Who’s the Conspiracy Theorist Now? Gov’t Scaring the Public with Aliens, Asteroids, and Global Pandemics

“Is everything a conspiracy?  No, just the important stuff.” — Jeff Wells, Rigorous Intuition

Nicholas West
Activist Post

Pandemics, Aliens, and Asteroids — Oh My!  It appears that the corporate-government-media has recently become the number one propagator of conspiracy theories.  That is, of course, as long as the fear campaign pushes the right buttons for the agenda.

The dumbed-down public will always be led by fear until they realize that no major events happen by mistake in the matrix.  All major events, reactions, and proposed solutions are thoroughly orchestrated and performed by the power players.  They hit all the right notes, all of the time, save for some minor tuning as needed.

It’s convenient for establishment leaders to claim that major events are mistakes. For example, we’re told the attacks of September 11th were a massive failure on the part of the intelligence community. Additionally, we’re told that the “idiots” on Wall Street did not see the housing collapse coming, or predict the 2008 financial meltdown, or the recent currency wars, or the recent gold and commodity rush.

It’s the typical story told to the public when catastrophe strikes:  whoops, who could have seen that coming? Even some of the most enlightened minds that predicted these events still call the people in charge “stupid” for not seeing or adapting to it.  Perhaps many of the useful idiots who run the gears of the system don’t know the fundamentals well enough to predict events, but the true controllers know exactly what they’re doing, what reaction they will get, and what calculated solution will ultimately give them more power and wealth.

We all witnessed the incredible consolidation of wealth and power orchestrated by our corrupt state since the 9/11 attacks, all at the expense of the common man’s treasure, blood, and rights — all caused by 19 (U.S. funded) extremists with box cutters who came from caves.  Only scared little sheep could believe that theory, especially given what has transpired to date.

Yesterday’s article in AOL News announced that Obama’s science czar John Holdren is concerned about threats of asteroid impacts on Earth.   While a valid concern, the timely disclosure seems to be yet another attempt to reach out to the alternative media.  This comes after the increasing stories which seem to be leading up to revealing the alien threat to the public, while other new threats of currency wars and new pandemics abound.

However, the 9/11 problem-reaction-solution playbook seems stale, as Al-Qaeda seems less scary by the day.  The matrix is now moving on to the next stage of fear campaigns with aliens, asteroids, more pandemics, and more manufactured economic catastrophes.  This is their all-out attempt to hit us with full spectrum fear. It seems that if the establishment can’t defeat the “conspiracy” crowd, they’ll seek to distract, divert, or co-opt it to the best of their ability.  As a sign of their desperation to control free humanity, their version of the threats facing us read more like a comic book or a science fiction script, rather than news about actual events.

For those who doubt that any of our multi-threats could have been orchestrated, I suggest you look around to see which part of society actually has benefited from terror and the constant threat of more terror.  The conclusion should be clear:  The Mega-Cartels that seek higher levels of control over their slave population.

Recently by Nicholas West:
Is The Establishment Preparing to Unveil Aliens?
Post-Apocalyptic Predictive Programming For the Whole Family

Halliburton Accused Of Flawed Job on Rig

Contractor Accused Of Flawed Job on Rig

Halliburton Shares Hit by Panel Report

By BEN CASSELMAN And SIOBHAN HUGHES

Halliburton Co. found repeated problems with the cement it was planning to install in BP PLC’s doomed oil well but used it anyway—perhaps without alerting BP—according to federal investigators studying the Gulf of Mexico disaster.

Halliburton tests showed that cement similar to that used to seal BP’s Macondo well would be unstable, but neither BP nor Halliburton acted on the data before the blowout, according to new documents. Siobhan Hughes joins the News Hub to discuss.

The cement was supposed to seal the well and prevent explosive natural gas from flowing in. Why the seal failed has been a central question in the April 20 explosion of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, which killed 11 workers and set off the worst offshore oil spill in U.S. history.

The investigators’ findings brought new scrutiny to Halliburton, which until now has escaped most of the blame for the disaster. Halliburton’s stock price tumbled 8% on the news closing at $31.68 on the New York Stock Exchange, despite the company’s assurance that it was indemnified by BP for damages.

