On martyrdom

نايلة تويني

نايلة تويني

Martyr   الشهيد

On martyrdom in Lebanon

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What allows the Lebanese to continue living in a country whose history, and perhaps future, is contaminated with blood is the will of life which is stronger than all circumstances. Nations establish peace for a better future for themselves and their sons while we drown in a sea of blood for the sake of causes which many don’t know the results and aims of. All nations sacrificed blood to reach their aims. Successes and victories cannot be achieved without sacrifices. If successes are not achieved, the blood which was shed is cheapened. This is what we do not want for Lebanon’s martyrs who fell at more than one place at many different times. All parties in Lebanon gave martyrs for the country’s sake. Some of them gave martyrs for the sake of other countries. But in all cases, they believed in a cause, defended it and sacrificed what is precious for its sake. Perhaps most Lebanese reached the conclusion that dialogue is the best for reaching goals and that martyrs – all martyrs – are a loss to Lebanon. The long war that lasted for 15 years shed a lot of blood, and it didn’t end until a political agreement, sponsored by certain countries and agreed upon by other countries, was reached.

But martyrdom itself is a cause that must be restudied; the basis and conditions of which must be specified considering some youths are being deceived. They are being deceived into believing in causes which are not actually patriotic, religious or humane but which actually serve certain parties’ personal aims.

Religious and social scholars must contribute to clarifying the concepts and conditions of martyrdom

Nayla Tueni

Therefore, religious and social scholars must contribute to clarifying the concepts and conditions of martyrdom instead of settling at condemnations that change nothing.

Martyrdom is a noble act as it signifies a cause in which the martyr sacrifices himself for the sake of his country’s independence and for the sake of protecting it and defending it and its people. But he who destroys his country, blows up its institutions, kills it citizens, destroys his family, gives up his humanity and threatens his society is certainly not a martyr. This is what religious figures must say. So, will they dare?

This article was first published in al-Nahar on Feb. 3, 2014.

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Nayla Tueni is one of the few elected female politicians in Lebanon and of the two youngest. She became a member of parliament in 2009 and following the assassination of her father, Gebran, she is currently a member of the board and Deputy General Manager of Lebanon’s leading daily, Annahar. Prior to her political career, Nayla had trained, written in and managed various sections of Annahar, where she currently has a regular column. She can be followed on Twitter @NaylaTueni
نايلة تويني

نايلة تويني

Martyr   الشهيد

annahar

 

2014

إنها ارادة الحياة الاقوى من كل الظروف التي تسمح للبنانيين باستمرار العيش في بلد تاريخه، وربما مستقبله، ملوث بالدماء. الامم تبني سلاما من أجل مستقبل أفضل لها ولأبنائها من بعدها، فيما نحن لا نزال نغرق في بحر من الدماء من أجل قضايا لا يعرف كثيرون نتائجها واهدافها. كل الامم بذلت دماء غالية من أجل بلوغ أهدافها الخاصة الواضحة المعالم، فالنجاحات والانتصارات لا تتحقق من دون تضحيات، أما اذا لم تتحقق النجاحات، فتصير الدماء التي اهرقت رخيصة. وهذا ما لا نريده لشهداء لبنان الذين سقطوا في اكثر من مكان وزمان. فكل الاطراف في لبنان قدموا شهداء من أجل الوطن، وبعضهم من أجل وطن آخر، لكنهم في كل حال آمنوا بقضية ما ودافعوا عنها وبذلوا الغالي من اجلها. وربما وصل معظم اللبنانيين الى استنتاج مفاده ان الحوار هو الافضل لبلوغ الاهداف، وان الشهداء، كل الشهداء، هم خسارة للبنان، بما لدى كل منهم من طاقة كان يمكن ان تفيد لبنانه في المجالات المختلفة. فالحرب الطويلة التي استمرت 15 سنة، قبل ان تسكت المدافع، اراقت دماء غزيرة، ولم توقف الا باتفاق سياسي رعته دول واتفقت عليه دول أخرى.

لكن الشهادة في ذاتها قضية يجب ان يعاد درسها وتحديد اسسها وشروطها، اذ ان عدداً من الشبان يغرر بهم لقضايا ليست في حقيقتها وطنية ولا دينية ولا انسانية، بل تخدم مآرب اصحابها وأنانياتهم وحساباتهم الشخصية، وربما ارتباطاتهم الاستخبارية. من هنا، على العلماء في الدين والمجتمع ان يساهموا في توضيح مفاهيم الشهادة واسسها وشروطها، عوض الاكتفاء باستنكارات لا تقدم ولا تؤخر.
الشهادة عمل نبيل في ذاته، اذ يحمل قضية يتحول معها الشهيد قربانا يقدم على مذبح الوطن، من اجل استقلاله، ومن أجل صونه، والدفاع عنه، وعن أهله. اما ان يدمر الواحد بلده، ويفجّر مؤسساته، ويقتل مواطنيه، ويدمر عائلته، ويفرّط في انسانيته، ويهدد كيان مجتمعه، فلن يكون هذا بالتأكيد شهيداً. وهذا ما يجب ان يقوله رجال الدين. فهل يتجرأون؟

