Susan Safi & Iman Safi
Journal of Turkish Weekly (JTW)
History invariably repeats itself. But in the techno age even history is running at top speed. Socio-economic and cultural changes that generally took centuries to develop and take shape in the past are materializing within decades if not years.
Much has changed in the Middle East since 1948 when the modern State of Israel was created. The Arabs in general were reeling from centuries of Ottoman rule and decades of British/French rule/mandate. Their young and fragile new states lacked infrastructure, resource management, skills and even identity and purpose. After over 13 centuries of having a structured Muslim hierarchy with the Khalif on top of the pyramid, the Muslim world lost its Khalifat with the toppling of the Ottoman Empire in 1924 that system was totally dismantled. The Khalif was meant to be the successor of Muhammed, but unlike his Catholic counterpart the Pope, the Khalif was both the ultimate religious and political leader.
Early Jewish migrants to Palestine faced an enemy that had no idea about what was to come. When Palestinians were driven away by Jewish settlers official Arab radio stations were encouraging them to leave, telling them that the Arab governments would host them for a week or two before they could return home. The rest is history.
Arab nationalism and the intention to liberate Palestine did not become a serious matter until after the Nasser revolution of 1952. Nasser rose to prominence in 1956 when he nationalized the Suez Canal and prevented Israeli ships from using it. The young and charismatic officer achieved stardom in the Arab world. His photographs adorned almost every Arab living room from “the ocean to the Gulf”, that is from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian Gulf. He was believed to be “the one” who would restore the great Arab pride, world stature, unity, cultural stature, international importance, and last but not least, the one to destroy Israel.
Nasser fell on his sword in 1967 when Israel single handedly crippled his air-force in no time and occupied all of Palestine, that is; Gaza strip and the West Bank together with the whole of Sinai and the Golan Heights. In June 1967 Israel scored a military victory of biblical proportions and reciprocally the Arabs reached their lowest point in their history. At that time it was believed and predicted that the Talmudic aspiration of Greater Israel was only a couple of decades away. The very mention of the word “Israel” signaled unspeakable fear and apprehension in the minds of most Arabs. Arabs genuinely believed that approximately every ten years Israel would strike, each time gaining more land, creating more refugees, whilst the region’s Arabs could only sit back and wait for their impending doom.
Amidst this hopeless and desperate predicament, Fatah, led by Arafat, rose from the ashes. For a change, news media in the Arab world were talking about Israeli casualties, Israeli fear, and Israeli plans being obstructed by those who opposed them. Arafat rose to a new hero status and Syria and Sadat’s Egypt scored a military victory, though modest, against Israel in 1973. There were signs of change on the horizon and ever since the immediate period following the infamous 1967 victory, these signs accelerated with growing momentum. It is quite a plausible argument that Israel reached its height in might and expanse after the Six Day War of June 1967. Ever since that day, Israel has been going through a treacherous slippery slide. This demise is the result of many factors; some are regional, others international and others internal.
In hindsight it could be said that Israel’s 1967 victory was a disaster in disguise. Forty odd years after occupying the West Bank, Israel is still battling with the people of that land, sometimes militarily and at other times politically. Three decades or so after the occupation of the West Bank Israel finally realized that it has to return the West Bank or at least some of it to its rightful owners. The costs of occupying the West Bank include the carnage of suicide bombers, countless situations of political turmoil, military clashes, enormous financial costs and mounting world outrage just to name a few. The doves of Israeli politics realized that those costs exceeded the emotional and actual financial value of the real estate gained by force. The West Bank remains a burden for Israel. It is damned if it gives it back to the Palestinians and damned if it doesn’t.
The cost of occupying Gaza speaks for itself, particularly the current war which exceeds by far any military confrontation to date in the West Bank. This is a full-scale war, a war that even if Israel wins will forever tarnish Israel’s reputation, bringing condemnation from previous friends and possibly resulting in publicized human rights and war crimes charges and trials of Israeli officials in The Hague.
The war booty of Sinai did not buy Israel any more than peace with Egypt. “Land for Peace” was the name of the deal. But this peace is as fragile as the political situation in Egypt at present. The likelihood of the Muslim Brotherhood attaining power in Egypt looks more probable by the day. In this event Israel will find itself in a “no land no peace” situation with Egypt.
In contrast, all this time the Assad father and son in Syria sat back, endorsing and supporting groups and militia committed to fighting Israel. As those confrontations intensify and become more frequent, Syrian soil and sky remain virtually unscathed. The Assad policy appears to tackle its enemy on its turf leaving Syrian turf a safe haven for growth, development and support for the anti-Israeli resistance. If this analysis is accurate then without any doubt the Assads have done a well in achieving this objective.
Israel, in 1968, lost its first battle in the small Jordanian border town of Karameh. It lost its first major war with Syria and Egypt in 1973. However, it was not humiliated until it was driven out of Lebanon in May 2000 by Hizbollah, a militia group, a rogue group in the eyes of many, a bunch of terrorists in the eyes of the West. After an agonizing occupation of Lebanon that started partially in 1978 with the initial intention of driving off the PLO, Israel invaded all of Lebanon. It occupied Beirut in 1982 and eventually withdrew under international pressure leaving a 40 to 60 kilometer buffer zone under its control in South Lebanon. Eighteen years and many casualties later, Israel was forced to leave Lebanon. Barak, Israel’s PM at the time, referred to this defeat as a “strategic withdrawal”.
Irrespective of how Israeli politicians “sold” the idea of this defeat to their electorates, in the minds of the antagonists of Israel, which “withdrawal” was regarded as a major defeat of the Israelis. After all, it was the first time in Israel’s history that it withdrew from an occupied territory unilaterally and without any trade-offs. If anything, in this withdrawal Israel did not only lose territory, but it lost a huge liquid asset; the Litani River. It would be foolish to consider that the Israelis would let go of such a huge water supply on the basis of a “strategic withdrawal”.
Fear was a major “ace” up Israel’s sleeve after their 1967 success. That fear that once existed in Arab minds and hearts was now gone. The “undefeatable army” of Moshe Dayan was no more. To add insult to injury, the July war of 2006 with Hizbollah created even more humiliation of the once mighty IDF. Israel had to soul search when it commissioned Winograde to report and recommend on these failings. The Knesset, on a bi-partisan basis, took on all the recommendations. With those recommendations implemented, and with the top gun Barak back in charge as defense minister, the Israeli war machine considered a Gaza invasion as akin to a walk in the park. Eighteen days later Hamas is still launching rockets at the heartland of Israel.
No one really knows what the striking force of Syria is. Israel struck Syrian targets on several occasions in the last two to three years and there was no military retaliation. The calculating and patient Assad may well be keeping the element of surprise till show-time. Knowing that Assad and Putin are strategic allies and close personal friends, this must be of concern for Israel.
As if Israel does not have enough enemies in the Arab world. The policies of the United States in the Middle East have been primarily focused on ensuring the military superiority of Israel, its continuity and protection. In doing so, America has invaded and occupied Afghanistan and invaded and pillaged Iraq based on fabricated motives. By and large, the Muslim world (over one billion people) regard the US-Israel alliance as a representation of the devil incarnate or at the least a personal affront. In every so-called attempt of fighting terrorism, this alliance is recruiting more enemies and instilling more radical thinking into the minds of Muslim and Arab youth. It seems like every time this alliance “eliminates” one enemy combatant, it is creating many more. There is now a huge wave of anger and outrage sweeping the globe including the heart of American, Europe and Australia where millions of Muslims are naturalized citizens.
Today, after eight years of Bush administration, Bush will perhaps be best remembered as the man whose actions have done little to combat terrorism and unfortunately backfired by inspiring the creation of countless organizations and driving the recruitment for dogmatically trained soldiers ready to give their lives for a number of related causes. Potentially such an “army” has a recruitment base of one billion people. What a stark contrast to the army consisting of a handful of ill-equipped Palestinian volunteers and young and equally ill-equipped armies of puppet Arab regimes back in 1948.
There is no doubt that the military balance in the Middle East is changing. The once mighty IDF appears to find itself unable to score a convincing and easy win against an enemy as small as Gaza even after it suffered two years of blockade. Add Iran to the equation and the balance of power would no doubt make Israel’s status in the Middle East more precarious.