BP declined to comment Thursday.

European Pressphoto AgencyBP will be less likely to be found “grossly negligent” if several different companies share the blame for the April 20 explosion of its Gulf well.

Halliburton late Thursday questioned the investigators’ cement tests, saying discrepancies between those results and the company’s “may be due to differences in the cement materials tested.”

The company said in a statement that the federal commission tested off-the-shelf cement and additives, whereas Halliburton tested the unique blend of cement and additives that existed on the rig at the time its tests were conducted. It added it has been unable to provide the commission with cement, additives and water from the rig because it is subject to a federal court preservation order, although the materials will soon be released to the Marine Board of Investigation.

Halliburton previously blamed BP for failing to heed its advice on the design of the well and failing to do all the necessary tests, while BP has said that Halliburton’s cement mixture itself was to blame.

Investigators cautioned that their findings don’t let BP off the hook, noting that cement failures are relatively common. It is up to the well’s owner—BP, in the case of this well, called Macondo—to test the cement and fix any problems, they noted.

“The story of the blowout does not turn solely on the quality of the Macondo cement job,” investigators wrote in a letter to members of the presidential commission probing the disaster.

Other seals and valves higher up the well also should have stopped the flow of explosive natural gas. Workers from BP and Transocean Ltd., which owned the rig, failed to detect gas entering the well, and misinterpreted a key test that should have revealed problems. Another important test was never done.

By the time the workers realized something had gone wrong, gas had already risen past the blowout preventer, the huge stack of valves meant to shut down a well in an emergency. And the valves didn’t work after the initial explosion, allowing oil to pour into the Gulf.

The investigators’ letter provided new evidence that the cement, which included additives and nitrogen, may have been faulty. Halliburton performed four tests on the cement mixture it planned to use in the months before the blowout. The cement failed the first three tests, and only passed the fourth after engineers changed the testing procedure, commission staff members wrote. Halliburton made minor changes to the cement formula after the second failed test, investigators said. They also said the third test may have been performed incorrectly.

Rig Disaster

View Interactive

Follow key developments from the initial explosion until the well was sealed in September.

The Final Moments

View Interactive

See a 3-D diagram of the Deepwater Horizon rig as the explosion happened, and learn more about the victims.

Gusher in the Gulf

View Interactive

See Journal graphics about the oil spill from the Deepwater Horizon rig — from what went wrong to efforts to contain the spill to its impact on wildlife.

• More photos and interactive graphics

It isn’t clear what BP knew about the tests. Halliburton provided the results of an early test, along with other information, in a March 8 email to BP.

But according to the commission, “There is no indication that Halliburton highlighted to BP the significance” of the results. The results of the other three tests were apparently never reported to BP. The commission also asked engineers fromChevron Corp. to try to recreate the cement mixture used on the well. When they did so, they couldn’t get a good seal.

Those results “strongly suggest” that the cement mixture was unstable, the investigators wrote. Halliburton and perhaps BP “should have considered redesigning the [cement mixture] before pumping it at the Macondo well,” investigators wrote.

Robert Mackenzie, an energy analyst with FBR Capital Markets and a former oil industry cementing engineer, noted that Halliburton’s final test apparently showed that the cement would work. He said it isn’t unusual for engineers to tweak a formula several times to find one that satisfies them.

In September, Halliburton’s vice president of cementing, Thomas Roth, told a National Academy of Engineering panel that “all of the design work, all of the testing work that was done by Halliburton in advance of this job indicated that the foam system was stable.”

Halliburton’s contract makes it unlikely that Halliburton will face much liability for the disaster, said Matthew Conlan, an analyst for Wells Fargo Securities. But the latest revelations could hurt Halliburton’s reputation, he added. “The integrity of their product is being questioned and the integrity of their advice is being questioned.”

From the Archives

• Halliburton Faulted Over Cement Job
• Halliburton Engineer Says He Warned BP Seal Might Fail
• Drilling Process Attracts Scrutiny in Rig Explosion

BP could benefit if investigators determine that Halliburton’s cement design was faulty, experts said.

