The Indian Art of Turning Jihadis Into Anti-Jihadis and the War On Pakistan

The 2009 terrorist attack upon the headquarters of Pakistan’s “CIA” (the ISI), was carried-out by at least one “anti-jihadi,” a man who had been supported by the ISI along his entire jihadi path, but, in the end, he apparently reversed a lifetime of belief.  Why would a deeply religious man attack the people responsible for helping him to find the path to God in the first place, the men he had fought beside in “holy war”?  He would not.

Something, or someone managed to “flip” this jihadi, motivating him somehow, to embark upon a path which is clearly in opposition to the teachings of Islam, while publicly maintaining his faith.  Would a man of faith even be capable of such hypocrisy and hostility to Allah?  Not likely, not if he understood his own actions.  The key to creating a functioning anti-jihadi is probably in deceiving true believers into thinking that the acts they undertake are somehow, in the service of God.

All known Islamist anti-jihadis have endured lengthy prison sentences in the hands of their avowed enemies.  Has science, or pseudo-science developed the ability to “flip” the minds of imprisoned men, forcing them to embrace the opposite of their own beliefs?   Could a mind be re-educated in such a way that the person would consciously accept a correction in beliefs?  Could the mind of a caged “Islamist” accept that he had been taught wrong, because of his basic error in entering a path of killing fellow Muslims?  If the devout, though ignorant Muslim could be shown that they had been misinformed by ignorant and evil men and tricked into embracing “jihad,” would that compel them to turn on their deceivers, those who had corrupted their faith?

On Sep 26, 2003, AsiaTimes reported that India had produced a secret army of anti-jihadis in Kashmir, known as Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon, or simply “Ikhwan.”   It is significant that the same name that was later used by the Saudi Islamic Brotherhood and now by all Sunni Muslim Brotherhood terrorists (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn).  Does this tie Indian intelligence to all Ikhwan terrorism?  How did India manage to turn all of those jihadis into anti-jihadis?  Does the presence of an anti-jihadi in the ISI HQ attack directly implicate India in this act of counter-terrorism?

Like the Manchurian Candidate scenario, it would be far better to take control of the enemy’s soldiers, rather than to go to the time and trouble to train soldiers of your own.  Infiltration would no longer be necessary if your men were already on the inside.  History proves that a Manchurian science does exist.

The ISI attack, was carried-out by professionally-trained guerrillas, and at least one of them was trained by ISI subordinates.  Maldivian Ali Jaleel had a long history with Pakistan and radical Islam; he has been documented as a true jihadi.  There is no known explanation for his break with a lifetime of belief in his participation in this anti-jihadi action.

The United States District Court, Portland Division has just convicted the only person arrested in the world for this deadly blast at ISI HQ in Lahore, Pakistan, May 27, 2009.  reaz-khanjpg

Portland, Oregon sewage plant worker, Pakistani expatriate Reaz Qadir Khan, was found guilty and sentenced Friday to seven years and three months in federal prison, for being an “accessory after the fact,” and for providing financial means to one of the ISI terrorists and support for the family of Maldivian suicide-bomber, Ali Jaleel.

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All of the other known suspects in the suicide attack, along with at least 35 ISI (Pakistan’s top intelligence agency) employees/agents died in the blast.  The evidence revealing Jaleel’s identity was in his video confession.

Ali Jaleel, aka Mus'ab Sayyid

It is not known what evidence was used in the trial to link Khan to Jaleel, despite their age differences and the fact that they were never obviously in Pakistan at the same time, apparently.

The following background on Khan and Jaleel comes from an investigative series of reports produced by  Bomb plot in Lahore does not explain the linkage between the two men either, except for their unexplainable emails.

Reaz Qadir Kahn was the only living person convicted for the terror attack, found guilty of “conspiracy to support terrorism” and financially sponsoring the dead Maldivian terrorist.  By trying Qadir Khan in American courts for supporting terrorism, instead of extraditing him to Pakistan, where he had already been sentenced to life in prison in absentia, American intervention saved him from the harsh penalties of the Pakistani justice system.  This is very much like the case of another known Pakistani/American terrorist, DEA agent, David Headley, who was saved from much deserved Indian justice.

