; Passport 9817619 (Sweden)  expires 14 Dec 2009 (individual) [SDGT]
MUMU, Mohamed (a.k.a. MOUMOU, Mohamed; a.k.a. “‘ABDALLAH, Abu”; a.k.a. “ABDERRAHMAN, Abou”; a.k.a. “AMINA, Abu”; a.k.a. “SHRAYDA, Abu”), Storvretsvagen 92, 7 TR. C/O Drioua, 142 31 Skogas, Sweden; Dobelnsgatan 97, 7TR C/O Lamrabet, 113 52 Stockholm, Sweden; Jungfruns Gata 413; Postal Address Box: 3027, 13603 Haninge, Sweden; London, United Kingdom; Trodheimsgatan 6, 164 32 Kista, Sweden; DOB 30 Jul 1965; alt. DOB 30 Sep 1965; POB Fez, Morocco; citizen Morocco; alt. citizen Sweden; Passport 9817619 (Sweden)  expires 14 Dec 2009 (individual) [SDGT]
“‘ABDALLAH, Abu” (a.k.a. MOUMOU, Mohamed; a.k.a. MUMU, Mohamed; a.k.a. “ABDERRAHMAN, Abou”; a.k.a. “AMINA, Abu”; a.k.a. “SHRAYDA, Abu”), Storvretsvagen 92, 7 TR. C/O Drioua, 142 31 Skogas, Sweden; Dobelnsgatan 97, 7TR C/O Lamrabet, 113 52 Stockholm, Sweden; Jungfruns Gata 413; Postal Address Box: 3027, 13603 Haninge, Sweden; London, United Kingdom; Trodheimsgatan 6, 164 32 Kista, Sweden; DOB 30 Jul 1965; alt. DOB 30 Sep 1965; POB Fez, Morocco; citizen Morocco; alt. citizen Sweden; Passport 9817619 (Sweden)  expires 14 Dec 2009 (individual) [SDGT]
“ABDERRAHMAN, Abou” (a.k.a. MOUMOU, Mohamed; a.k.a. MUMU, Mohamed; a.k.a. “‘ABDALLAH, Abu”; a.k.a. “AMINA, Abu”; a.k.a. “SHRAYDA, Abu”), Storvretsvagen 92, 7 TR. C/O Drioua, 142 31 Skogas, Sweden; Dobelnsgatan 97, 7TR C/O Lamrabet, 113 52 Stockholm, Sweden; Jungfruns Gata 413; Postal Address Box: 3027, 13603 Haninge, Sweden; London, United Kingdom; Trodheimsgatan 6, 164 32 Kista, Sweden; DOB 30 Jul 1965; alt. DOB 30 Sep 1965; POB Fez, Morocco; citizen Morocco; alt. citizen Sweden; Passport 9817619 (Sweden)  expires 14 Dec 2009 (individual) [SDGT]
“AMINA, Abu” (a.k.a. MOUMOU, Mohamed; a.k.a. MUMU, Mohamed; a.k.a. “‘ABDALLAH, Abu”; a.k.a. “ABDERRAHMAN, Abou”; a.k.a. “SHRAYDA, Abu”), Storvretsvagen 92, 7 TR. C/O Drioua, 142 31 Skogas, Sweden; Dobelnsgatan 97, 7TR C/O Lamrabet, 113 52 Stockholm, Sweden; Jungfruns Gata 413; Postal Address Box: 3027, 13603 Haninge, Sweden; London, United Kingdom; Trodheimsgatan 6, 164 32 Kista, Sweden; DOB 30 Jul 1965; alt. DOB 30 Sep 1965; POB Fez, Morocco; citizen Morocco; alt. citizen Sweden; Passport 9817619 (Sweden)  expires 14 Dec 2009 (individual) [SDGT]
“SHRAYDA, Abu” (a.k.a. MOUMOU, Mohamed; a.k.a. MUMU, Mohamed; a.k.a. “‘ABDALLAH, Abu”; a.k.a. “ABDERRAHMAN, Abou”; a.k.a. “AMINA, Abu”), Storvretsvagen 92, 7 TR. C/O Drioua, 142 31 Skogas, Sweden; Dobelnsgatan 97, 7TR C/O Lamrabet, 113 52 Stockholm, Sweden; Jungfruns Gata 413; Postal Address Box: 3027, 13603 Haninge, Sweden; London, United Kingdom; Trodheimsgatan 6, 164 32 Kista, Sweden; DOB 30 Jul 1965; alt. DOB 30 Sep 1965; POB Fez, Morocco; citizen Morocco; alt. citizen Sweden; Passport 9817619 (Sweden)  expires 14 Dec 2009 (individual) [SDGT]
YANDARBIEV, Zelimkhan Ahmedovich Abdul Muslimovich, Derzhavina Street 281-59, Grozny, Chechen Republic, Russia; DOB 12 Sep 1952; POB Vydriba Eastern Kazakhstan; citizen Russia; Passport 43 No. 1600453 (Russia) (individual) [SDGT]

