Mullah Dadullah Still Alive, Despite Claims Made By CIA-Taliban

[SEE:  Mullah Dadullah Front, Guantanamo, and the New, New Taliban]

Dadullah alive and kicking: Taliban’s breakaway faction


KABUL (Pajhwok): Taliban’s breakaway faction on Friday denied the killing of Mullah Mansoor Dadullah during clashes in the Khak-i-Afghan district of southern Zabul province.

A day earlier, Zabul’s deputy police chief, Ghulam Jilani Farahi, said the dreaded insurgent commander had been killed by Taliban leader Mullah Mansoor Akhtar’s supporters in the Kulrghan area of the district.

But a spokesman for the splinter group, Qari Hamza, told Pajhwok Afghan News opponents had spread propaganda about Dadullah’s death to hide the heavy casualties they had suffered during clashes.

“According to my information, Mansoor Dadullah is very much alive and kicking,” he remarked, claiming Mullah Mansoor’s loyalists had suffered many casualties during clashes in the restive province.

Qari Hamza vehemently denied his faction’s involvement in the beheading of seven civilians from the Hazara community, including four women and a child, in Khak-i-Afghan district on November 8.

The decapitations have triggered a wave of angry protests in Kabul and several other provinces, with a large of demonstrators trying to storm the heavily-fortified Presidential Palace in the capital.

Before the fighting erupted in Zabul, the group’s spokesman said, they held all hostages. But the fighters vacated several areas in the wake of attacks from supporters of Akhtar Mohammad.

Qari Hamza accused the rival outfit of killing the civilians to defame the breakaway faction. The slayings have prompted civil society, residents and rights groups to denounce all Taliban factions and the Islamic State.

Earlier in the year, Mansoor Dadullah refused to swear allegiance to the new Taliban leader and joined forces with a number of Uzbek rebels in Khak-i-Afghan.

Dadullah is a brother of former Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah. A month ago, Mullah Rassoul, a Taliban commander, created the splinter new group and named Dadullah as its deputy leader.


A Case Study of the Islamic State as the Saddam Regime’s Afterlife: The Fedayeen Saddam

syrian intifada

By Kyle Orton (@KyleWOrton)

Published at Baghdad Invest

Fedayeen SaddamSaddam Hussein created the Fedayeen Saddam in 1994 as a paramilitary Praetorian unit. The Fedayeen were initially charged with protecting the regime from a repeat of the revolts that followed Saddam’s eviction from Kuwait by acting as a pre-emptive counter-insurgency force. Over time this internal security mission became increasingly about enforcing the Islamic law. Saddam had begun Islamizing his regime in the late 1980s, and intensified this in the early 1990s, attempting to create a synthesis of Ba’athism and Salafism to buttress his legitimacy. Saddam had begun Islamizing his foreign policy as early as 1982-83, making alliances with all manner of Islamist terrorists, thousands of whom came to Iraq for training in the 1990s, where they attended camps run by the Fedayeen. In the Fedayeen—connected to the global Islamist terrorist movement, combining elements of Ba’athism with an increasingly-stern Salafism—is a microcosm of the Saddam regime’s mutation into the Islamic State (ISIS).

In March 1991, after Saddam’s annexation of Kuwait had been reversed, two intifadas broke out inside Iraq—in the Kurdish north and the Shi’a south—and they would shape Saddam’s security calculations ever-afterward. Saddam would now see internal dissent, far more than any external actor, as the chief threat to his regime. To counter-act this threat, Saddam created paramilitaries—the Fedayeen Saddam (Saddam’s Men of Sacrifice), al-Jaysh al-Quds (the Army of Jerusalem), and the Ba’ath Party militia—of which the Fedayeen was primus inter pares that “swore loyalty not to Iraq but to its president“.