Where Headley was proven to be an American spy, Khan has not yet been tied to the CIA directly, only through his American citizenship.  There have been no known cases of Americanized terrorists, who had not been under the watchful eyes of at least one American intelligence agency, so it is unreasonable to speculate about Khan dodging America’s surveillance net.

If the terrorist counter-jihadi Ali Jaleel was from the Maldives, close neighbor to India and Sri Lanka, then he may have been easy for Indian agents to intercept or to misdirect.  Missing from open source govt and press reports is any reference as to how Jaleel met his partner or how he managed to finance those trips.

We are left guessing as to American intentions in preventing Kahn’s date with Pakistani justice, never hearing anything which might implicate either American or Indian intelligence in this obvious act of state-terrorism.  The scant sources of evidence in the case document a clear-cut path, similar to that tread by countless jihadis before him, first travelling from his home country to Jamia Salafia madrassa in Faisalabad, Pakistan, in 1995.  After that, he was taught martial arts skills, either by Kashmiri instructors or by Taliban in the training camp he attended somewhere along the Durand Line between 1998 and 2001.

Jaleel’s path differed from other Islamist militants only in its final destination, in that he attacked his own handlers, dying in the suicide-bombing at ISI HQ in Lahore.

“Sometime in 2004, Jaleel told a friend he was leaving the [Maldives] with four teenage followers. The plan was to reach the Afghan front lines by way of Pakistan, the friend recalled.

The journey would be perilous. Pakistan’s army launched a bloody ground assault in the tribal areas near the Afghan border in March that year. In June, the first known U.S. drone strike within Pakistan’s borders killed a tribal leader [Nek Muhammad, in Wana], although Pakistan initially claimed credit.”-Bomb plot in Lahore)

Mr. Khan’s resume reveals a fifteen-month period coinciding with Jaleel’s trip to Pakistan, beginning in June, 2004, when he took time out from work, his whereabouts during that time are unknown.

India has always been content to silently fight terrorist fire with terrorist fire , understanding the value of silence and restraint in the face of provocation, which serves to confuse and redirect public awareness of any moves made by Indian intelligence or military to counter the provocation (SEE:  Remember the Ikhwan?).

India’s dalliance with anti-terror terrorism did not end in Kashmir with the Ikhwan fighters (which only served to spawn new Pak agency outfits, like Lashkar e-Taiba and others), despite loud, repeated public denials of continuing guilt.  Even today, proud Indian spokesmen, such as Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar let slip the truth about government policies,

“Removing a thorn with a thorn approach to tackle terrorism ( kante se kanta nikalna”).

Even when they do speak of this policy, they speak in code, or using metaphors.  That is how a state both denies its past usage of terrorism, and brags about it indirectly.

By comparison, Pakistan’s “commandos/terrorists” have openly celebrated their victories, like their win at Kargil (SEE: General Gambit), with audacious public celebrations, even daring the public display of high-value severed heads, taken from Indian officers.

India may have perfected the pseudo-scientific mind-craft capability to turn some captured terrorists into tools, but evidence points-out that most of them were simply bought-off.  The majority may have joined the anti-jihad for reasons of revenge or personal animosity to current terrorist leadership.

“Militants who surrender and then become recruits for one of the paramilitary groups are apparently motivated by the pay and the opportunity to carry out attacks on former rivals without risk of being killed by the security forces. Ikhwan-ul Muslimoon, for example, has targeted Hezb-ul Mujahedin forces as well as members of Jamaat-e Islami in its attacks. Some recruits may have been rejected from a militant group; others may have family members who were victims of militant violence and join the state forces out of a desire for revenge. Some paramilitary recruits join for the chance to engage in other crimes with impunity.”  INDIA’S SECRET ARMY IN KASHMIR