The Real Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi

U.S. Military Leaks al-Zarqawi Sex Tape, Sunnis Riot

By Phil Maggitti
Jun 10, 2006 – 9:03

 

an image

RAMADI , Iraq – Thousands of Sunnis rioted after a U.S. military official had leaked a copy of a twenty-five-minute sex tape found in the rubble of the “safe house” where Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed on Wednesday.

The tape, which somehow survived the bomb blast that killed Mr. al-Zarqawi and seven of his associates, had been sent to a local television station, which mistakenly aired the tape last night during an episode of Funniest Home Videos.

In the tape Mr. al-Zarqawi is seen watching Muslim women in various stages of dress. He grabs his man region and growls suggestively several times while women lift their burqas away from their faces, revealing first one cheek, then the other. One woman is even seen licking her lips, swaying erotically, and sucking her left forefinger—a supreme act of sensuality/degradation in the Muslim world.

“That’s bin Laden’s mother,” laughs Mr. al-Zarqawi, who was never as close to the al-Qaida leader as some sources claimed.

Soon after the tape had been aired, thousands of Mr. al-Zarqawi’s Sunni followers gathered in the courtyard of the Ramadi Inn, waving crudely drawn posters of American president George W. Bush with an outsize penis for a nose. The demonstrators shouted slogans and swore vengeance on the “warmongering dogs” who had leaked the tape to the television station.

an image

According to a technician at the station, the tape was dropped off by an American military officer early yesterday afternoon.

“We thought it was another one of those propaganda tapes that tries to show the American military in a good light by rebuilding a hospital they had blown up,” said the technician. “That’s why we didn’t bother to screen it. Who wants to see that [crap] over and over?”

Some observers have suggested that Mr. al-Zarqawi, 39, was watching the sex tape when the lights went out for good. If so, that would be a fitting end for a man whose twin obsessions with explosives and pornography informed his life.

Born Ahmad Fadhil Nazzal al-Khalaylah in Zarqa, an industrial city in Jordan, Mr. al-Zarqawi was a troubled youth, given to bootlegging, drinking, and brawling. He is also alleged to have been a pimp. He was fired from the only legitimate job he ever held, as a clerk in a video store, when he was caught pocketing the fines charged on overdue rentals.

an image

When Mr. al-Zarqawi was fifteen, he participated in a robbery of a relative’s home, during which the relative was killed. Two years later, a year shy of graduation, he dropped out of school after causing an explosion in chemistry class that took the lives of three fellow students.

Although Mr. al-Zarqawi was dyslexic and barely literate, he next tried his hand at journalism in Afghanistan, where he lived from 1989 to 1993. He was a reporter for a small lifestyle magazine, Al-Bonian al Marsous.

Salah al-Hami, a correspondent for a rival lifestyle publication in Afghanistan at the time, stepped on a landmine and lost one of his legs while covering a colorful polo game in which Afghanis use a live goat for a ball. While Mr. al-Hami was recuperating in hospital, he became good friends with Mr. al-Zarqawi.

Mr. al-Hami recalled being despondent over his chances of ever starting a family with only one leg.