Changes in the demographic balance do not look any better. The Arab population of Israel in 1948 was reduced significantly after a massive exodus to neighbouring Arab countries. Jewish migrants took over a land that was left virtually uninhabited. In its land acquisition of 1967, Israel found itself occupying a highly populated territory. This population has posed as management nightmare to Israel as mentioned above. By virtue of the fertility of the wombs of those mothers who did not flee Palestine in 1948 on one hand and the reduced influx of Jewish migrants on the other hand, the demographics within Israel proper are rapidly changing to the disadvantage of the Jewish majority. This trend, if it continues, according to the laws of mathematics, may one day lead to an Arab majority.
To compound the issues, Israel is primarily an “imported” country that is not independently viable. Credit must be given to the remarkable achievements in industry, agriculture and other areas but, Israel remains dependent on imported aid. To ensure this continued assistance, the Jewish migrants did not just bring in people and skills but also left in place a support base from the Jewish Diaspora. Better known as the “Jewish Lobby”, this body has been thus far very successful in ensuring a flow of funds, strategic and political support and unprecedented backing primarily from the United States and its close allies. The US goes one step further by vetoing UN sanctions against Israel’s violations against human rights and violations of UN resolutions. Israel has become a state that is above international law, a state that is totally unaccountable even to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
As the pampered child of the United States, the world’s only “New-Order” superpower, Israel has been literally given a license to kill. One has to remember that this license is contingent upon the existence and the ability of the licensee to grant it. America is now facing two major dilemmas; a rising financial giant called China and an economy that is showing major signs of fatigue. If the current Chinese growth maintains its momentum, macro-economists tip China to become the major economic power within 20 years.
History tells us that with wealth comes military might. It would not be unforeseeable to witness China thwarting the U.S and challenging its stature as the greatest military power within that same period. Unless Israel with its Jewish lobby manages to get into bed with China, it may in the near future; find itself backed by a bankrupt, toothless Tiger….oops Eagle.
The change in the nature of the bi-lateral relationship between the U.S and Israel may come from America itself. If the US is truly serious about improving its image in the Middle East, if it is truly serious about fighting terrorism, it may soon (and should) realize that best battles can be won by making friends rather than combating enemies; especially when the enemy is as elusive and invisible as some Al-Qaida-type organizations.
If or when America realizes that its support to Israel is coming at a great cost, a cost that it can do without, then its alliances in the Middle East may turn a corner in the very near future. Moreover, irrespective of how Obama pans out to be, he did not seem to rely on the endorsement of the Jewish Lobby to be elected. Perhaps this election win sets a precedent for all presidential and other office-bearer hopefuls in the future. If or when such a day comes the American support for Israel will no longer be synonymous with American national security. This realization, on its own, could spell the end of Israel at least as we know it.
Israel is like an inflated balloon, with cracks and holes. It remains inflated because there is a pump that is pumping it with air 24/7. There are pins also pointing at that balloon from the inside and the outside. This pump will only function for so long before it slows down or stops. The pins are likely to increase in number and sharpness.
Israel has the ability to act with wisdom and indeed could find a win/win situation for all. But, sadly, Israel is not learning from its mistakes and continues to live, think and act with short vision and in isolation from the realities on the ground. Israel persists, as is evident in its current war on Gaza, to believe that what force cannot achieve more force can.
Susan Safi & Iman Safi
23 day war in Gaza seems to have ended with more than 1300 dead and thousands of wounded Palestinians. It is really difficult to predict what is going to happen in upcoming days. Yet, it is not impossible to say that the forthcoming elections in Israel will occupy much of the time and the agenda of the Israeli politicians. If we would like to analyze the developments after the three-week war, we could say something under the following specific sub topics:
The Arab World: Current Regimes and the Islamist Oppositions
It is a concrete fact stated by everyone who knows the region very well that there is a huge gap between the Arab leaders/regimes and their societies. In this regard, the recent developments in the region illustrated this divided and problematic structure which has never been portrayed that obvious before. From the outset of the war, albeit all the prohibitions and restrictions, Arab people have not abstained from reacting and organizing demonstrations. On the other hand, the Arab leaders acted as usual, as expected, by not intervening in the issue. By doing so, once more, they proved that they are impassible and cack-handed.
Organizing three different Arab summits within the same week without having any concrete and logical result from any of them is a significant example, showing that Arab leaders do not only have problems with their people but also they are in a de-facto “cold war” among themselves. In fact, not being able to form a unified understanding toward many issues in the region by the Arab regimes is a natural result of the Middle Eastern geography. The maps drawn by the external powers like Britain and France between the years 1914 and 1922 simplify to have perpetual cleavages among the Arab regimes.
Another point drawing attention is that not only the recent developments in last month but, in a broader sense, all the negative events occurred in last 2-3 years have been pushing people in a more radicalized atmosphere, and puts especially the Palestinians on the horns of a dilemma; on the one hand, the Islamists who have been inherently criticized and tried to be delegitimized by the US and Israel; on the other hand, the prevailing secular regimes, -with a high level of corruption- which have been unable to provide proper solutions to the problems and unable to serve their citizens. The current equation is obvious; in Palestine, it could be said that Al Fatah and Hamas are the two options, and in Egypt, the Mubarak regime and the Muslim Brotherhood, which is the most important opposition movement, are again only two alternatives in this manner.
The most important thing that should have never been forgotten is the following; having the Islamist ideology or referring to Islam is not the fundamental reason behind the legitimate support for the Islamist organizations in the Arab World. The exhausted regimes, with no success story in the last three or four decades, which cannot be defended in a way or another due to their corruption, are the real motivations for Arabs to support the Islamists. In short, it is all about the legitimacy crisis within the current regimes. In this regard, as it is widely acknowledged that the legitimacy of a regime either leans on their society, which is hardly to see in the Arab world, or the legitimacy leans on the external powers. In this regard, the position of the Arab world in terms of the sources of the legitimacy is publicly known by everybody (!).
As long as the Arab regimes keep being silent in the recent and upcoming prospective developments, they will continue to be weakened by the impact of opposing reactions springing from their society. As a matter of fact, today these opposing groups are severely threatening their regimes as never seen before. Nothing was ever the same again in the Arab states. In the globalized world, it is very easy to access any kind of information by using many tools such as the internet and the satellites. Today, in Cairo, it is almost impossible to see a house without a satellite dishes even in the poorest areas of Cairo. This fact, for sure, makes people react against their regimes which have no ability to take any initiatives.
As Patrick Seale argues that the war in Gaza has revealed what was commonly known but rarely accepted; Arab leaders hate and fear each other more than they hate and fear Israel. The war also revealed another fact that the Arab League, which was, in fact, established to defend the common interests of the Arab nations, is just the name of a building located in the Square of Independence (Meydan Takhreer) in the hearth of Cairo and means nothing beyond that.
The Victory of Israel?
Let’s go back to the latest developments. Israel announced a ceasefire by claiming that Israel won a victory, before the new president of the US, Obama came to the power officially. Well, is that really possible to talk about a victory or at least a success for Israel in the War in Gaza? If we take into consideration that there are also some people within Israel asserting that there is no success, then, indeed, it is impossible to talk about an absolute success. It is obvious that Israel could not achieve its pre-announced aims –putting an end to the rocket firing and destroying Hamas completely-. Despite the fact that many of the high level leaders of Hamas were killed, such kinds of losses do not weaken Hamas or like-minded organizations. One can easily remember that Hamas came to the power in 2006 after the assassinations of its spiritual leader Shaky Ahmad Yasin and Abdulazez Rantissi in 2004. Moreover, the current top three leaders in the collective leadership of Hamas are still alive. Haniyye and Zahar are still in Gaza and the exiled leader Meshal is on duty in Syria. The leaders who announce the Hamas’ victory in the television programs after the ceasefire are also these leaders. Hence, Hamas, with its leadership cadres and the armed forces, is still in power in Gaza. From a different point of view, we should be aware of the fact that in this region destroying a radical group or conducting a wide range assaults always pave the way for emerging more radical fractions. For instance, as Salhani puts in his comment, Six Day War in 1967 pave the way for PLO and some other guerilla groups, the invasion of Lebanon in 1982 gave Hezbollah opportunity to emerge and in the coming years, in the wake of intifada the pressure on PLO and the Palestinians gave rise to Hamas. Then, even if Hamas is completely destroyed today, it is almost impossible for Israel to achieve its aims and also it is impossible to placate the tension.