Parrey, known as the “king of counter-insurgency” operations in the Kashmir Valley, was credited with having broken the back of the militancy in the Valley in the mid-1990s. A militant who received training in Pakistan, Parrey surrendered to the Indian security forces in 1993. Along with some other surrendered militants, he then formed a pro-government militia – the Ikhwan-ul-Muslimeen – with the blessings of the Indian government. “Friendlies”, as the Indian soldiers called these “pro-India militants”, gave the intelligence network and the counter-insurgency operation in the Valley a big boost.
“It was the logic of setting a thief to catch a thief that lay behind the Indian army’s strategy of using the surrendered militants” to fight the Hizbul Mujahideen and other Pakistan-supported militant groups in the Valley, a senior army officer told this correspondent some months back. After all, these were once militants, many of them armed and trained in Pakistan. “They knew who was who in the various militant groups and understood the mind of the militant far better than the armed forces did.”The downside to India’s Kashmir ‘friendlies’

Whatever the power of persuasion which was used to fuel India’s Ikhwan army, it did not simply pass away after this round of Kashmiri hostilities, it was taken underground.  Taken underground means taken to the CIA.  This is a more reasonable explanation than India’s official truth, that it does not practice state-terrorism.  It is impossible to believe that India simply threw away a winning counter-terror strategy which enabled them to split their Islamist attackers and to manipulate their ranks.  This particular form of psychological warfare is a powerful tool, which enables its practitioners to weaponize human nature, turning a man’s beliefs against him. Indian intelligence was successful in creating a “reverse jihad” out of former jihadis, reinserting brainwashing captured and surrendered militants turned mercenaries back into their native environments, unnoticeably.  To have acquired such a psywar capability to mentally manipulate fighters and jihadis into joining the enemy, to fight an anti-jihad against the jihad itself, is no small thing; it is the stuff that all spy agencies dream of.

The hallmark of an efficient intelligence agency covert operation is the total absence of any physical evidence to support any charges which might later be raised of “state terrorism.”  An effective operation would be finished-up with a thorough “cleaning” of all forensic evidence, leaving nothing tangible to corroborate any charges which might be made later.  Such thoroughness would ensure that the covert killings linked to the killers only existed within the minds of its participants, all of whom are either dead or cowed into silence, or bound by various oaths of allegiance.

Such are the secret operations of India’s RAW intelligence services.  India’s barely noticed secret operations are quiet, standing in stark contrast to the boisterous, braggadocio of the Pakistani pro-Army chorus.  Pakistani cries of self-defense, or charges of “Indian terrorism” are drowned-out by the loud international anti-Pakistani chorus of character assassination, automatically generated by the media slur campaign.

Everybody automatically ties Pakistan to most terrorism, most of us believing the false media projections of Pakistani guilt for every terror attack in that part of Asia, or associating all Tribals and militants with the term “Taliban.”  Looking behind the media mirror, we see a nation that has been besieged by the very terrorist hordes it helped the CIA to create.  Pakistan has been fighting a very serious anti-terrorist war against a new army of anti-jihadis (Pakistani Taliban) in the FATA regions since their rebellion against the Afghan Taliban.  The militant terrorists comprise small armies.  Formed under the command of Baitullah Mehsud, most of them were drawn from the Mehsud Tribe in the Wana region.  Mehsud’s rebels joined in strategic alliance with the terrorist progeny of Sufi Muhammad and his son-in-law Mullah Fazlullah from the Swat/Peshawar enclave in late 2008, or early 2009.  Since that time, the Pakistan Army has  suffered a hundred or a thousand times more terrorism than India ever has.  Pakistan probably loses more innocent lives to terrorism in one year than have died in India since the advent of modern Salafi-terrorism, yet you would never get that impression in Western media.  Indians and their American sponsors expertly manipulate popular opinion to play-up popular themes, like Indian victimization, while spinning true reports about India and state-sponsored terror to implicate Pakistan, or the Army or ISI.

After the post-2001 Kashmiri battles, hostilities erupted in Balochistan and in South Waziristan.  The more radicalized Taliban “students” that the Pakistani madrassas pumped out, the more candidates that became available, or susceptible to India’s anti-Taliban efforts.