“A one-legged man?” he wailed on one of Mr. al-Zarqawi’s frequent visits to the hospital. “Who would want to marry him?”

Mr. al-Zarqawi promptly took pictures of several of his sisters from his wallet and told Mr. al-Hami to take his pick.

“I was overwhelmed,” recalled Mr. al-Hami, “but that was Abu. He’d give you the shirt off somebody’s back and not think twice about it.”

an image

Mr. al-Zarqawi returned to Zarqa in 1993, and before long his fascination with explosives and pornography intersected. According to a former Jordanian intelligence official, Mr. al-Zarqawi convinced a friend to set off an explosive device in a local cinema that was showing pornographic films. The friend got caught up in the plot of one of the features, however, and forgot about his bomb, which eventually exploded and blew off his legs.

Although Mr. al-Zarqwai was never charged in that incident, he was caught hiding seven grenades in the cellar of his family’s home. When he appeared before a state security court, Mr. Al-Zarqawi said he had found the grenades while walking down the street. The judges were not amused. They convicted Mr. al-Zarqwai of possessing illegal weapons and sentenced him to fifteen years in Jordan’s Swaqa prison.

During his six-year prison stay, Mr. al-Zarqwai discovered god and physical fitness. He earned the Jordanian equivalent of a community college degree, and emerged from prison with washboard abs and all 6,236 verses of the Koran committed to memory.

After leaving prison, Mr. al-Zarqwai worked as an events planner and website designer in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The Dangerous Ideas of the Neo-Zarqawist Movement

The Dangerous Ideas of the Neo-Zarqawist Movement

ctc

Sep 03, 2009

Author: Murad Batal al-Shishani

on june 4, 2009, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi gave his first interview since his release from a Jordanian prison in March 2008. Considered the ideological defender of the overall Salafi-jihadi movement, al-Maqdisi admitted that there are now competing views among Salafi-jihadis in Jordan.[1] His confirmation of tension within the movement came in response to an escalating dispute between al-Maqdisi and his followers on one side, and on the other a splinter movement of Salafi-jihadis known as the “neo-Zarqawists.” The neo-Zarqawists are a small group of ideological radicals who consider themselves the heirs of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s legacy. Although al-Maqdisi is considered the spiritual mentor of al-Zarqawi, the two grew apart in mid-2005 when al-Maqdisi criticized al-Qa`ida in Iraq’s (AQI) tactics.

The differences within the Salafi-jihadi movement are significant because it is rare for an established Salafi-jihadi authority—in this case Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi—to be criticized and challenged for his writings and ideological position within his own base. This ongoing rift among the Salafi-jihadi community threatens to draw in a younger generation of militant youth—who idolize al-Zarqawi for his aggressive tactics—intent on pursuing al-Zarqawi’s legacy of spreading Salafi-jihadi violence into the Levant region.

This article provides a brief background on the growing tension among the Salafi-jihadi community in Jordan, identifies the leaders of the neo-Zarqawist movement, and shows that al-Zarqawi’s legacy may translate into an increase of terrorist plots and violence in the Levant and greater Middle East region.

Background
Differences between Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi first appeared in mid-2005, when the latter sent an open letter to al-Zarqawi in Iraq entitled “Advocacy and Advice.” The letter asked AQI to refrain from targeting Iraqi Shi`a and Christian civilians.[2] Al-Maqdisi also stressed the importance of allowing Iraqis to hold the leadership reins in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi responded to the letter by highlighting that its message harmed the overall “jihad in Iraq.” Since that incident, divisions appeared between al-Maqdisi’s and al-Zarqawi’s followers, and they have resulted in a growing gap within the Salafi-jihadi movement.

Today, a portion of the Salafi-jihadi community that agrees with al-Zarqawi’s actions and tactics in Iraq continue to criticize al-Maqdisi directly, and they warn other established Salafi-jihadi leaders and clerics against continuing to follow al-Maqdisi. In response, al-Maqdisi[3] and other established Salafi-jihadi leaders have warned their followers against promoting the views of the neo-Zarqawists, who they call “deviants.”