Besides, it is certain that the assaults did not directly targeted Hamas which was claimed by Israel. On the contrary, due to the high number of children and women causalities, it is obvious that the Palestinian people were direct targets of Israel. This is also a clear failure for Israel whether Israel accepts this reality or not. In addition to that, the captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalid is still in the hand of Hamas. If it assumed that Israel won a victory and destroyed Hamas seriously, then why is Gilad still on the other side of the border?
The tunnels on the border of Egypt and Gaza are destroyed. By doing so, Israel aimed to prevent the weapons smuggling. As a result, to a certain degree, it is true that the logistic support to Hamas is going to decline. However, it is also known that most of the weapons in the hand of Hamas are homemade which means they are not definitely bounded to the smuggling. The importing of the necessary primitive inputs of these rockets could not be fully prevented.
The Palestinian resistance will perpetuate, as long as the Israeli occupation of West Bank and the siege on Gaza continue. Since the children, who lose their family members in front of them, would inevitably be captive of the culture of violence. Within this context, it would be impossible to put an end to their resistance, even though Israel kills all the leaders of Hamas and confiscate all its weapons. Terror produces terror and violence only nurtures more violence. Permanent occupation means continuous resistance. And unfortunately, this state of affair connotes a persistent warfare and increasing violence.
Reasons of Withdrawal
Another point which needs to be considered is the reasons behind the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and the ceasefire announced by Israel. For sure, there are many reasons of this action. Nevertheless, oncoming elections in Israel represent a significant factor affecting the decision. It has been known that there has been a disagreement between the Chief of Staff and the minister of Defense Ehud Barak on the length of the war. Barak had been intending to finish the war but, on the contrary, the military circles had preferred to go a step further inside Gaza. If the army’s option would be realized, Israel would have found many difficulties to claim a victory. Because, a possible street war with Hamas, which would have led to more and more casualties for Israel, would be more advantageous for Hamas. If this had happened, Barak and Livni would lose many votes in the upcoming elections. In the last analyses, it is a fact that from the outset of the war, Kadima and Labor parties have increased their votes in comparison to Netanyahu’s Likud. We could say that Israel was scared of having a similar fiasco that it had in 2006 against Hezbollah. One can easily remember that after the defeat in summer of 2006, the PM Olmert was in a difficult situation which triggered the period of his resignation at the end of the day in 2008.
The Victory of Hamas?
It can be asserted that Hamas is relatively the winner of the war. At least, sympathy for Hamas dramatically increased in the Arab and the Muslim World. In spite of Israel’s desire, which was one of the aims of the war, Palestinians are not fully blaming Hamas of being the cause of the Israeli assaults. Yet, it does not mean that they will not blame Hamas in the future unless something changes in the short run. In this regard, international demands should not be required just from Palestinians in general and from Hamas in particular. Israel should also be the other side requested some demands. International actors have been always just looking at the results and criticizing Hamas and claiming that Israel has the right to defend its citizens. Yes, that’s right. Nevertheless, it is not the main issue here. The main problem is the process that paved the way to the latest developments. Hamas is an end-product and rockets fired from Gaza are reactions. In fact, before the results it would be better for all of us to talk about something else such as the ongoing occupation since 1948, more than 5 million Palestinian refugees, and more than 350 thousand Israeli settlements living in West Bank. Of course, Israel has the right to protect its citizens but it is a fact that Israel has been going its own way by ignoring tens of UN resolutions and all other international laws and norms.
From a different point of view, even though we assume that Hamas has no achievement at the end of the war, it will not be an exaggeration to say that Al Fatah and the President Abbas, who has almost no credibility, lost their whole legitimacy. In this context, we can still affirm that since Al Fatah is the absolute loser, then Hamas, the main rival of Al Fatah, has relatively become the winner.
 Rami, Khouri, “The Post Gaza Political Battle”, Middle East Online, 20 January 2009, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=29871
 Patrick Seale, “The Crippling Arab Cold War”, Middle East Online, 19 January 2009, http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=29860
 Claude Salhani, “What Was the Gaza War About”, Middle East Time, 20 January 2009, http://www.metimes.com/International/2009/01/20/what_was_the_gaza_war_about/5055/
 Hamas Eskisinden Güçlü, Radikal, 20 Ocak 2009
22/01/2009 Now that the Israeli offensive against the Gaza Strip came to an end, marking another victory for the Resistance in the region, it’s time for “action” against the “war crimes” committed by the Zionist entity against the Palestinians.
In this context, the Israeli military control banned the publication of the names and photos of officers and soldiers who have taken part in the Israeli offensive. The Israeli decision was regarded by analysts as an attempt to obstruct the juridical proceedings against Israeli military and political leaders who participated in ‘war crimes against humanity.’
The Israeli military sources said that the decision was taken after the propagation of the photos of the Palestinian civilians killed by Israeli excessive and random fire. They noted that international organizations and major states were heading towards accusing the Israeli army of violating international laws.
Furthermore, the Israeli website “wanted.org.il” published on Wednesday arrest warrants against fifteen Israeli figures from the political as well as the military institutions from those who have taken part in the Second Lebanon war and the Gaza war.
At the top of the list comes Defense Minister Ehud Barak who imposed, according to the warrant, a siege, as a collective punishment, on 1.5 million residents of Gaza. On 27 December 2008, the suspect ordered the aerial bombardment of Gazan population centers. The attacks involved hundreds of aircraft sorties, dropping hundreds of tons of bombs on Gazan neighborhoods.
Israeli outgoing PM Ehud Olmert was also among the “WANTED” list. On the 12th of July 2006, the suspect ordered the bombing of cities and villages in Lebanon, breaking international law. During the attack, the suspect also ordered several thousand cluster bombs to be dropped near residential areas in Lebanon, in defiance to international conventions. In the summer of 2007, the suspect ordered the blockade of 1.5 million people in Gaza, preventing them from receiving adequate food, water and electricity supplies and medication – something explicitly prohibited under international law according to the warrant.
Israel Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni has, of course, its reserved place on the list. On the 12th of July 2006, the suspect along with her accomplices ordered the aerial bombardment and artillery assault on residential areas in Lebanon. For 34 days she authorized troops to make 12,000 aerial sorties, to fire 100,000 artillery shells, damaging 350 schools and completely destroying 15,000 residential units in Lebanon. On 27th December 2008, the suspect and her accomplices ordered an aerial, ground and naval attack on densely populated areas in the Gaza Strip.
The list of “Wanted” Israeli “criminals” also includes Amir Peretz, Binyamin Ben Eliezer, Avi Dichter, Carmi Gilon, Dan Halutz, Doron Almog, Eliezer Shkedy, Gabi Ashkenazi, Giora Eiland, Matan Vilani, Moshe Bogie Yaalon and Shaul Mofaz.
After failing to anticipate Hamas’s victory over Fatah in the 2006 Palestinian election, the White House cooked up yet another scandalously covert and self-defeating Middle East debacle: part Iran-contra, part Bay of Pigs. With confidential documents, corroborated by outraged former and current U.S. officials, the author reveals how President Bush, Condoleezza Rice, and Deputy National-Security Adviser Elliott Abrams backed an armed force under Fatah strongman Muhammad Dahlan, touching off a bloody civil war in Gaza and leaving Hamas stronger than ever.
By David Rose
January 21, 2009 “Vanity Fair” — -April 2008 — The Al Deira Hotel, in Gaza City, is a haven of calm in a land beset by poverty, fear, and violence. In the middle of December 2007, I sit in the hotel’s airy restaurant, its windows open to the Mediterranean, and listen to a slight, bearded man named Mazen Asad abu Dan describe the suffering he endured 11 months before at the hands of his fellow Palestinians. Abu Dan, 28, is a member of Hamas, the Iranian-backed Islamist organization that has been designated a terrorist group by the United States, but I have a good reason for taking him at his word: I’ve seen the video.