Saddam had always been distrustful of the official military, seeing it as the likeliest source of a coup. After Saddam executed a number of senior Generals, blaming them for the failure in Kuwait, despite the fact the senior Generals opposed the Kuwait invasion, trust between Saddam and the senior military leaders broke down entirely. The professional military complained that the Fedayeen starved them of scarce resources; this was not an accident. Saddam sought to check the power of the senior Generals with the militias, specifically the Fedayeen, which operated outside the usual lines of command, answerable to Saddam’s oldest son, the psychopathic Uday. The Fedayeen’s recruits were selected far more for their fanatical loyalty to the dictator rather than their military skill.

“Uday’s Fedayeen … were staffed by people who were not senior regime members and had little access to intelligence or important operations,” Joel Rayburn, a former intelligence officer and adviser to Gen. David Petraeus who wrote a history of Iraq, told me. “[Izzat ad-Douri] and his people were … powerful inside the regime and plugged into the inner circle,” Rayburn said, while the Fedayeen were the opposite. “Basically Uday had to create a force by recruiting from the leftovers, including Shi’a from Baghdad,” Rayburn added.

Fedayeen Saddam propaganda video, children's training camp

Fedayeen Saddam propaganda video, children’s training camp

Still, the Fedayeen did what was needed: distributed throughout Iraq, especially the Shi’a south, they formed a pre-emptive counter-insurgency force, using espionage, intimidation, and violence in best KGB fashion to liquidate those who even might pose a threat to the regime, notably Shi’a clerics who were gaining too much popularity, such as Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq as-Sadr, the spiritual leader of Iraq’s Shi’ites. ISIS has rather notably mobilized the same tactics of infiltration and pre-emptive assassination in the areas it conquers.

To evade the sanctions, Saddam set up a grey economy run by Douri, his deputy, which smuggled oil and other goods across Iraq’s borders, funding a patronage network of security services (including Saddam’s Praetorians like the Fedayeen), tribes, and criminal elements to hold the regime in place. Douri took the chance for personal enrichment and also set up a Freemason-style parallel network based on his Sufi Naqshbandi Order, which would be formally activated as an insurgent group, Jaysh Rijal at-Ṭariqa an-Naqshabandiya (JRTN), after Saddam was sent to the gallows and Douri took the leadership of the Ba’ath Party. It was this sub-State structure in toto, overwhelmingly Sunni Arab, melded with foreign-led Salafi-jihadists, that resisted the new order after Saddam’s overthrow, and it was this structure that spawned ISIS.

Douri also led the Faith Campaign, which formally began in June 1993, intensifying the internal Islamization process Saddam started no later than 1989. The State indoctrination added Salafism to the cult of the leader and the sensibilities of pan-Arabism, effectively creating a religious movement—”Ba’athist-Salafism”—under Saddam’s leadership. Alongside the Ba’athist-Salafists, the Faith Campaign empowered longstanding “pure” Salafist opponents of the regime. (Douri’s Sufism, ironically, was regarded as heretical by both.)

The “pure” Salafis were one of the trapdoors in the Faith Campaign, with some going on to launch terrorism against the regime, as were men like Grand Ayatollah Sadr, since the Campaign allowed Shi’a clerics more religious freedom, which ended up highlighting the potential power of Shi’a opposition.

Fedayeen Saddam propaganda video

Fedayeen Saddam propaganda video

The security services were deeply affected by the Faith Campaign. Sent for mandatory religious instruction and to infiltrate the mosques, many Ba’athists in the military and intelligence agencies took to the faith, some choosing Salafism over Saddam, not least as a source of comfort and a means of atonement for the atrocities they had committed. After the regime collapsed, the “former regime elements” (FREs) who formed the core of the insurgency were already religious fanatics in many cases and joined ISIS’s predecessors out of ideological sympathy. This was noticeably true of the Fedayeen Saddam, and became more true over time.

Alex Mello, the lead Iraq security analyst at energy advisory service Horizon Client Access, points out, “Despite its die-hard Saddamist affiliation the Fedayeen increasingly Islamized as the insurgency went on, a process undoubtedly accelerated after Saddam’s capture in December 2003.”