The Neo-Zarqawists
The neo-Zarqawist movement identifies itself as the heirs of Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s legacy. This legacy can best be defined as inducing sectarian warfare and attempting to spread jihadist ideas into the Levant, rather than confining jihad to Iraq or Afghanistan. Importantly, al-Zarqawi’s “heirs” also ignore the decrees and opinions of senior Salafi-jihadi clerics and leaders, most evident through their ongoing criticisms of Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi. Their decision to directly challenge leading Salafi-jihadi clerics shows why this movement is less predictable and potentially more violent; it marks a fragmentation of the established Salafi-jihadi order. As stated by Joas Wagemakers, “it confirms the worrying trend among jihadists to see themselves as capable of deciding what is legitimate in combat, irrespective of what their scholars think.”[4] The majority of neo-Zarqawist writings can be found at the Midad al-Sayouf forum. [5]

The primary leaders of the movement are al-Zarqawi’s brother-in-law, Abu Qudama, and Abu Harith al-Mihdhar. These two individuals are best described as ideological leaders because they are not involved in actual jihadist operations. Nevertheless, their ties to al-Zarqawi and criticisms of established Salafi-jihadi leaders in a public forum are threatening because they could further incite militants to resume and prolong al-Zarqawi’s legacy of spreading violence throughout the Levant. This was partially confirmed in October 2008 when Jihad al-Qashih, a militant who was active operationally in the field with al-Zarqawi, expressed support for the movement in a letter he wrote from a prison cell, presumably in Syria.[6]

Abu Qudama Salih al-Hami’s real name is Sati Qasrawi. He is a Jordanian national and worked as Jihad Magazine’s correspondent in Afghanistan during the jihad against the Soviet Union in the 1980s.[7] He lost his leg there in a landmine explosion.[8] He is married to al-Zarqawi’s sister and currently lives in Jordan.

Al-Mihdhar’s real name is Abu Abu’l-Harith al-Mihdhar al-Shazli al-Hasani al-Sharif.[9] He is an Egyptian national who studied at al-Azhar University in Cairo, Umm al-Qura University in Mecca and studied Deoband in Pakistan.[10] He moved to London at an unknown point and founded the Midad al-Sayouf Forum. He also allegedly created the Thabitoun ala al-Ahd (Abiding by our Oath) site [11] for Muhammad Khalil al-Hakaymah,[12] a dissident jihadist leader who joined al-Qa`ida.[13]

Once Jihad al-Qashih joined the campaign against al-Maqdisi in 2008, it became clear that individuals with military experience are supporting the more radical neo-Zarqawist movement. Al-Qashih’s real name is Ibrahim Muhammad Abdul-Thahir Zain al-`Abidin.[14] He is often described on jihadist forums as the “hero of Falluja” due to his experience fighting with al-Zarqawi in Anbar Province in 2004. Currently, he is believed to be in a Syrian prison, from where he wrote the 2008 letter criticizing al-Maqdisi. His long letter was posted on jihadist websites, especially the sites popular among neo-Zarqawists.

Al-Qashih appears to have been instrumental to al-Zarqawi’s Levantine strategy, as he allegedly attempted to carry out terrorist attacks in Jordan, one of which was believed directed by al-Zarqawi himself. He remains wanted in Jordan, most famously for an assassination attempt against U.S. archaeologists in that country in April 2004.[15] He was also tried in absentia for involvement in the “chemical cell,” which was a plot to blow up Jordan’s General Intelligence building in 2004. The plot was headed by Azmi al-Jayousi and organized by al-Zarqawi, who was leading AQI at the time.[16]

Still a Fringe Movement
The neo-Zarqawists are not scholars or clerics. As a result, they lack the theoretical approach that characterizes the writings of al-Maqdisi and other established theorists. The neo-Zarqawist writings are almost solely based on personal criticism of al-Maqdisi. They also criticize al-Maqdisi’s lack of “jihadist credentials” since, unlike al-Zarqawi, he has never been involved in actual combat.[17] The neo-Zarqawists’ beliefs are even more radical than al-Maqdisi and the established Salafi-jihadi theorists. For example, they oppose al-Maqdisi because he refused to declare that all Shi`a are non-believers. The neo-Zarqawists refuse to criticize suicide bombings,[18] they pursue takfiri ideology, and charge Jordan’s Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs with blasphemy for its role in controlling mosques.