It shows abu Dan kneeling, his hands bound behind his back, and screaming as his captors pummel him with a black iron rod. “I lost all the skin on my back from the beatings,” he says. “Instead of medicine, they poured perfume on my wounds. It felt as if they had taken a sword to my injuries.”
On January 26, 2007, abu Dan, a student at the Islamic University of Gaza, had gone to a local cemetery with his father and five others to erect a headstone for his grandmother. When they arrived, however, they found themselves surrounded by 30 armed men from Hamas’s rival, Fatah, the party of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. “They took us to a house in north Gaza,” abu Dan says. “They covered our eyes and took us to a room on the sixth floor.”
The video reveals a bare room with white walls and a black-and-white tiled floor, where abu Dan’s father is forced to sit and listen to his son’s shrieks of pain. Afterward, abu Dan says, he and two of the others were driven to a market square. “They told us they were going to kill us. They made us sit on the ground.” He rolls up the legs of his trousers to display the circular scars that are evidence of what happened next: “They shot our knees and feet—five bullets each. I spent four months in a wheelchair.”
Abu Dan had no way of knowing it, but his tormentors had a secret ally: the administration of President George W. Bush.
A clue comes toward the end of the video, which was found in a Fatah security building by Hamas fighters last June. Still bound and blindfolded, the prisoners are made to echo a rhythmic chant yelled by one of their captors: “By blood, by soul, we sacrifice ourselves for Muhammad Dahlan! Long live Muhammad Dahlan!”
There is no one more hated among Hamas members than Muhammad Dahlan, long Fatah’s resident strongman in Gaza. Dahlan, who most recently served as Abbas’s national-security adviser, has spent more than a decade battling Hamas. Dahlan insists that abu Dan was tortured without his knowledge, but the video is proof that his followers’ methods can be brutal.
Bush has met Dahlan on at least three occasions. After talks at the White House in July 2003, Bush publicly praised Dahlan as “a good, solid leader.” In private, say multiple Israeli and American officials, the U.S. president described him as “our guy.”
The United States has been involved in the affairs of the Palestinian territories since the Six-Day War of 1967, when Israel captured Gaza from Egypt and the West Bank from Jordan. With the 1993 Oslo accords, the territories acquired limited autonomy, under a president, who has executive powers, and an elected parliament. Israel retains a large military presence in the West Bank, but it withdrew from Gaza in 2005.
In recent months, President Bush has repeatedly stated that the last great ambition of his presidency is to broker a deal that would create a viable Palestinian state and bring peace to the Holy Land. “People say, ‘Do you think it’s possible, during your presidency?’ ” he told an audience in Jerusalem on January 9. “And the answer is: I’m very hopeful.”
The next day, in the West Bank capital of Ramallah, Bush acknowledged that there was a rather large obstacle standing in the way of this goal: Hamas’s complete control of Gaza, home to some 1.5 million Palestinians, where it seized power in a bloody coup d’état in June 2007. Almost every day, militants fire rockets from Gaza into neighboring Israeli towns, and President Abbas is powerless to stop them. His authority is limited to the West Bank.
It’s “a tough situation,” Bush admitted. “I don’t know whether you can solve it in a year or not.” What Bush neglected to mention was his own role in creating this mess.
According to Dahlan, it was Bush who had pushed legislative elections in the Palestinian territories in January 2006, despite warnings that Fatah was not ready. After Hamas—whose 1988 charter committed it to the goal of driving Israel into the sea—won control of the parliament, Bush made another, deadlier miscalculation.
Vanity Fair has obtained confidential documents, since corroborated by sources in the U.S. and Palestine, which lay bare a covert initiative, approved by Bush and implemented by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Elliott Abrams, to provoke a Palestinian civil war. The plan was for forces led by Dahlan, and armed with new weapons supplied at America’s behest, to give Fatah the muscle it needed to remove the democratically elected Hamas-led government from power. (The State Department declined to comment.)
But the secret plan backfired, resulting in a further setback for American foreign policy under Bush. Instead of driving its enemies out of power, the U.S.-backed Fatah fighters inadvertently provoked Hamas to seize total control of Gaza.
Some sources call the scheme “Iran-contra 2.0,” recalling that Abrams was convicted (and later pardoned) for withholding information from Congress during the original Iran-contra scandal under President Reagan. There are echoes of other past misadventures as well: the C.I.A.’s 1953 ouster of an elected prime minister in Iran, which set the stage for the 1979 Islamic revolution there; the aborted 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, which gave Fidel Castro an excuse to solidify his hold on Cuba; and the contemporary tragedy in Iraq.
Within the Bush administration, the Palestinian policy set off a furious debate. One of its critics is David Wurmser, the avowed neoconservative, who resigned as Vice President Dick Cheney’s chief Middle East adviser in July 2007, a month after the Gaza coup.
Wurmser accuses the Bush administration of “engaging in a dirty war in an effort to provide a corrupt dictatorship [led by Abbas] with victory.” He believes that Hamas had no intention of taking Gaza until Fatah forced its hand. “It looks to me that what happened wasn’t so much a coup by Hamas but an attempted coup by Fatah that was pre-empted before it could happen,” Wurmser says.
The botched plan has rendered the dream of Middle East peace more remote than ever, but what really galls neocons such as Wurmser is the hypocrisy it exposed. “There is a stunning disconnect between the president’s call for Middle East democracy and this policy,” he says. “It directly contradicts it.”
Bush was not the first American president to form a relationship with Muhammad Dahlan. “Yes, I was close to Bill Clinton,” Dahlan says. “I met Clinton many times with [the late Palestinian leader Yasser] Arafat.” In the wake of the 1993 Oslo accords, Clinton sponsored a series of diplomatic meetings aimed at reaching a permanent Middle East peace, and Dahlan became the Palestinians’ negotiator on security.
As I talk to Dahlan in a five-star Cairo hotel, it’s easy to see the qualities that might make him attractive to American presidents. His appearance is immaculate, his English is serviceable, and his manner is charming and forthright. Had he been born into privilege, these qualities might not mean much. But Dahlan was born—on September 29, 1961—in the teeming squalor of Gaza’s Khan Younis refugee camp, and his education came mostly from the street. In 1981 he helped found Fatah’s youth movement, and he later played a leading role in the first intifada—the five-year revolt that began in 1987 against the Israeli occupation. In all, Dahlan says, he spent five years in Israeli jails.
From the time of its inception as the Palestinian branch of the international Muslim Brotherhood, in late 1987, Hamas had represented a threatening challenge to Arafat’s secular Fatah party. At Oslo, Fatah made a public commitment to the search for peace, but Hamas continued to practice armed resistance. At the same time, it built an impressive base of support through schooling and social programs.
The rising tensions between the two groups first turned violent in the early 1990s—with Muhammad Dahlan playing a central role. As director of the Palestinian Authority’s most feared paramilitary force, the Preventive Security Service, Dahlan arrested some 2,000 Hamas members in 1996 in the Gaza Strip after the group launched a wave of suicide bombings. “Arafat had decided to arrest Hamas military leaders, because they were working against his interests, against the peace process, against the Israeli withdrawal, against everything,” Dahlan says. “He asked the security services to do their job, and I have done that job.”
It was not, he admits, “popular work.” For many years Hamas has said that Dahlan’s forces routinely tortured detainees. One alleged method was to sodomize prisoners with soda bottles. Dahlan says these stories are exaggerated: “Definitely there were some mistakes here and there. But no one person died in Preventive Security. Prisoners got their rights. Bear in mind that I am an ex-detainee of the Israelis’. No one was personally humiliated, and I never killed anyone the way [Hamas is] killing people on a daily basis now.” Dahlan points out that Arafat maintained a labyrinth of security services—14 in all—and says the Preventive Security Service was blamed for abuses perpetrated by other units.
Dahlan worked closely with the F.B.I. and the C.I.A., and he developed a warm relationship with Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet, a Clinton appointee who stayed on under Bush until July 2004. “He’s simply a great and fair man,” Dahlan says. “I’m still in touch with him from time to time.”