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The Taliban and the Anti-Taliban

[All available evidence on the creation of the TTP suggests that the organization was founded as a “pseudo-gang,” for the express purpose of taking over the Pakistani militant movement and turning it against Pakistan.  The Uzbek “al-Qaeda” referred to in this report are the original IMU terrorists who joined with Abdullah Mehsud in Afghanistan, after his release from brainwashing at Guantanamo.  Abdullah’s IMU terrorists have formed the hard core of TTP, dominating the movement since moving into Wana.  After taking root in Wana, the pseudo-gang took advantage of the convenient killing of Nek Muhammad, filling the leadership vacuum until Baitullah was ready to takeover command of the Mehsud group.  [SEE: Dissecting the Anti-Pakistan Psyop ; Waging War Upon Ourselves

A tale of two Taliban

The Hindu

D. Suba Chandran

SOME UNKNOWNS: Given the lack of documentational support and evidence, along with interviews with the top leadership on both sides, most of the understanding of the two Taliban has to be based on conjecture. Picture shows a Pakistan Taliban militant in the Waziristan area.
File photo: AP SOME UNKNOWNS: Given the lack of documentational support and evidence, along with interviews with the top leadership on both sides, most of the understanding of the two Taliban has to be based on conjecture. Picture shows a Pakistan Taliban militant in the Waziristan area.

The Pakistan Taliban was more a creation of the al-Qaeda than that of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar

What are the linkages between the two Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan across the Durand Line? Is there a hierarchy or chain of command between these two, or are both two different organisations with different objectives, ideologies and targets? Is there a communication link between the two leaderships in terms of operational activities, or are they more of a rhetoric?

The more one analyses the linkages between the Afghan Taliban and the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the more differences one could trace between the two organisations — in terms of history, objectives, ideology and operational targets.

Given the lack of documentational support and evidence, along with interviews with the top leadership on both sides, most of the understanding will have to be conjectures based on an informed guess. A larger debate is needed on this subject.

The 10-year gap

There are adequate writings and historical accounts of the Afghan Taliban; from Ahmed Rashid’s magnum opus on the Taliban, to multiple publications during the last decade, there is a clear historical account of how Mullah Omar from a madrasa in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ended up becoming the Amir of Afghanistan.

The Afghan Taliban was founded and supported by Pakistan in the 1990s to achieve a particular objective in Kabul. To use Admiral Mike Mullen’s proposition much later, the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s was a veritable arm of Pakistan — both the political leadership and the military establishment. There is adequate literature available today explaining why Pakistan founded and supported the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s. Of course it was not referred to as the “Afghan” Taliban then; it was just the Taliban. The founders of the Taliban would have never expected or even dreamt that there would be a parallel organisation east of the Durand Line within Pakistan.

The TTP, referred to loosely as the Pakistani Taliban, came into being in 2007 with its headquarters in Waziristan. But who founded it and who supported it? More importantly, for what reasons?

The Pakistani Taliban was certainly not founded by the security establishment in Pakistan, which was responsible for the birth of the Afghan Taliban. Ironically, the TTP was founded to fight the Pakistani establishment. This could be seen from a series of attacks that the TTP carried out; from suicide attacks to high profile attacks on military targets in Rawalpindi, Karachi and elsewhere, one could easily conclude that the primary target of the TTP remains Pakistan.

Given the targets and the time span that the TTP is a post-2007 phenomenon, it would be safe to conclude that the Pakistani Taliban was established by the al-Qaeda, rather than Mullah Omar. Though the initial leadership of the TTP, especially Baitullah Mehsud, claimed Mullah Omar as his leader, in operational aspects he was supported by the al-Qaeda network such as the Uzbeks, rather than the Afghan Taliban.

Ever since the Taliban and al-Qaeda leadership and base shifted into Pakistan after international troops landed in Afghanistan, there was much pressure on Gen. Musharraf to go against the militants in Pakistan, who were using the FATA as a base to carry out operations against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). While Gen. Musharraf faced serious pressure and at times even sanctions and threats from the U.S. to do more, there was also equal resistance from his own establishment to going against “their boys.” How can they, for they are seen as their trump card in Afghanistan?