Although a potentially dangerous movement, it has not yet been accepted by the mainstream Salafi-jihadi movement.[19] This is due to the fact that the heirs of al-Zarqawi and others that pursue his more expansive ideology lack the credentials of the established Salafi-jihadi scholars and clerics. Moreover, as recently as January 14, 2009, Usama bin Ladin praised Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s website, Manbar al-Jihad wal-Tawhid, providing legitimacy to al-Maqdisi’s agenda. [20]Nevertheless, the neo-Zarqawist movement remains concerning as it could attract energetic youth, who may be less prone to rigidly follow the dictates of al-Maqdisi and more attracted to al-Zarqawi’s infamous legacy in Iraq.

Terrorism Spreading into the Levant
The possibility of other active militants pursuing the neo-Zarqawist ideology is concerning as it would result in more terrorist violence in the Levant. Although al-Zarqawi was killed on June 7, 2006 in a U.S. missile strike, he left an enduring mark on the region. His legacy is partly defined by his attempt to spread jihadist violence into the more stable states of the Levant—most vividly witnessed in the 2005 Amman hotel bombings. His goal was to liberate Palestine after the battle was concluded in Iraq. In December 2005, for example, al-Zarqawi claimed responsibility for launching missiles at northern Israel.[21]

From the establishment of his military training camp in Afghanistan’s Herat Province in 2000 through his violent activities in Iraq until his 2006 death, al-Zarqawi influenced a number of jihadists, many of whom were from the Levant region.[22] Al-Zarqawi wanted to create an “al-Qa`ida in the Levant” organization, and he sought to establish organizational and ideological links between his AQI movement and other jihadist cells in the Levant.

Since the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Jordan has seen a significant increase in the number of foiled terrorist plots. During the period of 1991-2003, for example, Jordanian courts ruled in 10 large cases related to Salafi-jihadis. From 2003-2008, however, that number more than doubled to 22.[23] Most of the cases were at least partly linked to either Iraq, Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi or AQI. Al-Zarqawi himself was personally tried in absentia in four of the 22 cases, while six cases were linked to him by one of his operatives or relatives.[24] In eight cases, the major charge was “planning to travel to Iraq to fight Americans.”[25] Although not all of the 22 cases were connected to al-Zarqawi or AQI, they demonstrate the worrying spread of Salafi-jihadi ideals into the Levant.

Some of the Jordanian court cases established links between Jordanian jihadists and other militants in the Levant region. Shakir al-Khatib, for example, is the leader of a group on trial in Jordan charged with plotting to blow up Christian churches and attacking a Lebanese choir in July 2008.[26] He was not trained in Jordan, however, but instead in the Ain al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon. According to the indictment, he allegedly pledged bay`at (oath of loyalty) to al-Qa`ida and wanted to fight in Iraq.[27] In 2005, the Khatab Brigades was a group seeking to fight in Iraq and to also implement terrorist attacks in Jordan.[28] Another example is of two leading Salafi-jihadi leaders in the Ain al-Hilwah refugee camp who were tried in absentia in Jordan: Usama al-Shihabi (Abu al-Zahra) and Haytham al-Saadi (Abu Tariq). Al-Shihabi was the leader of Jund al-Sham in Lebanon, an organization supposedly founded by al-Zarqawi himself when he was in Afghanistan’s Herat Province.[29] Al-Saadi is the brother of Asbat al-Ansar leader Abu Muhjin.[30]

Another effect of al-Zarqawi’s legacy is his impact on the Palestinian diaspora in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. Socio-political conditions in Palestinian refugee camps in these countries play an important role in increasing the influence of al-Zarqawi’s ideology. Jordan’s Irbid camp, for example, is close to the Syrian border and has emerged as a crossing point for Salafi-jihadis heading to Iraq or Lebanon, as seen through evidence uncovered during the ongoing trials of Salafi-jihadis in Jordan.