“Everyone Was Against the Elections”
In a speech in the White House Rose Garden on June 24, 2002, President Bush announced that American policy in the Middle East was turning in a fundamentally new direction.
Arafat was still in power at the time, and many in the U.S. and Israel blamed him for wrecking Clinton’s micro-managed peace efforts by launching the second intifada—a renewed revolt, begun in 2000, in which more than 1,000 Israelis and 4,500 Palestinians had died. Bush said he wanted to give Palestinians the chance to choose new leaders, ones who were not “compromised by terror.” In place of Arafat’s all-powerful presidency, Bush said, “the Palestinian parliament should have the full authority of a legislative body.”
Arafat died in November 2004, and Abbas, his replacement as Fatah leader, was elected president in January 2005. Elections for the Palestinian parliament, known officially as the Legislative Council, were originally set for July 2005, but later postponed by Abbas until January 2006.
Dahlan says he warned his friends in the Bush administration that Fatah still wasn’t ready for elections in January. Decades of self-preservationist rule by Arafat had turned the party into a symbol of corruption and inefficiency—a perception Hamas found it easy to exploit. Splits within Fatah weakened its position further: in many places, a single Hamas candidate ran against several from Fatah.
“Everyone was against the elections,” Dahlan says. Everyone except Bush. “Bush decided, ‘I need an election. I want elections in the Palestinian Authority.’ Everyone is following him in the American administration, and everyone is nagging Abbas, telling him, ‘The president wants elections.’ Fine. For what purpose?”
The elections went forward as scheduled. On January 25, Hamas won 56 percent of the seats in the Legislative Council.
Few inside the U.S. administration had predicted the result, and there was no contingency plan to deal with it. “I’ve asked why nobody saw it coming,” Condoleezza Rice told reporters. “I don’t know anyone who wasn’t caught off guard by Hamas’s strong showing.”
“Everyone blamed everyone else,” says an official with the Department of Defense. “We sat there in the Pentagon and said, ‘Who the fuck recommended this?’ ”
In public, Rice tried to look on the bright side of the Hamas victory. “Unpredictability,” she said, is “the nature of big historic change.” Even as she spoke, however, the Bush administration was rapidly revising its attitude toward Palestinian democracy.
Some analysts argued that Hamas had a substantial moderate wing that could be strengthened if America coaxed it into the peace process. Notable Israelis—such as Ephraim Halevy, the former head of the Mossad intelligence agency—shared this view. But if America paused to consider giving Hamas the benefit of the doubt, the moment was “milliseconds long,” says a senior State Department official. “The administration spoke with one voice: ‘We have to squeeze these guys.’ With Hamas’s election victory, the freedom agenda was dead.”
The first step, taken by the Middle East diplomatic “Quartet”—the U.S., the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations—was to demand that the new Hamas government renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and accept the terms of all previous agreements. When Hamas refused, the Quartet shut off the faucet of aid to the Palestinian Authority, depriving it of the means to pay salaries and meet its annual budget of roughly $2 billion.
Israel clamped down on Palestinians’ freedom of movement, especially into and out of the Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip. Israel also detained 64 Hamas officials, including Legislative Council members and ministers, and even launched a military campaign into Gaza after one of its soldiers was kidnapped. Through it all, Hamas and its new government, led by Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh, proved surprisingly resilient.
Washington reacted with dismay when Abbas began holding talks with Hamas in the hope of establishing a “unity government.” On October 4, 2006, Rice traveled to Ramallah to see Abbas. They met at the Muqata, the new presidential headquarters that rose from the ruins of Arafat’s compound, which Israel had destroyed in 2002.
America’s leverage in Palestinian affairs was much stronger than it had been in Arafat’s time. Abbas had never had a strong, independent base, and he desperately needed to restore the flow of foreign aid—and, with it, his power of patronage. He also knew that he could not stand up to Hamas without Washington’s help.
At their joint press conference, Rice smiled as she expressed her nation’s “great admiration” for Abbas’s leadership. Behind closed doors, however, Rice’s tone was sharper, say officials who witnessed their meeting. Isolating Hamas just wasn’t working, she reportedly told Abbas, and America expected him to dissolve the Haniyeh government as soon as possible and hold fresh elections.
Abbas, one official says, agreed to take action within two weeks. It happened to be Ramadan, the month when Muslims fast during daylight hours. With dusk approaching, Abbas asked Rice to join him for iftar—a snack to break the fast.
Afterward, according to the official, Rice underlined her position: “So we’re agreed? You’ll dissolve the government within two weeks?”
“Maybe not two weeks. Give me a month. Let’s wait until after the Eid,” he said, referring to the three-day celebration that marks the end of Ramadan. (Abbas’s spokesman said via e-mail: “According to our records, this is incorrect.”)
Rice got into her armored S.U.V., where, the official claims, she told an American colleague, “That damned iftar has cost us another two weeks of Hamas government.”
“We Will Be There to Support You”
Weeks passed with no sign that Abbas was ready to do America’s bidding. Finally, another official was sent to Ramallah. Jake Walles, the consul general in Jerusalem, is a career foreign-service officer with many years’ experience in the Middle East. His purpose was to deliver a barely varnished ultimatum to the Palestinian president.
We know what Walles said because a copy was left behind, apparently by accident, of the “talking points” memo prepared for him by the State Department. The document has been authenticated by U.S. and Palestinian officials.
“We need to understand your plans regarding a new [Palestinian Authority] government,” Walles’s script said. “You told Secretary Rice you would be prepared to move ahead within two to four weeks of your meeting. We believe that the time has come for you to move forward quickly and decisively.”
The memo left no doubt as to what kind of action the U.S. was seeking: “Hamas should be given a clear choice, with a clear deadline: … they either accept a new government that meets the Quartet principles, or they reject it The consequences of Hamas’ decision should also be clear: If Hamas does not agree within the prescribed time, you should make clear your intention to declare a state of emergency and form an emergency government explicitly committed to that platform.”
Walles and Abbas both knew what to expect from Hamas if these instructions were followed: rebellion and bloodshed. For that reason, the memo states, the U.S. was already working to strengthen Fatah’s security forces. “If you act along these lines, we will support you both materially and politically,” the script said. “We will be there to support you.”
Abbas was also encouraged to “strengthen [his] team” to include “credible figures of strong standing in the international community.” Among those the U.S. wanted brought in, says an official who knew of the policy, was Muhammad Dahlan.
On paper, the forces at Fatah’s disposal looked stronger than those of Hamas. There were some 70,000 men in the tangle of 14 Palestinian security services that Arafat had built up, at least half of those in Gaza. After the legislative elections, Hamas had expected to assume command of these forces, but Fatah maneuvered to keep them under its control. Hamas, which already had 6,000 or so irregulars in its militant al-Qassam Brigade, responded by forming the 6,000-troop Executive Force in Gaza, but that still left it with far fewer fighters than Fatah.
In reality, however, Hamas had several advantages. To begin with, Fatah’s security forces had never really recovered from Operation Defensive Shield, Israel’s massive 2002 re-invasion of the West Bank in response to the second intifada. “Most of the security apparatus had been destroyed,” says Youssef Issa, who led the Preventive Security Service under Abbas.
The irony of the blockade on foreign aid after Hamas’s legislative victory, meanwhile, was that it prevented only Fatah from paying its soldiers. “We are the ones who were not getting paid,” Issa says, “whereas they were not affected by the siege.” Ayman Daraghmeh, a Hamas Legislative Council member in the West Bank, agrees. He puts the amount of Iranian aid to Hamas in 2007 alone at $120 million. “This is only a fraction of what it should give,” he insists. In Gaza, another Hamas member tells me the number was closer to $200 million.
The result was becoming apparent: Fatah could not control Gaza’s streets—or even protect its own personnel.
At about 1:30 p.m. on September 15, 2006, Samira Tayeh sent a text message to her husband, Jad Tayeh, the director of foreign relations for the Palestinian intelligence service and a member of Fatah. “He didn’t reply,” she says. “I tried to call his mobile [phone], but it was switched off. So I called his deputy, Mahmoun, and he didn’t know where he was. That’s when I decided to go to the hospital.”