As a result, Pakistan was selective in apprehending and neutralising the militants on its soil. More al-Qaeda leaders were either captured and handed over, or neutralised. Even today, Pakistan is more than willing to sacrifice the al-Qaeda leadership, but not the Afghan Taliban. There is enough literature available on the number of al-Qaeda leaders either captured and handed over to the U.S. silently by Pakistan vis-à-vis the Afghan Taliban. The establishment of the TTP should be interpreted in this background; it was more a creation of the al-Qaeda than that of the Afghan Taliban under Mullah Omar. The U.S. should be aware of this, and is perhaps willing to live with this; it is no coincidence that the drone attacks have targeted more of the al-Qaeda and TTP leadership in Pakistan, but not the Afghan Taliban!

Operational linkages?

There appears a clear divide between the two, in terms of operational areas and targets. The Afghan Taliban — led by the Quetta Shura (of Mullah Omar) and the Haqqani network, in spite of having their bases in Pakistan (in Balochistan and FATA respectively), target primarily the Karzai government and international security forces in Afghanistan. There have been no major operations by these groups against the Pakistani establishment east of the Durand Line. Nor have there been any major statements or threats. Perhaps, that is why the government and military in Pakistan do not see the Afghan Taliban as a threat.

On the other hand, the TTP has been continuously targeting the government, society and military within Pakistan. Except for Mullah Fazlullah’s faction, referred to more as the Swat Taliban, and its earlier avatar — the TNSM (Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi) established by Sufi Muhammad (Fazlullah’s father-in-law), the Pakistani Taliban, especially those factions under the leadership of the Mehsuds (both Baitullah and Hakimullah) did not fight much in Afghanistan; they always targeted Pakistan and operated within the country.

In terms of links between the leadership, though the Pakistani Taliban claimed Mullah Omar as its leader, it was more rhetoric. In reality, it was led by the Mehsuds in Waziristan aided by a Shura, rather than “commanded” by Mullah Omar. In fact, the Pakistani Taliban is not a monolithic organisation; it has evolved into a franchisee, with the Mehsuds as the core in Waziristan along with the Swat Taliban, Bajaur Taliban and later, even a Punjabi Taliban.

The larger question today would be, are the linkages between the two groups likely to change in 2014, with the withdrawal deadline in Afghanistan, and the change in the TTP leadership from the Mehsud tribes in Waziristan to Mullah Fazlullah in Swat? We need a larger debate on and analysis of how the linkages between the two are likely to change in 2014.

(D. Suba Chandran is director, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies.)

Ret. Jordan Generals Warn of Kerry’s Revival of Zionist “Jordanian Option”

The center of the Jordanian capital, where organize weekly demonstrations
The center of the Jordanian capital, where organize weekly demonstrations

Jordan .. Retired generals vow to derail the project Kerry for “alternative homeland”

Adnan ground – Oman 29.01.2014

Jordanian generals announced what they described as “obey the dictates of foreign official”, pointing to the political project it was said that U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry leads him, and carries the risk of resettlement of the Palestinians in Jordan.

The statement, carried the signatures of retired generals from the army and the security services of Jordan: “The nation is going through a historic moment .. serious involving the targeting of U.S. – Zionist than the liquidation of the Palestinian cause at the expense of Jordan.”
He said the generals – who Veloa release their names and ranks of the military without mentioning what he described as retired officers – that “to obey the dictates of the project, promoted by U.S. Secretary of State, John Kerry, and a convicted felon.”
A statement generals – which followed a meeting was held at the home team’s first retired Abdul Hadi Majali, a member of the House of Representatives – they will take up with “all means” attempts to “dismantle the fundamentals of the state, and dissolving the Jordanian national identity, through naturalization policies and drop the right of return of Palestinian refugees to their country.” Generals launched an unprecedented attack on the government led by d. Abdullah Eagles, regarding them as “Ohn Governments of Jordan, and lacks the capacity to be able to defend the interests of Jordan’s strategy.” For the first time in Jordan engages Abdul Hadi Majali, the most influential national character, in the activities of anti-official policies. Sources close to the meeting, for “Today” unveiled a quick steps taken by the generals, including “holding a national forum determines the constants of Jordan, internal and external, which is prohibited for anyone to overcome, or to alienate them, and the declaration of a decisive stand on any official untouched or exceed them under any justification. ”
The shape of the generals “cell” did not announce its members, to “determine the national constants,” and “coping mechanisms obey the project Kerry,” and “how to address the land resettlement and alternative homeland”.
And included the names of the signatories of the statement advanced military ranks, and the generals of the various military and security services in Jordan.
Commenting on the statement, said Gen. d. Ali Habashneh (Dean Corner armor / Arab army), one of the signatories to the statement: The meeting is the first step to prepare for a national conference to be held in February.
The move comes in the wake of the rejection of the generals and the Jordanian Ministry of Interior license them to a political party, to serve as the political arm of the movement, the first of May, which calls for restricting the powers of the king of Jordan, and constitutionalization decisions disengagement between Jordan and Palestine.