The Tuzla Airlift–Sometimes History Refuses to Be Silent

[The Bosnian rescue mission, to save the “Islamist” army (some elements of future “Al Qaida” among them) that had been thrown together by Bill Clinton and his cohorts to advance American foreign policy as he saw fit, in spite of Congressional opinion or U.N. resolutions (Resolution 713).  The organization created for this purpose, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), was a new variation of a previous subversive organization also constructed for the purpose of subverting the will of Congress in a war zone (Boland Amendment), which media personality Oliver North referred to mischievously as “The Enterprise.”

Then, as now, American entities, composed of thousands of former and active intelligence and military services, supervised an international network (pipeline) of transportation and communication which facilitated the movement of “Islamic” militant armies and their arsenals, in a massive illegal operation, which operated beyond American and international law.  This is “al Qaida,” ladies and gentlemen.  Those crazy Arabs and Muslim terrorists behind the 911 attacks were trained by us and acted under American direction; they all do.

There would be no international “Islamist” terrorism if not for its American state sponsor (SEE: America’s “Islamists” Go Where Oilmen Fear to Tread).]

The Tuzla Airlift

the ABiH [Bosnian Muslim Army]
on 10 February 1995 that he had heard a Hercules C-130 on Tuzla Air Base. The Norwegian logistics battalion (known as NorLogBat), 4 kilometres from Tuzla West, also reported observing three unidentified aircraft: one cargo aircraft and two jet fighters. The cargo aircraft was described as a four-engine Hercules; the two fighters each flew close to either of the wing tips of the C-130 and left the area immediately after the Hercules has started the final approach. This was a familiar flying trick, because it created the impression on the radar screen that only one aircraft was in the air. Independently of this, Norwegian medical personnel (of NorMedCoy) reported seeing the same C-130.
The clandestine flights almost always seem to have taken place on nights either when no AWACS were in the air, or AWACS aircraft with US crews…

On 16 February, another C-130 was observed, and in the following days two more. A British daily newspaper even made a connection with a visit by Holbrooke to Turkey in mid February. This was not the end of the matter, because a further four flights were observed, where one aircraft was seen by a British UNMO using night vision binoculars. On 17 and 19 February, UN personnel made sixteen reports of helicopters that landed on Tuzla Air Base. Yet another cargo aircraft was said to have landed, or to have ejected its load at low altitude. Norwegian UNPROFOR patrols were consistently hindered by the ABiH. They did observe a few days later that the ABiH were wearing new American-manufactured uniforms. UNPROFOR soldiers established that a convoy of approximately 75 trucks left the airfield in the evening…

On the question regarding Black Flights, the commander of the Norwegian battalion, Colonel G. Arlefalk, stated that his soldiers sometimes reported six to eight aircraft to him, approaching from the direction of Brcko.

The equipment that was delivered in Tuzla consisted mainly of quick-firing weapons, ammunition, uniforms, helmets, new anti-tank weapons and Stingers.

The ABiH commander of Zepa reported, for example, that on 14 February 1995, a few days after the first observations of the Black Flights, forty machine guns were transported by air, some of which were to be brought to Srebrenica. The VRS [Bosnian Serb Army] did fire on the helicopter, but without result. At the same time, the flight delivered DM 308,000. The commander of Zepa did not know what he was supposed to do with this money, but he assumed that it was destined for the 28th Division in Srebrenica.

Two days later, on 16 February, an ABiH helicopter was hit by VRS anti-aircraft fire. The increasing number of helicopter flights with military equipment not only to Zepa, but also directly to Srebrenica, led to an order from the [Bosnian Serb] Drina Corps to various VRS units to shoot down these aircraft. In mid April, the ABiH commander of Zepa gave a summary of what he had received by air and what had been forwarded in transit to Srebrenica. Zepa had received the following items: 23,500 7.62 mm calibre cartridges, 15 mines (82 mm), 25 mines (60 mm), 4 TF-8 rockets, 34 B.R. M-93 machine guns and 1 rocket launcher for a TF-8 rocket. The total forwarded in transit to Srebrenica was 50,000 7.62 mm calibre cartridges, 35 mines (82 mm), 75 mines (60 mm), 90 B.R. M-93 machine guns, 123 uniforms and 124 pairs of shoes. A computer and a printer were also delivered to Srebrenica…

from an interview with the former Minister of Information of the Republika Srpska, Miroslav Toholj. He was minister from 1993-1996 and asserted that the Bosnian Serb regime [sic!] in Pale realized all too well that the military and other assistance from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, Malaysia and other Islamic countries would eventually enable the ABiH to conduct a long war. Toholj asserted that Pale knew of the flights of the C-130s – according to him not American but Turkish Hercules aircraft, with an element of ‘logistics patronage’ from the United States.

Southern Air Transport C-130s from Rhein Main airfield in Germany carried out the flights. It is not so strange that Southern Air Transport (SAT) crops up in this account: it was, like Civil Air Transport, Air Asia and Air America, former CIA property.

[The following from Antiwar.com]

Although the United States attempted to create the conditions for legally sanctioned defense cooperation with Croatia, Security Council Resolution 713, better know as the UN Arms Embargo, prevented wide ranging cooperation between the two parties. The UN Arms Embargo on the former Yugoslavia theoretically banned the United States and any other state from providing any military assistance to any of the ethnic groups in the former Yugoslavia. It also applied to private entities, which meant that no organization outside of government control could provide advice on military planning, intelligence services, advice, strategy, or tactics to any entity in the former Yugoslavia, including Croatia. However, these limitations did not stop Croatian Defense Minister, Gojko Susak, from forwarding a request for military assistance to the then Deputy Defense Secretary, John Deutch, who later went on to become the Director of the CIA. When Susak finally visited Washington seeking military assistance in March of 1994, the limitations of the arms embargo forced Pentagon officials to refer the Croatian Defense Minister to Military Professional Resources Incorporated.

MPRI spokesman and former head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Ed Soyster, once referred to this organization as the “greatest corporate assemblage of military expertise in the world.” MPRI has a core full time staff of 350 individuals and a database of approximately 2000 retired generals, admirals, and other officers from which to draw potential services. One could argue however, that MPRI is nothing more than an extended arm of the Pentagon, conveniently formed to circumvent international law when the American government is limited in seeking to achieve its perceived strategic objectives in various parts of the world… [the original “Blackwater”–P.C.]

MPRI’s involvement with Croatia officially started in September of 1994 when Croatian Defense Minister Susak and retired General and Vice President of MPRI, Carl Vuono, signed an agreement at the Croatian Embassy in Washington which came to be known as the Democracy Transition Assistance Program. MPRI personnel arrived in Croatia in November of 1994 and the first Croatian officers to complete the DTAP training program graduated in April of 1995.

Retired General and Vice President of MPRI, Carl Vuono, participated in and commanded a special training center that was responsible for devising a new American military doctrine which came to be known as AirLand Battle 2000.

Resolution 713 (1991) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3009th meeting, on 25 September 1991

“Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Recalling its primary responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security,

Recalling also the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Commending the efforts undertaken by the European Community and its member States, with the support of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to restore peace and dialogue in Yugoslavia, through, inter alia, the implementation of a cease-fire including the sending of observers, the convening of a Conference on Yugoslavia, including the mechanisms set forth within it, and the suspension of the delivery of all weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia…

Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia until the Security Council decides otherwise following consultation between the Secretary-General and the Government of Yugoslavia….”