Samira, a slim, elegant 40-year-old dressed from head to toe in black, tells me the story in a Ramallah café in December 2007. Arriving at the Al Shifa hospital, “I went through the morgue door. Not for any reason—I just didn’t know the place. I saw there were all these intelligence guards there. There was one I knew. He saw me and he said, ‘Put her in the car.’ That’s when I knew something had happened to Jad.”
Tayeh had left his office in a car with four aides. Moments later, they found themselves being pursued by an S.U.V. full of armed, masked men. About 200 yards from the home of Prime Minister Haniyeh, the S.U.V. cornered the car. The masked men opened fire, killing Tayeh and all four of his colleagues.
Hamas said it had nothing to do with the murders, but Samira had reason to believe otherwise. At three a.m. on June 16, 2007, during the Gaza takeover, six Hamas gunmen forced their way into her home and fired bullets into every photo of Jad they could find. The next day, they returned and demanded the keys to the car in which he had died, claiming that it belonged to the Palestinian Authority.
Fearing for her life, she fled across the border and then into the West Bank, with only the clothes she was wearing and her passport, driver’s license, and credit card.
“Very Clever Warfare”
Fatah’s vulnerability was a source of grave concern to Dahlan. “I made a lot of activities to give Hamas the impression that we were still strong and we had the capacity to face them,” he says. “But I knew in my heart it wasn’t true.” He had no official security position at the time, but he belonged to parliament and retained the loyalty of Fatah members in Gaza. “I used my image, my power.” Dahlan says he told Abbas that “Gaza needs only a decision for Hamas to take over.” To prevent that from happening, Dahlan waged “very clever warfare” for many months.
According to several alleged victims, one of the tactics this “warfare” entailed was to kidnap and torture members of Hamas’s Executive Force. (Dahlan denies Fatah used such tactics, but admits “mistakes” were made.) Abdul Karim al-Jasser, a strapping man of 25, says he was the first such victim. “It was on October 16, still Ramadan,” he says. “I was on my way to my sister’s house for iftar. Four guys stopped me, two of them with guns. They forced me to accompany them to the home of Aman abu Jidyan,” a Fatah leader close to Dahlan. (Abu Jidyan would be killed in the June uprising.)
The first phase of torture was straightforward enough, al-Jasser says: he was stripped naked, bound, blindfolded, and beaten with wooden poles and plastic pipes. “They put a piece of cloth in my mouth to stop me screaming.” His interrogators forced him to answer contradictory accusations: one minute they said that he had collaborated with Israel, the next that he had fired Qassam rockets against it.
But the worst was yet to come. “They brought an iron bar,” al-Jasser says, his voice suddenly hesitant. We are speaking inside his home in Gaza, which is experiencing one of its frequent power outages. He points to the propane-gas lamp that lights the room. “They put the bar in the flame of a lamp like this. When it was red, they took the covering off my eyes. Then they pressed it against my skin. That was the last thing I remember.”
When he came to, he was still in the room where he had been tortured. A few hours later, the Fatah men handed him over to Hamas, and he was taken to the hospital. “I could see the shock in the eyes of the doctors who entered the room,” he says. He shows me photos of purple third-degree burns wrapped like towels around his thighs and much of his lower torso. “The doctors told me that if I had been thin, not chubby, I would have died. But I wasn’t alone. That same night that I was released, abu Jidyan’s men fired five bullets into the legs of one of my relatives. We were in the same ward in the hospital.”
Dahlan says he did not order al-Jasser’s torture: “The only order I gave was to defend ourselves. That doesn’t mean there wasn’t torture, some things that went wrong, but I did not know about this.”
The dirty war between Fatah and Hamas continued to gather momentum throughout the autumn, with both sides committing atrocities. By the end of 2006, dozens were dying each month. Some of the victims were noncombatants. In December, gunmen opened fire on the car of a Fatah intelligence official, killing his three young children and their driver.
There was still no sign that Abbas was ready to bring matters to a head by dissolving the Hamas government. Against this darkening background, the U.S. began direct security talks with Dahlan.
“He’s Our Guy”
In 2001, President Bush famously said that he had looked Russian president Vladimir Putin in the eye, gotten “a sense of his soul,” and found him to be “trustworthy.” According to three U.S. officials, Bush made a similar judgment about Dahlan when they first met, in 2003. All three officials recall hearing Bush say, “He’s our guy.”
They say this assessment was echoed by other key figures in the administration, including Rice and Assistant Secretary David Welch, the man in charge of Middle East policy at the State Department. “David Welch didn’t fundamentally care about Fatah,” one of his colleagues says. “He cared about results, and [he supported] whatever son of a bitch you had to support. Dahlan was the son of a bitch we happened to know best. He was a can-do kind of person. Dahlan was our guy.”
Avi Dichter, Israel’s internal-security minister and the former head of its Shin Bet security service, was taken aback when he heard senior American officials refer to Dahlan as “our guy.” “I thought to myself, The president of the United States is making a strange judgment here,” says Dichter.
Lieutenant General Keith Dayton, who had been appointed the U.S. security coordinator for the Palestinians in November 2005, was in no position to question the president’s judgment of Dahlan. His only prior experience with the Middle East was as director of the Iraq Survey Group, the body that looked for Saddam Hussein’s elusive weapons of mass destruction.
In November 2006, Dayton met Dahlan for the first of a long series of talks in Jerusalem and Ramallah. Both men were accompanied by aides. From the outset, says an official who took notes at the meeting, Dayton was pushing two overlapping agendas.
“We need to reform the Palestinian security apparatus,” Dayton said, according to the notes. “But we also need to build up your forces in order to take on Hamas.”
Dahlan replied that, in the long run, Hamas could be defeated only by political means. “But if I am going to confront them,” he added, “I need substantial resources. As things stand, we do not have the capability.”
The two men agreed that they would work toward a new Palestinian security plan. The idea was to simplify the confusing web of Palestinian security forces and have Dahlan assume responsibility for all of them in the newly created role of Palestinian national-security adviser. The Americans would help supply weapons and training.
As part of the reform program, according to the official who was present at the meetings, Dayton said he wanted to disband the Preventive Security Service, which was widely known to be engaged in kidnapping and torture. At a meeting in Dayton’s Jerusalem office in early December, Dahlan ridiculed the idea. “The only institution now protecting Fatah and the Palestinian Authority in Gaza is the one you want removed,” he said.
Dayton softened a little. “We want to help you,” he said. “What do you need?”
Under Bill Clinton, Dahlan says, commitments of security assistance “were always delivered, absolutely.” Under Bush, he was about to discover, things were different. At the end of 2006, Dayton promised an immediate package worth $86.4 million—money that, according to a U.S. document published by Reuters on January 5, 2007, would be used to “dismantle the infrastructure of terrorism and establish law and order in the West Bank and Gaza.” U.S. officials even told reporters the money would be transferred “in the coming days.”
The cash never arrived. “Nothing was disbursed,” Dahlan says. “It was approved and it was in the news. But we received not a single penny.”
Any notion that the money could be transferred quickly and easily had died on Capitol Hill, where the payment was blocked by the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. Its members feared that military aid to the Palestinians might end up being turned against Israel.
Dahlan did not hesitate to voice his exasperation. “I spoke to Condoleezza Rice on several occasions,” he says. “I spoke to Dayton, to the consul general, to everyone in the administration I knew. They said, ‘You have a convincing argument.’ We were sitting in Abbas’s office in Ramallah, and I explained the whole thing to Condi. And she said, ‘Yes, we have to make an effort to do this. There’s no other way.’ ” At some of these meetings, Dahlan says, Assistant Secretary Welch and Deputy National-Security Adviser Abrams were also present.
The administration went back to Congress, and a reduced, $59 million package for nonlethal aid was approved in April 2007. But as Dahlan knew, the Bush team had already spent the past months exploring alternative, covert means of getting him the funds and weapons he wanted. The reluctance of Congress meant that “you had to look for different pots, different sources of money,” says a Pentagon official.
A State Department official adds, “Those in charge of implementing the policy were saying, ‘Do whatever it takes. We have to be in a position for Fatah to defeat Hamas militarily, and only Muhammad Dahlan has the guile and the muscle to do this.’ The expectation was that this was where it would end up—with a military showdown.” There were, this official says, two “parallel programs”—the overt one, which the administration took to Congress, “and a covert one, not only to buy arms but to pay the salaries of security personnel.”