Under federal pollution laws, BP will face much higher penalties if it is found to have been “grossly negligent” in the spill. Such a finding is less likely if several different companies share the blame.

Halliburton has long denied responsibility, saying BP ignored its warnings that the cement job would likely fail if BP didn’t use more “centralizers,” devices that keep steel pipe centered in the hole to ensure the even distribution of cement. Halliburton also said BP broke with industry best practices by failing to clean out the well fully before pumping cement and by failing to test the cement after the job was completed.

As the investigation has developed, however, Halliburton’s version of events has drawn more scrutiny. In testimony before a different federal panel, Halliburton engineers acknowledged that they never warned the well could blow out if the centralizers weren’t used and that they never explicitly recommended that the cement test be run.

Write to Ben Casselman at ben.casselman@wsj.com and Siobhan Hughes atsiobhan.hughes@dowjones.com

Recalling the Bad Old Days in Russia

[It is time that the world remembers the forgotten history of Communist genocide of peasants, Jews and political opponents within its own borders, which certain American and European political forces would prefer to remain forgotten.]

Vodpod videos no longer available.

Harvest of Despair (Soviet Engineered Famine in…, posted with vodpod

Vodpod videos no longer available.

Secret History – Gulag Archipelago, posted with vodpod

http://www.factualtv.com/documentary/gulag-archipelago

Recalling everything

Stalin. © Flickr.com/Vicky TGAW/cc-by-nc-sa 3.0

The Memorial international society is holding an event in Moscow to recall all the victims of Stalin’s terror years in the run-up to the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions, which is marked in Russia and other former Soviet republics on October 30th. The Voice of Russia has the details.

It may take one a lot of time recalling the Great Terror period, citing facts and figures. Political reprisals assumed horrific proportions in the Soviet Union in the late 1930s. Dozens of thousands of arrested Soviet citizens were sent from the building of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs, NKVD, in Moscow’s Lubyanka Square, to either forced labour camps in the north of the country, or to places where they were executed by shooting. 30,000 people were shot dead in 1937 and 1938 in Moscow alone.

The event to recall the names of victims of political repression, titled Restoring Names, has been held in the run-up to the Victims’ Remembrance Day in Lubyanka Square for almost 20 years now. The participants meet near the monument to the victims of Stalin’s system, – a huge granite stone that was brought to Moscow from the Solovetsky Islands, a one-time site of a forced labour camp with the toughest penitentiary regime. The names and surnames of those executed by shooting are read out one by one. The age, profession and the date of execution are also read out in what is seen as an appeal to people’s consciousness, a reminder of the errors made by our recent predecessors, says a prominent human rights activist, former political prisoner of the Soviet years, winner of the Andrei Sakharov Prize, as well as of many other international awards, chairman of the Memorial society Sergei Kovalev, and elaborates.

Stalin was actually engaged in selection work on the Soviet people, Sergei Kovalev says. He was moulding the people that he needed, through the use of terror, which is perfectly reflected by the newspapers of that time. The order for selection is clearly expressed in the coverage of related events, with the forced labour camps, the school system and Komsomol, or the Communist Youth League, being used as the selection ground.

It is very important that the people should have a true picture of their past, since it’s on the past that both the present and future depend, the Russian human rights activist believes.  Besides the Restoring Names event, Memorial also holds a number of excursions that are related to political repression history on October 29^th. The sites that are known for the most painful associations are the Ivanovo Convent, which was turned into a concentration camp after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, and the ill-famed House on the Embankment where Soviet Government Ministers, prominent Bolsheviks, writers and journalists lived in the 1930s. Repressive action was taken against many residents of the building, and even entire families during the Great Terror years.

The Voice of Russia on the Memorial international society activities on the eve of the Day of Remembrance of the Victims of Political Repressions tomorrow. The date is marked extensively in Russia and other former Soviet republics each October 30th.

The Ghosts of My Lai

Vodpod videos no longer available.