Douri thus laid the physical and ideological basis for ISIS.

By the time the Fedayeen were created in October 1994, Saddam had already begun his mosque-building campaign and subsidizing religious teachers and imams, making them their communities’ leaders, both policies laying the groundwork for the religiously-inspired post-Saddam insurgency. Gambling and public consumption of alcohol had already been banned, and zakat (the Islamic poor tax) and the shari’a punishment for theft (amputation) had already been imposed. In August 1994, the regime made prostitution a capital crime.

A good example of the Fedayeen acting as a mutaween (religious police)—and not-incidentally foreshadowing ISIS—was the beheading of women accused of prostitution, with swords, in front of their own homes, before an assembled crowd, with their “heads … left on the front doorsteps … as a deterrent.” Human rights groups say at least 200 women were beheaded in this way in the Saddam regime’s final two years.

The Fedayeen produced gruesome propaganda videos showing barbarous acts—from eating live wolves to lurid forms of murder for “spies”—intended to further recruitment and to intimidate enemies. Military exploits by masked Fedayeen were also videoed and distributed. A focus was put on inculcating the “spirit” of the Fedayeen—believed by many senior Saddamists to be the “spirit” the regime needed to recover—in children, with camps set up where children were given guns and military training (again, on disseminated video). While corruption overtook the Saddam regime in the 1990s—even, in the compliment of vice to virtue, corruption within the regime’s organized, sanctions-busting criminality—the reaction to corruption (financial and moral) in the Fedayeen was ferocious:

Punishments … included having one’s hands amputated for theft, being tossed off a tower for sodomy, being whipped a hundred times for sexual harassment, having one’s tongue cut out for lying, and being stoned for various other infractions. … [M]ilitary failure also became punishable as a criminal offense.

There is more than an echo of ISIS in this.

When Saddam fell in April 2003, there were up to 95,000 FREs—soldiers, militiamen, and intelligence officers and agents—still under arms, including 30,000 Fedayeen Saddam. When Saddam’s Foreign Minister, Naji Sabri, wrote to Saddam during the invasion that regime suicide bombers in civilian clothes should target the Americans to sow distrust and pre-emptively destabilize the occupation, it was almost certainly Fedayeen that Sabri had in mind for the job. The Fedayeen, often fighting in civilian garb, were almost the only force that did any fighting as the Coalition drove up to Baghdad.

A video of Fedayeen shown on State TV in the Saddam years, eating a live wolf

A video of Fedayeen shown on State TV in the Saddam years, eating a live wolf

The reason the Fedayeen were the main force resisting the invasion was because to the very last Saddam believed he would survive and the real threat was that a limited Coalition attack would spark a rebellion—again, internal dissent was seen as the primary challenge, not external attack. And let it be said, while the Fedayeen crumpled in the face of Anglo-American armed units, the Fedayeen succeeded against terrorized civilians. There was no Iraqi revolt during the invasion. As a man in Najaf explained, “How can I make an intifada? If I go outside the Fedayeen will kill me.”

To the extent Saddam saw an external foe during the invasion it was Iran, which he thought might capitalize on a Shi’ite revolt. Consequently, the networks of Fedayeen and other militias in their safe-houses throughout the Shi’a south, where they had been positioned since the mid-1990s to head-off a rebellion, were strengthened—accidentally laying the groundwork for a decentralized insurgency—and the main force of the regular army was placed along the border with Iran.

As part of maintaining internal security, the Fedayeen had used terrorism, including on at least one occasion a suicide bombing against the Kurds. But the Fedayeen’s terrorism was not confined within Iraq’s borders. Internal Iraqi documents show that an operation called “Blessed July” was planned for the summer of 1999 with fifty Fedayeen militiamen sent to bomb Iraqi opposition targets in the Kurdistan area, Iran, and London. What was targeted and if any of them were hit is unknown. The Fedayeen—referred to as “martyrs” throughout the documents—were reminded to use “death capsules” if captured in Europe.