In essence, the program was simple. According to State Department officials, beginning in the latter part of 2006, Rice initiated several rounds of phone calls and personal meetings with leaders of four Arab nations—Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. She asked them to bolster Fatah by providing military training and by pledging funds to buy its forces lethal weapons. The money was to be paid directly into accounts controlled by President Abbas.
The scheme bore some resemblance to the Iran-contra scandal, in which members of Ronald Reagan’s administration sold arms to Iran, an enemy of the U.S. The money was used to fund the contra rebels in Nicaragua, in violation of a congressional ban. Some of the money for the contras, like that for Fatah, was furnished by Arab allies as a result of U.S. lobbying.
But there are also important differences—starting with the fact that Congress never passed a measure expressly prohibiting the supply of aid to Fatah and Dahlan. “It was close to the margins,” says a former intelligence official with experience in covert programs. “But it probably wasn’t illegal.”
Legal or not, arms shipments soon began to take place. In late December 2006, four Egyptian trucks passed through an Israeli-controlled crossing into Gaza, where their contents were handed over to Fatah. These included 2,000 Egyptian-made automatic rifles, 20,000 ammunition clips, and two million bullets. News of the shipment leaked, and Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, an Israeli Cabinet member, said on Israeli radio that the guns and ammunition would give Abbas “the ability to cope with those organizations which are trying to ruin everything”—namely, Hamas.
Avi Dichter points out that all weapons shipments had to be approved by Israel, which was understandably hesitant to allow state-of-the-art arms into Gaza. “One thing’s for sure, we weren’t talking about heavy weapons,” says a State Department official. “It was small arms, light machine guns, ammunition.”
Perhaps the Israelis held the Americans back. Perhaps Elliott Abrams himself held back, unwilling to run afoul of U.S. law for a second time. One of his associates says Abrams, who declined to comment for this article, felt conflicted over the policy—torn between the disdain he felt for Dahlan and his overriding loyalty to the administration. He wasn’t the only one: “There were severe fissures among neoconservatives over this,” says Cheney’s former adviser David Wurmser. “We were ripping each other to pieces.”
During a trip to the Middle East in January 2007, Rice found it difficult to get her partners to honor their pledges. “The Arabs felt the U.S. was not serious,” one official says. “They knew that if the Americans were serious they would put their own money where their mouth was. They didn’t have faith in America’s ability to raise a real force. There was no follow-through. Paying was different than pledging, and there was no plan.”
This official estimates that the program raised “a few payments of $30 million”—most of it, as other sources agree, from the United Arab Emirates. Dahlan himself says the total was only $20 million, and confirms that “the Arabs made many more pledges than they ever paid.” Whatever the exact amount, it was not enough.
On February 1, 2007, Dahlan took his “very clever warfare” to a new level when Fatah forces under his control stormed the Islamic University of Gaza, a Hamas stronghold, and set several buildings on fire. Hamas retaliated the next day with a wave of attacks on police stations.
Unwilling to preside over a Palestinian civil war, Abbas blinked. For weeks, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia had been trying to persuade him to meet with Hamas in Mecca and formally establish a national unity government. On February 6, Abbas went, taking Dahlan with him. Two days later, with Hamas no closer to recognizing Israel, a deal was struck.
Under its terms, Ismail Haniyeh of Hamas would remain prime minister while allowing Fatah members to occupy several important posts. When the news hit the streets that the Saudis had promised to pay the Palestinian Authority’s salary bills, Fatah and Hamas members in Gaza celebrated together by firing their Kalashnikovs into the air.
Once again, the Bush administration had been taken by surprise. According to a State Department official, “Condi was apoplectic.” A remarkable documentary record, revealed here for the first time, shows that the U.S. responded by redoubling the pressure on its Palestinian allies.
The State Department quickly drew up an alternative to the new unity government. Known as “Plan B,” its objective, according to a State Department memo that has been authenticated by an official who knew of it at the time, was to “enable [Abbas] and his supporters to reach a defined endgame by the end of 2007 The endgame should produce a [Palestinian Authority] government through democratic means that accepts Quartet principles.”
Like the Walles ultimatum of late 2006, Plan B called for Abbas to “collapse the government” if Hamas refused to alter its attitude toward Israel. From there, Abbas could call early elections or impose an emergency government. It is unclear whether, as president, Abbas had the constitutional authority to dissolve an elected government led by a rival party, but the Americans swept that concern aside.
Security considerations were paramount, and Plan B had explicit prescriptions for dealing with them. For as long as the unity government remained in office, it was essential for Abbas to maintain “independent control of key security forces.” He must “avoid Hamas integration with these services, while eliminating the Executive Force or mitigating the challenges posed by its continued existence.”
In a clear reference to the covert aid expected from the Arabs, the memo made this recommendation for the next six to nine months: “Dahlan oversees effort in coordination with General Dayton and Arab [nations] to train and equip 15,000-man force under President Abbas’s control to establish internal law and order, stop terrorism and deter extralegal forces.”
The Bush administration’s goals for Plan B were elaborated in a document titled “An Action Plan for the Palestinian Presidency.” This action plan went through several drafts and was developed by the U.S., the Palestinians, and the government of Jordan. Sources agree, however, that it originated in the State Department.
The early drafts stressed the need for bolstering Fatah’s forces in order to “deter” Hamas. The “desired outcome” was to give Abbas “the capability to take the required strategic political decisions … such as dismissing the cabinet, establishing an emergency cabinet.”
The drafts called for increasing the “level and capacity” of 15,000 of Fatah’s existing security personnel while adding 4,700 troops in seven new “highly trained battalions on strong policing.” The plan also promised to arrange “specialized training abroad,” in Jordan and Egypt, and pledged to “provide the security personnel with the necessary equipment and arms to carry out their missions.”
A detailed budget put the total cost for salaries, training, and “the needed security equipment, lethal and non-lethal,” at $1.27 billion over five years. The plan states: “The costs and overall budget were developed jointly with General Dayton’s team and the Palestinian technical team for reform”—a unit established by Dahlan and led by his friend and policy aide Bassil Jaber. Jaber confirms that the document is an accurate summary of the work he and his colleagues did with Dayton. “The plan was to create a security establishment that could protect and strengthen a peaceful Palestinian state living side by side with Israel,” he says.
The final draft of the Action Plan was drawn up in Ramallah by officials of the Palestinian Authority. This version was identical to the earlier drafts in all meaningful ways but one: it presented the plan as if it had been the Palestinians’ idea. It also said the security proposals had been “approved by President Mahmoud Abbas after being discussed and agreed [to] by General Dayton’s team.”
On April 30, 2007, a portion of one early draft was leaked to a Jordanian newspaper, Al-Majd. The secret was out. From Hamas’s perspective, the Action Plan could amount to only one thing: a blueprint for a U.S.-backed Fatah coup.
“We Are Late in the Ball Game Here”
The formation of the unity government had brought a measure of calm to the Palestinian territories, but violence erupted anew after Al-Majd published its story on the Action Plan. The timing was unkind to Fatah, which, to add to its usual disadvantages, was without its security chief. Ten days earlier, Dahlan had left Gaza for Berlin, where he’d had surgery on both knees. He was due to spend the next eight weeks convalescing.
In mid-May, with Dahlan still absent, a new element was added to Gaza’s toxic mix when 500 Fatah National Security Forces recruits arrived, fresh from training in Egypt and equipped with new weapons and vehicles. “They had been on a crash course for 45 days,” Dahlan says. “The idea was that we needed them to go in dressed well, equipped well, and that might create the impression of new authority.” Their presence was immediately noticed, not only by Hamas but by staff from Western aid agencies. “They had new rifles with telescopic sights, and they were wearing black flak jackets,” says a frequent visitor from Northern Europe. “They were quite a contrast to the usual scruffy lot.”
On May 23, none other than Lieutenant General Dayton discussed the new unit in testimony before the House Middle East subcommittee. Hamas had attacked the troops as they crossed into Gaza from Egypt, Dayton said, but “these 500 young people, fresh out of basic training, were organized. They knew how to work in a coordinated fashion. Training does pay off. And the Hamas attack in the area was, likewise, repulsed.”