The Ghosts of My Lai, posted with vodpod

 

Russia plans to spend 19 trillion rubles (613 billion U.S. dollars) to buy new weapons.

By muhammadjusuf

U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates welcomes Russia’s Defence Minister Serdyukov to the Pentagon in Washington

Russia plans to spend 19 trillion rubles (613 billion U.S. dollars) to buy a new weapon.

Russia plans to spend 19 trillion rubles (613 billion U.S. dollars) to buy a new weapon in the next decade when the country was trying to modernize its Soviet-era military.

Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, in an interview with Bloomberg news agency that aired Tuesday, said the government was in the process to approve a plan to raise the armament on the 2011-2020 budgets by 46 percent from the previous budget of about 13 trillion rubles, as quoted from the AFP.

Serdyukov, who spoke after talks with U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, also said Russia was interested in U.S. technology. He did not elaborate the statement.

Much Russian military equipment from the Soviet period and the government in recent years has promised extra money to modernize its armaments.

Russia has been negotiating with France for a few months to buy a helicopter carrier Mistral, to purchase military hardware from the first NATO member. The talks, however, has slipped due to disputes about the transfer of technology.

Turkmenistan Warms Up to Caspian Delimitation Deal with Baku

09:39 27-10-2010 Matt Stone Independent Consultant

The global economic crisis has put Ashgabat in a difficult position. In April 2009, faced with falling European gas demand, Turkmenistan’s top gas customer, Gazprom, halted purchases of Turkmen gas, leading to the unexpected explosion of the Central Asia Center-4 pipeline. For the next nine months—until December 2009—Turkmenistan and Russia haggled over new terms for their bilateral gas trade, robbing Ashgabat of vital export revenues in the meantime. When gas exports to Russia finally resumed in January 2010, they did so at a much lower level—about 10 billion cubic meters per year (bcm/y) rather than 40 or more bcm/y previously exported [1]—and at a lower price—from something approximating 300 USD per thousand cubic meters in the first quarter of 2009 to a price less than 200 USD per thousand cubic meters through 2010. [2]

In response to his country’s weakened position in the Eurasian gas trade, Turkmen President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammadov engaged other external partners, including opening pipelines to China and Iran, and awarding hydrocarbon sector contracts to German, Korean, Emirati, and Chinese firms (as well as a couple Russian firms). The most recent manifestation of this outreach was the government’s indications in August [3] and October [4] that US, French, and Emirati firms may be the next in line to win contracts to develop oil and gas deposits in the Turkmen sector of the Caspian Sea. In August, President Berdymukhammadov also called for negotiations to secure a 4 billion USD loan from China. With Chinese gas purchases increasing only incrementally and Russian purchases flat-lining until European gas demand rebounds, Turkmenistan’s flurry of activity signals a government with its back to the wall, confused as to whence it will earn the currency necessary to preserve its domestic balance.

However, Ashgabat’s external engagement is stymied by complex regional geopolitics. To the southeast, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan undermines investor confidence in a putative trans-Afghan gas pipeline, delaying its realization by at least another decade. To the south, Iran, which has been a willing buyer of Turkmen gas, is under the strain of multilateral sanctions, limiting the volumes it can reasonably purchase at the price Turkmenistan demands. And to the west, Ashgabat’s disagreement with Baku over the proper delimitation of the bi-national maritime boundary and sovereignty over the Kapaz oil field (called “Sardar” by the Turkmen), as well as Russian and Iranian opposition to a trans-Caspian gas pipeline, has hampered Turkmenistan’s goal of opening a westward-oriented oil and gas export corridor.