Jihad al-Qashih was originally from the Irbid camp, as was Suleiman Ghayyad al-Anjadi, who was killed by Jordanian authorities after an armed confrontation in 2007. Al-Anjadi was accused of attempting to help Azmi al-Jayousi—who was sent to Jordan by al-Zarqawi to lead the 2004 chemical cell—escape from prison with the help of other militants. Al-Anjadi is also accused of plotting to assassinate U.S. President George W. Bush during his visit to Jordan in 2006.

Conclusion
Despite his death in 2006, Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi’s legacy lives on. His speeches and tactics have influenced militants in the Levant. Just as worrying, his so-called “heirs” continue to promote his legacy on jihadist web forums. The neo-Zarqawist movement has been able to mobilize and attract supporters despite its lack of a “legitimate” ideology when compared to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi and his followers.

Al-Zarqawi’s followers are even more radical than al-Maqdisi and the other established Salafi-jihadi theorists because they are pursuing a more unrestrained form of warfare. If his legacy gains further traction among the Salafi-jihadi community, it could mean a rise in terrorist plots in the relatively stable Levant region.

Murad Batal al-Shishani is a London-based analyst of Islamic groups and terrorism. He is also a specialist on Islamic movements in Chechnya and in the Middle East. Al-Shishani is a regular contributor to several publications in both Arabic and English such as The Jamestown Foundation’s Terrorism Monitor and the London-based al-Hayat. He is also the author of the book The Islamic Movement in Chechnya and the Chechen-Russian Conflict 1990-2000, and Iraqi Resistance: National Liberation vs. Terrorism: A Quantitative Study.

[1] Al-Sabeel, June 4, 2009.

[2] Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, “Al-Zarqawi – Muna-saha wa-Munasara,” available at http://www.tawhed.ws/r?i=dtwiam56.

[3] These leaders include Muhammad al-Maqdisi, Jarrah al-Qaddah, Abu Abdallah Riyalat, Abu Saraqa al-Faqih, among others.

[4] Joas Wagemakers, “Invoking Zarqawi: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Jihad Deficit,” CTC Sentinel 2:6 (2009).

[5] See for example, http://www.almedad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=10859, http://www.almedad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=11996 and http://www.almedad.com/vb/showthread.php?t=12343. Supporters of al-Maqdisi, in turn, created a forum that they named Shoumoukh al-Islam (Glory of Islam).

[6] It is not clear when he was arrested, but the first reference of his detention was in February 2007 in a report by the Arab Organization for Human Rights of Jordan.

[7] Jihad Magazine was a bi-monthly magazine founded by Abdullah Azzam in 1984. It was the major media source for the Afghan mujahidin at the time.

[8] See his participation in al-Jazira’s documentary about al-Zarqawi on July 1, 2004. This is available at http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/930C50BF-DF09-4597-9A24-18E23556F266.htm.

[9] Iman al-Qahtani, “Sijal Bayanat bayn Islamiyee London,” al-Arabiya, February 12, 2009.

[10] Ibid.

[11] The website is currently defunct. Its URL used to be located at http://www.altabetoon.eur.st.

[12] Al-Hakaymah is one of Egyptian Jama`a al-Islamiyya’s leaders who claimed that the group joined al-Qa`ida, creating al-Qa`ida’s “Egyptian branch” in 2006. Jama`a al-Islamiyya denied his claim, however. Al-Hakaymah is supposedly based in Afghanistan.

[13] Al-Qahtani.

[14] “Al-Rad Ala’a al-Maqdsi fi Tholmeh ll Zarqawi,” published on several jihadist web forums in October 2008. It is still available at http://www.muslm.net/vb/showthread.php?t=312502.

[15] In April 2004, Jordanian security foiled an attempt to attack four American anthropologists who were working in Irbid (northern Jordan). Al-Qashih was one of the ringleaders in this attempt, along with Jamil Kotkot. See al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 6, 2006.

[16] Al-Sabeel, January 11, 2005.

[17] For more on these compare-and-contrast criticisms, see Wagemakers.