Even when the Fedayeen technically were within Iraq’s borders, their contribution to terrorism was global. 4,000 foreign Salafi-jihadists were defending the Saddam during the invasion—just in Baghdad—and they were organized by the Fedayeen Saddam, and fought on well after the Republican Guards and other conventional units had called it quits. Not all of the foreign holy warriors in Iraq had arrived in the months before March 2003 when it was obvious an invasion was coming. Training camps in Iraq, most notoriously Salman Pak but Lake Tharthar, Samarra, Ramadi, and at least one near Baghdad that was so sophisticated it rivalled the training facilities of the American Marines, graduated at least 8,000 terrorists between 1998 and 2002. Whether al-Qaeda or the Taliban sent men to be trained at these camps is simply unknown, though al-Qaeda did have training camps on Iraqi soil before the Saddam regime fell, in Kurdistan.

The Qaeda affiliate, Ansar al-Islam, which ran these camps from early 2000 was essentially a joint enterprise of the Saddam regime and al-Qaeda. Led by loyalists of Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, who had been granted seed money by Osama bin Laden in late 1999 for his terrorist organization in Taliban Afghanistan, Ansar had senior commanders who were Iraqi intelligence officers and was pretty openly supplied with money and weapons by Saddam. Zarqawi took direct leadership of Ansar in late 2002—he had been in Baghdad in May 2002 and then moved through the Levant setting up the networks that brought the foreign fighters into the New Iraq—and there is no doubt about the Fedayeen-Qaeda/Zarqawi connection in the aftermath of the regime. Ansar was deeply tied to the Fedayeen.

As mentioned above, there was some distance between the Fedayeen and Douri’s networks while the regime lasted and this continued afterward. But Douri and Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed, the masterminds of the Iraqi insurgency who had fled to Syria, were hardly scrupulous in their distribution of resources to those who could frustrate the Americans. The Douri/Younis network concentrated patronage on a core of professionals from the old regime, with the skills and local knowledge around which an insurgency could be (and was) built. Many of the FRE-dominated Ba’athist-Salafist insurgent units that Douri most heavily supported had important Fedayeen contingents and Douri had no qualms in helping the foreign-led Salafi-jihadists, a number of whom were brought into Iraq by Douri through connections he made during the Faith Campaign, with assassinations and sabotage. The Douri-linked FREs brought Ansar back into Iraq from Iran—where Ansar had fled during the invasion and been sheltered by the mullahs—and Douri put his stolen car business at the disposal of Zarqawi’s car bombers. In short, both the Fedayeen and Douri were supporting Ansar.

Two Ba’athist-Salafist insurgent groups with notable Fedayeen contingents were Jaysh al-Muhammad, probably the strongest insurgent unit in the immediate aftermath of the regime and one most directly controlled by Douri and Younis, and Jaysh al-Mujahideen (JAM). Interestingly, ISIS’s “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, was a member of JAM by 2006, though it is possible he was really a member of ISIS’s predecessor and had infiltrated JAM. There is also a report from Amatzia Baram, who has done much work on the Saddam regime’s Islamization and the way this mutated into ISIS, that al-Baghdadi actually “served” with the Fedayeen, though when and in what capacity is not specified.

The Fedayeen also provide a microcosm of the way the Assad regime has weaponized Salafi-jihadism and helped ISIS grow since before the U.S. invasion of Iraq. After failing to repel the American invasion, “many ‘[Fedayeen] Saddam’ members fled to Syria, where they constituted the nucleus for the establishment of ISIS,” writes Baram. In March 2007, the U.S. apprehended a former Fedayeen leader “involved in setting up training camps in Syria for Iraqi and foreign fighters” in Mosul. Also notable, when ISIS decided in late 2011 to exploit the networks Assad had allowed them operate on Syrian soil to inject themselves into the uprising, one of the men in the advanced party that ISIS sent into Syria to set up Jabhat an-Nusra was Maysar Ali Musa al-Jabouri (a.k.a. Abu Mariyah al-Qahtani). Al-Qahtani is a former Fedayeen and had been active for ISIS’s predecessor in Mosul, where the Assad-supervised ratlines provided particularly strong support to the Iraqi insurgency. The exploitation of the Syria-based ISIS networks would go both ways: Assad (and Iran) would encourage ISIS’s growth to discredit and destroy the Syrian uprising.