Despite mutual mistrust, the Turkmen government’s actions in 2009-2010 suggest that it is looking to resolve its disagreements with Baku in order to open this export corridor. In July 2009, two weeks after vocalizing his country’s interest in the Nabucco pipeline, President Berdymukhammadov called for international arbitration of the Azeri-Turkmen Caspian delimitation dispute, declaring, “We [Turkmenistan] are ready to accept any decision of an international court.” [5] While initially interpreted by observers as a hostile move, the president’s statement was the first indication that Ashgabat would be open to an internationally mediated resolution. In October 2009, the Turkmen government backed off the call for international arbitration—probably after clarifying the extensive process that arbitration would entail—but left the option on the table should bilateral negotiations fail. [6]

It seems there has been little tangible progress toward a negotiated solution in 2010, but the August announcement that approximately 40,000 barrels of Turkmen crude oil are now transiting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline daily points to tentatively expanding bilateral cooperation in the energy trade (these volumes were previously shipped to Neka, Iran). [7] The precedent of exporting Turkmen crude oil by tanker to Baku and then through BTC may have demonstrative implications for a seaborne trans-Caspian natural gas export project, with Turkmen gas shipped to Baku and onwards through the South Caucasus Pipeline to Erzurum, Turkey. In this regard, Turkish Energy Minister Taner Yildiz announced on September 15 after a meeting with his Azeri and Turkmen counterparts in Istanbul that Turkey is interested in purchasing the 5 bcm/y of gas that Malaysian firm Petronas will produce in the Turkmen offshore, specifically calling for “the long-term supplies of Turkmen gas across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and further abroad.” [8] Turkey itself may be attempting to broker a resolution between Baku and Ashgabat in order to open up access to Turkmen gas reserves for the Turkish domestic market and the Southern Corridor.

The creeping internationalization of the Azeri-Turkmen Caspian delimitation dispute is further complemented—or complicated, depending on one’s point of view—by European Union (EU) efforts to foster a bilateral deal on a trans-Caspian pipeline. In August, Bloomberg reported on an EU-sponsored framework for a trans-Caspian pipeline that, according to the document, should “not be interpreted as affecting Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan’s jurisdiction over sub-soil resources or their sovereign rights under international law to the Caspian Sea.” [9] The EU effort to tie Turkmenistan into the Southern Corridor without dealing with the fundamental issue in Azerbaijani-Turkmen relations hints at desperation: after a number of years of fruitless negotiations Brussels now wants to selectively and conveniently forget about Caspian delimitation. The proposal, however, is unlikely to succeed. Ashgabat understands that if it wants a favorable outcome in the delimitation dispute, it will need to leverage its copious gas resources to bring European (and Turkish) pressure to bear on Baku. To agree to a trans-Caspian pipeline without a final resolution to delimitation would be to sacrifice Turkmenistan’s main trump card.

And yet, when Turkmenistan was exporting over 50 bcm/y Ashgabat had the luxury of holding out for Western pressure on Azerbaijan. (At the same time, Ashgabat also had to worry about a Russian cutoff or Iranian belligerence in the event that the country did throw its support behind a trans-Caspian pipeline.) Now that Turkmenistan is exporting a little more than 20 bcm/y, Ashgabat does not have time to wait and may be more amenable to a speedy bilateral resolution that paves the way for the short-term opening of a trans-Caspian gas export corridor.

In December, the Caspian littoral states will meet in Baku to discuss—again—the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Moscow and Tehran will be vocal and forthright in their opposition to a trans-Caspian gas transportation project. Nevertheless, Turkmenistan is likely to be looking for a sign from Azerbaijan that the bilateral delimitation dispute could be settled once and for all. The nationalist attitudes that have shaped Turkmen behavior during many years of talks may now be overshadowed by economic necessity.

Baku’s window of opportunity may not last long, however. Once China ramps up its purchases of Turkmen gas and gas prices return to their record highs of 2008-2009, Ashgabat will again be able to afford to take a hardline stance in negotiations. In the meantime, Turkmenistan remains in a position of relative weakness.

Notes

[1] Bloomberg, 16 April 2010.

[2] Kommersant, 15 April 2010; Eurasia Daily Monitor, 7 September 2010.

[3] Turkmenistan.gov.tm, 12 August 2010.

[4] Turkmenistan.ru, 9 October 2010.

[5] Reuters, 10 July 2010.

[6] Reuters, 1 October 2010.

[7] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 12 August 2010.

[8] Reuters, 15 September 2010; Turkmenistan.ru, 16 September 2010.

[9] Bloomberg, 3 August 2010.

http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/vol3no20/20101026023520372.html