[18] Al-Hami.

[19] For example, there was strong criticism from al-Faloja users, many of whom demanded the closure of Midad al-Sayouf.

[20] Usama bin Ladin, audio recording, January 14, 2009.

[21] Daily Star, December 20, 2005; Jerusalem Post, December 30, 2005.

[22] Fouad Husain, Al-Zarqawi: al-Jeel al-Thani ll Qaida (Amman: Dar al-Khayal Publication, 2005).

[23] These numbers were derived from the author’s review of all Jordanian cases since 1991.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Al-Hayat, January 28, 2009.

[27] Ibid.; Also see Murad Batal al-Shishani, “Al-Zarqawi’s Legacy Seen in Trial of Jordanian al-Qaeda Cell,” Terrorism Focus 6:4 (2009).

[28] Al-Ghad, December 7, 2005; Jordan Times, September 14, 2006.

[29] “Tantheem Jund al-Sham Bada’ ma’a al-Zarqawi fi Afghanistan w Antaqal Beza’amt Abu Yousof ila Mukhaim A’in al-Hilweh,” Asharq al-Awsat, May 25, 2007.

[30] “Al-Zarqawi Yoa’in Abu Muhjin al-Mutarad al-Falastini Qaedan Maydanyan,” Elaph, August 16, 2005.

Jihadi vs. Jihadi

Jihadi vs. Jihadi: Zarqawi Threatens ‘Moderate’ Terrorist

March 23, 2006

I just love this CNN interview with the son of Hamas founder Abdullah Azzam explaining the division that erupted in the late 1980s between Azzam and Osama bin Laden. Apparently Azzam’s “kill all the Jews” policy was a little too moderate for bin Laden. The Muslim Brotherhood, the radical Egyptian organization which bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri once belonged to, is believed to be behind Azzam’s murder. The family feud continues today when the adopted heir to the al Qaeda legacy, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, recently delivered a personal threat to the son of the Hamas founder, Huthaifa Azzam.

What would have been really interesting is if, instead of a slipping a CD with a personal message under the door, Zarqawi would have left a bloody decapitated horse’s head on Azzam’s pillow. Never go against the family Azzam.

CNN:

Huthaifa Azzam found the CD slipped under the front door of his Amman house a few weeks ago.He thought it might have been left there by one of his brothers. But when he put it into his computer and heard the voice, Azzam realized it was a message from Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the Jordanian terrorist who is leader of al Qaeda in neighboring Iraq.

Al-Zarqawi was issuing a death threat personally to Azzam, who had criticized him for ordering the hotel bombings in Amman last November.

“He was very angry. He was telling me … ‘You have changed your way. Now you are serving the policy of the enemy,'” said Azzam…..

Make no mistake, Huthaifa Azzam believes the following are legitimate targets: “The American troops fighting against our brothers in Iraq or the Israelis fighting against our brothers in Palestine.”

And he is quick to cite the notorious forgeries “The Protocols of the Elder of Zion” as fact when he starts talking about how Zionism is a threat.

But he says al-Zarqawi’s ideology is worse than either the Americans in Iraq or Israelis because of how it twists the meaning of jihad.

Is arrogant Zawahiri a blow to al Qaeda?

Is arrogant Zawahiri a blow to al Qaeda?