The troops’ arrival, Dayton said, was one of several “hopeful signs” in Gaza. Another was Dahlan’s appointment as national-security adviser. Meanwhile, he said, Hamas’s Executive Force was becoming “extremely unpopular I would say that we are kind of late in the ball game here, and we are behind, there’s two out, but we have our best clutch hitter at the plate, and the pitcher is beginning to tire on the opposing team.”
The opposing team was stronger than Dayton realized. By the end of May 2007, Hamas was mounting regular attacks of unprecedented boldness and savagery.
At an apartment in Ramallah that Abbas has set aside for wounded refugees from Gaza, I meet a former Fatah communications officer named Tariq Rafiyeh. He lies paralyzed from a bullet he took to the spine during the June coup, but his suffering began two weeks earlier. On May 31, he was on his way home with a colleague when they were stopped at a roadblock, robbed of their money and cell phones, and taken to a mosque. There, despite the building’s holy status, Hamas Executive Force members were violently interrogating Fatah detainees. “Late that night one of them said we were going to be released,” Rafiyeh recalls. “He told the guards, ‘Be hospitable, keep them warm.’ I thought that meant kill us. Instead, before letting us go they beat us badly.”
On June 7, there was another damaging leak, when the Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported that Abbas and Dayton had asked Israel to authorize the biggest Egyptian arms shipment yet—to include dozens of armored cars, hundreds of armor-piercing rockets, thousands of hand grenades, and millions of rounds of ammunition. A few days later, just before the next batch of Fatah recruits was due to leave for training in Egypt, the coup began in earnest.
Fatah’s Last Stand
The Hamas leadership in Gaza is adamant that the coup would not have happened if Fatah had not provoked it. Fawzi Barhoum, Hamas’s chief spokesman, says the leak in Al-Majd convinced the party that “there was a plan, approved by America, to destroy the political choice.” The arrival of the first Egyptian-trained fighters, he adds, was the “reason for the timing.” About 250 Hamas members had been killed in the first six months of 2007, Barhoum tells me. “Finally we decided to put an end to it. If we had let them stay loose in Gaza, there would have been more violence.”
“Everyone here recognizes that Dahlan was trying with American help to undermine the results of the elections,” says Mahmoud Zahar, the former foreign minister for the Haniyeh government, who now leads Hamas’s militant wing in Gaza. “He was the one planning a coup.”
Zahar and I speak inside his home in Gaza, which was rebuilt after a 2003 Israeli air strike destroyed it, killing one of his sons. He tells me that Hamas launched its operations in June with a limited objective: “The decision was only to get rid of the Preventive Security Service. They were the ones out on every crossroads, putting anyone suspected of Hamas involvement at risk of being tortured or killed.” But when Fatah fighters inside a surrounded Preventive Security office in Jabaliya began retreating from building to building, they set off a “domino effect” that emboldened Hamas to seek broader gains.
Many armed units that were nominally loyal to Fatah did not fight at all. Some stayed neutral because they feared that, with Dahlan absent, his forces were bound to lose. “I wanted to stop the cycle of killing,” says Ibrahim abu al-Nazar, a veteran party chief. “What did Dahlan expect? Did he think the U.S. Navy was going to come to Fatah’s rescue? They promised him everything, but what did they do? But he also deceived them. He told them he was the strongman of the region. Even the Americans may now feel sad and frustrated. Their friend lost the battle.”
Others who stayed out of the fight were extremists. “Fatah is a large movement, with many schools inside it,” says Khalid Jaberi, a commander with Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, which continue to fire rockets into Israel from Gaza. “Dahlan’s school is funded by the Americans and believes in negotiations with Israel as a strategic choice. Dahlan tried to control everything in Fatah, but there are cadres who could do a much better job. Dahlan treated us dictatorially. There was no overall Fatah decision to confront Hamas, and that’s why our guns in al-Aqsa are the cleanest. They are not corrupted by the blood of our people.”
Jaberi pauses. He spent the night before our interview awake and in hiding, fearful of Israeli air strikes. “You know,” he says, “since the takeover, we’ve been trying to enter the brains of Bush and Rice, to figure out their mentality. We can only conclude that having Hamas in control serves their overall strategy, because their policy was so crazy otherwise.”
The fighting was over in less than five days. It began with attacks on Fatah security buildings, in and around Gaza City and in the southern town of Rafah. Fatah attempted to shell Prime Minister Haniyeh’s house, but by dusk on June 13 its forces were being routed.
Years of oppression by Dahlan and his forces were avenged as Hamas chased down stray Fatah fighters and subjected them to summary execution. At least one victim was reportedly thrown from the roof of a high-rise building. By June 16, Hamas had captured every Fatah building, as well as Abbas’s official Gaza residence. Much of Dahlan’s house, which doubled as his office, was reduced to rubble.
Fatah’s last stand, predictably enough, was made by the Preventive Security Service. The unit sustained heavy casualties, but a rump of about 100 surviving fighters eventually made it to the beach and escaped in the night by fishing boat.
At the apartment in Ramallah, the wounded struggle on. Unlike Fatah, Hamas fired exploding bullets, which are banned under the Geneva Conventions. Some of the men in the apartment were shot with these rounds 20 or 30 times, producing unimaginable injuries that required amputation. Several have lost both legs.
The coup has had other costs. Amjad Shawer, a local economist, tells me that Gaza had 400 functioning factories and workshops at the start of 2007. By December, the intensified Israeli blockade had caused 90 percent of them to close. Seventy percent of Gaza’s population is now living on less than $2 a day.
Israel, meanwhile, is no safer. The emergency pro-peace government called for in the secret Action Plan is now in office—but only in the West Bank. In Gaza, the exact thing both Israel and the U.S. Congress warned against came to pass when Hamas captured most of Fatah’s arms and ammunition—including the new Egyptian guns supplied under the covert U.S.-Arab aid program.
Now that it controls Gaza, Hamas has given free rein to militants intent on firing rockets into neighboring Israeli towns. “We are still developing our rockets; soon we shall hit the heart of Ashkelon at will,” says Jaberi, the al-Aqsa commander, referring to the Israeli city of 110,000 people 12 miles from Gaza’s border. “I assure you, the time is near when we will mount a big operation inside Israel, in Haifa or Tel Aviv.”
On January 23, Hamas blew up parts of the wall dividing Gaza from Egypt, and tens of thousands of Palestinians crossed the border. Militants had already been smuggling weapons through a network of underground tunnels, but the breach of the wall made their job much easier—and may have brought Jaberi’s threat closer to reality.
George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice continue to push the peace process, but Avi Dichter says Israel will never conclude a deal on Palestinian statehood until the Palestinians reform their entire law-enforcement system—what he calls “the chain of security.” With Hamas in control of Gaza, there appears to be no chance of that happening. “Just look at the situation,” says Dahlan. “They say there will be a final-status agreement in eight months? No way.”
“An Institutional Failure”
How could the U.S. have played Gaza so wrong? Neocon critics of the administration—who until last year were inside it—blame an old State Department vice: the rush to anoint a strongman instead of solving problems directly. This ploy has failed in places as diverse as Vietnam, the Philippines, Central America, and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, during its war against Iran. To rely on proxies such as Muhammad Dahlan, says former U.N. ambassador John Bolton, is “an institutional failure, a failure of strategy.” Its author, he says, was Rice, “who, like others in the dying days of this administration, is looking for legacy. Having failed to heed the warning not to hold the elections, they tried to avoid the result through Dayton.”
With few good options left, the administration now appears to be rethinking its blanket refusal to engage with Hamas. Staffers at the National Security Council and the Pentagon recently put out discreet feelers to academic experts, asking them for papers describing Hamas and its principal protagonists. “They say they won’t talk to Hamas,” says one such expert, “but in the end they’re going to have to. It’s inevitable.”
It is impossible to say for sure whether the outcome in Gaza would have been any better—for the Palestinian people, for the Israelis, and for America’s allies in Fatah—if the Bush administration had pursued a different policy. One thing, however, seems certain: it could not be any worse.