The early, foreign-led leadership of ISIS has been picked off over the years, especially following the 2007 Surge and notably with the mass-cull of April-June 2010. With the flow of foreign fighters drying up in the 2007 to 2011 period, the replacements were Iraqis, and they were the most competent at counterintelligence and operational security: the FREs.

While none of the named top commanders of ISIS have yet been demonstrated to have Fedayeen background, the Fedayeen likely form an important part of ISIS’s “mid to upper-tier commanders,” Mello says. The Fedayeen’s role in logistics and facilitation within ISIS goes back to the early days of the insurgency. “Several insurgent cell leaders in Fallujah in 2004 were former Fedayeen accepted into Salafist groups on the condition they repudiated Saddam,” Mello continues. And the Fedayeen linked up with ISIS’s predecessors for terrorist attacks on the Coalition by drawing on “connections going back to their pre-invasion relationship with Zarqawi’s Tawhid wal-Jihad. Notably the leader of Zarqawi’s ‘Umar Brigade’ cell formed in 2005 tasked with attacks against Badr and other Shi’ite groups was a former Fedayeen.”

The Fedayeen did not have access to the intellectual capital and logistics capacity, such as the personal connections, that the senior military and intelligence officers did, so it makes sense that they would not rise to the apex of ISIS, but they would be the prime candidates when ISIS was repairing its mid- and upper-mid-level structure.

The Fedayeen helped imbue ISIS with the spirit of fanaticism and cruelty from the beginning, and by now, with all of the former Iraqi insurgent groups—and their Fedayeen contingents—subordinated to ISIS, their role must be relatively enhanced. The Fedayeen were a key part of Saddam’s Islamization program, internally and externally, linking the regime with Islamist terrorists around the world, and in the aftermath provided connections with al-Qaeda and its offshoots for the Salafized regime remnants. The Fedayeen was a crucial glue that helped bind the disparate elements of the Iraqi insurgency together as it transformed into ISIS.

128 Dead, So Far, In Paris Terrorist Fedayeen/Commando Attack

[SEE:  The Paris attacks show that barbarians are inside the gate ; NUKE ISIS!!]

Attacks in Paris: at least 128 dead, decreed three days of mourning


Together Editor

Place Léon Blum (Paris 11th), Saturday, November 15, 2015. A psychological cell was set up for the victims of the 11th to the mayor.
Place Léon Blum (Paris 11th), Saturday, November 15, 2015. A psychological cell was set up for the victims of the 11th to the mayor. (LP / Olivier Arandel.)


First day state of emergency in France. The country is waking up Saturday morning in fright after the series of terrorist attacks in Paris Friday night.

At least 128 people were killed and 192 injured including 79 in serious condition. Eight attackers were killed. All night relief continued to intervene. François Hollande must keep a Defence Council at 9 am at the Elysee.


IDF Pilots May Be Bombing for Saudis In Yemen

[SEE:  Saudi Prince Makes Stunning Announcement About Israel And The Palestinians ; “We, the Saudi family are cousins of the Jews.”]

Israel has common interests with Saudi Arabia in Yemen,

we might send F16 warplanes to help Saudis to bomb Yemeni rebels; Israeli officials


Lt. Col. Peter Lerner

On Thursday, Lt. Col. Peter Lerner, the IDF spokesperson in a joint press conference with Egyptian military officials in Cairo tried to insinuate the idea of potential Saudi-Israeli co-operation in striking Houthi Shiite rebels – a close ally of Saudi Arabia’s arch-enemy, Iran–, albeit Mr. Lerner did not explicitly specify whether the Israeli F16 pilots themselves would take part in combat or just military assistance and experts is what Israel can offer.