It is unknown how deeply the Indian spy agency was involved in the process, but the majority of the anti-jihadi recruits came from India-sponsored Northern Alliance forces around Kunduz, Afghanistan, an area long under the influence of India.  A large number of the men recruited to join anti-terrorist leaders like Abdullah Mehsud (after his release from Guantanamo in 2004) were either Uzbeks or disillusioned former Taliban, who were left behind to suffer the indignities of General Dostum and Gitmo, after the Kunduz airlift to Pakistan.

Top candidates for anti-jihad graduated from these Indian/American mind control programs and were then released into Afghanistan, where they mysteriously acquired limitless sources of cash, weaponry and recruits, before their reinsertion back into the Tribal Regions of Pakistan.  With the loyal Pakistani tribes embracing the released Taliban with open arms, apparently, no one bothered to question the reconditioned terrorists about their freedom and good fortune.

The Mehsud militants, just like all targeted militant Sunni outfits, used their reprogrammed influence upon other militant groups, to pollute the ideological integrity of the Tribal Islamists.   Using their recommitted mercenary cadres to commit acts of “false flag” sectarian terrorism, intended to implicate all Taliban,  the anti-jihadi leaders waged war upon Shia and upon other factions, particularly those allied with Maulvi Nazir. with the intention of igniting the anti-jihadi “civil war” first in the tribal tinderbox of Wana, intended then to spread to all of the restive FATA Region.  By early 2007 there was a virtual mini-war underway within Wana, fueled by punitive attacks committed upon pious Muslims by self-appointed, Wahhabi/Deobandi-influenced, Shariah-pushing Uzbeks, most of them from the IMU (Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan).

These acts of “Islamist” terrorism served to obliterate the ideological purity of the radical Islamist factory in Pakistan, which had always supplied fresh fighters to the Taliban fighting the fore Afghanistan, to the war in Bosnia, to assorted adventures in the MENA region.  Painting over the “Holy Warrior” imagery employed around the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was easy, using faithful puppets to ensure daily scenes of mass-murder, drawn in shades of bright red, using brushes dipped in puddled pools of spent, wasted human life.  Now, the factory’s terrorist output is turning against the factory itself, planning to explode it, using sabotage from within the Taliban movement.  Such is the purpose of all or part of the Pakistani Taliban, the TTP.

This is where an anti-jihadi movement might actually help to implode Pakistan’s Sunni terrorist union.  By taking the jihad to the jihadis, in such a way as to challenge the moral legal ground staked-out by the Taliban, thoughtful, sincere counter-jihadis can easily refute the false Taliban message.  Wahhabi/Deobandi claims of divine privilege to slaughter the unbelievers is not from the Quran.  It is NOT a message meant for our time; it is a vestige of a people seeking to establish earthly order through the creation of self-defined Law (Shariah).

Even though there is no real evidence to tie India to actions of the Pakistani Taliban (TTP), we can measure the success of the anti-Taliban Mehsud by the fact that everybody automatically assumes now that every act of terror is tied to Pakistan.  Most of us are willing to believe every false media projection of Pakistani guilt for everything in that part of Asia, or associating all Tribals and militants with the term “Taliban.”

Then there are the mysterious murders of Taliban trainer and mentor, ISI colonel, Sultan Amir Tarar (also known as Col. Imam) and ISI agent Khalid Khawaja, who were killed trying to deliver to Hakeemullah Mehsud a list of

14 senior Punjabi Taliban commanders…were getting financial assistance from Indian intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW)”, according to Khalid Khawaja.

In an infamous video gone viral, Col. Imam was murdered by one of Hakeemullah’s men, after a long harangue by Mehsud.  The two elderly former ISI agents were on their way through dangerous Tribal country to deliver the list to Mehsud, yet some mysterious, new group, calling itself the “Asian Tigers,” kidnaps them, only to deliver them to Hakeemullah.  Khawaja was accused of being a CIA operative, the charge for which he was killed.  Just another bizarre incident in the land of Jihadis and anti-Jihadis, along with jihadis pretending to be anti-jihadis, and vice versa.