hindustan
Source: HT
Huthaifa Azzam was a young man living in Osama bin Laden’s house in the 1980s when he met a cantankerous Egyptian with a gift for rubbing people the wrong way. Ayman al-Zawahiri was then well on his way to terrorist superstardom, but he struck Azzam as mostly a jerk. “He was arrogant, angry an
d extreme in his ideas,” said Azzam, 40, son of a radical Palestinian ideologue who had become bin Laden’s mentor. “He fought with everyone, even those who agreed with him.”On Thursday, Zawahiri was declared al Qaeda’s new leader, formalising an ascension that has been under way since bin Laden’s death in May. But while expected, his promotion was widely viewed as a blow to the jihadist movement. U.S. intelligence officials, terrorism experts and even the Egyptian’s former cohorts say a Zawahiri -led al Qaeda will be far more discordant, dysfunctional and perhaps disloyal than it was under bin Laden. Whether it also will be less effective remains to be seen. “If he manages to pull off an operation, al Qaeda will be back in business,” said Magnus Ranstorp, a terrorism analyst at the Swedish National Defense College. “We won’t be having these conversations about whether they’ll be loyal to him.”Al Qaeda’s general command announced the promotion in a statement carried on jihadist websites. The statement said Zawahiri would continue in bin Laden’s footsteps and urged Muslims to fight “against the disbelieving invaders who attack the lands of Islam, headed by Crusader America.” Zawahiri , a surgeon who once commanded his own extremist group in Egypt, had been the presumed successor to bin Laden after the al Qaeda founder was killed by U.S. Navy SEALs inside his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Still, some U.S. officials and terrorism analysts had speculated that Zawahiri might face competition from other candidates, such as the former Egyptian military officer Saif al-Adel or the Libyan jihadist Abu Yahya al-Libi.

PERSONA PROBLEM
The problem, experts agree, is Zawahiri ’s disagreeableness. While he has been al Qaeda’s ideological and operational heavyweight for more than a decade, he also is considered rigid, truculent and lacking in charisma. Some U.S. officials and terrorism experts say it is unclear whether he can rebuild an organisation that has been under siege by U.S. military and intelligence forces.

“This is an organisation that, for its entire history, has been centered around the persona of its leader,” said a senior U.S. counterterrorism official who insisted on anonymity in discussing the U.S. intelligence community’s views of Zawahiri . “It’s an open question whether Zawahiri will be able to maintain that level of personal leadership.”
Azzam, the ideologue’s son who lived in bin Laden houses in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan and came to know Zawahiri well, said the Egyptian physician appeared animated by an inner rage that comrades suspected was a legacy of the torture he enduring during his years in Egyptian jail cells in the 1980s.

Pressure to perform
“He was bent by his prison experience and it affected his whole personality,” said Azzam, himself a former militant jihadist who lives in Jordan. “He had no tolerance for talking with someone who didn’t hold his ideas.” Azzam recalled that Zawahiri would feign respect for Azzam’s father, Abdullah, a cleric who helped found the Palestinian militant movement known as Hamas and rallied Muslims to join the fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But then Zawahiri would denounce Azzam publicly at the local mosque for failing to embrace his vision for violent jihad against the West. The elder Azzam was killed by unknown assailants in a 1989 bombing in Peshawar, Pakistan.
As the new leader of al Qaeda, Zawahiri will face intense pressure to launch a major strike to avenge bin Laden’s death. But Huthaifa Azzam, citing personal recollections and contacts with al Qaeda associations, said he doubted that Zawahiri could command a network of operatives required for a complex operation.

Changing qaeda
“The truth is, he doesn’t have the power to strike back,” Azzam said. “Sept. 11 was carried out by highly motivated people in many different places. Zawahiri can’t pull together something like that.” U.S. officials said they have seen no indication that such large-scale plot is in the works, or that al Qaeda remains capable of such an attack. “It’s not like they were only half-heartedly trying to attack us until bin Laden was killed,” a second U.S. counterterrorism official said. “This is an organisation with one main mission: to attack the United States. The harder they try, the more risks they’re going to have to take.”

U.S. officials said that Zawahiri is presumed to be hiding in Pakistan. The materials found at the compound where bin Laden was killed has not provided significant new clues to Zawahiri ’s location. But officials said that the completion of the decade-long bin Laden manhunt has freed up intelligence resources to pursue other targets, including Zawahiri .
Al Qaeda is a different organisation than it was on Sept. 11, 2001. With growing affiliates in Yemen, Somalia and North Africa, it is more diffuse both in its reach and in its mission. Experts say the network can’t be controlled by a single leader on a day-to-day basis, and perhaps not even in a long-term sense. “What has happened is that al Qaeda has become more of a brand name in fomenting terrorism,” said David Livingstone, an associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London.

In am exclusive partnership with The Washington post. For more info visit, http://www.washingtonpost.com

Posted 19th June 2011 by