“We have common enemy in Yemen and we shall face Iran’s increasing interference in that country but unfortunately the Saudis are utterly hapless to rout rebels’ encroachment, thus to break the status quo we made sincere proposals to our Saudi partners,” the Kuwaiti News Agency (KUNA) cited the Israeli official as saying.

The security of Bab-el-Mandeb waterway is of essential importance for Israeli national interest, added Lt. Col. Lerner, and we won’t let Iranians or their Yemeni stalwarts to seize the southern port city of Aden, hence our Air Force can dispatch fighter jets to pound the Houthi rebels and subsequently Iran would loosen its grip, but due to considerable geographical distance between Israel and Yemen we must use Saudi air bases to refuel.

Meanwhile , tens of thousands of indignant Yemenis took to the streets of Sana’a’, the capital city of Yemen, in protest to the ongoing Saudi siege and atrocious war crimes committed by Saudi regime.  The Yemeni demonstrators held placards reading “No to colonial plots, No to blockade and No to war”. Chanting anti-Saudi slogans, participants held banners condemning the so-called Saudi-led coalition targeting the Yemeni civilians.

The protesters called for the option of ‘resistance’ as the sole strategy to face the Saudi-Israeli aggression declaring their support for Abdul-Malik al-Houthi and his decisions of resorting to decisive defensive measures—probably using long-rang Squad missiles.

Yemeni demonstrators slammed UN and other international organizations for failing to condemn the Saudi war against their country which resulted in killing of civilians, among them children, women and the elderly and the deliberate destruction of the civilian infrastructure. Moreover, the Yemenis called on International community to protect Yemenis from Saudi crimes and bring an immediate end to Saudi aggression and their al-Qaeda affiliated militias.

Paris under siege—Dozens dead, hostages taken in terror attacks

Paris under siege: Dozens dead, hostages taken in terror attacks

new york post

At least 60 people were killed in four coordinated shooting and bomb attacks in central Paris late Friday while up to 100 others were taken hostage at a heavy metal concert, French authorities said.

A man armed with a Kalashnikov fatally shot a number of people and wounded seven others at a packed restaurant and there were also a pair of explosions in another restaurant near the Stade de France, where the French soccer team was playing Germany.

Authorities suspect the attack near the stadium was the work of a suicide bomber.

Two other gunmen fired at least 20 shots in the Bataclan theater, where the US band the Eagles of Death Metal were playing, killing a number and holding up to 100 concertgoers hostage.

And there were reports of yet another shooting the Les Halles shopping mall.

A US law enforcement official said the attacks bore all the signs of a terrorist operation.

“Typically when there are coordinated attacks — in this case three — it has all the hallmarks of it being a terrorist attack,” the source said.

Police and ambulances were on the scene outside the Cambodge Cambodian restaurant in the 10th arrondissement or district where one of the atrocities occurred.

Dozens of shots were fired, according to witnesses, who described the grisly scene as a “nightmare,” with multiple bodies lying in the street, the Liberation newspaper reports.

Reports said that French President Hollande was in the stadium at the time of the attacks but was hustled away by his security team.

Hollande later called an emergency cabinet.

The game continued for some time before authorities asked fans.

The city was in a state of panic as authorities were frantically trying to determine if some of the attackers were still on the loose.

Friday morning, Germany’s national team returned to its hotel in western Paris after being evacuated following a bomb threat, The Telegraph reported.

The Hotel Molitor said an anonymous person called in the threat at 9:50 a.m. and the German team and other guests were quickly evacuated.



Police officials in France on November 13, 2015 reported multiple terror incidents, leaving dozens dead.